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Abstract
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India began in the late 1970s. For the 
first time the rights of prisoners, bonded labourers, other neglected peoples and issues 
were considered in the judicial forum. Using their inherent powers under Articles 32 
and 226 of the Constitution, a few judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts 
made access to justice easier. Anyone acting in the public interest was permitted to 
file a petition on behalf of those unable to do so themselves, or for issues of grave 
public importance. Lawyers, social activists, concerned individuals and even judges 
approached the courts. Aside from locus standi, other procedural norms were relaxed, 
including the need to file a proper petition. Once admitted, attempts were made to 
resolve litigations using a conciliatory form of justice. Offending state authorities were 
encouraged to co-operate with the Court, which in turn took on the role of fact-finder, 
when appropriate, and appointed commissions of enquiry.
Most of the reported and many unreported PIL cases, filed from its 
inception until April 1994, have been examined. Interviews with petitioners and 
lawyers have revealed much about PIL, and have resulted in the discussion of many 
unreported cases. Interviews of Supreme Court Judges, administrative officials in the 
courts and analysts of Indian law have enabled the study to extend to all aspects of 
the legal process as it relates to PIL. This new form of litigation in the courtroom thus 
provides a focal point for the study of the Indian legal system.
The perception that inequities could be resolved through the legislative 
or administrative processes had given way to a belief that recourse to legal action was 
the only mechanism through which rights could be upheld. Thus, the initial agenda 
was t(^  introduce the social justice considerations of poverty and inequality into the 
court, whilst making legal institutions more accessible. The hundreds of documented
PIL cases reflect a huge range of issues and concerns. While many do fulfil the initial 
mandate, PIL has often been used as another available legal tool that facilitates access 
to the courts and increases the public profile of the petitioner.
For many of those who have used PIL in an effort to counter serious 
violations of rights, the inherent limitations of legal action and the poor 
implementation of favourable Court orders have rendered PIL a meaningless exercise. 
For some, PIL has provided necessary short term redress or has focused attention on 
issues never before discussed in a national forum. Whatever the outcome, PIL has 
necessitated the recognition that every Indian citizen should have access to justice.
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Chapter One - The Context
In 1979, for the first time in Indian legal history, petitions were 
admitted into the Supreme Court that, earlier, would have been rejected on procedural 
grounds. This was done to enable poverty and inequality to be considered in legal fora 
by increasing access to justice. Public Interest Litigation (PIL), as these cases came 
to be known, is the particular use of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to 
implement legal rights of disadvantaged groups, by circumventing strict procedural 
rules.' Determined by the parameters ascribed to both the content and form of cases 
by the judges, litigants, lawyers and commentators involved, PIL is a fluid category 
of cases, which cannot be conclusively defined, either in terms of issues or procedures. 
This thesis will examine all reported^ and many unreported cases defined as PlLs in 
the Supreme Court and High Courts, from their introduction in 1979 to April 1994.^
The growing concern for access to justice, and the provision of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights, led to the relaxation of procedural rules such as 
locus standi and the form in which a petition was filed. Letters were admitted as writ 
petitions and sue moto actions were instituted. As PIL evolved, its characteristics were 
further elucidated, and the importance of conciliatory methods of resolving cases was 
stressed. However, as this form of litigation gained credence, it extended into a broad 
range of issues beyond its initial remit. Initial concern was to make the Court more 
responsive to poverty and inequality, both in its judgments and through a reassessment
' For a full listing of these articles see Appendix A, and for a discussion, see 'Constitutional 
Remedies', infra.
- All the Supreme Court orders and judgments in PIL that have been published in AIR, SCC, SCR 
or SCALE have been referred to, along with some JT and SLR. All the High Court orders and 
judgments that have been published in AIR have been referred to, together with some from State law 
reporters.
 ^ Unreported cases are documented in Ahuja, Sangeeta, Public Interest Litigation in India: A 
Casebook, (Orient Longman, New Delhi, forthcoming 1995).
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of the legal process. Escalating and encompassing an expanse of public interest issues, 
this legal mechanism has been increasingly appropriated by those who seek to use it 
as a tactic for gaining the attention of the courts, despite the availability of alternative 
remedies.
While PIL has yielded notable results, for example in extending the 
judicial discourse on rights, in promoting awareness of poverty related issues, and in 
establishing a concern for access to justice, there have been few cases in which 
substantive success has been realised. Having surmounted initial barriers to the 
courtroom, many petitions have not been listed or heard. The procedure prescribed for 
the management of letters sent to the Court has confounded the intention of providing 
access to justice when it has been most needed.
Despite numerous court orders directing that action be taken to remedy 
injustice, and the monitoring of directions given in certain cases, implementation has 
been inconsistent and inadequate. A theme that permeates the thesis, the poor 
implementation of PIL petitions, emphasises the limitation of the use of law for social 
change. Moreover, in the orders judges have not innovated to the extent anticipated 
by those who initiated the litigation.
The focus of this analysis is on the legal process, through an appraisal 
of why PIL emerged, what was sought to be acheived and why certain results have 
ensued. Initial fieldwork framed the discussion as many petitioners, who had 
approached the courts out of concern for poverty and inequality, were disappointed in 
the results of using law. As a microcosm for the study of the Indian legal system the 
study of PIL provides a more general understanding of the potentialities and 
constraints inherent in the use of law.
The shape of PIL has inevitably been determined by the structure and 
operation of the Indian Constitution, and by the legal framework into which it was 
introduced. Concentrating on the period until 1979, this chapter locates many of the 
issues of concern to the study of PIL, in terms of the legal and political process. After
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a survey of the constitutional imperatives, the legal framework will be considered. 
Growing concern for access to justice and legal aid, the precursor to PIL, and 
international influences are then discussed. The chapter will conclude with an 
introduction to the analysis in the rest of the thesis.
Constitutional Imperatives
Law and lawyers have a prominent place in modem India. An 
adversarial legal system and a legal profession to support it, were introduced in the 
colonial period,"  ^when existing systems of adjudication were replaced by legislations 
and court orders. It was this stmcture that was inherited by the newly independent 
India. The Constituent Assembly, comprising many lawyers,^ was set up on December
See Cohn, Bernard S, 'From Indian Status to British Contract', The Journal o f  Economic History, 
Vol 21 No 4, Dec 1961, 613-628, in which he concludes, at 628:
Failure to understand the nature of Indian society, assumptions based on British practice, 
mistakes, and short-term practical considerations, rather than the unfolding of a social law or 
the implementation of a well thought through grand design on the part of the British rulers, 
lay behind the movement in Indian society o f “status to contract”.
Also see Maine, Henry, 'The Development of Law' inGhai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, Francis 
(eds), The Political Economcy of Law. A Third World Reader, (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987), 
35-39 for an exposition of this move from status to contract and Washbrook, David, Law, State and 
Agrarian Society in Colonial India', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 15 No 3, 1981, 649-721. See the section 
on the emergence of the modem legal system in Galanter, Marc, Law and Society in Modern India, 
(Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1989). For a chronology of legal developments Jain, M P, 
Outlines o f  Indian Legal History, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, fifth edition, 1990) and Agrawala, 
B R, Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, fifth edition, 1989). 
Also of interest is Conrad, Dieter, The Influence o f Western Liberal Ideas on Gandhi's Constitutional 
Philosophy' in Singh, Mahendra P (ed). Comparative Constitutiional Law, (Eastern Book Company, 
Lucknow, 1989), 43-69.
 ^ One analyst o f Indian law noted:
Western liberal education had made the “inheritance elite” conscious o f the 
illegitimacy of colonial mle, but it was not enamoured by the strengths of indigenous 
traditions and political practices.
Sudarshan, R, In Quest of State: Politics and Judiciary in India', Journal o f  Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, Vol 28 No 1, Mar 1990, 44-69 at 46-47. Other observations have bourne this out. 
See Cohn, Bernard S (1961) at 626:
The conceptualisation of the lawyer as an independent professional standing between his client 
and the court, defending the rights of his client, but at the same time being part o f the judicial 
system, again illustrates the conflict between British conception and Indian reality.
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9, 1946 to draft a constitution, but it was not until 26 November, 1950 that the
Constitution of India was adopted. Establishing a parliamentary system of governance,
the Constitution delineated the extent of judicial power and its organisation and
included a bill of rights.^ Embodying the choice of modem polity and legal system,^
and the promise of a new age,® the Constitution envisioned a professionalised state:
The Constitution's eclectic combination of elements borrowed from the 
state tradition of European constitutions and Anglo-American legal 
traditions has posed serious problems in working it. It envisages a state
Also the discussion of lawyers in chapter six.
 ^ See Austin, Granville, The Indian Constitution. Cornerstone o f  a Nation, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1966); Ray, Amal, 'From a Constitutional to an Authoritarian System o f Government; 
Interactions between Politics and the Constitution in India', Vol 25 No 3, Nov 87, 275-291. The 
Constitution was loosely based on the Government o f India Act. 1935. Other basic laws, such as the 
Indian Penal Code. 1860, the Code o f Civil Procedure. 1908 and the Code o f Criminal Procedure. 1898 
continued in force. Referring to the 1935 Act, Robert Kidder noted:
In effect, the British colonial tradition was continued with few restraints.
Kidder, Robert L, 'Law and Order or Law and Freedom?' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, 
Francis (eds) (1987), 601-608 at 603. For a general study o f the 1935 Act see Sarkar, Sumit, Modern 
India, 1885-1947, (Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, second edition, 1989). One political scientist has 
therefore observed:
The essential problem about the state in post-colonial societies stems from the fact that it is 
not established by an ascendant native bourgeoisie but instead by a foreign imperialist 
bourgeoisie.
Alavi, Hamza, The State in Post-Colonial Societies' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, 
Francis (eds) (1987), 231-239 at 231.
’ Upendra Baxi notes that Austin's chapter 'Which Road to Social Revolution?' reflects the:
threshold “choice” between tradition and modernity in political institutions and in social 
structure and a cautious eclecticism, after that “choice” was made, in utilising the constitutional 
history of the world for our own Constitution.
Baxi, Upendra, '“The Little Done, The Vast Undone” - Some Reflections on Reading Granville Austin's 
The Indian Constitution', Journal o f  the Indian Law Institute, Vol 9, 1967, 323-430 at 339. For an 
overview of the predominance of ideas of modernity see Higgott, Richard A, Political Development 
Theory, (Groom Helm, London, 1983) and Ramirez-Faria, C, The Origins o f  Economic Inequality 
between Nations, (Unwin Hyman, London, 1991). For a critique of the foundation o f a liberal- 
democratic, modernising state see Chattel]ee, Partha, 'Secularism and Toleration', Economic and 
Political Weekly, 9/7/94, 1768-1777. Also see Galanter, Marc, The Modernisation of Law' in Weiner, 
Myron (ed). Modernisation. The Dynamics o f  Growth, (Basic Books Inc, New York, 1968) in which 
he discusses the characteristics of a modem legal system.
* Referring to Article 17 of the Constitution, J S Gandhi noted:
The entire structure o f the Constitution bears ample testimony to the legalistic-formalistic 
cognition o f the Indian reality, on the part o f its framers. The highly idealistic and euphoric 
tone in which some of its provisions are cast betokens the characteristic optimism which 
lawyers would have in the capacity o f law to change the existing social reality.
Gandhi, J S, Potential and Parameters o f Social Change through Law in Contemporary Indian Society - 
A Sociological Assessment' in Podgorecki, Adam; Whelan, Christopher J and Khosla, Dinesh, Legal 
Systems & Social Systems, (Croom Helm, London, 1986), 174-189 at 177.
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with the requisite 'steering' capacity over society to fulfil its 
programmatic goals. A heavy burden is placed on constitutional law 
and the judiciary to supply what is, in fact, a missing tradition.^
Nonetheless, much discussion had foreshadowed the powers given to the judiciary, and
the use to which they might be put.’°
Soon after the Constitution began to operate, the Supreme Court began 
to pronounce judgments that exercised its powers of judicial review. Activism in the 
Court manifested itself in attempts by judges to assert powers of judicial review, 
examining cases of detention,' ^  and upholding, in other cases, the right to freedom of 
speech and expression.'^ It was in response to these orders that the government first 
amended the Constitution in 1951 to provide for the protection of certain statutes from 
judicial review and to modify some of the rights available to citizens.'^ The historic
Sudarshan, R, 'Political Consequences of Constitutional Discourse' in Sathyamurthy, T V (ed), 
State and Nation in the Context o f  Social Change, (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994), 55-86 at 69. 
Sudarshan went on to note, at 74:
the detailed and ideologically programmatic nature o f the Constitution, combined with the vast 
jurisdiction granted to courts, has resulted in the judicialisation of many political issues. In turn 
this has resulted in attempts to politicize the judiciary.
For example, one member of the Constituent Assembly feared:
It might ... be that to give the judiciary an enormous amount of power - a judiciary 
which may not be controlled by any legislature in any matter except by ultimate 
removal - we may perhaps be creating a Frankenstein monster, which could nullify 
the intention of the framers of the Constitution.
T.T. Krishnaswami [VII CAD 583] quoted in Dhavan, Rajeev, The Supreme Court o f India: A Socio- 
Legal Study o f  its Juristic Techniques, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1977) at 17.
A K Gopalan v State o f Madras AIR (37) 1950 SC 27.
'■ For example, Romesh Thappar v The State o f  Madras AIR (37) 1950 SC 124.
See the Constitution (First Amendment) Act. 1951. Soli Sorabjee described the Ninth Schedule, 
which was introduced to protection for some statutes, as tolling the death knell o f Fundamental Rights 
by expressly sanctioning constitution-breaking law reforms - see the foreword to Dhavan, Rajeev (1978) 
at viii. However, in a speech in support of the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, quoted in Dudeja, 
Vijay Lakshmi (1988) at 12, Jawaharlal Nehru had said:
The real difficulty we have to face is a conflict between the dynamic ideas contained in the 
Directive Principles of State Policy and the static position o f certain things that are called 
“fundamental”.
See below for a detailed discussion of the rights in the Indian constitution. George Gadbois discussed 
the schedule in the context of political imperatives, noting that of the forty-five constitutional 
amendments between 1951 and 1980, twenty-one were enacted to limit the exercise of judicial power: 
the official response to a significant number of major decisions that have gone against the 
government has been an effort to circumvent such decisions via amendment o f the 
Constitution, the sheltering of certain legislation from court scrutiny in the Ninth Schedule, the
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tussle between the judiciary and the legislature had begun, with the former passing 
orders in favour of landowners whose property was jeopardised by land reform 
legislation, and the latter using its powers of constitutional amendment to counter 
these orders. The availability of the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution was 
delineated, and the power of constitutional amendment was used extensively.''^ 
Identified as 'desirable conservatism', the guiding principles of judicial thought have 
resulted
in the very frequent conflict between Fundamental Rights and the 
legislative measures that have tried to uphold the Directive Principles 
of State Policy: this also explains the conflicting attitudes of Parliament 
and the Supreme Court towards justice, since the judiciary has been 
predominately conservative in striking down laws which have tried to 
enact social changes.'^
In 1971, elected on a mandate that sought to pass constitutional 
amendments to “overcome the impediments in the path of social justice”,'^ the 
Congress (I) Government led by Indira Gandhi was unwilling to brook any more
devising of new limitations on the court's power, or some other step believed capable of  
solving the problem presented by the court.
Gadbois, George H, The Supreme Court o f India as a Political Motivation' in Dhavan, Rajeev; 
Sudarshan, R and Khurshid, Salman (eds) (1985), 250-267 at 253. Also see Agarwal, Bina, A fie ld  o f  
one's own. Gender and land rights in South Asia, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994) at 
220 - 221 .
Much has been written about the first three decades of the post-independence the Supreme Court. 
Das, Gobind, Supreme Court in Quest o f  Identity, (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1987) provides 
a useful and thorough starting poinj ,^ as does Dhavan, Rajeev (1977). For a survey of the literature 
available on law in India see Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Means, Motives and Opportunities; Reflecting on Legal 
Research in India', Modern Law Review, Vol 51, Oct 87, 725-749 and Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Introduction' 
in Galanter, Marc, Law and Society in Modern India, (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989). Also see 
Kothari, Rajni, Politics and the People. In Search o f  a Humane India. Volume I, (Ajanta Publications, 
Delhi, 1990); Sudarshan, R (1990); Dudeja, Vijay Lakshmi, Judicial Review in India, (Sangam Books, 
London, 1988) on different stages of judicial review; Gadbois, George, 'The Supreme Court o f India: 
A Preliminary Report of an Empirical Study' in Grover, Verinder (ed). Courts and Political Process in 
India, (Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1989), 9-37 for a study o f the kinds o f litigants and 
cases in the Supreme Court from 1950 to 1967; Gadbois, George 'The Supreme Court of India as a 
Political Institution' in Dhavan, Rajeev; Sudarshan, R and Khurshid, Salman (eds), Judjjes and the 
Judicial Power, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1985) at 250-267.
Gupta, Sobhanlal Datta, Justice and the Political Order in India. An Inquiry into the Institutions 
and Ideologies: 1950-1972, (K P Bagchi & Company, Calcutta, 1979) at 130.
Election manifesto of the Congress Party quoted in Das, Gobind (1987) at 64.
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opposition from the Supreme Court. On its election platform the incumbent Congress 
Government had called for a “committed” judiciary, to enable the Directive Principles 
of State Policy to be realised.’^  When it was held, in 1973, that there was a “basic 
structure” to the Constitution that could not be amended,'* the power of appointment 
of the Chief Justice of India and other judges was mobilised in support of the 
legislature, thus implementing the election call. Amongst others. Justice V R Krishna 
Iyer, former Independent Law Minister in Kerala's first Communist Government, and 
Justice P N Bhagwati were appointed to the Supreme Court in 1973. Although it has 
been widely acknowledged that ' “progressive” was becoming a code word for Mrs. 
Gandhi's partisan interest','^ the doctrine of a “committed” judiciary, dedicated to the 
policies of the government, was to have unexpected repercussions - it was these judges 
who were to initiate PIL.^°
The control of judicial appointments had many less welcome effects. 
The practice of appointing the senior most sitting judge as Chief Justice was 
disregarded for political reasons and three senior judges who had given orders against
R Sudarshan described how:
The expression 'committed' was ambiguous and ominous.
Sudarshan, R, 'Political Consequences of Constitutional Discourse' in Sathyamurthy, T V (ed) (1994), 
55-86 at 73. Baxi furthered the analysis:
The discourse of commitment' signified, too, that the judicial power of the state, legitimated 
through the doctrine of separation of powers, should serve as a mask of the centralised unity 
of state power.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Law and State Regulated Capitalism in India: Some Preliminary Reflections' in Shah, 
Ghanshyam (ed). Capitalist Development: Critical Essays, (Sangam Books, London, 1992), 185-209 
at 189. For an analysis o f Mohan Kumaramangalam's support of a “committed judiciary” and his role 
in conceiving the twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth amendments to the constitution, see 
Rudolph, Lloyd I and Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber, In Pursuit o f  Lakshmi. The Political Economy o f  the 
Indian State, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987) at 107-108. For a discussion o f the Directive 
Principles of State Policy see Constitutional Rights' infra.
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and others v State o f  Kerala and others 
(1973) 4 SCC 225. See also Kothari, Rajni, Taking Stock of the Seventies', in Kothari (1990), Volume 
II, 343-353.
Rudolph, Lloyd I and Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber (1987) at 108-109.
See the discussion of 'Judges' in chapter five.
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the government were superseded.^* All three resigned.^^ Justice H R Kharma, a sitting 
judge of the Supreme Court who was later superseded himself, noted the perceptible 
change of atmosphere in the Supreme Court at this time:
One of the new trends was the change in the approach of the 
court with a view to give tilt in favour of upholding the orders of 
government. Under the cover of highsounding words like social justice 
the court passed orders, the effect of which was to unsettle settled 
principles and dilute or undo the dicta laid down in the earlier cases.^^
A rift in the Court was becoming visible.
The power and legitimacy of the Supreme Court was eroded by 
subsequent events. Growing dissent, and a judgment of the Allahabad High Court 
which found Prime Minister Indira Gandhi guilty of violations of the election code, 
led the Primie Minister to declare a state of internal Emergency in 1975; it was 
through the law and the courts that she attempted to legitimise this declaration.^"* 
Unable or unwilling to counter the government at this time, the Supreme Court 
allowed civil liberties to be suspended. In an effort to curb dissent, detentions were 
made throughout India, under the Maintenance of Internal Securitv Act. 1971.^  ^
Habeas corpus petitions were filed in several High Courts challenging the orders of 
detention on the grounds that they violated the Constitutional right to life and personal
■' For biographical details o f judges, and their dates in office see Judges o f  the Supreme Court and 
the High Courts, (Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government 
of India, 1987).
■■ After the appointment o f Justice A N Ray to the post o f Chief Justice, Justice J M Shelat and 
Justice K S Hedge resigned on April 30, 1973 and Justice A N Grover resigned on May 31, 1973.
IChanna, H R, 'Neither Guns nor Roses', Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1986, at 63.
See Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299; Baxi, Upendra (1982) at 16-21.
Enacted to counter external aggression, this Act was later amended to serve in times of internal 
disturbance. After the declaration of Emergency, the Act was placed in the Ninth Schedule o f the 
Constitution by the Constitution fThirty-ninth Amendment) Act. 1975, thus giving it protection from 
judicial review. Over ten thousand people were detained without trial during the Emergency period, of 
which many had engaged in peaceful actions against the government. It was repealed in 1977. See 
Medhi, Kunja,'Protecting Civil and Political Rights in India: Mrs Gandhi's Emergency and Thereafter' 
in Forsythe, David P (ed). Human Rights and Development, (The Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke, 
1989), 279-291 at 282; Tripathi, Parag P, The persisting dilemma'. Seminar, Oct 1984, 32-46.
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liberty/^ Although the government did challenge the admissibility of the petitions on
the grounds that rights guaranteed by the Constitution had been suspended by a
Presidential Order, the petitions were allowed.^^ When the State appealed to the
Supreme Court, the appeal was allowed and the petitions were dismissed. Even Justice
Bhagwati, who was later to be lauded as the father of PIL in India gave a judgment
supporting the suspension of Article 21 of the Constitution:
I do not think that it would be right for me to allow my love of
personal liberty to cloud my vision or to persuade me to place on the
relevant provision of the Constitution a construction which its language 
cannot reasonably bear ... the Constitution is the law of all laws and 
there alone judicial conscience must find its ultimate support and its 
final resting place. It is in this spirit of humility and obedience to the 
Constitution and driven by judicial compulsion that I have come to the 
conclusion that the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975 bars 
maintainability of a writ petition for habeas corpus where an order of 
detention is challenged on the ground that it is mala fide or not under 
the Act or not in compliance with it.^ *
Only Justice H R Kharma dissented,^^ and was then superseded for the post of Chief
Justice of India.^“ He resigned from his post as Supreme Court judge on March 12,
1977.
The Constitution IFortv-Second Amendment) Act. 1976, although 
intended to disempower the judiciary^^ and strengthen the executive, did bring in
See Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v Sivkant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207 for details of 
the orders given by the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab 
and Rajasthan. As each State has an individual legal history and therefore, in this chapter 1 will refer 
to judgments of the Supreme Court exclusively, with a few exceptions for illustrative purposes.
Ibid.
Justice P N Bhagwati in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v Sivkant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 
1207, quoted in Das, Gobind (1987) at 91-2. Unlike the Supreme Court, the High Court were more 
strident in their support for civil liberties. For example see N  P Nathwani v The Commissioner o f  Police 
1975 BLR (78) 1. For a discussion of 'Judges' see chapter six.
See Khanna, H R (1986) at 78-82 for a personal recollection of the case.
The method of judicial appointments and its bearing on the independence of the judiciary was 
to become one of the most controversial issues in contemporary India. See the section on Judges, 
Courts, Lawyers' in Chapter 4 for details.
See Ray, Amal (1987); Dhavan, Rajeev (1978); Desai, Ashok K, 'Assaults on the Judicary', 
Economic and Political Weekly, 30/2/77, 726-729.
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elements to the Constitution that were to be important for PIL cases, for example the
introduction of a section of Fundamental Duties and an amendment to the Directive
Principles of State Policy to include the right to free legal aid. It was in this
amendment that the republic of India was declared to be socialist. As Justice Krishna
Iyer observed, the constitutional amendments displayed a determination on the part of
the Indian Parliament to transform the economic order and establish social justice
through State action.^^ In tandem with this, enactments intended to secure social
Justice were passed, including the Bonded Labour Svstem tAbolition) Act. 1976. Even
before the declaration of Emergency, and during Emergency Rule, the new appointees
to the Supreme Court initiated procedural changes that were to form the basis of PIL.
Justice Krishna Iyer was the main proponent of these changes.A lthough criticised
for his lengthy and sometimes erratic judgments,^'* it was he who first articulated the
need for an interpretation of statutory provisions, sympathetic to the particulars of a
case,^  ^ and the need to extend the scope of locus standi?^ As early as 1976, he
stressed the importance of relaxed standing provisions in the context of the injustices
prevalent in India:
Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi 
in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism 
permits taking liberties where the remedy is shared by a considerable 
number, particularly when they are weaker.
In these sporadic judgments, a new era in the Supreme Court had begun. Practical
Iyer, V R Krishna, Human Rights and the Law, (Vedpal Law House, Indore, 1986) at 7.
See the section on access to justice, infra, for a discussion of legal aid as supported by Justice 
V R Krishna Iyer and Justice P N Bhagwati.
See Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Introduction' in Galanter, Marc (1989), xxiii to Ixx at xxvi-xxvii. For a 
more generous view see Sharma, M K, 'The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer' in Dhavan, 
Rajeev et al (eds) (1985), 316-336.
See Katikara Chintamani Dora and others v Guatreddi Annamanaidu and others AIR 1974 SC 
1069 at 1083.
See Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v Roshan Kumar AIR 1976 SC 578; Maharaj Singh v State o f  Uttar 
Pradesh and others AIR 1976 SC 2602 at 2609. Also see Justice M H Beg speaking for the majority 
in Bar Council o f Maharashtra v M  V Dabholkar AIR 1975 SC 2092 at 2098.
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others AIR 1976 SC 1455 
at 1458.
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attempts to counter injustices combined with a struggle over access to justice and the 
assertion of public rights against the state.
Once the Janata Government was elected at the end of the Emergency 
in 1977, the Constitution TFortv-third Amendment) Act. 1977 and the Constitution 
(Fortv-fourth Amendment! Act. 1978 were enacted to restore the structure of the 
Constitution to its pre-Emergency state.^  ^The primacy of the Fundamental Rights in 
Part III of the Constitution was restored, but certain provisions, such as the 
introduction of the right to free legal aid and the Fundamental Duties remained in 
place. Despite the return to a normal state of governance, provisions of the 
Constitution continued to be misused, for example the ordinance promulgation powers 
under Article 123 of the Constitution.^^ It was PIL that was to explore issues relating 
to the judiciary and the use of constitutional provisions that had emerged during the 
years since independence.O ne analyst has noted that the Emergency exposed the 
inadequacies of the post-Independence developmental strategies adopted by successive 
governments, as well as the continuing impoverishment and marginalisation of 
millions of people.'” The Court was to assume the responsibility of ensuring the 
integrity of governance.
Describing PIL as “an assertion of judicial review” a sitting Supreme
Formed in 1977 as a merger of four existing political parties, the Janata (People's) Party stood 
for election in opposition to the ruling Congress (I) Party and the imposition of Emergency.
See D C Wadhwa and others v State o f Bihar AIR 1987 SC 579 in 'Public Policy and 
Administration' in chapter four. In addition, existing provisions for control of political violence were 
supplemented with the National Securitv Act. 1980, and the Armed Forces ^Special Powers) Act. 1958 
was used in Assam for the first time in 1980. See the section on 'The Armed Forces' in chapter four.
See the section on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in Chapter 4.
Kothari, Smitu The Human Rights Movement in India; A Critical Overview' in Kothari, Smitu 
and Sethi, Harsh (eds) (1989), 83-89 at 83. An discussion of these points can be found in three 
successive articles: Nehru, B K, 'Western Democracy and the Third World', Third World Quarterly, Vol 
1 No 2, Apr 1979, 53-70; Morris-Jones, W H, 'The West and the Third World: Whose Democracy, 
Whose Development', Third World Quarterly, Vol 1 No 3, July 1979, 31-42; Nehru, B K, 'Western 
Democracy and the Third World: A Further Comment', Third World Quarterly, Vol 2 No 1, Jan 1980, 
126-130.
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Court Judge"^  ^ stressed that convictions were made under the Emergency because of 
the absence of rights. The Supreme Court began to display a change when hearing 
cases that related to the Emergency excesses and to the limitation of fundamental 
rights by the Govemment."^^ Some have perceived this as an attempt, by the judiciary, 
to reassert its position as an independent institution of the state vested with integrity 
and worthy of the respect it had compromised in earlier years, when unable to uphold 
civil liberties under the E m ergencyW riting  in 1991, with a perspective on the 
decades since 1950, Upendra Baxi described the struggle to capture judicial power on 
behalf of the dominant classes in the first two decades of the Constitution as having 
been converted into a struggle for constraining judicial power “on behalf, if not at the 
behesf\ of the dominated classes, which in turn led to the judicial activism of the 
1980s."^
Thus, the Court found a focus in prisoners' rights cases and 
concentrated on the procedural impediments to access to justice. Many of those who 
had been detained during the Emergency had been made aware for the first time of 
the conditions in jails, and had recognised that few people had the resources or 
knowledge to approach the courts of their own accord. In a series of cases, the 
procedures governing habeas corpus were relaxed, and the issues raised were decided 
with a sympathy towards those imprisoned in appalling conditions."*  ^ The scope of 
Article 21 of the Constitution was considered,"*  ^and in 1980, Justice Krishna Iyer held 
that Article 21 of the Constitution, read with Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution,
Justice YCl in interview. Each of the eighteen sitting judges of the Supreme Court were 
interviewed from January to March 1991 have been given code names to respect confidentiality.
See Das, Gobind (1987) at 103-130, where he describes the Supreme Court in the period 1977- 
1980 as having a “Spell o f Grandeur”.
See Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur AIR 1976 SC 1207.
Baxi, Upendra (1991) at 82, italics in original.
See Inder Singh and another v State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1978 SC 1091; Charles Sobraj 
V Supdt. Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi 1978 (4) SCC 104; Sunil Batra (I) v Delhi Administration and 
others (1978) 4 SCC 494.
An important such case was Maneka Gandhi v Union o f India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
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obligates the State only to imprison under that law which is reasonable, fair and just 
in procedure:
It is too obvious to need elaboration that to cast a person in prison 
because of his poverty and consequent inability to meet his contractual 
liability is appalling/^
Similarly, it was this judge who observed, in a 1978 judgment, that although there had
been a remarkable improvement in policing methods, there was still torture and abuse
of power.' '^^
The gravity of the problems endemic in India meant that the
justifications for a departure from the recent tradition of judicial decision-making went
beyond considerations of legal correctness that had hitherto guided the judgments of
the Supreme Court. It was recognised by judges, activists, lawyers and academics that
something needed to be done, and the courts were perceived as the only alternative,
the “last resort”, short of extra-legal action. Predicting the course of a new kind of
judgment. Justice Krishna Iyer was able to concentrate on a social justice orientation
that could only be realised along with procedural changes. In a 1980 judgment he
stated that the issues before the court necessitated a shift from the traditional
individualism of the requirements of locus standi to the community orientation of
public interest litigation.^° Urging the liberalisation of procedures, he described the
alternative to the law as “the streets”:
We have no doubt that in competition between courts and 
streets as dispenser of justice, the rule of law must win the aggrieved 
person for the law court and wean him from the lawless streets.^*
This echoed the fears of B R Ambedkar, during the Constituent Assembly Debates,
who had stressed the need to remove the contradiction between the inequality
Jolly George Varghese v The Bank o f Cochin AIR 1980 SC 470 at 475. See also Francis Coralie 
Mitllin V Administrator, Union Territory o f Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 on preventive detention and Article 
21 of the Constitution.
Nandini Satpathy v P L Dani AIR 1978 SC 1025 at 1029.
Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand and others AIR 1980 SC 1622 at 1623, as discussed 
in 'Urban Space' in chapter four.
Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v Union o f  India and others 
AIR 1981 SC 344 at 353, as discussed in 'Labour' in chapter three.
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prevalent in social and economic life and the constitutionally established equality in 
political life:
We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or 
else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of 
democracy which the Assembly has so laboriously built up.^^
The Legal Framework
Law in India has been variously defined as a set of policies declared 
by the government; the activity of law courts; a strategic weapon for (repression and 
facilitative use) by various individuals and groups and by agencies of the State; an 
activity of a professional group of lawyers; a process of litigation and the manner and 
conditions under which this process of litigation can be put into effect; a bureaucracy 
of judges operating within the context of the institutional framework of law courts; a 
hegemony of ideas which is both symbolic and rhetorical as well as capable of acting 
in certain limited situations when the pressure of other aspects of the law is not too 
great or too subtle/^
Seen in this context, PIL, emerging in response to an acknowledged 
crisis in the Indian legal system, '^  ^ provides a microcosm for the study of the many 
facets of law. Despite the lack of respect for the rule of law and of the prevailing 
governmental lawlessness,^^ the characteristics of the Constitution promoted a belief 
in the use of law for disempowered peoples. The Constitution laid the foundation for
B R Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD Vol XI at 979), quoted in Baxi, 
Upendra, Law, Democracy And Human Rights' in Kothari Smitu; Sethi, Harsh (1989), 101-117 at 102.
Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Public Interest Law in India: An Investigative Report', (Report to the National 
Committee for the Implementation o f Legal Aid Schemes, 1981) at 46, quoted in Dhavan, Rajeev 
(1986) at 166.
See Baxi, Upendra (1982) for a study o f this crisis.
Ibid. at 22.
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a society with more justice, which had not been realised after forty years of 
constitutional government. Moreover, many of the more authoritarian provisions in the 
Constitution^^ had been used to greater effect than the social justice texts which 
formed only a small part of the whole constitution.^^
The following sections analyse the ideological framework of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights, the constitutional remedies available for the 
enforcement of these rights and the statutory provisions relevant for the study of PIL
Constitutional Rights
The Indian Constitution contains sections of rights which have been 
described as the core of the Constituent Assembly's commitment to social justice.^* 
Part III, the Fundmental Rights, and Part IV, the Directive Principles of State Policy, 
were supplemented by Part IVA, the Fundamental Duties, in 1976.^  ^ In framing the 
rights in Part III, the Constituent Assembly was informed by the natural law ideas 
prevalent in eighteenth century Europe. Knowledge of existing constitutions^® and their 
declarations of rights went in tandem with the Univeral Declaration on Human Rights, 
promulgated by the United Nations in 1948.®^  The Fundamental Rights provided for
For example, the use of Article 213 of the Constitution, providing for ordinance promulgation,
see D C Wadhwa op cit note 39.
Baxi, Upendra (1991) at 73. He describes the social justice texts as Parts III, IV, parts o f IVA, 
and the fifth and sixth schedules which provide for the autonomous administration of tribal districts.
58 Austin, Granville (1966) at 50.
For a full listing of the articles in these parts, see Appendix A. See 'Constitutional Imperatives',
supra.
60 See Austin, Granville (1966) at 50-83.
See Waldron, Jeremy (1987) for a historical background of the rights contained in the declaration. 
Noting that the concern for rights is firmly entrenched in the modem world, he describes the lasting 
controversies. By examining the critiques of the French 'Declaration of the Rights o f Man and the 
Citizen 1789' written by Bentham, Burke and Marx, Waldron, at 166-209, sets out the four main points 
of criticism of human rights which confine to be relevant for contemporary critiques: that they are too 
abstract', that they are too rationalistic, that they are too individualistic in their approach to human life;
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justiciable civil and political rights available against the state, with the exception of 
Articles 15(2), 17 and 23 of the Constitution which, it was envisaged, would protect 
the individual against other citizens. “Reasonable restrictions” were included in many 
of the fundamental rights, delineating their availability and empowering the State to 
disregard them in certain circumstances. Debates in the Constituent Assembly about 
the inclusion of the right to “due process”^^  in the right to life and personal liberty 
ended in a more diluted version of the phrase.^^ Thus, fears about conferring on the 
judiciary powers greater than the other branches of government informed the final 
decision on the form which the constitutional rights should take.^ "^
The Directive Principles of State Policy, which can be identified as 
social and economic rights were made non-justiciable.^^ This compromise which made 
civil and political rights justiciable, while leaving the realisation of economic and 
social rights to the anticipated governmental policies rather than judicial directive, 
delineated the new social order that was envisaged for independent India.
Critics of the constitutional scheme of rights have focussed on the 
particularities of the context in which they operate.^^ While some are concerned with
that they introduce an unjustified element of egoism into moral argument. For the text of this declaration 
see Brownlie, Ian (ed), Basic Documents on Human Rights, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).
The Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution held that no person should be deprived of 
life, liberty and property “without due process of law” as quoted in Austin, Granville (1966) at 84. This 
was described as the classic statement of the right to “due process”.
See Article 21 of the Constitution in Appendix A.
Austin, Granville (1966), 84-115.
Opinion on the provisions varied. One member of the Constituent Assembly described the 
Diretive Principles of State Policy as a “veritable dustbin o f sentiment ... sufficiently resilient as to 
permit any individual of this House to ride his hobby horse into it”. Mr T T Krishnamachari quoted in 
Austin, Granville (1966) at 75-76.
See Austin, Granville (1966), 50-83; Iyer, V R Krishna (1986) at 7.
Sethi, Harsh and Kothari, Smitu (1989) provides an insight into the perspective on rights in India. 
See also Understanding Human Rights, (Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots, Manila, 
1988), and chapter seven.
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human rights as civil and political r i gh t s , o t h e r s  have focused more on 
economic and social r i g h t s , a nd  more recently, a need-based, situation-specific, 
theory of community rights has been discussed/^ The historical antecedents of the 
modem critique of human rights is presented by Waldron, who notes that modem 
rights theorists depart from the historical critiques by their emphasis on welfare rights 
and on the idea that rights may express claims about need and not merely individual 
freedom/' Dhavan and Partington expanded this argument in a discussion of the 
“new” entitlements that were being given to the poor and disadvantaged through PIL. 
These entitlements consist of social welfare rights (part of the “third generation” of 
community rights), a greater emphasis on the social aspects of the right to equality, 
and on increasing the scope of political participation.^^
Interpretation of constitutional rights by the courts had been restricted,^^ 
but by 1978, the interpretation of rights was being evolved in an effort to realise 
constitutional objectives. This was done by revising the procedures by which rights 
could be enforced and could be restricted. For example, in Maneka Gandhi v Union 
o f I n d i a it was held that the procedure depriving a person of the right to life and 
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution must be reasonable, fair and just. 
In the words of Justice Bhagwati:
For example see Human Rights in India: The updated Amnesty International Report, (Vistaar 
Publications, New Delhi, 1993).
See Baxi, Upendra 'From Human Rights To The Right To Be Human: Some Heresies' in Sethi, 
Harsh and Kothari, Smitu (eds) (1989), 151-166.
Dias, Clarence (1993) presents the arguments in favour and against a universal conception of 
human rights. See also Nariman, Fali S (1993); Muchlinski, P T, '“Basic Needs” Theory and 
“Development Law” in Snyder, Francis & Slinn, Peter (eds) (1987).
Waldron, Jeremy (1987) at 2.
Dhavan, Rajeev & Partington, Martin 'Co-optation or Independent Strategy? The Role of Social 
Action Groups', in Dhavan, Rajeev and Cooper, Jeremy (eds), 237-8.
For example in In re, Sant Ram AIR 1960 SC 932, the Supreme Court held that the right to 
livelihood was not included in the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. See Basu, Durga 
Das (1994) for details o f constitutional law.
(1978) 1 SCC 248.
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The attempt of the Court should be to expand the reach and ambit of 
the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and content 
by a process of judicial construction/^
Many of the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution, containing economic and social
rights, had lain dormant until the appointment of activist judges who were to mobilise
their potential. In 1976, one such judge, Justice Krishna Iyer stated:
Statutory interpretation, in the creative Indian context, may look for 
light to the lodestar of Part IV of the Constitution e.g.. Art. 39(a) and 
(c) and Article 43. Where two judicial choices are available, the 
construction in conformity with the social philosophy of Part IV has 
preference.^^
Thus it is through PIL that the rights of groups began to be recognised.^^ In a leading 
PIL judgment, this phenomenon was described as a challenge and an opportunity for 
the government and its officers to make basic human rights meaningful to the deprived 
and vulnerable section of the community and to assure them socio-economic justice.^® 
The trend was strengthened when, in 1979, after the emergency, India largely ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.^^
Constitutional Remedies
Article 32 of the Constitution
In his study of the Indian Constitution, Granville Austin analysed the
Ibid. at 280.
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha op cit note 37 at 1465.
For example see Justice P N Bhagwati in People's Union fo r  Democratic Rights PUDR and 
others AIR 1982 SC 1473 at 1476-7.
78 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union o f  India and others AIR 1984 SC 802.
These covenants were not fully ratified on 10/4/79, as India reserved autonomy with respect to 
certain provisions. See United Nations Publication ST/LEG/SER.E/11, Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
with the Secretary’-General. Status as at 31 December 1992, (United Nations, New York, 1993) at 116 
for details. For the text of these covenants see Brownlie, Ian (ed) (1992).
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discussions about the scope of the remedies available in Article 32 of the
Constitution.*” He noted that while ordinary remedies existed for the enforcement of
rights, the prerogative writs put teeth into the fundamental rights provisions and were
widely believed to be “the cornerstone of freedom and liberty”.*’ One member of the
Constituent Assembly said of Article 32 of the Constitution:
If I was asked to name any particular article in this Consitution as the 
most important - an article without which this Constitution would be 
a nullity - 1 could not refer to any other article except this one. It is the 
very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it.*^
The writs in this article were an adoption of the English system, enabling the Supreme
Court to issue writs and orders in the nature of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
habeas corpus and quo warrantoP
The way in which the use of Article 32 had developed*'’ had laid the 
foundation for its use in PIL found from the late 1970s. In 1950, shortly after the 
Constitution was established, the Supreme Court commented on the scope of Article 
32 of the Constitution, differentiating it from Articles 226 and 131-139*  ^ of the 
Constitution:
Austin, Granville (1966) at 67.
Alexandrowicz quoted in Austin, Granville (1966) at 68. Marc Galanter has subsequently 
described the writ jurisdiction of the SC as “the most striking legal innovation in independent India”. 
See Galanter, Marc (1984) at 498.
B R Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol VII at 953) quoted by Chief Justice 
Y V Chandrachud in Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v Union o f  India 
and others AIR 1981 SC 344 at 347.
Certiorari is a direction against the decision o f a lower court declaring it to be ultra vires or 
displaying an error in law. Mandamus is a direction which instructs a tribunal, public official or 
corporation to perform a specified public duty. Prohibition is an order instructing a lower court, a 
tribunal or an administrative authority not to carry out an ultra vires act. Quo warranto is a writ asking 
that the a person or institution show the legal basis for something that was done or a right that was 
claimed. Habeas corpus is a writ used to challenge the validity of a person's detention, whether in 
official custody or in private hands. For the first three, the court only admitted petitions praying for the 
issuance of a writ filed by a person whose rights had been aggrieved. The latter, habeas corpus, could 
be applied for by a person outside the scope of an aggrieved person but was usually applicable to 
someone with a connection with the aggrieved, for example a family member.
See Basu, Durga Das (1994) for a comprehensive survey of the case law.
These articles delineate the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court.
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Article 32 provides a “guaranteed” remedy for the enforcement of those 
rights, and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental right by 
being included in Part III. This Court is thus constituted the protector 
and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with 
the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications 
seeking protection against infringements of such rights^^
Referring to the scope of the writs, the Supreme Court held, in 1955:
In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now 
look back to the early history or procedural technicalities of these writs 
in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of 
opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges.
It was held that the Court would not refuse to entertain a petition filed under Article
32 of the Constitution on the ground that it involved a determination of disputed
questions of fact,^  ^ and in 1961, Justice Gagendragadkar had ruled that:
In our opinion, on a fair construction of Art 32(1), the expression 
“appropriate proceedings” has reference to proceedings which may be 
appropriate having regard to the nature of the order, direction or writ 
which the petitioner seeks to obtain from this Court. The 
appropriateness of the proceeding would depend upon the particular 
writ or order which he claims and it is in that sense that the right has 
been conferred on the citizen to move the Court by appropriate 
proceedings*^
Thus the procedures that were to promote access to justice, had already been raised 
in the courtroom, for example when the Court capitulated on its early orders to affirm 
that the right to invoke Article 32 of the Constitution could not be affected by the 
existence of an alternative remedy.^®
While these orders left a wide scope for the use of the Supreme Court, 
the opportunity was not taken up initially. The constitutional work of the Supreme
Romesh Thappar v State o f Madras AIR (37) 1950 SC 124 at 126. 
T C Basappa v T Nagappa and another (1955) SCR 250 at 256.
Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nayar v State o f Madras and others AIR 1959 
SC 725 at 734.
Daryao and others v State ofU . P. and others AIR 1961 SC 1457 at 1461.
See Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nayar v State o f  Madras and others AIR 
1959 SC 725; Kharak Singh v State o f  U P and others AIR 1963 SC 1295.
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Court had been small, and the number of fundamental rights cases were relatively 
insignificant. However, by the mid-1970s more fundamental rights cases were being 
filed.* '^ A statement issued regarding the number of pendencies in the Supreme Court 
in 1979, broke down the petitions into what are described as “constitutional matters”, 
which use the original jurisdiction of the court, and “non-constitutional” matters. Out 
of a total of 15,256 cases pending in the Supreme Court, 1015 were writ petitions, of 
which one had been pending for almost 9 years
Dhavan, Rajeev, Litigation Explosion in India, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1986) at 80.
Table and information taken from: 'Cases pending before Supreme Court', Lok Sabha Debates, 
Series 6 Session 7 Vol 17, 15/5/79, 128-130. Question from Shri K. Mallanna tothe Minister of Law, 
Justice and Company Affairs (Shri Shanti Bhushan) at 129-130. For details o f some High Courts see 
Galanter, Marc (1984) at 498.
59
Length of Pendency Number of Writ Petitions pending in 
the Supreme Court as on 
1st January 1979
less than one year 203 (20%)
1 to 2 years 478 (47%)
2 to 3 years 123 (12%)
3 to 4 years 18(2%0
4 to 5 years 31 (3%)
5 to 6 years 87(9%0
6 to 7 years 69(7%0
7 to 8 years 5
8 to 9 years 1
number of writ petitions pending 1015 (100%)
total number of all petitions 
pending in Supreme Court
15256
It was PIL that was to realise this potential, leading to a broad interpretation of this 
article:
While interpreting Article 32, it must be borne in mind that Court's 
approach must be guided not by any verbal or formalistic canons of 
construction but by the paramount object and purpose for which this 
article has been enacted as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution and 
its interpretation must receive illumination from the trinity of 
provisions which permeate and energise the entire Constitution namely, 
the Preamble, the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of 
State Policy.
The discussion about the extent to which the Court can give remedies, the function of 
a constitutional court and the extent of its powers, was to be articulated primarily
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union o f  India and others (Haryana Mines 1) AIR 1984 SC 802 at 813.
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through
Article 226 of the Constitution
Whereas Article 32 of the Constitution could only be envoked for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights, the discussion in the courtroom on Article 226 of 
the Constitution^^ has centred on locating when it could be used for the enforcement 
of any rights.^^ Over time, the extent of the power of the High Courts has been 
delineated.*^  ^ The breadth of the potential application of Article 226 has led to the 
Supreme Court decision that the availability of an althemative remedy could limit 
access to Article 226 of the Constitution, but that the decision as to whether a petition 
would be admitted would be be discretionary on the High Court.^ ®
As with Article 32 of the Constitution, the potential for PIL in Article 
226 of the Constitution was indicated in a number of cases. In 1966, the Supreme 
Court held that this article confers wide powers on the High Courts to “reach injustice 
wherever it is found”, enabling the High Courts to “mould the reliefs to meet the 
peculiar and complicated requirements of this country”.^  ^Similarly in 1974 it was held 
that all the residents of a municipality have a personal interest in the actions of a 
municipal body and would therefore have locus standi to petition the High Court
It is interesting to note that in digests such as Jain, M P (1987) and Sastry, K K (1990), 
discussion of Article 32 of the Constitution concentrated on developments since 1979. See chapter one 
for a discussion.
For full text see Appendix A.
See Basu, Durga Das (1994) and Jain, M P (1987) for details o f the case law.
For example, see Calcutta Discount Co Ltd v Income Tax Office, Companies District India, 
Calcutta and another AIR 1961 SC 372^ M/s Esmail Noor Mohammad and Co. and others v Competent 
Officer, Lucknow and others AIR 1967 SC 1244; Praga Tools Corporation v C V Imanual and others 
AIR 1969 SC 1306.
For examples see C A Abraham v Income Tax Officer, Kottayam and another AIR 1961 SC 609; 
M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another v Collector o f customs, Calcutta AIR 1962 
SC 1893; Municipal Council, Khurai and another v Kamal Kumar and another AIR 1965 SC 1321.
Dwarka Nath v Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and another AIR 1966 SC 
81 at 84-5.
61
under Article 226 of the C o n stitu tio n .It was only with PIL that these initiatives 
were consolidated into the extensive use of this article, and therefore of Article 136 
of the Constitution, the discretionary right to appeal to the Supreme Court in a special 
leave petition.
Procedural Provisions
In addition to habeas corpus petitions, which permitted standing in a 
representative capacity, provisions like Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 
made exceptions for children or for those of unsound mind.'°' More significant for the 
development of PIL were provisions for class actions, by persons with a common 
interest in the outcome of a litigation. Section 91*°^  of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
1908 provides for the award of standing to two or more persons, in cases of public 
nuisance, at the discretion of the co u rt.S ec tio n  92 and Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code 
contain similar provisions.
Other provisions gave the courts inherent discretionary powers. Section 
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 saved the inherent power of “the Court to 
make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of 
the process of the Court”. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 saved
K. Ramdas Shenoy v The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and others AIR 1974 
SC 2177 at 2181. Also see Narendra Dutt Chakravarty v Corporation o f Calcutta and others AIR I960 
Gal 102; R Varadarajan v Salem Municipal Council by its Commissioner, Salem and another AIR 1973 
Mad 55; Nabaghan Naik and others v Sadananda Das and another AIR 1972 Ori 188.
For details o f civil and criminal remedies available in Indian law see Singh, Avtar (ed), V M. 
Shukla's Legal Remedies, (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, sixth edition, 1991). Also see Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v Union o f India and others (Haryana Mines 1) AIR 1984 SC 802 at 839, as discussed 
in Bonded Labour' in chapter three.
As amended in 1976. Justice Krishna Iyer described Section 91 and Order 1 Rule 8 of the C P 
C as the root of the changed procedures, such as locus standi, which enabled PIL to be used (interview, 
Enrakulam, 14/8/93). See the section on access to justice below.
For a definition of “public nuisance” see section 268 o f the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Gupta, 
R S, 'Widening the Rules o f Locus Standi', Journal o f  the Indian Law Institute, Vol 26 No 4, 1984, 
424-444 at 424-425 for a discussion of this point.
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the inherent powers of the “the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary 
to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any 
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. In addition, provisions such as Order 
39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 133 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. 1860 empowered the judiciary 
to respond adequately to any kind of complaint.
The potential for widening access to justice and the issues brought to 
the court, dormant in these statutory provisions, had been mobilised before 
independence. In 1924, a petition was filed before the Sub-Divisional Office of Siwan, 
in Bihar, by almost a hundred people. All of them lived in the vicinity of a river 
which they claimed had been polluted by effluents from a local mill. The death of 
some cattle, the pollution of the drinking water and the fear of disease had prompted 
them to use section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.A lth o u g h  the case was 
lost both at the local level and in the High Court, standing had been awarded to the 
petitioners, and the justiciability of the issue was upheld.'®  ^This was echoed in 1979, 
when Chief Justice Y V Chandrachud upheld the order of a Magistrate who had closed 
a bakery on the grounds that the smoke emitted from its chimney was causing a public 
nuisance, stating that the matter concerned the public at large, not just an individual 
right.'""
Probably one of the most influential and widely quoted judgments, 
delivered by Justice Krishna Iyer, began as a class action petition to the Magistrate's 
Court, Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh, filed by citizens of the municipality, complaining 
about the inadequate drainage in the area. The Magistrate had allowed the petition, 
ordered the municipality to clean up the drains and further ordered it to draft a plan
The reporter judgment does not give a date for this enactment. For a discussion o f the Codes 
o f Criminal Procedure in force at this time see Jain, M P (1990) at 539-541.
Deshi Sugar Mill v Tupsi Kahar and others AIR 1926 Pat 505 at 507-8. For a discussion o f the 
milieu in which this judgment was given see Anderson, Michael R, 'Public Nuisance and Private 
Purpose: Policed Environments in British India, 1860-1947', SOAS Law Department Working Papers, 
No 1, July 92.
Gobind Singh V Shanti Sarup AIR 1979 SC 143 at 145.
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for the removal of nuisance. The petition arrived, on appeal, in the Supreme Court,
where the key question identified by the Court was whether a court, by affirmative
action, could compel a statutory body to carry out its duty to the community.
Referring to the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Justice
Krishna Iyer stated:
Although these two Codes are of ancient vintage, the new social justice 
orientation imparted to them by the Constitution of India makes it a 
remedial weapon of versatile use. Social justice is due to the people 
and, therefore, the people must be able to trigger off the jurisdiction 
vested for their benefit in any public functionary like a Magistrate 
under S. 133, Cr. P. C. In the exercise of this power, the judiciary must 
be informed by Art. 38 of the Constitution.
The substantive issue was linked with access to justice and the need for a sympathetic
interpretation of statutory provisions:
a few profound issues of processual jurisprudence of great significance 
to our legal system face us and we must zero-in on them as they 
involve problems of access to justice for the people beyond the 
blinkered rules of 'standing' of British Indian vintage. If the centre of 
gravity is to shift, as the Preamble of the Constitution mandates, from 
the traditional individualism of locus standi to the community 
orientation of public interest litigation, these issues must be 
considered.
Although the use of these provisions was soon to be superceded by the 
quicker, more direct access to the courts provided by the writ jurisdiction under 
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, the content of statutes was to facilitate the 
emergence of PIL, having been framed or amended upon the tenets of social justice. 
It was not just procedural provisions, but the substantive content of laws that needed 
to be employed. A class action petition filed by rickshaw pullers from Punjab, 
challenging the validity of the Punjab Cvcle Rickshaws (Regulation of Rickshaws') 
Act. 1975, illustrates this point.R esponding to the petition, the Court simply framed 
a scheme under the existing Act. In both procedural and substantive terms, much of
Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand and others AIR 1980 SC 1622 at 1628.
Ibid., at 1623.
Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union, Amritsar and others etc v State o f  Punjab and another AIR 1981
SC 14.
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the existing legal framework contained the ingredients necessary for PIL to flourish 
in the courtroom.
The Court and its Rules
The costs of litigation and the difficulties in gaining access to justice 
have been compounded by the administrative establishment of the courts and the rules 
governing their p rocedure.'T he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts 
is extensive, in both their original and appellate sides.'" The constantly changing rules 
of procedure of the Supreme Court provide comprehensive regulations to be followed 
within the Court, and when approaching it."^ Order XXXV, Rule 7 of the Supreme 
Court Rules. 1966 would seem to preclude the admittance of letters as writ petitions 
by establishing functional criteria for filing a writ petition."^ Far from being used to 
prevent PIL from emerging, other provisions in these rules, conferring discretionary 
financial powers on the Court, strengthened the existing opportunities to increase 
access to justice and to facilitate PIL petitions.
See chapter five for a discussion.
For details o f the establishment and jurisdiction o f the SC see the Constitution o f India, Part V 
The Union, Chapter IV on The Union Judiciary, Agrawala, B R (1989). For details o f the HCs see the 
Constitution of India, Part VI The States, Chapter V on The High Courts in the States.
"■ Information has been taken from Agrawala, B R (1989) and correct to that date. The frequent, 
subsequent changes to these rules have not been incorporated.
For example, that a minimum of seven copies be supplied.
Order XLI, Rule I o f the Supreme Court Rules 1966 states:
Subject to the provisions of any statute or o f these rules, the costs o f and incidental to all 
proceedings, shall be in the discretion o f the Court. Unless the Court otherwise orders an 
intervener shall not be entitled to costs.
Similarly, a specific provision for habeas corpus petitions is found in Order XXXV, Rule 2:
No court-fees shall be payable on petitions for habeas corpus or other petitions under Article 
32 of the Constitution, arising out of criminal proceedings or proceedings connected with such 
petitions, 
and in Order XXXV, Rule 6:
In disposing of any rule, the Court may in its discretion make such order for costs as it may 
consider just.
The discretionary powers are wide, as in Rule I o f Order XLI, which states:
Subject to the provisions of any statute or o f these rules, the costs o f and incidental to all
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Access to Justice
Questions about access to justice can only be considered in the context 
of the particularities and characteristics of a legal system, which consistently excludes 
many from its ambit. In his seminal book on the pervasive crisis of the Indian legal 
system, Upendra Baxi has documented this exclusion,”  ^ an exclusion that had 
previously been noted in studies of the USA (United States of America)."^ PIL was 
initiated when the inclusion of all citizens within the realm of court action was urged
proceedings, shall be in the discretion of the Court. Unless the Court otherwise orders an 
intervener shall not be entitled to costs.
In addition to the Court rules provisions exist in enactments concerned with the costs o f litigation. For 
example the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. 1960 stipulates that the court fee payablle for 
a suit under section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be a fixed sum o f Rs.lO. See 
Lohithakshan, A K, 'Law and Practice: Section 91 of the Code o f Civil Procedure', The Lawyers, Vol 
2 No 7, July-Aug 1987, 49.
Baxi, Upendra, The Crisis o f  the Indian Legal System, (Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New  
Delhi, 1982). Also see Gandhi, J S, Sociology o f the Legal Profession: The Indian Setting, (Gian 
Publishing House, Delhi, 1987). Raising many of the points that are discussed in Chapter 5, Baxi notes 
that the content o f PIL petitions shows that, for many, the only contact with formal law is the delay and 
injustice o f the criminal justice system. See Baxi, Upendra (1982) at 26-29. Also see Mendelsohn, 
Oliver, 'The Pathology of the Indian Legal System', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 15 No 4, 1981, 823-863 
where the pathology is identified at 823:
The proceedings are extraordinarily dilatory and comparatively expensive; a single issue is 
often fragmented into a multitude of court actions; execution of judgments is haphazard; the 
lawyers frequently seem both incompetent andd unethical; false witness is commonplace; and 
the probity of judges is habitually suspect. Above all, the courts are often unable to bring about 
a settlement of the disputes that give rise to litigation. So great are these failings that the 
Indian judicial process can reasonably be seen as a pathology' o f a legal system.
He discusses differing perspctives on the way in which the Indian legal system has developed. See 
chapter six for a more general discussion.
In a study of litigation in the USA, Marc Galanter analysed why the “haves” come out ahead. 
He suggested the use of class actions to overcome obstacles to access and concluded that: 
breaking the interlocking advantages of the “haves” requires attention not only to the 
level o f rules, but also to institutional facilities, legal services and organization of 
parties.
See Galanter, Marc, 'Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change', 
Law and Society, Vol 9 No 1, Fall 1974, 95-160 at 150. It is interesting to note that he later 
acknowledged that this article had been “infused by perspectives developed in my encounter with Indian 
law”. See Galanter, Marc, Law and Society in Modern India, (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 
1989) at 299. For an evaluation o f international influences, including PIL in the USA, see below.
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by judges, lawyers and activists."^ The discussions about access to justice centred on 
the provision of legal aid to those who did not have the means to approach the Court.
Shortly after the Indian constitution began to operate, the Supreme 
Court held that although the provision of legal aid was not mandatory, if a court of 
appeal or revision felt that by the denial of such aid, the accused was denied a fair 
trial, it could in te rv e n e .T h e  first recorded legal aid programme in India, after 
independence, was formulated by Justice Krishna Iyer when he was an Independent 
Minister in the first Communist State Government of Kerala. The Leeal Aid (To The 
Poor) Rules. 1958 were framed and Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits 
Valuation Act. 1960 provided for the establishment of a legal benefit fund. Other 
states followed this example to frame schemes.
It was not until the 1970s that legal aid was to become an issue on the 
national agenda and be provided by the majority of State G overnm ents.A  new Code 
of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1973, mandating the provision of legal aid in 
Section 304. Committees were established by State Governments to recommend the 
form that a legal aid scheme should take.'^' The most important such development was 
the establishment of a committee, by the central government, in 1973. The expert 
committee, chaired by the newly appointed Supreme Court judge. Justice Krishna Iyer,
See chapter five.
Janardhan Reddy & others v The State o f  Hyderabad & others AIR (38) 1951 SC 217 at 222.
For example, in Punjab the Legal Aid to the Poor (Punjab) Rules. 1959 and the Legal Aid to 
the Scheduled Castes (Punjab) Rules. 1960 were formulated; in Maharashtra the Maharashtra Legal Aid 
to Backward Classes Rules. 1963 were instituted; in Andhra Pradesh a legal aid scheme was established 
in 1966 by a government order.
For a comprehensive survey of the provisions for legal aid at State level see the Bhagwati 
Committee report, 88-107. Also see Baxi, Upendra (1975). In tribute to Justice P N Bhagwati, it was 
noted that only after twenty years of constitutional government was it realised that “social justice is a 
product of legal relationships”. See Menon, N R Madhava, The Dawn o f Human Rights Jurisprudence', 
(1987) 1 SCC (J) 1-16 at 1.
One o f the first such reports was published by the Government o f Gujarat in 1971. Others, such 
as the Ramakrishna Report on Legal Aid to the Poor (Government of Tamil Nadu, 1973), the Report 
of the Preparatory Committee for Legal Aid Schemes (Government of Madhya Pradesh, 1976) and a 
report published by the Government of Madhya Pradesh in 1976, followed.
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with ten other members, was to consider the provision of legal aid for the weaker 
sections of the community, to persons of limited means and to persons belonging to 
socially and economically backward classes. The report of almost 300 pages, known 
as the Krishna Iyer Committee report, was the first of its kind.'^^ Apart from detailing 
the need for legal aid, the report indicated the need for legal aid centres to initiate 
litigation on behalf of their clients in a model that was to become known as 
The report was subsequently criticised: by the government, reluctant to spend the 
necessary money on an unpredictable service; by lawyers who felt the report was no 
more than a plea that they provide their services free of charge or below the market 
rate; by voluntary activists who were promised nothing more than a visible 
representation on various bodies; by the disadvantaged, to whom the proposals seemed 
to be an invitation to get further drawn into the “law as a social trap”.^ '^* Nonetheless, 
the report was the first stage in central government's growing concern for access to 
justice, and began to define a new agenda.
During the Emergency, legal aid was inserted into the Constitution as 
a Directive Principle of State Policy.Sim ultaneously, the Code of Civil Procedure. 
1908 was amended in 1976, to insert Order 33, Rule 9A,‘^  ^and Rule 18.*^  ^The same 
amendment altered the wording of Order 44 of the Code which provides for appeals
'Processual Justice to the People' Report o f the Expert Committee on Legal Aid, (Department 
of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government o f India, May 1973), 
hereafter referred to as the Krishna Iyer Committee report.
Krishna Iyer Committee report at 126. The report also anticipated the controversial nature of PIL
when it stated that:
Care has to be taken to save the legal service institution from acrimonious controversy while 
being ready to fight for unpopular but just legal causes, beliefs and rights.
Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Managing Legal Activism: Reflecting on India's Legal Aid Programme', 
(unpublished paper, 1984) at 17.
Article 39A of the Constitution was inserted by the Constitution fForty-secondl Amendment Act.
1976.
In particular see section (I) o f this rule, entitled “Court to assign a pleader to an unrepresented 
indigent person”.
Again, see section (1) o f this rule, entitled “Power of Government to provide for free legal 
services to indigent persons”.
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and payment of fees by an indigent person. Another committee was appointed by the 
Congress (I) Government, this time with Justice P N Bhagwati as the chairman, 
Justice Krishna Iyer as the sole member and Shri N L Vaidhyanathan as the secretary. 
The committee was exhaustive in its recommendations on legal aid, taking the earlier 
Krishna Iyer Committee report as the starting point. The Bhagwati Committee report 
was published in 1977.’^  ^ In a discussion of the philosophy, objectives and principles 
of a new legal services programme, the report noted that as the removal of poverty 
was dependent upon the radical transformation of the existing socio-economic 
structure, the legal services programme should aim at this. The programme would, 
therefore;
have to be directed inter alia towards providing representation to 
“groups of social and economic protest” and it must encourage group- 
oriented and institution-directed approach to the problem of poverty.
and to devise:
new legal techniques and methods to bring to the court the problems 
of the poor, like class action, group-interest litigation etc.'^°
A national legal aid authority was proposed, draft legislation suggested 
and conciliation encouraged. Included in the twenty-four functions of the national 
authority, were two recommendations that it enlist the support of social service 
organisations,'^' and that it take “necessary steps by litigation or otherwise” to ensure 
consumer protection, environmental control and for any other matter of special 
concern to the p u b l i c .T h i s  theme was continued when the report suggested that a 
strategy to vindicate the rights of individuals, unable to pursue a remedy because of
Report on National Juridicare: Equal Justice - Social Justice, (Committee on Juridicare, New  
Delhi, August 1977), hereafter referred to as the Bhagwati Committee Report. The use o f the term 
“juridicare” was an attempt to embody some o f the principles o f “judicare” in the USA. Justice V R 
Krishna Iyer, interview, Emakulam, 14/8/93.
Bhagwati Committee Report at 25.
Ibid. at 26.
The Report noted that the costs of class actions, other suits and proceedings purely of a pro bono 
publico nature incurred by voluntary agencies and social service organisations would be readily given 
by the proposed authority, ibid., at 75-76.
Bhagwati Committee report at 15.
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poverty and lack of assertiveness, would be to empower the Director of the national 
authority to adopt appropriate proceedings, and be awarded standing to do so. One of 
the examples given of a circumstance which would compel the director to act, was if 
minimum wages were not being paid to farm labour. Contained in the report was 
a chapter on “Public Interest Litigation and Legal Aid”. This chapter identified 
collective injustices relating to environmental pollution, drug adulteration, mental 
retardation and untouchability. It imaginatively linked injustices “inherited and 
acquired, colonial, feudal, industrial, political, bureaucratic and economic” with an 
expensive, unequal court system, to demonstrate the need for public interest litigation, 
representative and class actions, within an active legal aid o rgan isa t ion ,T he  
parameters of PIL were established and the report effectively invited PIL and class 
action petitions to be filed.
Within the courtroom, progress towards the provision of greater access 
to justice was more tentative. Judges had begun to acknowledge that the court had 
become limited in its scope,'^^ and in 1974, Justice Krishna Iyer reproached Judges 
of the Sessions Courts for not responding with adequate gravity to the need to appoint 
competent State Counsel for undefended accused p e r s o n s . I n  1978 it was held that, 
in the absence of a comprehensive programme of free legal services, a person who is 
a party to a proceeding can be represented by a person who is not an a d v o c a t e . In  
the same year, a public defender system was p r o p o s e d , a n d  the government's 
responsibility to provide legal aid under Article 21 of the Constitution was
' Ibid. at 31.
Ibid. at 61, Chapter XII.
In Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and others v State o f  Kerala and others (1973) 4 SCC 
225, Justice Dwivedi stated, at 2009;
The Constitution is not intended to be the arena o f legal quibbling for men with long purses. 
It is meant for the common people.
Ranched Mathur Wasawa v State o f  Gujarat AIR 1974 SC 1143 at 1143-44.
Harishankar Rastogi v Girdhari Sharma and another AIR 1978 SC 1019.
Nandini Satpathy v P L Dani AIR 1978 SC 1025.
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del ineated.However,  it was Maneka Gandhi v Union o f India, t h a t  has been 
described as the judgment that paved the way for justice to the poor. "^ '^ By stipulating 
that the procedure in Article 21 of the Constitution, that “No person shall be deprived 
of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”, be 
a reasonable, fair and just, and that Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution be read 
together, the Supreme Court effectively introduced the “due process” that had been 
excluded by the Constituent Assembly.Judicial  power, which had been appropriated 
under the emergency, was more than restored.
By 1980 the need for a national legal aid programme became not only 
more apparent but embarrassingly la c k in g .T h e  Committee for the Implementation 
of Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS) was constituted by a Government Resolution of 
September 26, 1980,''^ '  ^ to implement comprehensive Legal Aid Schemes throughout 
India. Chaired by Justice P N Bhagwati, the initial term was for three years. 
CILAS was to implement comprehensive legal aid schemes throughout India, In 
addition to monitoring the activities and funding of the Supreme Court Legal Aid 
Committee (SCLAC), the Legal Aid and Advice Boards and High Court Legal Aid
Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v State o f Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548.
supra note 67. See Basu, Durga Das (1994) for details o f the case law on Article 21 of the 
Constitution.
141 Dixit, A K (1986) at 51.
See Das, Gobind (1987) at 119-120 and Baxi, Upendra, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics, 
(Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1980), 157-167.
There was discussion about the prospect of legislation. See 'Bill to provide for Free Legal Aid 
to Poor', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 6 Session 5 Vol 16, 18/7/78, 136.
'Resolution' D/-26/9/80.
For details of the activities see Legal Aid Newsletter', available at the offices of CILAS in New
Delhi.
This term had been extended and from 14/11/90, CILAS was reconstituted with Justice A M 
Ahmadi, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court as its chair. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the Legal 
Service Authorities Act. 1987.
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Committees in many s ta te s ,C IL A S  funded legal aid camps, lok adalats (people's 
courts), PIL organisations and numerous other activities/'^* A workshop of social 
action groups to discuss the implementation of legal services was held in May 1981 
in New Delhi, at which the strategy of PIL was discussed/Access  to justice through 
legal aid was to become a theme of the Court in the early 1980s, and PIL itself has 
been described, by Justice P N Bhagwati, as a strategic arm of the legal aid 
movement/
International Influences
Public Interest Litigation was first used to describe a legal development
in the USA. Its emergence in India was not just dependent on the USA for its
terminology (see chapter two). In a discussion about who could approach the Court,
Justice Krishna Iyer articulated his sentiments with reference to North America and
the terminology of development:
a new class of litigation - public interest litigation - where a section or 
whole of the community is involved (such as consumers' organisations 
or NAACP - National Association for Advancement of Coloured 
People - in America), emerges. In a developing country like ours, this 
pattern of public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is 
to run close to the rule of life.^ '^
See the Bhagwati Committee report, at 88-107, for Annexure II which details 'Existing provision 
for Legal Aid'.
See Dhavan, Rajeev (unpublished, 1984) for a critique of CILAS and Alternatives and Corollary 
Innovations' in chapter five.
See chapter five; 'Workshop on Legal Services Delivery System for Rural Regeneration and 
Community Mobilisation, New Delhi, May, 1981', Legal Aid Newsletter, Vol 1 No 1, May 1981, 8;
Report of a Workshop of Social Action Groups on Implementation o f Legal Services held on 8 & 9 
May, 1981 (New Delhi)', Legal Aid Newsletter, Vol 1 Part 2, August 1981, 10-12.
People's Union for Democratic Rights PUDR and others v Union o f India and others AIR 1982 
SC 1473 at 1476. For a discussion of the developments in the 1980s see Chapter 5.
Bar Council o f Maharashtra v M V Dabholkar AIR 1975 SC 2092 at 2104.
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A number of petitioners and organisations have relied upon developments in the USA 
to substantiate efforts to increase both the range of petitions heard by the courts and 
access to j u s t i c e . I n  his article urging the Supreme Court to hear a PIL petition filed 
by him and two of his collègues, journalist Arun Shourie referred to a number of 
American decisions.^”  Justice Bhagwati drew inspiration from Mauro Cappelletti^ '^  ^
when referring to the “massification” of rights in a leading PIL judgment in 1981.^^^
PIL in the USA had begun with the civil rights movement in the 1960s 
when efforts were made to mobilise law to increase participation in the processes of 
democratic governance. Contributions from the American government through the 
Office of Economic Opportunity and the Legal Services Corporation helped to 
structure a movement that now has support from lawyers in the public and private 
sectors. Access to justice was facilitated when standing provisions were expanded and 
the provisions for class actions were amended. Particular legal mechanisms, such
See, for example Shah, Manubhai and Tanna, Bhaskar, 'Public Interest Law Movement in North 
America and the U.K. Report of a Study Tour', (Consumer Education and Research Centre, Ahmedabad,
1983). At the time of writing this reports, both authors were members of a voluntary organisation which 
has used PIL on a number of occasions. The same is also true for academic studies of PIL. For 
example, Agrawala, S K (1985) surveyed US PIL before beginning his critique o f PIL in India and 
Gomez, Mario (1993) directed a section o f study of PIL in India and Sri Lanka to a survey of the 
American experience.
See Shourie, Arun (1981).
See Cunningham, Clark (1987) at 496-7.
See S P Gupta, V M Tarkunde, J  L Kalra and others v Union o f India and others 1981 (Supp) 
SCC 87 / AIR 1982 SC 146, as discussed in 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four. Justice Bhagwati 
has referred to this outside of the courtroom;
Today in our contemporary society, because of the massification phenomena, human 
relationships assume a collective rather than a merely individual character; they refer 
to groups, categories and classes o f people rather than to one or a few individuals 
alone
See Bhagwati, P N, Social Action Litigation: The Indian Experience' in Tiruchelvam, Neelan and 
Coomaraswamy, Radhika (eds) (1987), 20-31 at 21.
For a detailed study of this see Scott, K E, 'Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional 
Analysis', Harvard Law Review, Vol 86 No 4, Feb 1973, 645-692 and the 1966 Amendments to Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also see Stewart, R B, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law', Harvard Law Review, Vol 88 No 8, June 1975, 1669-1813; Johnson, Earl; Bice, 
Scott H; Bloch, Steven A; Drew, Ann Barthelmes; Kantor, Valerie; Schwartz, Elizabeth and Tucker; 
Mama Susan, 'Access to Justice in the United States: The Economic Barriers and Some Promising 
Solutions' in Cappelletti, Mauro and Garth, Bryant, Access to Justice. Volume I: A World Survey. Book 
II, (A. Giuffre Editore, Milan, 1978), 913-1023; Cappelletti, Mauro and Garth, Bryant, Finding an
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as the use of the amicus brief and the Brandeis Brief, which was used in the USA for 
the first time in 1907, were to prove useful in attempts to circumvent the rigours of 
adversarial procedure in India.
The value of a comparison between the content of PIL in India and the 
USA is questionable, leading to the important debate on whether this legal 
phenomenon in India should rightly be called “public interest litigation”, or given the 
unique name “social action litigation” (see chapter two). Poverty was not the centre 
of concern in the USA in the way that it was in India in the late 1970's. PIL in the 
USA was more concerned with civil liberties, consumers and the environment,’^  ^ than 
its Indian counterpart, a characteristic that Upendra Baxi had noted with foreboding.
Appropriate Compromise: A Comparative Study of Individualistice Models and Group Rights in Civil 
Procedure', Civil Justice Quarterly, 1983, 111-147 in which the the replacement o f a traditional model 
of adversarial justice with a distinction between public and private rights with a collective interest in 
legality is discussed.
Harlow and Rawlings stated that the importance of the Brandeis Brief for future o f interest-group 
litigation could not be overestimated:
First, it opened the door to the admission of sociological and other contextual material not 
normally admissable under legal rules of evidence. .. Second, when combined with the so- 
called 'amicus brief - which can be filed by a person or organisation who is not a party to the 
suit and thus allows access to the court by third parties - it provided a convenient way for third 
parties to participate in court proceedings.
See Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard (1992) at 77.
' Scheingold, Stuart A, 'The Politics o f Rights Revisited' in Gambitta, Richard A L; May, Marlynn 
L and Foster, James C, Governing Through Courts, (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981), 193-224 
at 202. Also see Scheingold, Stuart A, The Politics o f Rights. Lawyers, Public Policy and Political 
Change, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974). For detail and analysis o f PIL in the USA see 
Aron, Nan, Liberty and Justice fo r All. Public Interest Law in the 1980s and Beyond, (Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1989); Chayes, Abraham, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation', Harvard Law 
Review, Vol 89 No 7, May 1987, 1281-1316; Handler, Joel F, Social Movements and the Legal System, 
(Academic Press, London, 1978); Judicial Process and Social Change. Constitutional litigation Cases 
and Materials, (American Casebook Series, West Publishing Co, St.Paul, 1977). For an analysis o f the 
role of the judiciary see Theberge, Leonard J (ed). The Judiciary in a Democratic Society, (Lexington 
Books, Lexington, 1979).
For detail see the discussion on the definition o f PIL in Chapter I. A discussion on the content 
of PIL in the USA has also been the subject o f criticism:
In the current romance between public interest law devotees and pollution, there is a 
danger of a major moral default by the legal profession. Major Hatcher correctly observed that 
the environment issue had done what Alabama's George Wallace had not beeen able to do - 
“distracted the attention of the nation from the pressing problems of the black and poor people 
of America.”
See Cahn, Edgar S and Jean Camper, Power To the People or the Profession? - The Public Interest in 
Public Interest Law', Yale Law Journal, Vol 79 No 6, May 1970, 1005-1048 at 1005.
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Thus, the schism between PIL in USA and PIL in India is mirrored by the debate in 
India over the terminology PIL, or Social Action Litigation (SAL) (see chapter two). 
In a lecture given in London in 1988’^ ° Justice Krishna Iyer described PIL in India as 
a unique indigenous system and explained that his numerous references to American 
decisions^^' were necessary for the Indian version of PIL to gain credibility within the 
legal profession, the judiciary and the government. Interviewed in 1991, a sitting 
Judge on the Indian Supreme Court’ cited the Bihar blindings c a s e s a s  an example 
of an issue unique to India, as he perceived that PIL to be more important in India 
than the USA, because of the nature of the issues. A comparative study of PIL in 
India and the USA identified a more fundamental difference between the two legal 
phenomena:
the strategy for giving the poor and oppressed meaningful access to 
justice is not, as in the United States, to provide funds so that they may 
participate in the traditional system on an equal economic footing.
Instead the strategy is to change the system.’^ '’
Nonetheless, much can be learned from the scholarship on PIL in the 
USA, and other attempts to increase access to justice and encourage a focus on 
collective rights .Obstacles  to using the courts,variations in the provision of legal
Lecture on 'Public Interest Litigation' delivered at the School o f Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, 10/5/88.
See for example Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v Union o f  
India and others, as discussed in 'Labour' in chapter three.
Justice LC2 in interview.
Anil Yadav and others v State o f  Bihar and others (1981) 1 SCC 622 and Khatri and others v 
State o f Bihar and others (mi)  1 SCC 623; (1981) 1 SCC 627; (1981) 1 SCC 635; (1981) 2 SCC 493; 
1983 (2) SCC 266.
Cunningham, Clark (1987) at 522.
See Cooper, Jeremy, Keyguide to Information Sources in Public Interest Law, (Mansell, London, 
1991) for a survey of the material on public interest law and an extensive bibliography. Also see 
Cooper, Jeremy and Dhavan, Rajeev (eds). Public Interest Law, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986); 
Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard, Pressure through Law, (Routledge, London, 1992). For a 
comprehensive survey of PIL worldwide, up to 1978 see Cappelletti, Mauro and Garth, Bryant, Access 
to Justice. Vol I. A World Survey. Book II, (Sijthoff and Noordhoff: Alphen aan den Rijn, Milan, 1978).
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aid,‘^  ^ the difficulties or “contradictions” of radical law p rac t i c e /a n d  introspection
See Johnson, Earl; Bice, Scott H; Bloch, Steven A; Drew, Ann Barthelmes; Kantor, Valerie; 
Schwartz, Elizabeth and Tucker, Mama Susan, 'Access to Justice in the United States: The Economic 
Barriers and Some Promising Solutions' in Cappelletti, Mauro and Garth, Bryant, Access to Justice. 
Volume I: A World Survey. Book II, (Sijthoff and Noordhoff - Alphenaadenrijn Dott. A. Giuffre Editore 
- Milan, 1978), 913-1023 at 993-4:
There are at least three principal reasons why persons with small and modest claims may fail 
to seek judicial relief. First, they may be ignorant of their rights, and the harms they have 
suffered may be too small to justify investigation o f their entitlements. Second, the costs of  
litigation mey be too large to justify suit. Third, certain courts may require that a minimum 
amount of money be at stake before they will assume jurisdiction, the class action can 
potentially help overcome all three of these obstacles.
On legal aid see Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, 'Legal Aid in the United States: the 
Professionalization and Politicization of Legal Services in the 1980's', Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol 
22 No 1, 1984, 29-67; Besharov, Douglas J (ed). Legal Services fo r  the Poor. Time for Reform, (AIE 
Press, Washington D C, 1990)
Stuart Scheingold describes the three obstacles faced by British lawyers who attempt to develop 
a radical practice: thay they are encouraged to think of law as a vital and beneficent social institution; 
they are taught that their responsibility to the law is best served by their neutrality as legal advocates; 
they are distanced from radical alternatives by the social organization and homogeneity of the legal 
profession. See Scheingold, Stuart, The contradictions of radical law practice' in Cain, Maureen and 
Harrington, Christine B (eds). Lawyers in a Postmodern World, (Open University Press, Buckingham, 
1994), 265-285 at 265. Marc Galanter made a similar point:
The more that lawyers view themselves exclusively as courtroom advocates, the less their 
willingness to undertake new tasks and form enduring alliances with clients and operate in 
forums ofther than courts, the less likely they are to serve as agents o f redistributive change. 
See Galanter, Marc (1974) at 151. Elsewhere Scheingold has grappled with the description o f such 
lawyers:
How are we to refer to these lawyers who make a commitment to social change? A number 
of terms have been used: public interest lawyers, legal rights lawyers, radical lawyers, and the 
like. My original solution was to refer to them as activist lawyers and to distinguish amoung 
traditional, innovative, and radical activists depending principally on the tactics they employed. 
In a sense, any of these terms would suffice if agreement could be reached, but no consensus 
has emerged. Moreover, each of these terms is misleading in important ways. There are, for 
example, an increasing number of lawyers these days using activist tactics on behalf o f the 
status quo rather than social change. Similarly as the issues get more complex, it is not always 
clear who is speaking in the public interest.
Scheingold, Stuart A (1981) at 194-195. For discussion the legal profession see The New Public 
Interest Lawyers', Yale Law Journal, Vol 79 No 6, May 1970, 1069-1152. For a history of PIL in the 
USA see Auerbach, Jerold S, Unequal Justice, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1976); Green, Jerry 
Ain & Green, Ellen Sickles, The Legal profession and the Process of Social Change: Legal Services 
in England and the United States', Hastings Law Journal, Vol 21, 1969-70, 563-607. For an early class- 
based analysis o f legal representation see Carlin, Jerome E and Howard, Jan, 'Legal Representation and 
Class Justice', UCLA Law Review, Vol 12, 1964-65, 381-437 and for a study of the career choices made 
by lawyers see Handler, Joel; Hollingsworth, Ellen Jane and Erlanger, Howard S, Lawyers and the 
Pursuit o f  Legal Rights, (Academic Press, London, 1978).
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o v e r  t h e  t a c t i c  o f  u s i n g  l a ws * ^ ^  w e r e  i s s u e s  i n
North America and Britain as much they are now in India. Problems of
implementation were to become the most intransigent difficulty of PIL in India,
echoing the experience of the USA.*^° Similarly, the growth and recession of concern
for poverty and access to justice in the USA has structural similarities with PIL in
I n d i a . M o s t  striking is that the problem of defining what constitutes PIL in India
appears to be a universal phenomenon. Rajeev Dhavan noted the problems with the
nomenclature in the USA:
Marketed as a compendium phrase to gather together a cluster of 
movements seeking to mobilize law and legal services on behalf of the 
disadvantaged, the phrase has come to acquire many meanings, not the 
least of which has been to encompass any espousal of the 'public 
interest' (often subjectively defined) by any persons or group
It was not just examination of the USA that inculcated the need to 
introduce new issues and techniques into the judicial fora. India sought to participate 
in international fora. For example, it was after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had 
attended the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
See Scheingold, Stuart A (1981), Scheingold, Stuart A (1974) and Alinsky, Saul J. Simon 
Wexler examined the reasons which might induce a lawyer to build up a practice which would be aimed 
at helping poor people, corresponding to many o f the lawyers involved in PIL in India were to face: 
First, there aren't enough lawyers to serve poor people, so poor people must be helped and 
taught to serve themselves. Second, it is better for poor people to acquire new skills than new 
dependencies. Third, poor people can often do what lawyers cannot or will not do. Finally, the 
law ought to be demystified for all laymen, but especially for the poor.
See Wexler, Simon, 'Practicing Law for Poor People', Yale Law Journal, Vol 79 No 6, May 1970, 
1049-1067 at 1055. Also see Kessler, Marc, Legal Services fo r  the Poor. A Comparative and 
Contemproary Analysis o f Interorganisational Politics, (Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1987).
Handler, Joel F (1978) at 221 describes the bureaucratic contingent as the most critical variable 
in divining the results o f using law. Moreover, as Marc Galanter has observed, rule change can have 
unintended results:
Randall's study of movie censorship shows that liberalization of the rules did not make 
censorship boards more circumspect; instead, many closed down and the old game between 
censorship boards and distributors was replaced by a new and rougher game between exhibitors 
and local government-private group coalitions.
Galanter, Marc (1974) at 139. Also see Stuart A Scheingold (1981) at 194.
For example see Auerbach, Jerold S (1976); Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Whose Law? Whose Interest' in 
Dhavan, Rajeev and Cooper, Jeremy (eds) (1986) at 19.
Dhavan, Rajeev, Whose Law? Whose Interest?' in Dhavan, Rajeev and Cooper, Jeremy (eds) 
(1986), 17-48 at 17.
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Stockliolm in 1972, that enactments, including the Air (Prevention and Control of 
Pollution) Act. 1981, were passed. Similarly, developments in Australian law were 
used to counter fears that liberalized access would add to the already intolerable 
burden on the c o u r t s a n d  to support the admittance of class actions into the Supreme 
Court.
Resultant Changes
It is clear that a number of factors contributed to the emergence of PIL,
when a few judges of the post-emergency Supreme Court began to mobilise the
initiatives of the 1970s. By 1979, a recognisable alternative to established patterns of
litigation had begun to emerge. Judges, lawyers, social activists and mediapersons
fonned an informal nexus, exposing injustice and petitioning the Supreme and High
Courts (see chapter six). Perhaps the most vital contribution to the nexus which
enabled PIL was the open and critical manner in which discussion was held in the
press, the courtroom and in the Lok Sabha (the House of the People). After the
supression of infonnation and freedom of expression during the Emergency, the
reclaimed ability to express a critical response to state policies and their
implementation was harnessed in a way never before witnessed in India. The dialogue
between the Court and the Legislature that had been underway for many years found
a resting place as attention was diverted into constitutional remedies for the atrocities
that were being exposed:
the Emergency, which came close to emasculating the judiciary, 
paradoxically strengthened it, and gave legitimacy to the 'basic 
structure' doctrine. ... The basic structure' doctrine, and the democratic
''' For a reference to the Australian Law Commission review o f the litigation that arise from the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act. 1970, see Shourie, Arun (1981) at 26.
For example, see Justice V R Krishna Iyer in Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) 
Sindri and others v Union o f  India and others AIR 1981 SC 344 at 355, as discussed in 'Labour' in 
chapter three.
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processes it is expected to protect, now have widespread support from 
intellectuals, lawyers and even politicians. The country's rulers, who did 
not encounter much resistance from these elites when the Emergency 
was imposed, cannot now count on similar acquiesence to autocracy‘s^
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy were being discussed
in the courtroom, as the judiciary was able to display its willingness to depart from
a rule-mindedness in order to meet the imperatives of the s o c ie ty .N o t  only were the
Courts perceived as a last resort, trust was placed in their ability to provide relief.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, petitions have been filed relating to most of
the issues of concern in the contemporary Indian polity.
The Thesis
PIL is defined in chapter two, according to the mechanisms by which 
it became established and the grievances raised in the courtroom. The discussion is 
located in the debate, initiated by Upendra Baxi, over the terminology PIL or Social 
Action Litigation. The case studies in chapters three and four are divided into issue 
based sections. At the beginning of chapter three, a brief summary of methodology is 
followed by discussions of the cases on Prisons and State Institutions', 'The Police', 
The Armed Forces', 'Injustices Specific to Women', 'Children', Labour', Bonded 
Labour' and Urban Space'. In chapter four cases on Environment and Resources', 
'Consumer Issues', Education', Politics and Elections', Public Policy and 
Administration' and 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' are discussed. Both these chapters 
provide an insight into the breadth of cases and illustrate the characteristics of PIL.
Sudarshan, R (1990) at 57.
See Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously. Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court 
of India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415.
See the case studies in chapters 3 and 4.
79
Chapter five, Administering Justice, discusses the administrative 
apparatus in the courts, and its response to PIL by presenting data and information 
collected in the Supreme Court and eight High Courts. Chapter Six, the Court and the 
People, provides a sociological analysis of the people involved in PIL - primarily the 
judges, lawyers, activists, the media and those involved in funding. It is in this chapter 
that insight is sought about the motivations of the actors, and their input into the 
emergence of PIL. As PIL continues to evolve, the parameters determining what the 
Court can decide upon and who can petition it are constantly under review. Much has 
depended on how PIL has been used at particular times, by whom and why. Chapter 
seven summarises the analysis in each chapter of the thesis, and addresses the broader 
implications of the conclusions reached.
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Chapter Two - Defining “Public Interest Litigation”
Definitions of PIL which were given in many of the early PIL cases,
were lengthy and imprecise. In a leading judgment in 1982, Justice Bhagwati
described PIL as litigation undertaken to redress public injury, enforce public duty,
protect social collective or “diffused” rights and interests, or for vindication of the
public interest.' He stated:
where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a 
determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional 
or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any 
constitutional or legal position or without authority of law or any such 
legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such 
person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, 
helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged 
position, unable to approach the court for relief, any member of the 
public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order 
or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of any breach 
of fundamental right of such persons or determinate class of persons, 
in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal 
wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.^
Articulated in terms of its structure, PIL was described as a “strategic arm of the legal
aid movement ... which is intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses”, as justice would be provided to groups, rather than individuals.^ It was
' S P Gupta, V M  Tarkunde, J  L Kalra and others v Union o f  India and others 1981 (Supp) SCC 
87 as discussed in 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
■ Ibid. at 210. For other definitions, see People's Union for Democratic Rights PUDR and others 
V Union o f  India and Ors (Asian games) AIR 1982 SC 1473, Labourers Working on Salal Hydro 
Project V State o f  Jammu and Kashmir and others (1983) 2 SCC 181 and Fertilizer Corporation 
Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v Union o f  India and others AIR 1981 SC 344, as discussed 
in ' Labour' in chapter three.
 ^ People's Union for Democratic Rights PUDR and others v Union o f  India and others AIR 1982 
SC 1473 at 1476, ibid. See the discussion of legal aid in chapter one, and 'Alternative and Corollary 
Innovations' in chapter six. Many analysts welcomed the innovations, for example, Mukhoty, Gobinda, 
'Public Interest Litigation: A Silent Revolution', (1985) 1 SCC (J) 1-11; Menon, N R Madhava, 'Public 
Interest Litigation; A Major Breakthrough in the Delivery o f Social Justice', Journal o f  the Bar Council 
o f  India, Vol 9 No 1, 1982, 150-165.
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recognised that injustice was intrinsic in the structure of the legal system, because of 
limited, economically determined, access to justice, the requirements of the adversarial 
process and the functioning of the courts. Care was taken not to circumscribe the 
potentialities of PIL, as the Court supported and nurtured litigation “in which [the] 
public or [a] class of the community have peculiar interest by which their legal rights 
or liabilities are affected”.'^
Writing in the early 1980's, Upendra Baxi, an analyst and participant
in PIL, objected to the terminology of “public interest litigation”, which had been
borrowed from the USA.^ Stressing the need to highlight the conceptual differences,
he suggested “Social Action Litigation" as a more accurate description.^ By focussing
on the nomenclature he sought to avoid the extension of this litigation, evolved for the
disadvantaged and deprived, into a more general legal tool for all public interest
issues. This semantic, but crucial, distinction was to symbolise the dilemma over the
use of PIL in its varied forms, and to highlight the differing contexts:
The appreciation of the vital political and cultural differences between 
the two societies will be deferred; and a loose-minded importation of 
notions apposite to the circumstances of development in the United 
States will continue to obscure a genuine appreciation of the distinctive 
social and historical forces shaping, generally, the role of adjudication 
in India. I propose to use the notion SAL rather than PIL to avoid these 
pitfalls.^
 ^Janata Dal v H  S Chowdhary and others (1992) 4 SCC 305 at 331, as discussed in Public Policy 
and Administration' in chapter four. The Supreme Court concluded that no litmus test could be applied 
as the contours o f the litigation were still evolving.
 ^ See Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court 
of India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) Law and Poverty, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1988), 387-415. See 
'International Influences' in chapter one for a discussion of PIL in the USA. In particular see 
Scheingold, Stuart, A, The Politics o f Rights Revisited' in Gambitta, Richard A L; May, Marlynn L 
and Foster, James C, Governing Through Courts, (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981), 193-224.
Ibid. at 389:
The issues within the sway of PIL in the United States concerned not so much state repression 
or governmental lawlessness but rather civic participation in governmental decision-making. 
Nor did PIL groups there focus preeminently on the rural poor. And, typically, PIL sought to 
represent “interests without groups” such as consumerism or environment.
 ^ Baxi, Upendra, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of  
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 390.
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Justice Bhagwati, one of the main supporters of PIL on the Supreme Court, later 
acknowledged Baxi's argument, describing SAL as seeking to vindicate exploitation 
and repression.^ While it is acknowledged that the PIL/SAL debate is important, the 
tierm PIL will be used in this thesis as the more widely recognised terminology, and 
more appropriate in the context of the breadth of issues raised.
Much of the debate amongst activists and supporters of PIL, about the 
use and efficiency of PIL, as discussed in chapter six, can be located in terms of a 
choice between PIL and SAL.^ Before this can be considered, analysis in the present 
chapter will focus on the mechanisms of PIL, at the centre of much of the literature 
on this legal phenomenon.Examination of the procedures involved when PIL began 
and events within the courtroom will be followed by a general survey of the issues 
raised. After a discussion of the resistance to PIL and the limits of judicial action, 
attention will again be focused on the definitional problem raised by Upendra Baxi.
 ^ Bhagwati, P N, 'Social Action Litigation: The Indian Experience' in Tiruchelvam, Neelam and 
Coomaraswamy, Radhika (eds) (1987), 20-31 at 23. Also see Bhagwati, P N 'Law, Justice and the 
Underprivileged', (Keynote address at the National Seminar on Unorganised Labour, Delhi, 5-8/1/84), 
quoted in Agrawala, S K, Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critique, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, 
Bombay, 1985) at 46.
For a good survey of the initial momentum that inaugurated PIL see Jaising, Indira, Social 
Engineering through SAL', The Lawyers, Vol 1 No 8, Aug 1986, 4-7.
S K Agrawala identified six “broad contours” of PIL in India, taken from the leading cases up 
to 1985 in Agrawala, S K (1985) at 9-10. See the sections on PIL in the Annual Survey o f Indian Law, 
published by the Indian Law Insitute, including Singh, Parmanand, Public Interest Litigation', Annual 
Survey o f Indian Law, Vol 23, 1987, 139-161; Singh, Parmanand, Public Interest Litigation', Annual 
Survey o f Indian Law, Vol 25, 1989, 45-63; Singh, Parmanand, Public Interest Litigation', Annual 
Survey o f Indian Law, Vol 26, 1990, 181-189. For general surveys see, for example, Prasad, M Krishna, 
'Public Interest Litigation: A New Juristic Horizon', AIR 1984 J 1; Moije, Mahabaleshwar N, Public 
Interest Litigation', Indian Bar Review, Vol 15 Nos 1&2, 1988, 59-68; Hedge, Santosh. Public Interest 
Litigation and Control o f Government', Indian Bar Review, Vol 15 Nos 1&2, 1988, 1-7; Gupta, Niwas, 
Public Interest Litigation', KLT 1984 J 23-27. Also see Jaswal, Nishtha, Role o f  the Supreme Court 
with Regard to the Right to Life and Personal Liberty, (Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1990) 
and Gupta, Uma, Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, (Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1988).
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The Procedures
Although the Fundamental Rights, applicable to every Indian citizen, 
could be enforced in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, and all 
other legal rights could be enforced in the High Courts under Article 226 of the 
Constitution, the procedures governing the use of these provisions were determined 
by the rules of each court and by accepted practice.^^ Acknowledging that procedural 
arrangements were limiting access to justice, some judges began to disregard accepted 
practice.'^ It was the suitability of the forum of the court to decide upon the issues that 
were coming before it that was to become a pivotal consideration and induced 
procedural liberalisation, by broadening the interpretation of the term “appropriate 
proceedings” in Article 32 of the Constitution/^ The urgency and imperative of the 
grievance became the important point for consideration, together with the absense of 
viable alternative remedies.
The following sections chart the elements which enabled a new kind of 
petitioner and a new kind of petition to be heard in the courts. Using elements of 
existing provisions and disregarding those that did not foster the aims of the 
litigations, the Court began to develop new techniques, perhaps a new jurisprudence. 
The next section 'PIL Begins' is followed by a discussion of the means used to gain 
access to justice, and the procedures deliberated upon in the courtroom.
' ' A full listing of these provisions can be found in Appendix A.
Justice V R Krishna Iyer in The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai 
and others AIR 1976 SC 1455 at 1458, pronounced that “Procedural prescriptions are handmaidens, not 
mistresses, o f justice”, a sentiment echoed by Justice Bhagwati in 5 P Gupta op cit note 1 at 210. The 
affinity between judges on the SC is not only reflected in PIL but also in other areas law relating to 
social justice. For example see Venkataramani, R, Judgments by O Chinappa Reddy - A Humanist, 
(International Institute of Human Rights Society, New Delhi, 1989).
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union o f  India and others (Haryana Mines I) AIR 1984 SC 802, 
as discussed in 'Bonded Labour' in chapter three. Justice Bhagwati held that the consideration of 
appropriateness was with reference to the purpose o f the proceeding, not in terms of any particular 
form.
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PIL Begins
It was in the procedure determining the writ of habeas corpus that the 
increased scope of standing was first apparent. The first petitions that are identifiable 
as PILs related to conditions in detention. Indira Jaising, a leading practitioner of PIL, 
noted that the precise date when PIL began cannot be established, but stated that the 
turning point was in 1978 when the Supreme Court took cognizance of letters written 
from prison by Charles Sobraj and Sunil Batra.^  ^ Filed as habeas corpus petitions, 
these cases have not been discussed in the case studies in chapters three and four, as 
they can be filed by an aggrieved person, and therefore do not fit within any definition 
of PIL. Nonetheless, they did contribute to the increasing awareness of access to 
justice and social justice, as discussed in chapter one. The Supreme Court Registry 
described a case that was not filed or heard until 1980 as the first PIL,’^  while S K 
Agrawala, in an exposition of the legal characteristics of PIL,'^ stated that it was 
Justice Bhagwati who gave the concept of PIL a comprehensive exposition in 5 P  
Gupta^^ popularly known as the Judges' case.'^
The first PIL that clearly fulfils the criteria later established by the 
Supreme Court was a habeas corpus petition filed by an advocate on the basis of news
See Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Jaising, Indira (1986) at 4. Although procedures were relaxed in both these cases, because they 
were filed by the aggrieved prisoner, they cannot be described as PIL in the form supported by the 
Supreme Court. See Charles Sobraj v Supdt. Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi 1978 (4) SCC 104 and 
Sunil Batra (I) v Delhi Administration and others (1978) 4 SCC 494.
Khatri and others v State o f Bihar and others (1981) 1 SCC 623, as discussed in 'Prisons and 
State Institutions'.
Agrawala, S K (1985) at 8-9.
Op cit note 1.
This view was shared by a sitting judge of the Supreme Court in 1991:
The first PIL was the Judges' case where the locus standi o f a member of the bar was 
upheld.
Justice HNl in interview. A discussion o f PIL first appeared in the Annual Survey published by the 
Indian Law Institute in 1984, when it was observed that the first PIL was the judges case. See Prakash, 
Anand, Public Interest Litigation', Annual Survey o f  Indian Law, Vol 20, 1984, 324-332 at 324.
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reports in the Indian Express in early 1979.^° Other similar petitions were admitted, 
for example when a letter written by Sunil Batra, a prisoner in Tihar jail complaining 
on behalf of another prisoner was sent to a judge of the Supreme Court/^ By the early 
1980's some High Courts had also begun to admit petitions filed under Article 226 of 
the Constitution, using relaxed proceedings/^ For the first time since the inception of 
the Constitution, representative proceedings, where the petitioner is not the aggrieved 
person or persons, were allowed by the court/^ PIL emerged as a category of petitions 
distinct from habeas corpus.
Petitions were filed as representative actions by petitioners who would 
not specifically benefit from the litigation, and in many instances the fate of a large 
group of people was at stake/"* Relaxation of standing requirements brought new 
issues to the courtroom, and widened the parameters of justiciability. Simultaneously,
Hussainara Khatoon and others v Home Secretary, State o f  Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 as discussed 
in the section on 'Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three.
Sunil Batra (II) v Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 488, also see Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi 
Administration (1980) 3 SCC 526, Kishore Singh Ravinder D e w  State o f  Rajasthan AIR 1981 SC 625, 
Rakesh Kaushik v B L Vig, Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi and another AIR 1981 SC 1767, 
all of which have been discussed in the section on Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three.
■" Upendra Baxi has noted that;
the activism in SAL historically arose first in some High Courts, although the caste-view of  
the judiciary in India has so far forbidden explicit recognition of this fact.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court o f India' 
in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415, footnote 103 at 409, and his references at 412-3 to the Himachal 
Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan High Courts. See Baxi, Upendra, The Crisis o f the Indian Legal System, 
(Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 1982) at 27 for details o f an unreported case initiated by 
Justice Thakkar in the Gujarat High Court. Manubhai Shah of the Consumer Education and Research 
Centre supported this assertion, by referring to the petitions he had been instumental in filing in the 
High Courts:
Justice Bhagwati’s statements on Article 21, on the right to life with dignity, came later. I used 
Article 21 before Justice Bhagwati on safety.
Manubhai Shah, Consumer Education and Research Centre, Ahmedabad, 17/2/91. Others have supported 
the view that PIL was initiated in the High Courts. See Mahajan, Krishan, 'Major Issues in Public 
Interest Litigation' in Gandhi, P K, Social Action through Law, (Concept Publishing Company, New  
Delhi, 1985), 83-92 at 84. See 'Judges' in chapter six.
See chapter one for alternatives to the use o f the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High 
Courts.
One of the first such petitions. Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand and others AIR 1980 
SC 1622, as discussed in Urban Space' in chapter four, did not originate in the writ jurisdiction, but 
in a magistrates court. It has been included because o f its key role in the emergence o f PIL.
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the rules determining the way in which petitions were to be filed were relaxed. Those 
without the resources to file proper petitions were allowed, even encouraged, to write 
letters or telegrams to the courts. Judges of the Supreme Court and various High 
Courts initiated petitions suo moto, newspaper clippings were accepted as evidence. 
There was an increase in the number of class actions and issues such as delays in the 
filing of petitions and res judicata were decided in relation to PIL. Efforts were made 
to provide adequate legal representation, to facilitate the provision of evidence, and 
to appoint commissions to enquire into the facts of cases. Innovative directions were 
issued and the courts began to monitor the implementation of their own directions. PIL 
was heralded as a conciliatory form of litigation, and an opportunity for the 
Government to examine the social and economic entitlements due to the poor.^^ New 
remedies were devised as the courts began to award compensation, treating PIL as a 
class of litigation separate from that which already existed.
Gaining Access to Justice
This section discusses the mechanisms facilitating access to justice: 
locus standi, justiciability, letters as writ petitions, fees, suo moto aetions, newspaper 
elippings as evidence, class actions, delay and res judicata. This analysis underpins 
the diseussion on 'Access to Justice' in all the case studies in chapters three and four.^^
• Locus Standi
Standing, or the right to approach a court, was, in Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence, conferred upon someone with a grievance which would be recognised 
by the courts.^^ While standing is needed to get entry for a hearing by a court, an issue 
must be considered justiciable if a petition can be admitted as suitable for
See Justice P N Bhagwati in Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 at 810-811.
With the exception of the cases on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
The rudiments of PIL have been traced to Roman Law in Mohan, Surendra K, Public Interest 
Litigation and Locus Standi', Cochin University Law Review, [198?], 523-533.
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adjudication. Before the inception of PIL, standing had reinforced the notion that the 
primary duty of a court was to give relief to individuals seeking remedy or redress for 
private wrongs.^* Representative standing was to gain currency with PIL, in the form 
of petitions for individuals and class actions, as locus standi now encompassed anyone 
acting in a public spirit. In 1981 the SC held that standing had to be relaxed to meet 
the ends of jus t ice ,and  in the judges' case, the standing of a group of advocates was 
upheld:
Where a legal wrong or injury is caused to a person or to a determinate 
class of persons ... and such a person or determinate class or persons 
is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or 
economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for 
relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for 
appropriate direction.^”
Within the first few years of PIL, standing was given to a vast array of petitioners
including journalists, academics, lawyers, citizens, and large bodies of individuals.^*
The Court was careful to prescribe that only genuine public interest 
litigants be allowed to approach the Court, and not meddlesome interlopers or 
busybodies, and not those bringing issues of no public interest import to the courts.^^
See Deshpande, V S, 'Standing and Justiciability', Journal o f the Indial Law Institute, Vol 13 No 
2, 1971, 153-188; Sathe, S P, 'Public Participation in Judicial Process: New Trends in Law o f Locus 
Standi with Special Reference to Administrative Law', Journal o f  the Indian Law Institute, Vol 26 Nos 
1&2, 1984, 1-12; Chaturvedi, Maheshwar Nath, Liberalising the Requirement of Standing in Public 
Interest Litigation', Journal o f the Indian Law Institute, Vol 26, Nos 1&2, 1984, 42-54; Gupta, R S, 
'Widening the Rules of Locus Standi', Journal o f  the Indian Law Institute, Vol 26 No 4, 1984, 424-444. 
Even before PIL, individual standing had already incorporated, to an extent, citizen standing, as seen 
in the statutory procedures outlined in chapter one, and provision such as order 1, rule 8 in the C P C ,  
1908 have been mobilised for PIL petitions - see Consumer Action Group and another v State o f  Tamil 
Nadu and others as discussed in Urban Space' in chapter four.
Fertilizer Corporation op cit note 2 at 356.
S P Gupta op cit note 1 at 189. Similarly People's Union fo r  Democratic Rights op cit note 2, 
the rule of standing was liberalised to allow a petition to be filed by a social action group, and in 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 and Neeraja Chaudhary v State o f  M P AIR 1984 SC 1099, the 
importance o f such social action groups in furthering the cause o f social justice was stressed - see 
' Bonded Labour' in chapter three.
See the section on class actions, infra.
See ' Resistance to PIL' infra.
This led to a number of decisions in which standing was not given to the petitioner, 
and in which courts have limited the expansion of standing in the early 1980's by 
using the definition of an ideal type of PIL to question the bona fides of the 
petitioner.^'^ The Supreme Court refused to hear a PIL petition filed against the death 
penalty stating that a third party can only raise an issue if the aggrieved party has a 
disability recognised by law.^  ^The often incoherent approach of the SC to the question 
of standing is apparent in Krishna Swami v Union o f India & Ors^^ and throughout 
the case studies in chapters three and four. Denial of standing, while often arbitrary, 
has been more prevalent in some cases as the justiciability of the issues raised has
See Sachidanand Pandey and another v State o f  West Bengal and others AIR 1987 SC 1109, an 
order that has been widely referred to in subsequent decisions, and T N  Rugmani and another v C. 
Achutha Menon and others AIR 1991 SC 983, as discusssed in the section on 'Urban Space' in chapter 
four. Other examples are Ramsharan Autyanuprasi and another v Union o f  India and others AIR 1989 
SC 549 and Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti v State ofU.P. and others AIR 1990 SC 2060 
in Environment and Resources' in chapter four - see the critique of this order in Menski, Wemer F, 
'Bottlenecks o f Justice? A further note on the limits of public interest litigtion', KLT (I) 1992, 57.
Numerous examples from the Supreme Court have been discussed in various sections o f chapter 
four: Subhash Kumar v State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1991 SC 420 in ' Environment and Resources', 
Kashinath G Jalmi and another v Speaker and others AIR 1993 SC 1873 in 'Politics and Elections', 
Janata Dal op cit note 4 in Public Policy and Administration', Nandjee Singh v P.O. Medical Students' 
Association and others (1993) 3 SCC 400 in Education', Krishnaswami v Union o f India and others 
1992 (I) SCALE 87 [484] and K  Ashok Reddy v Government o f  India and others (1994) 2 SCC 303 
in 'Judges, Courts and Lawyers'. Examples from the High Courts in chapter three include E. Sharma 
V The State o f  Assam and others AIR 1992 Gau 58 in Prisons and State Institutions' and Sand Carrier's 
Owners' Union and others v Board o f  Trustees fo r  the Port o f  Calcutta and others AIR 1990 Cal 176 
in 'Labour'; and in chapter four S S Sobti v Union o f  India and others AIR 1982 Del 51 in 'Urban 
Space', Vinod Kumar Gupta v Indian Airlines and others AIR 1984 J&K 35 in Consumer Issues', 
Duyal Chandra Bhuyan and others v Secretary to the Government o f Assam, Panchayat and C.D. 
Department and others AIR 1987 Gau 56 in 'Politics and Elections', Jagram v Gwalior Town and 
Countr)) Development Authority Gwalior and others AIR 1987 MP 11 in Public Policy and 
Administration' dcnàSatyavani and another v A P Pollution Control Board and others AIR 1993 AP 257 
in 'Environment and Resources'.
See Simranjit Singh Mann v Union o f  India & Anr 1992 (2) SCALE 102 [506], as discussed in 
' Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three. A similar position was taken in a petition filed by on 
behalf o f two persons sentenced to death, see Karamjeet Singh v Union o f  India JT 1992 (5) SC 598. 
Standing was refused on the grounds that there were no provisions in the Code o f Criminal Procedure, 
1973 or in any other statute permitting a third party stranger to question the correctness o f the 
conviction and sentence imposed by the Court after a regular trial. The SC refused to consider the legal 
disability of the two, who had been unable to petition the Court themselves. For both see Prisons and 
State Insitutition' in chapter three.
1992 (2) SCALE 66 [311], as discussed in 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four. The 
advocate-petitioner was given standing, but Raj Kanwar, another advocate-petitioner was not permitted 
to approach the court. A reading of the case reveals that the Court refusal stemmed from his persistence 
in attempting to orally address the Court.
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been questioned (see chapter four).
• Justiciability
The nexus between the right of a litigant to approach the court and the 
suitability of an issue to be heard on the judicial forum is pivotal. However, in S P 
Gupta^^ Justice Venkataramiah noted that although the issues raised in the petition are 
non-justiciable, and may have to be dismissed on the ground that the impugned 
administrative action is beyond judicial review, this would have no bearing on the 
question of locus standi of the petitioners. Nonetheless, he observed that there was 
still a class of questions such as international relations and national security that could 
not be examined by the Court.^  ^ The Supreme Court thus sought to uphold the 
doctrine of the separation of powers which ascribes particular functions to the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary,^^ while at the same time retaining the 
jurisdiction necessary to enable law to be meaningfully deployed.'*^
In a number of High Court cases, standing has not been considered in 
instances where a petition has been rejected as unsuitable for adjudication in the 
courts.'^' The Supreme Court linked the two criteria of standing and justiciability to
Op cit note 1.
S P Gupta op cit note 1. Also see Justice Bhagwati's order at 219 where he explained the vital 
distinction between locus standi and justiciability. See the section on the limits of judicial action.
For an exposition of this see Dicey, A V, An Introduction to the Study o f  the Law o f  the 
Constitution, (Macmillan Education, Basingstoke, tenth edition, 1959).
It was held, in 1981:
The Court must defer to legislative judgement in matters relating to social and economic 
policies and must not interfere, unless the exercise o f legislative judgement appears to be 
palpably arbitrary.
R K  Garg v Union o f India and others (1981) 4 SCC 675 at 706 - see 'Public Policy and 
Administration' in chapter four. See Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) 
and another v State o f Karnataka and others (1991) 2 SCC 604, as discussed in 'Urban Space' in 
chapter four when standing to bring a PIL action was given despite the lack o f standing under the 
Karnataka Slums Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 - it was held that the object o f the 
statute and the relief that was sought to be conferred were matters that had to be taken into 
consideration in such an action.
For example, see chapter four for: Chandanmal Chopra and another v State o f West Bengal AIR 
1986 Cal 104 in 'Public Policy and Administration'; Goa Foundation and another v The Konkan 
Railway Corporation and others AIR 1992 Bom 471 and K  K  Vasant v State o f Karnataka and others
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hold that a lack of remedy amounted to a lack of bona fides,^^ but held elsewhere that 
private litigation involving questions of public importance assumes the character of 
public interest litigation/^ thus reaffirming an earlier order of the Gujarat High 
Court."^ "^  These orders are by no means conclusive, as the reactions of courts have been 
diverse and unpredictable,"^  ^ particularly when the issues raised were not directly 
concerned with poverty/^ Further complexity has been added by the administration of 
letter petitions sent to the court, using the PIL guidelines/^
• Letters as Writ Petitions
Using the terminology of appropriate proceedings in Article 32 of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court began to register letters sent to the Court as writ 
petitions, enabling easier access to justice and the avoidance of court fees. The 
increase in the scope of petitions has led PIL to be described as the epistolary 
jurisdiction of the C ourt.A gain  it was prisoners' rights and habeas corpus petitions 
that signalled this innovation. While the Court would accept letters, telegrams or 
postcards complaining of illegal detention, it was only with the onset of PIL that the
AIR 1992 Kant 256 in 'Environment and Resources'.
Rajatha Enterprises v S K Sharma and others (1989) 1 SCR 547 in 'Urban Space' in chapter four.
Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v Dr Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and others (1987) 1 SCC 227 in 
'Education' in chapter four.
Bhaghubhai H. Devant v Porbander Municipality and other AIR 1984 Guj 134 in Urban Space' 
in chapter four.
In Nandjee Singh v P.O. Medical Students' Association and others (1993) 3 SCC 400 as discussed 
in ' Education' in chapter four, it was held that as the petition detailed a dispute relating to an individual 
without any question of law, it could not be treated as a PIL. A similar order was passed in Chhetriya 
Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti op cit note 33 when it was held that there needed to be a violation 
of fundamental rights - the criteria of justiciability was only one factor as the Court also held that the 
petition was filed mala fides.
The petitions relating to urban space, discussed in chapter four, highlight this.
See chapter five and Appendix B for a full listing of the guidelines.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court o f  
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 398.
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courts could be approached informally for other forms of legal redress/^
At the overt^° and covert^  ^ invitation of Justice Bhagwati, letters were
sent to individual judges or the Court. Upendra Baxi noted that the receipt of such
letters by Justice Bhagwati, and their adjudication by him, on the bench of court
number two had unforseen effects:
First, it indirectly deprives the Chief Justice of India of his undoubtedly 
important role in docket management and allocation of work to his 
companion judges. This clearly has its own implications for inter se 
relationships among justices, including perhaps factionalism in the 
Court. Second, many justices are deprived by this result of epistolary 
jurisdiction of the much-needed exposure to SAL; in the process the 
learning capacity of the Court as an institution is constricted. Third, the 
existing overload on Court No. 2 is accentuated, causing problems of 
priority in handling. If high priority is accorded to SAL at the cost of 
other matters, irate leaders of the Bar (as it is happening) are bound to 
seek to discredit SAL. If such priority is not accorded, SAL matters 
continue to drag on, like others and this (as is already happening) 
begins to raise serious questions concerning the impact of judicial 
intervention for such causes^^
This prophetic analysis was realised even as letters were being encouraged. While
Justice Bhagwati was endorsing the use of letters, Justice Pathak was cautious in his
response:
No such communication or petition can properly be addressed to a 
particular judge. Which judge or judges will hear the case is 
exclusively a matter concerning the internal regulation of the business 
of the Court, interference with which by a litigant or member of the 
public constitutes the grossest impropriety.... It is only right and proper 
that this should be known clearly to the lay public.... They also
It is unclear which was the first letter to be registered as a writ petition, records in the Supreme 
Court Registry stated that the first letter converted to Writ Petition was that sent by Rural Litigation and 
Entitlement Kendra, D/-2/7/83. The letter was registered as a petition on 14/7/83 and disposed o f on 
30/8/88. Other letters appear to have been registered before this, in particular see Prisons and State 
Institutions' as discussed in chapter three.
See Bandhua Mukhti Morcha op cit note 13.
See 'Judges' in chapter six.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 400-401.
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embarrass the judge to whom they are personally addressed/^
Before retiring from the Court, then Chief Justice Bhagwati ensured that a mechanism 
for the administration of letters sent to the Court was in place. This removed 
objections to the personalisation of PIL, ensured its place amongst other forms of 
litigation in the Supreme Court, but led to the formalisation of a procedural relaxation 
that had been remarkable for its informality.^"^
• Suo Moto Actions
The enthusiasm for social justice led some judges to initiate PIL actions 
suo moto or revive petitions through suo moto proceedings.^^ As with standing, the 
appropriateness of such an action was dependent upon the issue raised and the 
intended beneficiaries of the case.^  ^ These actions, largely prompted by newspaper 
reports and representative in character, reveal much about the sympathy of judges, for 
example, when mobilised by the plight of widows whose pensions had not been paid.^^
” Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 at 848. In the same case, Justice Sen echoed this 
sentiment, at 848:
A private communication by a party to any learned judge over any matter is not proper and 
may create embarrassment for the Court and the judge concerned.
Commentators on PIL have gone further in their reservations about the registration of letters, for 
example:
While the court treats a letter as a regular petition, necessarily, the condition regarding 
payment of court fees is necessarily waived. Article 39A being addressed only to the 
legislature and the government and directive principles being not enforceable in court, the court 
cannot legitimately adopt such a course in exercise of judicial power.
Rajagopalan, M, 'Constitutional Issues in Public Interest Litigation in India', Cochin University Law 
Review, [(198?)], 516-522 at 520. Also see Tulzapurkar, V D, Judiciary: Attacks and Survivals', AIR 
1983 J 9 at 13.
Cells have been created in the Supreme Court and some High Courts to process the letter- 
petitions received. For detail see chapter five. The PIL guidelines, listed in Appendix B, were used by 
the cells.
For example, see the cases on family pensions in Public Policy and Administration' in chapter 
four; In the matter of: Judicial Enquiry into Gang-Rape Demanded, and, Concerted Demand for  
Judicial Probe (1988) 1 GauLR 489 and Niloy Dutta v District Magistrate, Sibsagar District (1991) 
2 GauLR 217 in 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three; M  C Mehta v State o f  Tamil Nadu & 
Ors (child labour) (1991) 1 SCC 283 as discussed in Children' in chapter three. See note 27 in chapter 
six. Suo moto actions have been initiated outside the purview of PIL, for example News item from 'The 
Tribune' o f  1st November, 1993 1993 (4) SCALE 56 [299] and 1993 (4) SCALE 151 [652].
See Krishna Swami op cit note 36 and Janata Dal op cit note 4.
See Public Policy and Administration' in chapter four.
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• Class actions
The access to justice provided by PIL was often used for whole classes 
of people, both in the initiation of representative standing and the encouragement of 
citizen standing by groups of people with a common interest in the outcome of the 
litig a tio n .T h e  latter category of class actions, is distinct from the representative 
standing, in the same way that habeas corpus petitions are distinct from letter 
petitions.^^ However, in practice the distinction is often hard to make. Some class 
action petition, although filed with the name of aggrieved persons on the cause title, 
have been instigated by an organisation or individual without a direct interest in the 
outcome of the petition. Because of the differing strategies used, the import of some 
class actions to the emergence of PIL^° and the Court's description of some as PILs, 
the case studies in chapters three and four seek to account for some problematic class 
actions in the analysis.^’
See the section on 'Statutory Procedures' in chapter one. One o f earliest cases discussed, 
Municipal Council, Ratlam op cit note 24 is in fact a class action appeal that came to the Supreme 
Court from the Magistrates' Court. Class action petitions, which have to be discussed when considering 
PIL, have been indicated in the footnotes to the case chapters three and four. The definitional problem 
is underscored by National Textile Workers' Union etc v P VRamakrishnan and others AIR 1983 SC 
75, a class petition filed by workers objecting to the closure of a company, has been described as one 
in which “public participation was facilitated. See Sathe, S P, 'Public Participation in Judicial Process: 
New Trends in Law of Locus Standi with Special Reference to Administrative Law', Journal o f  the 
Indian Law Institute, Vol 26 Nos 1&2, 1984, 1-12 at 9.
See note 242 in chapter three for citations of some o f the numerous class action petitions filed 
asking the Court to decide on the question of equal pay for equal work. In particular, see Balbir Singh 
and others v M/s M.C.D. and others (1985) 1 SCC 167, Krishan Kumar v Union o f  India and others 
(1989) 2 SCC 504 and Krishena Kumar and others v Union o f  India and others (1990) 4 SCC 207.
For example, Bombay Hawkers' Union and others v Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1985 
SC 1206, as discussed in the cases on Urban Space' in chapter four.
For example V Lakshmipathy and others v State o f  Karnataka and others AIR 1992 Kant 57 in 
' Urban Space' in chapter four was described as a PIL, but could also have been treated as a class action. 
In his regular survey of PIL, Parmanand Singh has overlooked the often crucial distinction bringing 
class actions in the ambit of his discussion: Dhirendra Chamoli v State o f  Uttar Pradesh (1986) 1 SCC 
637 and Surinder Singh v Engineer-In-Chief C.P.W.D. (1986) 1 SCC 639 on equal pay for equal work, 
in Singh, Parmanand, Public Interest Litigation', Annual Survey o f  Indian Law, Vol 22, 1986, 483-506; 
petitions concerning the resettlement of Army personnel, Assam Rifles Multipurpose Co-operative 
Society Ltd. v Union o f India (1987) 2 SCC 638 and the housing of hutment dwellers. In the Matter o f  
No 57 Block Bastuhara Committee and others AIR 1987 Cal 122 in Singh, Parmanand (1987); petitions 
asking for equal pay for equal work. Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under P&T Department 
through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v Union o f India and others (1988) 1 SCC 122, Jaipal and 
others v State o f Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 354, Federation o f  All India Customs and Central Excise 
Stenographers v Union o f  India (1988) 3 SCC 91, and for the reservation of jobs for scheduled castes
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• Delay & Res Judicata
Other procedural norms, such as the limitation on filing a petition after 
an undue delay (known as laches), were disregarded by judges adjudicating upon PILs 
because of the extraordinary situation necessitating the petitions.^^ The Supreme Court 
has held that res judicata only applies to PIL if the previous litigation was also PIL.^^
In the Courtroom
Having surmounted the difficulties faced by marginalised groups of 
people in gaining access to the courts, the process through the courtroom itself had to 
be adjusted to accommodate the different needs that arose. The Court's response to 
PIL petitions filed on various issues, as discussed in chapters three and four, was 
informed by the available procedures.^"* The following sections chart the attention paid 
to legal representation, evidence and fact-finding, conciliation, devising new remedies, 
compensation and costs, and withdrawing a PIL petition.
• Legal Representation
Access to justice extended beyond the parameters of procedural
and scheduled tribes, P and T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees' Welfare Association (Regd.) and others 
V Union o f India and others (1988) 4 SCC 147 in Singh, Parmanand, 'Public Interest Litigation', Annual 
Survey o f  Indian Law, Vol 24, 1988, 123-146 and concerning hawkers, Sodan Singh and others v New 
Delhi Municipal Committee and others AIR 1989 SC 1988 / (1989) 4 SCC 155 and labour issues, S 
Krishna and others v The State o f Karnataka and others AIR 1989 Kant 291 in Singh, Parmanand, 
Public Interest Litigation', Annual Survey o f Indian Law, Vol 25, 1989, 45-63; Hardoi Roadways 
(Private) Union, Hardoi and another v Cantonment Board, Shahjahanpur and others AIR 1991 All 59 
in Singh, Parmanand, 'Public Interest Litigation', Annual Survey o f Indian Law, Vol 27, 1991, 35-55.
See Hundung Victims o f  Development through its convenor Mr David Mahung v North Eastern 
Council and others as discussed in 'Environment and Resources' in chapter four.
See Foi'ward Construction Co and others v Prahbat Mandai (Regd.), Andheri and others AIR 
1986 SC 391 in 'Urban Space' in chapter four.
With the exception of the section on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers'.
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impediments and into the courtroom, with its pervasive inequities.^^ Although many 
of the petitions were initiated by advocates, petitioner-organisations or individuals 
were often unable to afford adequate legal representation. The courts enlisted the help 
of legal aid organisations or appointed advocates as amicus curiae, in those cases 
where no advocate was present.^^ In 1987, the mles of the Supreme Court were 
amended to provide for the payment of advocates fees, at the discretion of the Court.^^
• Evidence & Fact-finding
The need for the strict pleadings of adversarial litigation, was sought 
to be replaced by inquisitorial proceedings. Newspaper clippings have been accepted 
as evidence in many cases, either at the initial stage, in representative or suo moto 
actions, or during the course of the litigation. Many of the early PILs were filed on 
the basis of news reports - a practice that has continued.Investigative journalism was 
significant in exposing the kinds of issues that were brought to the courts, and news
See chapter one for a discussion of legal aid and chapter six for a discussion of lawyers and for 
'Alternative and Corollary Innovations'. Also see the cases discussed in 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in 
chapter four.
See the discussion of cases 'Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three, for example, for 
Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev v State o f Rajasthan AIR 1981 SC 625 and Dhronamraju Satyanarayana 
V N T Rama Rao and others AIR 1988 AP 62 in Politics and Elections' in chapter four. It is not Just 
in PIL cases that legal representation has been discussed. See, for example, Sukh Das and another v 
Union Territory o f  Arunachal Pradesh AIR 1986 SC 991.
Amendment made 26/7/87 inserting rule lO-A(I) to order XVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 
1966 (with effect from 18/7/87), which provides:
Where the petitioner is not represented by an advocate of his choice, in any writ petition, civil 
or criminal, or any other case, the Court may in proper case direct the engagement of an 
Advocate amicus curiae at the cost o f the State. The fee of an Advocate so engaged shall be 
Rs.250 up to the admission stage and a lump sum not exceeding Rs.500 for the final hearing 
of the case as may be fixed by the Bench hearing the case, and in an appropriate case, the 
Bench hearing the case may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, sanction payment of 
a lump sum not exceeding Rs.750 to the said advocate.
See note 209 in Alternatives and Corollary Innovations' in chapter six.
For examples in chapter three, see the cases discussed in Prisons and State Institutions'; Mukesh 
Advani v State o f M P  AIR 1985 SC 1854 in Bonded Labour'; Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, 
through its Hon'y Secretary v State o f Bihar and others in The Police'; Labourers Working on Salal 
Hydro Project op cit note 2; Laxmi Kant Pandey v Union o f  India (1984) 2 SCC 244 in the chapter on 
Children'. See also Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) v Union o f  India and others 
in 'The Armed Forces' for a case in which the Guwahati High Court refused to accept newspaper 
articles as evidence because they were not accompanied by affidavits for verification. The SC was 
similarly wary in Manmohan Kalia v Shri Yash and others AIR 1984 SC 1161.
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reports have provided an important backdrop to the socio-legal issues involved.T he 
onus was with the Court to evolve methods of resolving a case with disputed facts.
One of the most essential elements that was to characterise PILs, in 
particularly those heard in the early 1980s by Justice Bhagwati, was the investigatory 
role assumed by the Court.^° Enquiry commissions were appointed by the judges, and 
the implementation of the recommendations of these commissions, and of the Court's 
own orders, was monitored. The most noted example of this was Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha^ ^ in which numerous commissions were appointed and the case monitored 
over many years.^^ Similarly, a petition filed concerning a protective home for women, 
filed in 1981, was still pending in 1994, partly because poor conditions in such homes 
were not ameliorated and partly because of the Court's technique of continually 
reviewing PIL m atters .A lthough  many PILs have been characterised by the 
appointment of enquiry commissions, the results of such enquiries have depended 
upon the progress of the petition through Court, '^  ^ the sympathies of the experts
The Court has used newspapers and other media to provide publicity for its orders, for example 
in For examples, see M  C Mehta v Union o f  India AIR 1992 SC 382 in the chapter on 'Environment 
and Resources' and Parmanand Katara v Union o f India and others AIR 1989 SC 2039 in the chapter 
on 'Prisons and State Institutions'. For a discussion of the media and its involvement with PIL see 
chapter six. It was perhaps the significance o f the media for PIL that led Parmanand Singh to describe 
a petition that was concerned with freedom of expression, Indira Jaising v Union o f  India and others 
AIR 1989 Bom 25, to be a PIL. Singh, Parmanand (1988).
See the analysis o f evidentiary problems in PIL in Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: 
Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415.
Op cit note 13.
For further examples, see the cases on children in prisons in chapter three.
Upendra Baxi v State o f U P &  Ors 1982 (I) SCALE 84 [502] as discussed in Prisons and State 
Institutions' in chapter three, and 'Petitions and Petitioners' in chapter six. Also see Banwasi Sewa 
Ashram v State o f  U P  (1986) 4 SCC 753 in Environment and Resources' in chapter four. The the 
Court has been criticised for taking on an administrative role, see Tulzapurkar, V D (1983) at 14.
Analysing Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 S K Agrawala noted that the petition had not 
been posted since the famous order of 16/12/83, in spite o f the Court's request for a report. He used this 
example to strengthen his suggestion that a permanent investigative machinery be established:
the Court cannot exercise continuous supervision over the implementation o f laws and its 
directions, through commissioners appointed by it. Its character as a Court enables and entitles 
it only to determine the violations of rights, and not supervise the implementation o f laws and 
directions for which it is not at all equipped and constituted. The appointment o f  
commissioners is therefore. Justified, if at all, for the ascertainment of facts and for nothing
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appointed to the commission, the mandate for the enquiry, the method by which it was 
conducted, and indeed on the ease with which an issue lends itself to resolution/^ The 
evidentiary problems which arose have led to other innovations. Although not a court 
of record, the Guwahati High Court ordered that evidence for a writ petition pending 
in the High Court be heard in the Sessions Court at Imphal,^^ and Justice Sujata 
Manohar heard direct evidence from evicted pavement dwellers whilst on the Bombay 
High Court.^^
• Conciliation
The rhetoric of conciliation between the State and its citizens was a
theme that permeated many of the early PILs. It was envisaged that parties in a PIL
would strive towards a common goal, to find a solution to a problem, with the Court
as investigator. Focussing on the co-operation required of the State, and on the
opportunity presented to the government to remove inequalities and exploitation, the
Court delineated its own role:
When the Court entertains public interest litigation, it does not do so 
in a cavilling spirit or confrontational mood or with a view to tilting at 
executive authority or seeking to usurp it, but its attempt is only to 
ensure observance of social and economic rescue programmes, 
legislative as well as executive, framed for the benefit of the have-nots 
and the handicapped and to protect them against violation of their basic 
human rights, which is also the constitutional obligation of the 
executive. The Court is thus merely assisting in the realisation of the
else
Agrawala S K (1985) at 28.
For an example of the variation in effectiveness see P Rathinam v State o f Gujarat 1987 (2) 
SCALE 317 [1464] as discussed in 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three and Chattisgarh 
Krishak Mazdoor Sangh v State o f M  P & Ors 1984 (3) SCALE 93 [603] as discussed in 'Bonded 
Labour' in chapter three. In another case on bonded labour, Neeraja Chaudhary op cit note 30 the 
Supreme Court mobilised social action groups to help it in its task. In other cases, in Labour' in chapter 
three, the State was praised for its co-operation with the appointed commissioners, whilst in others, the 
State did very little to co-operate. For a more general discussion see 'Petitions and Petitioners' in 
chapter six.
Naga People's Movement fo r Human Rights op cit note 68.
Nazamunissa Shaukat Ali and another v Municipal Corporation o f  Greater Bombay and others 
as discussed in Urban Space' in chapter four.
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constitutional objectives/^
A similarly notable characteristic of PIL has been the relative failure 
of the rhetoric of conciliation to affect the actual progress of a petition through 
Court/^ That there has been change in the judicial discourse is undeniable, but the 
effects have been inconsistent, if at all/°
• Devising new remedies
The obiter dicta of Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice Bhagwati,^’ and the 
expansion of the scope of some litigations is most striking when examined in the 
context of the legal developments in the relevant field/^ Innovation of remedy enabled 
the Court to extend the realm of justiciability,^^ to frame schemes,*'  ^ to order the
Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 at 811. Justice Bhagwati also held, at 803, that “there is 
nothing sacrosanct about the adversarial procedure and in fact it is not followed in many other countries 
where the civil system o f law prevails”.
The wisdom of expecting the State to respond to PIL in a collaborative manner had already been 
questioned by Justice Bhagwati:
We have undoubtedly an Attorney-General as also Advocates General in the States, but they 
do not represent the public interest generally. They do so in a very limited field .. even if  we 
had provision empowering the Attorney-General or Advocate General to take action for 
vindicating public interest, I doubt very much whether it would be effective. The Attorney- 
General or the Advocate General would be too dependent upon the political branches of 
government to act as an advocate against abuses which are frequently generated or at least 
tolerated by political and administrative bodies.
S P Gupta op cit note 1 at 215.
The example of the first Bandhua Mukti Morcha case, op cit note 13, can again be used. The 
other example given of a commission was the Agra case, Upendra Baxi op cit note 73, in which the 
continued monitoring has bettered conditions in the home. See the case chapters and 'Petitions and 
Petitioners' in chapter six.
See the discussion of judges in chapter six.
The scope of the petition was enlarged by the Court at the time of passing orders in Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha op cit note 13, Rajangam, Secretary, District Beedi Workers' Union v State o f  Tamil 
Nadu and others (1992) 1 SCC 221 in Children' in chapter three, and "Niyamakendran” v State o f  
Kerala and others in 'Public Policy and Administration' in chapter four, amongst others. In the former 
case, twenty-one directions were issued that fell outside the scope of the petition.
See Geetha Timbers, Chalakudy v State o f Kerala and others 1990 (1) JLT 402 (F.B.) in 
'Environment and Resources' and in Dhronamraju op cit note 66, Anil Yadav & Ors v State o f  Bihar 
(1982) I SCALE 43 [278] in Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three, and numerous other PIL 
petitions.
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implementation of existing legislation/^ and to determine the priorities of State
action/^
• Compensation and costs
In addition to relaxing requirements to pay fees on the registration of 
petitions filed in the court in the form of a PIL/^ the Court has often awarded costs 
in PIL orders. Amounting to small sums in comparison to the fees charged by many 
Supreme Court advocates, costs were often awarded in recognition of the public 
service done by the petitioner.^^ Exercising its discretion, the Court has made ex gratia 
compensation payments, or exemplary awards. In the first such recorded instance the 
Court held:
we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit for damages for his 
illegal detention a decree for damages would have to be passed in that
For example, Laxmi Kant Pandey op cit note 68. Referring to the orders in this case, Parmanand 
Singh questioned the viability o f Court action:
Laxmikant cases invite a brief comment. It may be asked why should the Supreme 
Court indulge in 'legislation' every time when the problem of Indian children adopted by 
foreign parents come up before it? Why does not the court ask Parliament to enact a 
comprehensive legislation on this matter? Judicial ad-hocism might only create several 
complexities and uncertainties. For instance, in none of the three Laxmikant cases is there any 
mention of'penal' provisions preventing the oppression and exploitation o f the adopted Indian 
children in foreign countries.
Singh, Parmanand (1991) at 41.
As in Common Cause, A Regd Society v Union o f  India & Ors 1989 (2) SCALE 98 [541] in 
Consumer Issues' in chapter four. In State o f H P v  Parent o f  a Student o f  Medical College, Simla and 
Others (1985) 3 SCC 169 in Education' in chapter four, the SC overturned the Simla HC's direction 
that legislation be passed to prevent ragging.
For example State o f  Himachal Pradesh and others v Umed Ram Sharma and others AIR 1986 
SC 847 in ' Environment and Resources' in chapter four. Contrast with P Nalla Thampy Thera v Union 
o f  India and others (railway services) AIR 1984 SC 74 as discussed in Consumer Issues' in chapter 
four.
Petitions clearly marked as PILs are automatically exempted from the fees charged by the 
Registry. See Agrawal, K P, Class Action and Payment o f Court Fees', The Lawyers, Vol 7 Nos 8&9, 
Aug-Sept 1992, 41.
Costs were awarded to the PIL petitioner in Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 on the basis 
that the efforts of social activists must be supported. Other examples include Mukesh Advani v State 
o f M P  AIR 1985 SC 1363 in 'Bonded Labour' in chapter three and M  C Mehta v State o f  Tamil Nadu 
& Ors (child labour) (1991) 1 SCC 283 in Children' in chapter three. Conversely, in Subhash Kumar 
V State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1991 SC 420 the petition was charged punitive costs for filing a PIL 
mala fides. See 'The Court and its Rules' in chapter one for rule 1 o f order XLI o f the Supreme Court 
Rules. 1966, a provision which has been mobilised to reward PIL petitioners.
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su it... In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order 
of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip- 
service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government 
has so grossly violated. ... The right to compensation is some palliative 
for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of 
public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the 
State as a shield.
Despite numerous decisions in which compensation or ex gratia payments have been 
awarded, the Court has avoided making a decision on lia b il i ty a n d  on the criteria 
for the award of compensation for a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.^’ This 
avoidance reflects prevalent reservations about the payment of compensation, for 
example, the financial burden it would involve, and concern about the perceived 
boundaries of judicial action.^^ In addition to compensation or costs paid to the 
petitioners, records exist of the concerned state government being asked to pay for the
Rudul Sah v State o f  Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086 as discussed in 'Prisons and State Institutions' in 
chapter three. Described variously as compensation or exemplary costs, awards were made in Sebastian 
M  Hongray v Union o f  India AIR 1984 SC 571 in 'The Armed Forces' in chapter three exemplary costs 
were awarded and in many other cases, including a number of cases relating to the police, discussed 
in the sections on The Police' and 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three.
M C Mehta v Union o f India and Ors (Sriram gas leak) 1985 (2) SCALE 151 [1280] as discussed 
in 'Environment and Resources' in chapter four, in particular, for the order given on Article 12 o f the 
Constitution. For the text of this article see Appendix A.
For example in Khatri op cit note 16 as discussed in Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter 
three. Also see Sant Bir v State o f  Bihar 1982 (1) SCALE 144 [668], for similar indecision in a habeas 
corpus petition. See chapter six for a discussion of this point.
Agrawala, S K. (1985) at 43. There have been a number of cases, outside PIL, in which the Court 
has used its newly found discretion to award compensation or exemplary costs. See for example, Devaki 
Nandan Prasad v State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1983 SC 1134, Jwala Devi v Sub-Inspector, Bhoop 
Singh and others AIR 1989 SC 1441, State o f  Maharashtra and others v Ravikant S Patil (1991) 2 SCC 
373, Ashok Kumar & Anr v Union o f  India & Ors 1991 (1) SCALE 129 [564], Ganga Das v State o f  
Orissa & Ors 1992 (2) SCALE 192, Kumari v State o f  Tamil Nadu AIR 1992 SC 2069, Veer Bala v 
Delhi Administration and others 1993 (2) SCALE 45 [179], Nilabati Behera Alias Lalita Behera 
(through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) v The State o f  Orissa & others 1993 (2) SCALE 
70 [309], B Rarmlamma v State o f  Andhra Pradesh 1993 (1) SCALE 27 [90]. The temptation to equate 
innovation in remedy with PIL is seen when Parmanand Singh discussed a case in which compensation 
was given to an Member of the Legislative Assembly, who had been wrongfully arrested by the police, 
Bhim Singh, MLA v State o f  J  & K  and others AIR 1986 SC 494 / (1985) 4 SCC 677, as a PIL. See 
Singh, Parmanand (1987). The discretionary nature o f this power is highlighted by Jiwan Mai Kochar 
V Union o f  India and others AIR 1983 SC 1107 when the Court held that “damages and compensation 
cannot be granted in this proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution”.
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costs and expenses of any commissions of enquiry instituted by the Court.^^
• Withdrawing a PIL petition
Departing from the procedure delineated by the Supreme Court Rules, 
1966,'^ '^  the Supreme Court, by preventing a PIL petition from being withdrawn, has 
affirmed the separate character of a litigation in the public interest.^^ Simultaneously, 
the Court has asserted its own role in litigation that enhances the projected image of 
a judiciary concerned with a myriad of social justice concerns.
The Issues
If procedural justice provided the structure and the mechanism of PIL, 
it was in an effort to promote a more egalitarian society. That the changing judicial 
interpretation of the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy,^^ has 
been critical in the initiatives to facilitate social justice, is not questioned.^* However,
Costs o f the committee and costs to the petitioner were awarded in A/ C Mehta v Union o f  India 
and others (pollution o f the River Ganges) (1987) 4 SCC 463 in 'Environment and Resources' in 
chapter four, and in Ram Kumar Misra v State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1984 SC 537 in 'Labour' in 
chapter three.
Order XVIII, rule 9 provides for the withdrawal of a petition.
See Sheela Barse & another v Union o f  India & Ors (children in jails) 1986 (2) SCALE 1 [1] 
as discussed in Children' in chapter three and 'Petitioners and Petitions' in chapter six.
In Sampat Singh & Ors v State o f  Haryana & Ors 1992 (3) SCALE 117 [565] at 567, a party 
was criticised for withdrawing his allegations:
He ought to have submitted to the discipline of the Court, especially when he has initiated the 
proceedings as a public interest litigant.
See chapter one and Appendix A for a discussion and listing o f these rights.
Jamie Cassels identified four distinctive characteristics of PIL, three of which were procedural 
(liberalisation o f locus standi, procedural and remedial flexibility and ongoing judicial 
participation/supervision) and one which was the creative and activist interpretation o f legal and 
fundamental rights. Cassels, Jamie, 'Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation: Attempting the 
Impossible?', The American Journal o f Comparative Law, Vol 37, 1989, 493-519 at 498. Parmanand
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it was the issues that could then be presented for legal resolution, that were to 
determine the direction that PIL was to take. Five broad categories of petitions that 
have been heard by the Supreme Court and High Courts are detailed below. Although 
this categorisation provides a way of understanding the PIL cases discussed in 
chapters three and four, none of the categories are exclusive of all the others, and 
many cases can only be understood in terms of two or more categories. For example, 
gender issues cut across all the sections outlined here. Women have suffered appalling 
conditions in jail, have been displaced from their homes, have been discriminated with 
regard to labour conditions and have been the subject of petitions seeking judicial 
review for legislation.
1. PIL for the marginalised/excluded
These are cases which have arisen when an individual or group is pitted 
against the state, having been excluded from the ambit of civil and political rights, as 
found in the Fundamental Rights. Those disadvantaged as a direct result of executive 
action, or more pertinently, inaction, had, for the first time, a recourse to law. 
Criminal jurisprudence cases horrified the courts and judgments were given directing 
the State administration to act. Conditions in protective homes, hospitals and other 
State institutions were exposed. Petitions were filed attempting to vindicate executive 
power and gain relief for the victims of custodial rape and those who had not received 
their legitimate dues (for example widowed women who had not been paid the pension
Singh observed:
It all happened with the socially motivated crusade of a few judges of the Supreme Court who 
by an activist interpretation o f fundamental rights, converted them into “positive rights”. .. In 
this process a new regime of fundamental rights emerged. For example, right to free legal aid, 
right to access to court, right to speedy trial, right against torture, right not to be solitarily 
confined, right to himan treatment in prison, right to be paid minimum wages and not to be 
subjected to forced labour, right to human dignity, etc. emerged as independent fundamental 
rights.
Singh, Parmanand, 'Vindicating Public Interest through Judicial Process: Emerging Trends and Issues', 
Indian Bar Review, Vol 10 No 4, 1983, 683-694 at 683-4.
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due to them) 99
Aside from individual exceptions, this group of cases, which formed the 
bulk of the petitions in the early days of PIL, has been scantily implemented as each 
order relies upon the offending official or institution itself for implementation. 
However, the horror of some of the cases has created an increased public awareness 
of conditions in jails and other institutions, causing some betterment in conditions and 
more discussion of jail reforms.
There are striking features to the orders given in these cases. The courts 
have condemned the apathy of the state, but have not condemned its functionaries, and 
have rarely made individuals responsible for their actions. The courts have moumed 
the injustices meted out, for example to prisoners, by the State administration, but 
have not analysed the laws and procedures which cause there to be so many prisoners 
and detainees. Using arguments about the separation of powers the court has not even 
been able meaningfully to employ Article 13 of the Constitution, which states that 
laws must be consistent with the Fundamental Rights. By neglecting to examine the 
ways in which existing legislations criminalise the most disadvantaged, and the real 
difficulties in using legal services, the courts have not explored an area which could 
have alleviated certain injustices. Hence, enactments giving the army and police wide 
powers and thus denying peoples' basic right of hearing have not been disputed by the 
courts, or have simply not been heard. Despite these shortcomings, PIL has given 
prisoners an opportunity to be heard and has been instrumental in generating attention 
to punishment and prison conditions.
See the discussions on 'Prisons and State Institutions', 'The Armed Forces', 'The Police', 
'Injustices Specific to Women' and 'Children' in chapter three, and the discussion o f cases on family 
pensions in Public Policy and Administration' in chapter four.
See Appendix A for the text o f this article.
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2. PIL for the disadvantaged and deprived
These are cases for those who have not secured the equality promised 
by the constitutional scheme. Challenging structural injustice and prejudice, these 
cases have a complex background and appertain to many state and private bodies. 
Bonded labour cases form a major portion of the PILs in this section, as do other 
labour and wage issues and cases relating to more distinct groups like women, 
scheduled castes or tribes and children. There is a greater focus on economic and 
social rights (than on civil and political rights), and therefore on the realisation of the 
Directive Principles of State Policy. In tandem with this is the expansion in the 
courtroom or, rather, recognition on the judicial forum, of the scope of Fundamental 
Rights such as Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to life is no longer constructed 
in a narrow way, now including the right to livelihood. However, as with the cases for 
the marginalised/excluded, implementation has been problematic, in the absence of 
political will to ensure the issues are resolved.
3. PIL for development/resource rights
Issues of development, environment, community rights and resource 
rights form a unique category of p e titio n s .T h o se  complaining of environmental 
pollution have largely been successful in gaining the attention of the court, as the right 
to life has been interpreted to include the right to live in a clean environment. Other 
petitions, raising issues of economic and social policy, have received a mixed 
reception as at times judges have been welcoming and at others dismissive. Thus, 
although the suitability of using law has been questioned, it is in this category of cases 
that the courts' willingness to innovate can be most clearly evaluated - both in 
procedural and substantive terms. Property relations which had been set beyond the
See the sections on 'Bonded Labour', 'Labour', 'Children' and 'Injustices Specific to Women' 
in chapter three, and 'Urban Space' chapter four.
See the discussions on 'Environment and Resources' and Urban Space' in chapter four.
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courts' jurisdiction by constitutional amendments are again raised, but with a different 
emphasis. Instead of individual rights to property, the court has had to consider, for 
example, the community rights of tribal people who have been displaced by a 
development project. In the instances where it has been asked to assess the suitability 
of a development project itself, the courts have been reticent, remaining within the 
accepted limits of judicial action and at most making some concession, for example 
on environmental safeguards. The famous case of pavement dwellers in Bombay sets 
out many of the problems in using the court to reallocate resources.
Law has acted as a catalyst, conferred certain freedoms and provided 
an ideological framework of organisation and action for those petitioning the courts. 
However, in dealing with the most disadvantaged in rural areas, as in the section on 
the disadvantaged/deprived, the Court does not appear to be the appropriate institution 
for providing the necessary structural changes. Judicial attitudes to the role of the 
Court has tempered judicial decision making, just as political will has tempered the 
value of PIL orders.
4. Where PIL ends?
Increasingly in recent years, petitions have been filed relating to a 
myriad of often legitimate complaints, as well as those which attempt to appropriate 
PIL for corporate gain, political advantage or personal in te re s t.T h e  majority of the 
cases in this section are well-intentioned but inappropriate. As PIL is widely perceived 
as an easy way to focus an issue, the courts have been approached for grievances 
which could, and should, be addressed to other agencies. A central paradox arises as 
other agencies are unable to manage the problems brought before them. Thus the 
discussion of many issues appertaining to a group or class of people, for example land
See the chapter on 'Urban Space' for the discussion o f Olga Tellis and others v Bombay 
Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180, and 'Petitioners and Petitions' in chapter six.
See the sections on 'Public Policy and Administration', 'Politics and Elections', Education', 
Urban Space' and Consumer Issues' in chapter four.
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allotments and pensions, would not have been possible without PIL. Procedures do 
exist in the civil and criminal manuals and in other provisions for the presentation of 
such petitions, but endemic problems of long pending cases, obstructive procedures, 
high costs and the lengthy process of appeals when petitioning a lower court have 
made PIL into an attractive option. Recourse to PIL is now common practice for many 
Supreme Court and High Court lawyers. It provides the opportunity to participate in 
the well-being of society, to vindicate causes and, for some young lawyers, valuable 
experience of the Court and career advancment. That public interest sentiments can 
be misplaced is seen in the case of an advocate whose first PIL petition asked the 
court to direct the telephone company to prioritise the allocation of telephones to 
advocates as well as to medical doctors, because of the importance of the legal 
profession to the general public.M oreover, personal grievances are often framed in 
terms of public importance to take advantage of the benefits of using PIL. 
Undoubtedly the manifold difficulties of dealing with public authorities are frustrating, 
but using a legal tool fashioned as a last resort for those to whom the legal system is 
inaccessible cannot be the first refuge for those with easy access to the courts.
Most pernicious has been the arrogation of PIL as another tool in the 
weaponry of corporate warfare and of political manipulation. Numerous petitions have 
been filed with questionable motives, including one attempting to ban the Koran, 
another to expel a minister from office (although such a petition has import for 
judicial r e v i e w ) a n d  to manipulate urban planning regula t ions .Often  hard to 
distinguish from genuine litigants, especially as lawyers themselves have been 
petitioning the courts, judicial vigilance has not always interceded. While many 
petitions have been rejected on the grouds of standing or justiciability, others have 
been admitted and heard as PILs.
See M Balagovindam, advocate v Union o f India and another in the chapter on 'Consumer
Issues'.
106 See Chandanmal Chopra op cit note 41.
For example, see A G Prayagi v State o f  M.P. and others AIR 1987 MP 25 in the chapter on 
'Politics and Elections'.
See the section on Land and its Use' and Construction' in the chapter on Urban Space'.
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5. PIL and the Judicial Process
Aside from the actual procedural mechanisms and the issues raised, PIL 
began with much discussion of the role of the judiciary and the need for the benefits 
of law to accrue to those who have previously not had access to courts. It is not just 
the development of PIL that has had an input into the judicial process. Activism in the 
court has taken on new dimensions through PIL, as judges have begun to enter realms 
of decision-making previously reserved for the legislative or executive branches of 
government. As already indicated, some Judges have acted suo moto and awarded 
compensation. A reassertion of the integrity of the court and its essential function as 
an institution of the state can be witnessed in PIL actions. Parameters and functions 
of judicial review and judicial action have been evaluated and expanded, and the 
incorruptibility of the judicial process has been upheld. In S P Gupta and the body of 
cases that follow, the Supreme Court addressed the essential requirements of the 
judicial/democratic process, inevitably including issues of public policy. Questions 
of jurisdiction have recently seen cases regarding judicial corruption and parliamentary 
sovereignty. The court has discussed the parameters of constitutional adjudication and 
decision making, definitions of the state, liability and torts, and the disclosure of 
documents in court. Political impasses have been brought to the court and while some 
have been resolved, others have not gained the Court's attention. The discretion 
exercised by judges has meant that by ignoring certain PIL matters the Court has left 
untouched certain areas of policy making or executive action.
PIL has also provided a forum in which issues of importance to the 
judiciary itself have been sorted out. Judicial appointments and transfers have been 
examined, judges have directed that court vacancies be filled and have determined 
their own conditions of service - even deciding the kind of cars they should drive.
See 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
' For example see chapter three for Chaitanya Kalbagh and another etc v State o f U P  and others 
AIR 1989 SC 1452 as discussed in 'The Armed Forces' and the petitions challenging enactments in 
'Injustices Specific to Women'.
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Allegations of corruption by judges have been heard, as have issues relating to the 
integrity of the Court in cases of contempt/
Resistance to the changes
Few judges were unequivocally supportive of P I L / T h e  ambivalence 
of many of those hearing PIL cases has already been seen in the discussion of 
procedures/'^ The tensions within the bench were reflected in statements about the 
implausibility of certain features of PIL, rather than their undesirability. PIL has not 
been condenmed, because of its populist inclusion of issues of concern to the have- 
nots,"'' but has certainly been circumscribed by some judges.
Initially there was little discussion in the courtroom itself about the 
availability of an alternative forum or remedy to PIL - PIL itself was the alternative. 
Attempting to assuage the fear that PIL would open the floodgates to the Court, 
bringing an unmanageable burden, it was held, in 1982:
There is a misconception in the minds of some lawyers, 
journalists and men in public life that public interest litigation is 
unnecessarily cluttering up the files of the Court and adding to the 
already staggering arrears of cases which are pending for long years 
and it should not therefore be encouraged by the court. This is, to our 
mind, a totally perverse view smacking of elitist and status quoist 
approach. ... No State has a right to tell its citizens that because a large 
number of cases of the rich and well-to-do are pending in our courts 
we will not help the poor to come to the courts for seeking justice until
Ibid. Also see the chapters on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' and 'Public Policy and Administration'.
"■ See the discussion of judges in chapter six.
See Agrawala, S K (1985) for a discussion of the resistance to PIL and Tulzapurkar, V D (1983) 
for Justice Tulzapurkar's critique o f the Supreme Court's directions and procedural innovations in PIL. 
In particular see letters as writ petitions' supra.
I have borrowed this term from Galanter, Marc (1974).
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the staggering load of cases of people who can afford, is disposed ofJ^  ^
Nonetheless, growing concern about the load of PIL cases adding to the already high 
pendencies in the Supreme Court led to pronouncements suggesting that the High 
Court of the State in which the issue arose^'^ or, for example, an Industrial Tribunal,^ 
should first be approached. Although the number of PILs is growing, in comparison 
to the total number of cases on the docket of the Supreme Court and High Courts the 
number remains relatively small in 1994.’’*
The order given in 1982 by Justice S Murtaza Faizal Ali and Justice E 
S Venkataramiah in response to a petition filed in 1980 by Supreme Court advocate, 
Sudipt Mazumdar, delineates the reservations about PIL.”  ^ The ten procedural 
questions were raised,’^ ” which were directed to be considered by a five judge bench. 
However, this aspect of the case was not considered again until 1994, when the earlier 
order was modified and the procedural questions were directed to be dealt with by a
' People's Union for Democratic Rights op cit note 2 at 1478. Also see 'Constitutional Remedies' 
in chapter one and chapter five.
In Re the Petitions o f  Nawal Thakur, a convict kept in the Kulu Jail (1984) 3 SCC 572 in 
'Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three; in an order D /-18/2/87 by Justice M P Thakkar in 
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v State o f  Gujarat AIR 1987 SC 1159 at 1159, the Supreme Court directed the 
petitioner to approach the High Court, stating:
If this Court entertains Writ Petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court 
directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of  
thousands of Writ Petitions would in the course o f time be instituted in this Court directly 
(more than 9,000 are already pending). The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining 
to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution 
will assume more alarming proportions. As it is, more than ten years old Civil Appeals and 
Criminal Appeals are sobbing for attention.
Decision taken on the letters sent to the Court also determine the number of cases - see chapter five. 
Also see 'Alternatives and Corollary Innovations' in chapter six.
See Vidyulatta Vivek Pandit and others v State o f  Maharashtra and others as discussed in 
'Labour' in chapter three.
See the discussion of the courts in chapter one and in chapter five.
Sudip Masumdar v State o f  Madhya Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC 584. The substance o f the case was 
not reported until 1994, at 1994 (2) SCALE 25 [329] and is discussed in Environment and Resources' 
in chapter four.
The issues raised in this order became known as “The 10 Commandments”.
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bench of two judges/^’ It appears that the matter no longer warranted the attention of 
five judges, as PIL no longer represented a conflict within the bench. It had been 
delineated by case law, the evolution of court procedure and the administrating bodies 
of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Discussion about the limits of judicial action has been prompted both
by the relaxation of the procedures determining access to justice and innovations in
the form and substance of Court orders. Apprehensions that PIL could undermine the
authority of the Court that it had helped to re-establish led to calls for prudence in
judicial a c t i v i s m . B y  using unconventional tactics, some judges were said to be
contesting the foundations of Indian law and the legal system:
As the reach of law expands, it begins to lose its autonomy, self- 
contained quality, certainty and predictability. .. Some recent PIL 
opinions on bonded labour, children of prostitutes, Bofors scandal, the 
Ramaswamy and the Nadiad episodes, closing down of stone quarries, 
and the like would look like moral discourse and the statements issued 
in the judgments would seem to be addressed to other political 
elements - policy-makers, legal academics, professionals, the press and 
wider public.
Criticism of the cases that were to form the fourth category of PIL petitions. Where 
PIL ends?''^^ pointed to the appropriation of PIL as another legal tool in the hands of 
a private l i t igan t .E ven  more threatening to some was the agenda of petitioners who
'■'It had been hoped by supporters of PIL that the questions raised would not be heard. See note 
166 in chapter six.
For example, see Hedge, Santosh, 'Public Interest Litigation and Control o f Government', Indian 
Bar Review, Vol 15 Nos 1&2, 1988, 1-7. The background can be found in chapter one.
'■^  The Consitution o f India, promulgated in 1950, established a separation o f powers between the 
three branches of government, in terms of structure and function. See 'The Constitutional Imperatives' 
in chapter one.
Singh, Parmanand (1991) at 35.
'■"’ See 'Where PIL ends' supra.
'■^  See Menski, W F, 'On the Limits of Public Interest Litigation', KLT 1990 (2) J 45; Parmanand 
Singh described it as being a return to feudalism, as it opened up the judicial process to new abuses like 
blackmail. Singh, Parmanand, Thinking About the Limits of Judicial Vindication of Public Interest', 
(1985) 3 SCC (J) 1. S P Sathe forewarned:
We should take care that public interest litigation does not become a resort of the trigger happy 
litigants or professional litigants, or another method of political agitation.
I l l
brought new issues within the ambit of the Court's discourse, which Upendra Baxi 
described as symbolising “the politics of liberation”. W h e r e  would this new form 
of litigation end? What changes would it require? Would it compromise the integrity 
of the institution and its power? These were the prevailing fears, as PIL gained 
momentum.
The power of appointments affected the ethos of the Court, which was, 
in turn, to inform the debate on PIL (see chapters one and five). Either in limiting 
their own actions or in extending their orders, it was the actions of judges that shaped 
the controversies. Considerations of justiciability and appropriate action were not 
discarded^^^ and even those judges who supported PIL did not necessarily accede to 
the demands in all the petitions filed relating to poverty i s s u e s .T h e  optimism that
Sathe, S P (1984) at 11.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously; Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at at 406. See Singh, Parmanand (1990) at 182:
Almost anything under the sun that could be brought under the elusive rubric “public interest” 
came to be the subject matter of PIL. ... Many PIL actions did not seek to enforce any one's 
fundamental rights or provide access to justice to the disadvantaged group but to vindicate the 
claims that were so diffused among the public generally that no traditional legal or 
constitutional rights existed to be enforced.
See 'Justiciability', supra. Also see B Krishan Bhat v Union o f  India (1990) 3 SCC 65 in Public 
Policy and Administration' in chapter four, when the Court held that the Directive Principles o f State 
Policy are not enforceable in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Tehri Bandh 
Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti and others v State o f  U P  and others (1990) 2 Supp SCR 606 in 'Environment 
and Resources', when the Court refrained from deciding on the suitability o f a dam - it has been 
suggested that the Court felt intimidated by the amount of material placed before it. Nalini Jayal, Indian 
National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, interview. New Delhi, 5/8/93. The judges have been 
praised for their restraint, in not impinging on legislative or executive functions, in P Nalla Thampy 
Thera op cit note 86. See Prakash, Anand (1984) at 332. For an indication o f the limits o f judicial 
review generally see M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v Board o f  Trustees o f  the Port o f  Bombay AIR 
1989 SC 1642 and Hindi Hitrashak Samiti and others v Union o f  India and others AIR 1990 SC 851, 
where it was held that Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be used to indicate a policy preference.
The Bihar Legal Support Society petitioned the Supreme Court, asking it to admit appeals in 
cases where bail/anticipatory bail had been refused in the High Courts, citing exceptions made to 
consider the bail applications o f industrialists. Justice Bhagwati held that the Supreme Court was not 
a regular court o f appeal, justifying his order with reference to public interest litigation:
It is, therefore, not correct to say that this Court is not giving the “small men” the 
same treatment as the “big industrialists”. In fact, the concern shown to the poor and 
disadvantaged is much greater than that shown to the rich and well-to-do because the 
latter can on account of their dominant social and economic position and large 
material resources, resist aggression on their rights where the poor and deprived just 
do not have the capacity or will to resist the fight.
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suffused Upendra Baxi's seminal article on PIL, that PIL would continue to uncover 
in ju s t ice ,gave  way to less rigorous activism/^^ The exercise of judicial discretion 
in determining the import of “public interest” has rarely been informed by 
comprehension of the context in which legally articulated problems arise. Moreover, 
the relative ineffectiveness of the judiciary to resolve the problems brought before it 
was exposed, as calls for implementation of its orders were repeatedly ignored. 
Fears that PIL would undermine judicial authority have been partly realised, as many 
have been disillusioned by the experience of using PIL.
Towards a Definition
The vast range of issues and the numerous procedural changes led Marc 
Galanter to describe cases of the early 1980's, that sought to actualise the promises of 
justice in the Constitution, as “a series of unprecedented and electrifying initiatives”.
Order D/-19/11/86 by Chief Justice P N Bhagwati in Bihar Legal Support Society v Chief Justice o f  
India (1986) 4 SCC 767 at 769.
He wrote;
the results of SAL irritate the Big Men. No matter how irate (as was Jagannath Mishra, the 
Chief Minister o f Bihar, on the Supreme Court's swift probe in the Bihar Blindings), they 
cannot so easily manipulate public opinion in their favour as the court.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court o f India' 
in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 408.
For his vision of an activist judge, see Baxi, Upendra (1987) at 173.
For example see Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 13 and the petition later filed asking the 
Court to ensure the implementation of its earlier directions, Neeraja Chaudhary op cit note 30. For a 
discussion of implementation, see the discussions o f The Contribution of PIL' in chapters three and 
four, and chapter seven.
Galanter, Marc, The Changing Legal Environment and the Prospects of the Strategic Use of  
Law by India's Disadvantaged', (A Report to the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 20/9/89) at 2.
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While avoiding the need for a rigorous definition, he described the aim as seeking to 
“use judicial power to protect excluded and powerless groups (like prisoners and 
migrant laborers) and to secure entitlements that were going unredeemed”.
Defining the cases in terms of procedure is relatively unproblematic. 
Procedural characteristics that help to identify a PIL include locus standi, the method 
of filing the petition, the availability of an accessible alternative forum/remedy, a 
conciliatory procedure in the courtroom, an expansion of the scope of the litigation 
and innovations in the nature of the directions given.
A greater dilemma arises when the issues addressed are analysed.
Interviewed in 1992, Justice Bhagwati described two kinds of PIL that were to be
found in the Indian courts:
The first is the one I developed, for weaker sections. This is the one 
which fascinated me. It was for vulnerable groups who for lack of 
awareness, resources etcetera were deprived access to justice. This was 
not PIL but SAL because it was intended to promote social action 
amongst the target groups. In this way it differed from PIL. The other 
form of PIL is Public Interest causes like in the US, England and 
anywhere else. For example, in S P Gupta’s case where the 
independence of the judiciary was threatened. Unlike this SAL was 
meant for enforcement of collective rights of classes of people and 
groups. Ordinary procedure cannot do justice to these kinds of 
problems.
The parameters of what constitutes public interest have nowhere been defined for the 
purposes of PIL,’^  ^ with the exception of the disparate category of issues that were 
included in the PIL guidelines of the Supreme Court. The judges, at the apex of the 
heirarchy of gatekeepers to the Court, have neither constructed a definition, nor have
Ibid.
The problems that do arise have been discussed in the relevant sections, above. 
Justice P N Bhagwati, interview. New Delhi, 15/4/92.
See Jain, D C, 'The Phantom of “Public Interest”', (1986) 3 SCC (J) 30 at 31.
' See chapter five and Appendix B for a full listing o f the guidelines.
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they adhered to a uniform cognition of the public interest.
More profound are the problems that attend any discussion why, and
for whom PIL was evolved. It is at this point that Upendra Baxi’s objection to the
meaning implied by PIL, as opposed to SAL, is most instructive. When viewed from
the perspective of social activism, and the urge to provide justice to indigent groups,
then the actual scope of PIL has ventured far from SAL. Rajeev Dhavan has further
narrowed the definitional paradigm:
public interest law is part of the struggle by, and on behalf of, the 
disadvantaged to use 'law' to solve social and economic problems 
arising out of a differential and unequal distribution of opportunities 
and entitlements in society. In an effort to procure justice between 
generations' it is also concerned with preventing the present and future 
needless exploitation of human, natural and technological resources.
He then stipulated that public interest law can only be described as such when it is
conceived not just on behalf of the disadvantaged but with their involvement. The
use of law in the public interest is therefore defined not just by the content/intent but
also by the mobilising potential of using law, and the kind of legal services provided.
Calling SAL creeping' jurisdiction, Upendra Baxi noted that few SAL 
matters had resulted in a final verdict .Because this creeping jurisdiction gradually
See Life Insurance Corporation o f India v Escorts Ltd. and others (1986) 1 SCC 264 at 274. It 
is interesting to note that in the order of the Madras HC in 1994 in a case on wetlands, Justice 
Kanakaraj held:
it is not a public interest litigation in the strict sense of the term. This is a case initiated by a 
Consumer Action Group strictly for the purpose o f protection and improvement o f human 
environment.
without elucidating the parameters of PIL. Consumer Action Group v Union o f  India and others as 
discussed in Environment and Resources' in chapter four.
Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Whose Law? Whose Interest?' in Cooper, Jeremy and Dhavan, Rajeev (eds) 
Public Interest Law, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), 17-48 at 21.
Ibid. at 21, italics in original.
Baxi, Upendra, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 401.
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takes over the role of the administration in a particular arena, he prescribed that:
It is the task of the SAL entrepreneurs to ensure that these issues are 
ultimately reached with the desired results
However, the what is desired varies as the articulation of concern for the 'public
interest' has varied greatly amongst the vast array of petitioners who approach the
court, as amongst the lawyers, the judges, the media and between/within political
parties, according to their perspectives and priorities. A notion of the public interest
as a homogeneous and intelligible goal has proven to be fallacious. The cases in this
thesis are thus selected for discussion using the Court's own definitions of PIL.
Some definitional parameters can be established. PIL is a form of 
litigation which differs from ordinary litigation on two fronts: the manner in which the 
petition is brought to court and the subject matter of the petition. The petition is 
usually filed as a representative action, and access to justice is facilitated. The 
treatment of the petition in Court often departs from the strict adversarial procedure, 
for example by the appointment of independent commissions of enquiry for fact 
finding, by monitoring the case, by the expansion of the litigation or by the directions 
given. The proceedings are often monitored by the courts which may ask for periodic 
reports to enable it to keep abreast of the results of orders. The relief sought may 
involve a large body of people, and is not for specific benefit of the petitioner. The 
nature of the relief asks the Court to consider those disempowered by the political, 
administrative and legal process.
In practice, since it was first evolved, PIL has extended beyond these 
parameters, as cases involving a myriad of broad public interest' issues have come
Baxi uses the provision of medical attention to blinded undertrials and the improved conditions 
in Agra and Delhi Protective Homes for Women as examples (see the Khatri and Upendra Baxi v. State 
of U.P). There are many such examples of the administration by the court, together with cases in which 
the court has taken on the character of a legislative body. When speaking to Lotika Sarkar, co-petitioner 
in the Agra Protective Homes case, in early 1991, new concerns created by the this creeping jurisdiction 
become apparent. Once a final judgement is delivered, the fear expressed was that the situation in the 
home may revert to that which existed prior to monitoring by the court.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 401.
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within the scope of this litigation. In the following two chapters, the cases discussed 
include those that defy even a broad definition of PIL, despite having been described 
as such by judges or petitioners. Nonetheless, tThe judicial process has been realigned 
to accomodate social justice considerations, but only within PIL. This new form of 
litigation has become an increasingly attractive option, in the midst of awkward and 
lengthy legal proceedings for other forms of litigation. While it may have been SAL 
that the judges and petitioners of the early 1980's intended to introduce, it is the 
broader remit of PIL that has gained popular credence.
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Chapter Three - Case Studies #1
Cases are discussed in the following two chapters according to issues 
rather than legal doctrine or a particular time period. As issues were the initial 
mobilising principle for the use of PIL, they are used as the focal point for the 
analysis.* Most of the cases discussed in this chapter are concerned with the 
disadvantaged/deprived and marginalised/excluded (see chapter one). Most of the cases 
through which PIL was introduced in the Supreme Court and High Courts are found 
in this chapter, with some exceptions in chapter four. The analysis begins with 
petitions filed on 'Prisons and State Institutions', the concern of the first PIL petitions 
heard. The Armed Forces' are then considered, to give an overview of issues raised 
and the response of the Courts to the agencies of law and order. As 'Injustices 
Specific to Women' were amongst the issues to gain prominence by the early 1980's, 
they are discussed next. Analysis of cases relating to 'Children' cover a range of 
issues, salient to the other sections in this chapter, is followed by an evaluation of the 
litigation on Labour' and 'Bonded Labour'.
Each of the issues is analysed in the same, that is linear, manner. After 
a discussion of the context in which each injustice arose, and of its articulation in law, 
are sections evaluating Access to Justice', The Court's Response' and The 
Contribution of PIL'. The only exception to this is the section entitled 'Judges, Courts, 
Lawyers' in chapter four, as many of the cases relate to the judicial process and caimot 
be analysed in the same terms as other PILs. A brief account of the methodology used 
to research the thesis is given before the case studies.
’ Included amongst the cases are numerous documents, including unreported court orders, which 
are only available in India. These can be found in Ahuja, Sangeeta (1995).
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Methodology
While the documents of reported cases were easily available, they did 
not entirely answer questions about who was using law, why and with what results. 
Using the reported cases as a starting point, fieldwork began with a list of petitioners, 
advocates and judges who had been involved in PIL. Initially, it was envisaged that 
the thesis would be concerned, primarily, with petitions filed for the marginalised and 
excluded.^ However, the range of issues and the breadth of discussion, prompted 
flexibility in research strategy and analysis, whilst the first three categories of cases 
defined in chapter two remained the focus of fieldwork. The following is a brief 
survey of the varied aspects of field research, conducted during a total of 26 months 
in India.^
PIL has not been confined to the Supreme Court in Delhi: research was 
conducted in several states: Haryana, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Karnataka, 
Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Himachal Pradesh and Kerala. 
These states were chosen as the northern/central states were relatively well represented 
in cases to the Supreme Court.'  ^ The single most important aspect of methodology 
were insights from conversations and interviews that were to equip me with the 
information and penetration necessary to situate the personalities involved in PIL and 
the particularities of the political context and legal culture. Initially, academics were
■ See the discussion of issues in chapter two.
 ^ The Economic and Social Research Council generously sponsored two fieldtrips; the first from 
from December 1990 to March 1991, and the second from January 1992 to April 1992. I then lived in 
India from October 1992 to May 1994, having received a Ford Foundation grant to write a casebook 
on PIL.
'’ For example, many of the reported cases on prisons related to Bihar. Moreover, discussions 
indicated that the Patna High Court was not sympathetic to social justice considerations, and that 
therefore PIL was not flourishing. Conversely, the relatively few reported cases from the Supreme Court 
concerning Kerala and the abundance of High Court cases reported in Kerala Law Times (KLT) and 
Kerala Law Journal (KLJ), and informed the decision to research there.
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the focus of research.^ Discussions ensued with Judges, lawyers, court administrators, 
bureaucrats, librarians, editors of law reports and a wide variety of petitioners 
including social and political activists, and journalists.
During a three month period from January 1991 to March 1991, 
eighteen of the twenty-four judges sitting on the Supreme Court were interviewed.^ 
Much of the response to these semi-structured interviews was rhetorical, but 
perspectives on PIL were instructive and insight was gained into the issues of concern 
within the Supreme Court. In addition, interviews with retired Supreme Court judges^ 
and sitting judges of High Courts continued throughout the period of research. 
Research in the courts extended to the Registries where PIL is managed and 
significant discretion exercised.®
Discussion with lawyers and visits to Non-Governmental and Voluntary 
Organisations were both demanding and rewarding. Some were reluctant to engage 
with a researcher from abroad whose motivations appeared obscure. Research findings 
in the thesis are reflected by the experience of conducting research. Suspicion of the 
researcher is justifiable when asking politically sensitive questions. Ambivalence about 
foreign funding (see chapter six) is easily projected onto the recipient of foreign funds. 
The relevance of academic research in the face of widespread violations of rights 
which require urgent action, is difficult to recognise.
There are still many gaps in the research. It had originally been planned
 ^ During fieldwork I was to discuss PIL with academics in the Indian Law Insitute, the University 
of Delhi, the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in Pune, the National Law School University o f India 
in Bangalore, Cochin University and University of Gujarat, amongst others.
 ^ References and quotations have been given in code, to protect the confidentiality o f the 
interviewees.
 ^ Including Justice V R Krishna Iyer, Justice P N Bhagwati and Justice D A Desai.
* See 'Administering Justice' in chapter five. During my first fieldtrip, I visited the High Court in 
Ahmedabad, Gujarat, but did not call upon the Registry - I was only subsequently to realise the vital 
insight that could be gained from analysing the role o f the administration o f the Court in the 
management of PIL.
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that a few cases would be studied in their entirety, accounting, first-hand, for the 
perspective of the potential beneficiaries of PIL.^ This was not possible because those 
beneficiaries who were accessible work with or have links with organisations, are a 
small minority, and cannot be taken as a sample.*® Other insoluble difficulties were 
encountered, such as differences in language. To include potential beneficiaries into 
the ambit of research would have required much unstructured and relaxed discussion 
time and could not be combined with research in the offices of busy lawyers, a heavy 
schedule of appointments and the need to be near a telephone for repeated return calls. 
I have had to rely on discussion with other participants in PIL or on other written 
studies for this aspect of research. Limitations inherent in the conduct of research are 
illustrated by the letters I sent to all the regional editors of the All India Reporter - 
only one reply was received from Goa.
The division of the cases in chapters three and four into issue-based 
sections is itself a product of field research. Whilst commonalities do exist between 
the cases, as already seen in the general categorisation of cases (see chapter two), the 
differing legal management of issues is of central concern. Conspicuous by its absence 
is a section discussing cases filed for tribal and “untouchable” peoples. Recognised as 
constituting the most disadvantaged groups of people, they are the easiest people to 
displace and to harass. PIL seems to be ideally conceived for people who have rarely 
been able to approach the courts themselves. There is no separate chapter because 
there is no one story. Grouped together under the official descriptions “Scheduled 
Caste”, “Scheduled Tribe” and “Other Backward Classes", the people who constitute
This reflects Bryant Garth's conclusion, after a study o f class actions in the USA, that there is a 
need to consider:
not just what happens in lawyers' offices and courts, and not just the results, but also the 
complex situation of the persons whose statuses are constructed and lives inevitably affected 
by the filing and conduct of litigation.
Garth, Bryant, 'Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action', Law and Society Review, Vol 26 
No 2, 1992, 237-271 at 269. Some aspects o f this are presented in the case studies.
Accessability was limited partly because the constant flux in the labour market encourages 
migration, and documentation of residence and workplace are rarely kept, in the few occasions that such 
documents had existed.
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these groups could not be more diverse. The case chapters are riddled with cases 
relating to tribal peoples.'^ One study of bonded labourers put the percentage from 
scheduled castes and tribes at 86.6%.^  ^The cases relating to slum dwellers, prisoners, 
and those displaced by development projects, are examples of in which scheduled 
castes and tribes have a disproportionately high stake.
Prisons and State Institutions
The duty of the State to ensure the well-being of those in its care is 
nowhere more apparent than in relation to prisons and other state institutions. 
Removed from the rest of society, as a punishment, for protection or for care, the 
inmates of such institutions are dependent upon the State for all aspects of their life. 
It is because the State has failed to treat such people with a semblance of dignity that 
these cases have come before the Court. Cases relating to prisons and prisoners, 
mental health and detention,hospitals'^ and institutions for w o m e n a l l  reveal a
" The term “scheduled” refers to the schedule in the constitution in which the designated 
communities are listed.
'■ 1 use this terminology not to create the sense that all “tribal” people display similar identifying 
characteristics, but because this is the term used in many of the petitions and judgments.
Marla, Sarma Bonded Labour in India: A National Survey on the Incidence o f Bonded Labour, 
Final Report, January 1981 (Academy of Gandhi an Studies, Hyderabad, 1981).
In addition to those documented, many other cases have been filed. For example in the Kerala 
High Court on behalf of people from the Kuchar community in the Kelakam-Kannur whose person and 
property had been attacked at the behest of local landlords, after allegations of theft of some arika nuts 
had been denied. A X Verghese, advocate, interview, 8/93. Another case was filed on behalf o f people 
from the Irula community, traditional snake catchers who extract snake venom for a serum. The petition 
challenged the imposition of a royalty on the income made from the serum. Sriram Panchhu, advocate, 
interview, Madras, 4/93.
Rudul Sah v State o f Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086; Veena Sethi v State o f  Bihar and others (1982) 
2 SCC 583; Sant Bir v State o f  Bihar 1982 (1) SCALE 144 [668]; B R Kapoor and others v Union o f  
India and others AIR 1990 SC 752; S P Sathe v State o f  Maharashtra', Rakesh Chandra Narain v State 
o f  Bihar 1986 (Supp) SCC 576, AIR 1989 SC 348 and 1993 (4) SCALE 103 [509]; E Chidamabaram 
V State o f Bihar, People's Council for Social Justice and others vs State o f  Kerala', Sheela Barse v
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common concern.'® Various strands of concern can be identified including the long 
pendency of criminal cases , the  use of fetters, handcuffs and solitary confinement,^® 
torture,^' the exploitation of prison labour,^  ^conditions in prisons,^^ the courts' concern 
that the petitioners approach an appropriate forum,^'' access to prisons,^^ sentencing, 
detention and parole.^®
Union o f  India and another (1993) 4 SCC 204.
Free Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur v Mahatama Gandhi Memorial Medical College Hospital, 
Sakchi, Jamshedpur 1987 (1) SCALE 327 [1321]; Parmanand Katara v Union o f  India and others AIR 
1989 SC 2039; Siddha Raj Dhadda v State o f Rajasthan AIR 1990 Raj 34; E Sharma v State o f  Assam  
and others AIR 1992 Gau 58; Social Action and Legal Aid Society v State o f  Kerala and others', 
Paschim Banga Khat Majoor Samity and another v The State o f  West Bengal and another, Niamathulla 
V State o f Kerala 1992 (2) KLT 699; regarding a diagnostic clinic for CT scanning; C V Sathyan v State 
o f  Kerala & others.
Upendra Baxi v State o f Uttar Pradesh and another (Agra protective home) 1982 (1) SCALE 
84 [502], (1983) 2 SCC 308 and (1986) 4 SCC 106 / AIR 1987 SC 191; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v 
State o f  Bihar AIR 1988 SC 1782; Chinnamma Sivadas v State (Delhi Admn.) 1992 (3) SCALE 31 [85].
In the section on 'Children' there are cases on prisons, many o f which highlight many o f the same 
issues as those in this chapter.
Hussainara Khatoon and others v Home Secretary, State o f  Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81, (1980) 1 
SCC 81, (1980) 1 SCC 93, (1980) 1 SCC 98, (1980) 1 SCC 108 and (1980) 1 SCC 115; Kadra 
Pehadiya and others v State o f Bihar AIR 1981 SC 939; Mathew Areeparmtil & Ors v State o f  Bihar 
& Ors AIR 1984 SC 1854 / 1984 (2) SCALE 85 [402]; regarding conditions in Aizwal Central Jail.
Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 526; Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev 
etc. V State o f Rajasthan AIR 1981 SC 625; Aeltemesh Rein v Union o f  India (1988) 4 SCC 54.
Sunil Batra (II) v Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 488; Rakesh Kaushik v B L Vig, 
Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi and another AIR 1981 SC 1767; Anil Yadav and others v State 
o f  Bihar and others 1982 (1) SCALE 43 [278] and (1981) 1 SCC 622; Khatri and others v State o f  
Bihar and others (1981) 1 SCC 623, (1981) 1 SCC 627, (1981) 1 SCC 635, (1981) 2 SCC 493 and 
1983 (2) SCC 266.
"■ In the matter of: Prison Reforms Enhancement o f  Wages o f  Prisoners etc AIR 1983 Ker 261; 
Poola Bhaskara Vijayakumar v State o f  Andhra Pradesh and another AIR 1988 AP 295; Gurdev Singh 
and others v State o f Himachal Pradesh and others AIR 1992 HP 76.
Regarding prisoners in Karnataka; a letter detailing conditions in Ranchi Central Jail; In Re: A 
Prisoner 1993 (2) KLT 10; for an inquiry into jail conditions in Srinagar.
In Re the Petitions o f Nawal Thakur, a convict kept in the Kulu Jail (1984) 3 SCC 572.
Sheela Barse v State o f Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96, (1987) 4 SCC 373.
R M Tewari v Home Secretary, State o f U P &  Ors 1991 (1) SCALE 71 [249]; Simranjit Singh 
Mann v Union o f  India & Anr 1992 (2) SCALE 102 [506]; Karamjeet Singh v Union o f  India JT 1992 
(5) SC 598; V J  Jayakumar Abraham v State o f  Kerala & others.
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The first question to be raised when examining how the issues have 
been framed, is - who has been removed from society and why? The failure of the 
criminal justice system to dispense justice quickly and the questionable methods by 
which the mentally unstable have been committed to institutions and jails, has led to 
a situation where many people have been confined without a valid reason and with 
little attention paid to their needs. The undertrial (remand) prisoner has been a 
particular focus in the cases, as many have been detained for lengthy periods, without 
having their guilt tested. The majority of such inmates belong to economically and 
socially disadvantaged sections of the population, to scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes, easily intimidated and harassed by officials. The second consideration is to 
examine the conditions of this confinement. Provided with few basic amenities, such 
as water and clothing, the inmates of State institutions have had to live in appalling 
conditions. Violent and corrupt, these institutions foster many of the characteristics 
which initially led to the imprisonment of an individual.
It was investigative journalism that was the catalyst in framing these 
issues. More and more journalists began to investigate the conditions in jails, exposing 
the delays in trials, and the incidence of torture and deprivation. These revelations 
were supported by a series of judgments given by the Supreme Court, mainly by 
Justice Krishna Iyer, in which the rights of prisoners had begun to be enunciated and 
criminology discussed in ways that were new to the Court.^^ Responding to this 
situation, petitions were filed by advocates and letters sent to the Court by prisoners 
and legal aid organisations.
The legal framework governing prisons and other institutions is 
comprised of old manuals and enactments, for example the Prisons Act, 1894.^  ^ The 
ethos of punishment as a deterrent, the lack of accountability of the administration and
See 'PIL Begins' and 'Gaining Access to Justice' in chapter two for discussion o f these cases. 
Also see Gonsalves, Colin; Desai, Mihir and Cox, Jane, Leading Cases on Prisoner's Rights, (A Legal 
Resource Centre Publication, Bombay, [198?]); Ganesh, M S, Public Interest Litigation Concerning 
Prisons' in Gandhi, P K, Social Action through Law, (Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1985), 
127-135.
Amendments have been made, for example in the Delhi manual which was “modified” in 1988,
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the unwillingness to provide prisoners with any facilities has been exacerbated by the 
overcrowding endemic in jails. The petitions demonstrated how the prison 
administration, like the criminal justice system, was not functioning correctly, if at all.
Similarly, it was only by the enactment of the Mental Health Act. 1987 
that the Indian Lunacv Act. 1912 was superseded. Many “sane” persons were 
confined, as the separate categories of criminal and non-criminal lunatics were not 
based on sound criteria and the elaborate procedure for release was prolonged by a 
mal-functioning administration. Much the same situation has existed in hospitals and 
institutions for women. It is government-run institutions, established for the care of 
those unable to afford private facilities, or without a family willing or able to impart 
the necessary care, that have been the subject of petitions.
Access to Justice
As prisons and prisoners were the subject of the first PIL matters, the 
Court can be seen taking its first tentative steps in broadening the scope of its 
jurisdiction and relaxing procedural barriers. Access to justice had been the major 
obstacle preventing those confined from approaching the Court. By invoking Article 
39A of the Constitution and discussing the need for legal aid, the Court responded to 
the horrific situations brought before it. For the first time. Supreme Court judges 
conceded that the Court had only concerned itself with a small proportion of the 
population.^^
The first recorded public interest litigation order in the Supreme Court 
came in a habeas corpus case filed by an advocate on the basis of a news report.^® On 
being appraised of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court relaxed the procedural rule
In Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev op cit note 20 at 627 Justice Krishna Iyer referred to the elitist 
strands and lucrative slant of the Court.
Hussainara Khatoon op cit note 19. Also see the discussion 'PIL Begins' and 'Gaining Access 
to Justice' in chapter two.
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that a habeas corpus petition be filed with a power of attorney or by a close relative. 
The distinction between a letter-petition, which could be sent by an aggrieved 
individual, and a PIL has never been fully clarified because of the genesis of the 
letter-petition in habeas corpus proceedings. The letter became the key to gaining 
access to the Court, and often the Court was urged to, and did, give orders covering 
a whole class, be they prisoners or undertrials. The first PILs were in the form of 
letters from convicts which departed from the standard plea in habeas corpus letter- 
petitions.^' By appointing advocates as amicus curiae and directing that legal aid be 
made mandatory, the Court welcomed the cases brought before it.^ ^
The common practice of filing habeas corpus petitions has continued, 
but with the exception of the first, notable, cases which pioneered the way for future 
cases, none have been studied. The mass of litigation on habeas corpus matters could 
itself be the subject of a thesis. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged its 
inability to deal with the volume of complaints received, stating that the High Court 
should first be approached.”
The locus standi of the petitioners in this chapter has rarely been 
questioned. The marked division between the academics. Journalists, advocates or legal 
aid committees, and the inmates whose rights are in question, has meant that mala 
fides was unlikely.^"* Similarly, the justiciability of the issues have been clear in the
Many letters were sent to individual judges, for example to Justice Bhagwati in his capacity as 
Chairman of CILAS. One such letter was sent by the Free Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur regarding 
the case of an undertrial inmate of a Bihar Jail who had been waiting for nine years for her trial. The 
letter told that she had delivered her child in jail and that her son had spent eight years in prison and 
asked that she be released on a personal bond. See [anon], 'Undertrial Woman in Bihar', PUCL Bulletin, 
Vol 1 No 7, Nov 1981, 30.
As in Sunil Batra (II) op cit note 21, Gurdev Singh op cit note 22 and Kishore Singh Ravinder 
Dev op cit note 20.
” \n In Re the Petitions o f  Nawal Thakur op cit note 24 the Supreme Court considered neither the 
justiciability of the complaints was not questioned, not the locus standi o f the petitioners, when directing 
the letters to the relevant High Court.
In the only case in which the locus standi o f the petitioners was questioned, E Sharma op cit note 
16, the petition was not concerned with indigence.
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light of constitutional provisions. Nonetheless, the Court refused to allow third party 
interference in death sentence cases on the ground that it was up to the convicted 
persons to file for themselves.^^
Gaining access to the courts may have become easier, but an 
examination of a case on non-criminal lunatics shows how access has not necessarily 
been quickly available.^^ The letter in question was sent to the Chief Justice of India 
on 27/1/89, it was received by the Public Interest Litigation Cell of the Supreme Court 
16/2/89,^^ an office note was put up to Justice G L Oza on 7/4/89 and finally on 
11/4/89 it was ordered that the letter be treated as a petition. The arbitrary nature of 
the procedure for admitting a PIL petition is highlighted, as Justice Oza could have 
refused to admit the letter as a writ petition had he chosen to take the advice offered 
by the Registry (see chapter five).
The Court’s Response
In many of these cases, the Court has proceeded without an appropriate 
conception of the context of the grievance. There are only two recorded instances in 
which a sitting judge has visited a jail to see in person the conditions there. In the first 
case filed by Sunil Batra^* which was not a PIL, Justice Krishna Iyer visited Tihar Jail, 
Delhi and in the case filed by Smriti Acharya, two judges of the Mizoram Bench of 
the Guwahati High Court visited Aizawl Central Jail. Initially, ad-hoc orders were 
given, with very little rhetoric, unlike those given in other notable PILs.^^
Simranjit Singh Mann and Karamjeet Singh op cit note 26. 
Sheela Barse op cit note 15.
37 For an analysis o f the functioning of this cell see Chapter 5.
Sunil Batra (I) v Delhi Administration and others (1978) 4 SCC 494. In this case the petitioner- 
prisoner complained of being kept in solitary confinement, while under sentence of death. The Court, 
in a detailed judgment, discussed jail conditions and the rights of prisoners.
For example in Anil Yadav and Khatri op cit note 21, both on the same incidents o f torture, the 
Court dealt with the cases separately, giving similar orders, but without linking the two.
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The Court's activism in this area has been self-critical, both admitting 
and depicting the failure of the criminal justice system, a judicially caused failure. By 
stating that speedy justice is a fundamental right, the Court acknowledged that the 
rights of undertrials were violated by delays and procedural difficulties.'^^ Moreover 
the legislative framework in which the Court has had to operate has been criticised, 
and the Court has noted the need to amend the Prisons Act. 1894 and to overhaul the 
Prison Manual.However,  the Court declined to issue a direction to the State to 
implement the Mental Health Act. 1987, on the grounds that it was not within the 
powers of a court.'^  ^The activism has been limited in other ways, as there is very little 
evidence of any action taken against prison administrators, despite the Court's 
acknowledgement that prison officers responsible for violations of constitutional and 
statutory rights need to be punished.'’^
There have been developments in the law relating to prisons. The 
conditions of confinement of undertrial prisoners were greatly improved as the Court 
held that they could not be held in fetters or tortured, and relaxed bail procedure. The 
Court has held that Article 21 of the Constitution incorporated the right to a speedy 
triaf'^ and in many cases the right to free legal aid was stressed. Although the 
applicability of Article 23 of the Constitution to prison labour has been considered, 
no consensus has emerged.'^  ^ Similarly, the prisoner's right to society and not to be
In addition to the cases in this chapter, many other petitions have been filed - eg. Govind 
Mukhoty V Delhi Administration (W P No 1119 o f 1982) filed in the Supreme Court referring to the 
conditions under which 35 undertrial foreigners were confined in Tihar Jail, Delhi, and by the PUCL 
in the J & K HC asking for a list o f detenues lodged in various jails. See Imroze, Parvez, 'Srinagar 
PUCL', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 11 No 12, Dec 1991, 16-17.
For example see Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev op cit note 20.
E Chidambaram op cit note 15.
See Sunil Batra (II), Anil Yadav and Khatri op cit note 21. In the last reported order in Khatri, 
in 1982, the Court directed that the trial o f the police officials must go on speedily. There has been no 
subsequent reported order stating the results o f any trial.
Hussainara Khatoon op cit note 19.
The exploitation o f prison labour was first referred to by the Supreme Court in Sunil Batra (II) 
op cit note 21. See In the matter of: Prison Reform, Gurdev Singh and Poola Bhaskara Vijayakumar 
op cit note 22.
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placed, unnecessarily, in solitary confinement was asserted by the Court,"*^  but access 
to prisons has not been clearly conferred as a right/^
While realising the unsuitability of putting “lunatics” and children in 
prison, the Court has limited its response to condemning such practices and has 
provided little alternative.'*  ^Nonetheless, notable orders have been passed, which have 
been repeatedly used in later cases .T h e  procedure for a declaration of sanity has 
been discussed^° and the conditions in institutions for the mentally ill^ * and for 
women^^ have been chronicled by the Court. Responding to the inaction of local 
administrative bodies, control of some institutions has been removed from the local 
arena,^  ^ and in one case, recognising the treatment of non-criminal lunatics as a 
national problem, the Court expanded the scope of the case by impleading all states. '^* 
For the first time, compensation was awarded for the abuse of a fundamental right,^^
Sunil Batra (II) op cit note 21.
Sheela Barse op cit note 25. Also see Prabha Dutt v Union o f  India (1982) 1 SCC 1. Petitions 
have been filed in the Madras HC challenging the refusal o f the Jail Administration in the State of 
Tamil Nadu to provide facilities to lawyers to meet prisoners and to conduct interviews and challenging 
the validity of circulars issued by the Inspector-General o f Police which stated that lawyers should not 
be allowed to interview prisoners. The HC passed orders declaring that lawyers should be given all 
safeguards in conducting confidential interviews with prisoners. S S Vasudevan, advocate, interview, 
Madras, 4/93.
In Kadra Pehadiya op cit note 19 the Court ordered that the undertrials stand trial even though 
they were only aged between nine and eleven when arrested, and in Hussainara Khatoon op cit note 
19 the Court noted that women were held in “protective custody” in prisons.
See Veena Sethi op cit note 15.
Rudul Sah op cit note 15.
Rakesh Chand Narain op cit note 15
Upendra Baxi op cit note 17.
B R Kapoor op cit note 15 and Rakesh Chand Narain op cit note 15.
Sheela Barse op cit note 15.
Although the issue of compensation for violation of Article 21 of the Constitution was raised in 
Anil Yadav op cit note 21 and Khatri op cit note 21, it not until Rudul Sah op cit note 15 that 
compensation was awarded. Whilst not a PIL, this case has had seminal importance for PILs filed on 
many issues.
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a practice that was to gain some credence.
Many of the cases on non-criminal lunatics can be described as ideal- 
type PILs.^  ^ From their antecedents and method of gaining access, to the kinds of 
issues raised, the petitioners brought issues of the disadvantaged and deprived to the 
Court. The development of these cases in Court has shown remarkable perseverance, 
given the unresponsiveness of the concerned authorities and the abuses of rights 
brought to the fore. Commissions have been appointed, enquiries conducted and the 
cases have been monitored by the judges.^^
The investigation and monitoring that has been taken on by the Court 
has been supplemented by the affirmation of the Court's power to intervene and decide 
with reference to the issue before it. In one case, the Court appointed four separate 
commissions to monitor implementation,^^ whilst in another the Rajasthan High Court 
affinned its duty to investigate in a case, in spite of being unable to order the 
Government to constitutite a commission of enquiry.^° In this context, the Court 
discussed rules of evidence,^* and mobilised the media in support of its orders. 
Nonetheless, the Court's inability to appreciate poverty is reinforced by an order from 
Kerala. It was held that even a skinflint could afford the Rs.2 needed for a 
homoeopathic consultation.^
In Paschim Banga op cit note 16 the Court awarded compensation, while acknowledging that its 
order may have wide-reaching financial implications.
Upendra Baxi op cit note 17, Rakesh Chandra Narain op cit note 15 and Sheela Barse op cit note
15.
For other examples, see B R Kapoor and Rakesh Chandra Narain op cit note 15.
B R Kapoor op cit note 15.
60 Siddha Raj Dhadda op cit note 16.
See Khatri op cit note 21 and Siddha Raj Dhadda op cit note 16 for a discussion of newspapers 
as evidence.
Parmanand Katara op cit note 16.
Niamathulla op cit note 16.
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The Contribution of PIL
Violations of rights continue in jail and other institutions under state
control. The innovative decisions that have been made have had little lasting effect,
with the exception of individual instances of a home or hospital or prison, and the
catalytic role of the courts’ orders has not been realised. As one petitioner noted,
monitoring a case can only affect the situation in one state institution, and described
the aim of the case on the Agra Protective Home '^  ^ as being to find model rules for
the whole country:
We were very fortunate with Agra, there has been real progress. The 
District Magistrate visits the home and reports each month. I never 
have any regrets about the case. I do have fears, that these injustices 
will continue. It is not enough because it is just one home in one huge 
country. The rules need to be accepted state-wise, and we will argue 
for this in the next hearing. First let them accept it for Agra and then 
we will ask for U P and the whole of India. There shouldn't be any 
difficulty. The U P State Counsel thinks it should cover the whole of 
U P.""
However, the case may be finally decided, and the fear remains that the situation will 
revert to the days before Court intervention highlighted the ineffective, irresponsible 
and even callous administration.
Certain decisions, because of their more generalised nature, have 
effected changes in the status of enacted law and procedure. By stating that hospitals 
cannot refuse to treat “medico-legal” cases, in which injury has to be reported to the 
police, a new precedent has been set.^  ^However, the Court has often stopped short of 
giving a meaningful order. For example, the constitutional validity of the Indian 
Lunacv Act. 1912 has not been considered. A critique of the Court’s orders noted that 
in addition to not examining the validity of the 1912 Act in the context of Article 21
Upendra Baxi op cit note 17.
Lotika Sarkar, interview, New Delhi, 22/1/91.
Parmanand Katara op cit note 16. See the section on 'Consumer Issues' for: Cosmopolitan 
Hospital & Anr v Vasantha P Nair 1992 (3) SCALE 59 [228].
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of the Constitution, there were many other problems. The Court orders focussed on 
the institution and not on the inmate. The basic reason for the petitions' existence (the 
violation of fundamental rights) was obscured, and at no point in the litigation did the 
Court consider the rights of the mentally ill.^ ^
After the Bhagalpur blindings, although the police officers concerned 
were arrested, those who disclosed the facts were victimised.^® This resistance of the 
administration to the problems of the underprivileged was echoed by the Court when 
adivasi undertrials, after being detained for many years, were warned not to take the 
law into their own hands and instead to depend on the criminal justice sy s tem .In  the 
absence of an effective legal system, can the Court expect law and order to be upheld? 
Moreover, the courts demonstrate little awareness of the reasons for resorting to crime, 
and the criminals, and preventive steps that could be taken.
The difficulties of the petitioners cannot be underestimated. When filing 
the case regarding non-criminal lunatics in Aizwal Central Jail, one petitioner 
described how the authorities changed all the figures and details in their documents, 
that related to the implementation of the 1987 Mental Health Act. She was then 
tlireatened with a defamation suit.^° One analyst of the cases filed for undertrials in 
Bihar noted that the official figures available for the number of such prisoners did not 
reveal the true situation, and that the cases only related to a tiny proportion of the 
affected people.^^ Again, in the cases on the Bhagalpur Blindings, the State was
See the discussion of B R Kapoor op cit note 15 in Muralidhar, S 'In House and Out Rights: Is 
institutionalisation subversive of the rights of the mentally ill?', Legal Perspectives, No 25, 34-38. Also 
see Muralidhar, S, “An Empirical Evaluation of the Implementation of the Supreme Court Orders 
Concerning the Hospital for Mental Diseases, Shahdara, Delhi”, (unpublished LLM report, University 
of Nagpur, 1991). At the time that this analysis was written, although the Mental Health Act. 1987 had 
been enacted, it had not been notified.
See Dhagamwar, Vasudha, 'Trends in Public Interest Litigation; Straws in the Wind', monograph, 
ILS Law College, Diamond Jubilee Volume 1985, 17-25 for a discussion of Khatri and Anil Yadav op 
cit note 21.
Mathew Areeparmtil op cit note 19.
™ Smriti Acharya, interview, Pune, 4/93.
Dhagamwar, Vasudha (1985).
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obdurate in its response:
the Bihar Government adopted an attitude of obstruction if not hostility. 
Police and jail officials who disclosed the facts were victimised, the 
press was accused of sensation mongering, and told not to make the 
police nervous and the people insecure.
Although some exceptions do exist to the squalid and violent 
institutions described in the petitions, notably an institution called 'NIMHANS' in 
Bangalore and Tihar Jail in New Delhi, they are not the norm.^^ Little has resulted 
from the numerous orders given by the courts. Thus, in the introduction to a casebook 
on prisoners' rights, the cases documented were described as merely of academic 
interest, or perhaps appealing to “the brooding spirit of law [and] the intelligence of 
a future day”.^ "^
The Police
The cases in this section encompass concern for the maintenance of law
Ibid. at 20.
See Rahman, M, "Wages of success', India Today, 31/5/95, 42-45.
Justice Hughes as quoted in Gonsalves, Colin; Desai, Mihir and Cox, Jane ([198?]) at 2. For 
repeated calls for the implementation of Supreme Court directives see Report o f a Seminar on 
“Criminal Justice in India. Problems and Perspectives”, 6-8 May 1994, SCOPE Convention Centre, New  
Delhi', (Law Commission of India, 1994). Although concern was initially articulated on the political 
arena, when the SC began to give judgments, they seems to be little consequence. See 'Prevention of  
Delay in putting up Challans o f Undertrials in Court', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 6 Session 7 Vol 22, 
21 /2/79, 98-99; ' Steps taken to expedite Court Proceedings in respect o f undertrial prisoners', Lok Sabha 
Debates, Series 6 Session 7 Vol 27, 9/5/79, 70-71; 'Supreme Court Directive Regarding Release of  
Undertrials in States', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 6 Session 8 Vol 28, 11/7/79, 162-63; 'Supreme Court 
Observation in Sunil Batra's case', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 7 Session 2 Vol 15, 8/4/81, 165-67;
' Supreme Court observation re. undertrial Prisoners in Jails', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 7 Session 2 Vol 
12, 19/2/81, 185-6; Supreme Court's orders re: release ofTihar Juvenile prisoners',
Series 7 Session 7 Vol 42, 16/11/83, 150-1.
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and order (morchas or demonstrations and r a l l i e s , r i o t s , p o l i c e  protection,^^ 
general^*), petitions filed after the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Nadiad was publicly 
handcuffed and humiliated by the police,^^ the incidence of custodial violence,^® police 
firings and deaths in “encounters” with the police,^^ police negligence,*^ investigations 
and corruption.*^ With the exception of complaints that the police and administration
Rupinder Singh Sodhi and another v Union o f  India and others AIR 1983 SC 65; 
Sankaranarayanan and others v State o f Kerala AIR 1986 Ker 82; Supreme Court Bar Clerks 
Association (Regd) v Delhi Administration and others 1991 (2) SCALE 194 [1042].
Rajendran v V Vayalar Ravi and others 1983 KLT 100 and T A Rajendran v State o f  Kerala 
1984 RLT 113; filed by Madhu Kishwar and others on the Delhi riots in 1984; Peoples Union for  
Democratic Rights and another v Ministry o f Home Affairs AIR 1985 Del 268; R Gandhi and others
V Union o f India and another AIR 1989 Mad 205 and State o f  Tamil Nadu v R Gandhi and others', 
Nathulal Jain, Advocate and others v State o f Rajasthan and others AIR 1993 Raj 149.
Hindustani Andolan and others v State o f  Punjab and others AIR 1984 SC 582.
P M  Antony v Distt. Collector & Ors 1986 (2) SCALE 290 [1254].
In the Matter o f  Complaint received from Delhi Judicial Service Association Tis Hazari Court, 
Delhi 1989 (2) SCALE 119 [654], 1989 (2) SCALE 140 [748] and 1989 (2) SCALE 174 [877] together 
with Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v State o f  Gujarat and others AIR 
1991 SC 2176.
D K  Basu V State o f West Bengal and Ashok K  Johri v State o f  U  P; Social Action and Legal Aid 
Society/ v State o f Kerala and others', Rajasthan Kisan Sangathan v State o f  Rajasthan and others AIR 
1989 Raj 10; SAHELI, a Women's Resources Centre through Ms. Nalini Bhanot and others v 
Commissioner o f Police, Delhi and others AIR 1990 SC 513; Peoples Union o f Democratic Rights 
through its Secretary and Anr v Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters & Anr 1989 (1) 
SCALE 114 [599]; Sunil Gupta and others v State o f Madhya Pradesh and others (1990) 3 SCC 119; 
Pratul Kumar Sinha v State o f West Bengal', "Re Death o f  Sawinder Singh Grover” 1992 (3) SCALE 
15 [34]; Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v State o f  Assam. Although relating to the Enforcement 
Directorate and not the police, "Re Death o f Sawinder Singh Grover” has been included in this section.
Chaitanya Kalbagh and others v State o f U P  and others AIR 1989 SC 1452; People's Union for  
Democratic Rights v State o f Bihar and others AIR 1987 SC 355; P V Kapoor and another v Union 
o f  India and another 1991 (3) Delhi Lawyers 391 (DB); R S Sodhi, Advocate, People's Union fo r  Civil 
Liberties v State o f U P &  Ors 1991 (2) SCALE 81 [463]; People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)
V Union o f India & others'. All India Democratic Women's Association v The State o f  Tamil Nadu and 
others.
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, through its Hon'y Secretary v State o f  Bihar and others 
(1991) 3 SCC 482.
State o f West Bengal and others v Sampat Lai (1985) 1 SCC 317; Association fo r  Protection o f  
Public Rights and Interest through its Secretary v State o f  Bihar and others and Union o f  India and 
another v Association for Protection o f Public Rights and Interest through its Secretary Shri 
Sachidanand Singh and another, Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association Chandigarh through 
its secretary v State o f  Punjab and others 1993 (4) SCALE 147 [636].
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has been inefficient in its duty to maintain law and o r d e r ,m o s t  of the cases 
document allegations of abuse or misuse of police power.
Members of the police force are considered to hold civil posts, within 
the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The police force is governed by central 
Police Regulations. 1943 and local regulations, framed under the Police Act. 1861, 
which prescribe the internal procedures and disciplinary measures .In  most instances, 
police powers are determined by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973.*^
The petitioners in the PIL cases filed against the police have largely 
been advocates and organisations concerned with civil liberties, who, in the absence 
of another forum have invoked the Fundamental Rights. While accepting the need for 
a police force, cases have been filed out of concern for the misconduct of those acting 
to uphold state power, both in negative and positive te rm s .T he  inaction and for tacit 
complicity of the police during riots has been challenged,^* along with the acts 
committed in the line of duty including “encounters”*^  and custodial violence.^®
For other cases on this issue see the section on 'Bonded Labour' for Karneshwar Prasad Sharma, 
'Slave President', Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Bihar 1983 (2) SCALE 160 [897] and 1983 (2) SCALE 161 
[897] in which the Court directed that police protection be provided to the petitioner and villagers. 
Contrast with the case of Pradeep Prabhu in the section on Environment and Resources' filed because 
of police harassment of tribal cultivators, the case of Self Employed Women's Association and others 
in the section on 'Urban Space', filed because of police harassment of vendors and Janwadi Mahila 
Samiti and another (Crl W P No 221 of 1988) in the section on 'Injustices Specific to Women', filed 
after a woman activist was injured during a demonstration after a police lathicharge.
Also applicable are the rules made under section 241 of the Government of India Act. 1935 in 
so far as they are consistent with the Constitution.
Certain states, such as Nagaland, and areas are exempt from specified provisions o f the Code.
See the section on 'Injustices Specific to Women' for petitions filed complaining of rapes by 
members of the police: Rameezabee; P Rathinam v State o f  Gujarat 1987 (2) SCALE 317 [1464]; In 
the matter of: Judical Enquiry into Gang-Rape Demanded, and. Concerted Demand fo r  Judicial Probe 
(1988) 1 GauLR 489. In Niloy Dutta v District Magistrate, Sibsagar District (1991) 2 GauLR 217, the 
Court issued guidelines on the interrogation of women by the army and police.
In addition to those documented, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court in 1992 by the PUCL 
after the Seelampur riots in Delhi.
During “encounters” with terrorists or secessionist groups, the police have killed people all over 
the country. In the petitions, these killings have been challenged as unnecessary and described as extra­
judicial.
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In the petitions on law and order the court has been asked to arbitrate 
between fundamental rights when a conflict is perceived. While one case argues that 
the freedom of movement is paramount, another highlights the limitations of the 
freedom of expression.^^ The difference in the perception of the petitioners displays 
both the difficulties faced by the administration in the management of public spaces 
and the limitations placed on dissent.
Detailing encounter deaths in different parts of India, one petition 
demonstrates how recourse to the law was taken to solve a predominantly political 
problem, resistance to dissent by the police.^^ In spite of being discouraged, by Justice 
Bhagwati, from bringing this issue to the Supreme Court,^  ^ the petition was filed as 
it was felt there was nothing to be lost by approaching the Courts.
The media has been a catalyst in raising many of the issues. It was after 
reading of the situation of Sikhs in Coimbatore after the riots in 1984 that an advocate 
made an enquiry into the matter and a case was filed. Similarly, the petition filed after 
the Mandai riots by advocate P V Kapoor was motivated by an issue of the video 
magazine News track. The attention given to the Nadiad incident bolstered what was 
to become one of the seminal PIL cases relating to the police. News reports detailing 
incidents of custodial violence formed a major part of the petition filed by D K Basu 
in the Calcutta High Court. '^^
See the section on Prisons and State Institutions’ for cases on custodial violence, specifically
Sheela Barse op cit note 25.
See Rupinder Singh Sodhi op cit note 75 and Hindustani Andolan op cit note 77 respectively. 
Also see Supreme Court Bar Clerks Association op cit note 75.
Chaitanya Kalbagh op cit note 81.
One of the petitioners described how he, Rajni Kothari and Claude Alvares had gone to see 
Justice Bhagwati at the insistance of Ganshyam Pardesi. K Manoharan, interview, Madras, 13/4/93.
Even the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee op cit note 82 petitioned the Court in response to 
a newspaper article.
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Access to Justice
Media attention on the issues brought to the Court has enabled easier 
access and raised the profile of the issues. For example, the publicity afforded to the 
devastating effects of riots, police firings and custodial violence have given the 
petitions a validity that they may otherwise have lacked.^^ The Court has responded 
to letters as writ petitions,^^ but, in view of the PIL guidelines it is unclear whether 
the petition would have been admitted without the intervention of the Supreme Court 
Legal Aid Commit tee .As  in cases in many other sections, the Court refused to 
consider a specific request that it direct the government to institute an inquiry under 
the Commissions of Inquirv Act. 1952.^*
The Court's Response
The variable responses of the courts is illustrated by the orders in the 
petitions on riots, as each High Court has responded differently. The lack of 
consistency extends throughout the cases on the police.*^  ^ Moreover, there is little 
correlation in the courts' response to the petitions filed on behalf of Sikhs after the 
riots which followed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination.
Protecting its own officers and asserting support for its own institution.
In "Re Death o f Sawinder Singh Grover” op cit note 80 the Court responded to a news report 
by registering a case suo moto.
For example Rajasthan Kisan Sangathana op cit note 80.
All India Democratic Women's Association op cit note 81. For the full text o f the guidelines, see
Appendix B, and for a discussion see chapter five.
Peoples Union for Democratic Rights op cit note 80. Similarly, in responding to the Nadiad
incident, the Court noted that the enquiry ordered had been for the benefit o f the Supreme Court and 
not within the meaning of the 1952 Act. In this way, it was careful not to overstep the prescribed 
judicial function.
In Nathulal Jain op cit note 76 the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the reference to the Railways 
Act. 1890, but in Pratul Kumar Sinha op cit note 80 the Calcutta High Court invoked the same act to 
support its direction that a solatium fund be established.
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the Supreme Court's response to the Nadiad incident was both detailed and 
exhaus t ive .W hen alerted of the treatment of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, who had 
been handcuffed, paraded in the streets and photographed, on the charge of having 
breached the prohibition law in Gujarat, the Court acted with uncommon speed. From 
the beginning of the litigation, the issue was articulated with reference to the judiciary, 
rather than as another instance of institutional violence by the police. A series of 
unusually rigorous and comprehensive orders followed. In October 1989, the Court 
ordered the transfer of the relevant officers and ordered that a copy of the order be 
published in the newspaper media. Contempt powers were assumed on behalf of the 
lower judiciary as the Court upheld the rule of law by the courts in the face of an 
encroaching “Police Raj”. Criminal cases were directed to be lodged against the police 
officers concerned, who were to be arrested if they failed to appear in Court. Because 
of the conflict over what had actually happened, a High Court judge was appointed 
as commissioner to enquire into the matter.
The inclination of the courts to pay specific attention to questions 
concerning the judiciary is seen repeatedly. After filing a petition on custodial deaths 
in the Calcutta High Court, advocate D K Basu became a judge of the Court. In a 
lengthy judgment^°^ he dealt with questions already raised in his earlier petition, 
accepted that there is widespread abuse of power by the police, and dwelt on the 
security of the High Court. Enquiries into incidents of custodial violence have also 
been ordered in the case filed by Saheli, the Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights 
and by the Rajasthan Kisan Sangathana, and compensation has been awarded, but 
there is little evidence of any action taken against members of the police force.
In a number of cases the Court has ordered that a Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) enquiry be conducted. For example in both the cases filed by the
In the Matter o f  Complaint received op cit note 79.
Pratul Kumar Sinha op cit note 80.
This was the first case to be heard by the Indian Peoples Human Rights Tribunal, a non­
governmental organisation.
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Hailakandi Bar Association and by the All India Democratic Women's Association, 
the Court has expressed its dissatisfaction with the way in which enquiries have been 
conducted by the state and the police. In both cases fresh enquiries were ordered. 
However, in other cases, such as the in petition filed by Chaitanya Kalbagh, the Court 
directed that the petitioners approach the State Governments. However, as respondents 
to the petition, the State Governments would be unlikely to provide any relief.
Although there is little evidence that the police has been punished for 
the crimes committed by its personnel, the Court has awarded compensation in many 
of the cases in this s e c t i o n , i n  an ad hoc, if sympathetic, manner. After the award, 
disbursement of compensation has been more problematic. In some instances, the 
Court has attempted to ensure that the compensation awarded was actually paid, °^'  ^
whilst in another the Supreme Court has stayed the disbursal of the compensation 
pending an investigation to determine the recipients.
The importance of relevant information has been s t r e s se d 'an d  the 
Court has questioned the veracity of investigations by the p o l i c e w h i l s t  having to 
trust and hope in the integrity of the CBI. Corruption in the ranks of the police has 
thus been underscored by the Courts as much as by the petitions.
See R Gandhi op cit note 76, Rajasthan Kisan Sangathan op cit note 80, People's Union for  
Democratic Rights op cit note 80, R S Sodhi op cit note 81 and the Supreme Court Legal A id Committee 
op cit note 82.
See R Candhi op cit note 76. However, in the case filed after the Arwal firing, the SC stated 
that compensation would not be payable and in the petition filed by advocate P V Kapoor, the Delhi 
HC directed the Delhi police to pay compensation because of the way in which injured persons were 
treated after the firing, but not for the firing itself.
R S Sodhi op cit note 81.
Social Action and Legal Aid Society op cit note 80.
107 Association for Protection o f Public Rights op cit note 83.
For example, in in Punjab and Haryana High Court op cit note 83 the Supreme Court ordered 
a CBI enquiry because of the alleged inefficency o f the police.
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The Contribution of PIL
Some instances of the abuse of police powers have been acknowledged 
by the courts and compensation awarded to the victims. However there are many 
examples of cases where the Court has refused to recognise police transgressions. 
Overall there has been an unwillingness by the courts to make police officers into 
adversaries. Cases have remained pending and the courts have not monitored the 
proceedings taken against police officials. The nexus between the police and the 
judiciary, as parts of the same state structure can be seen in cases where the powers 
of the police have been upheld, directly or tacitly. It is only in the lengthy judgment 
given by Justice D K Basu, a judgment which was subsequently stayed, that efforts 
were made to include voluntary or social action groups in ensuring the safety of those 
in custody, and the pivotal role of the lawyer was recognised, when they were 
described as the saviours of the victims of custodial violence.
Compensation awards have often been arbitrary and disbursement has 
been erratic making orders of the Court meaningless. It was only when the judiciary 
itself was threatened by the police, by the Nadiad incident, that police officials were 
punished by the Supreme Court. Unlike any other case of police excesses, the Court 
ordered the punishment of the police officers concerned and issued guidelines for the 
arrest of any judicial officer.’ '^ As with the orders in the previous section on 'Prisons 
and State Institutions' there have been no amendments in the laws governing police 
behaviour and no limitations prescribed for the exercise of police power.
See P V Kapoor op cit note 81 and Chaitanya Kalbagh op cit note 81. 
Pratul Kumar Sinha op cit note 80.
//Î the Matter o f  Complaint received op cit note 79.
140
The Armed Forces
Most of the cases relating to the armed forces are concerned with 
battalions stationed in areas of the nor th-east /The first section details challenges to 
the constitutional validity of the Assam Disturbed Areas Act. 1955 and the Armed 
Forces fSpecial Powers) Act. 1958/^^ the second details the three petitions and some 
of the many applications filed in the Guwahati High Court after the army operation 
in Oinam village, Senapati District, Manipur called “Operation Bluebird”,''"^  and a 
disparate collection of c a se s /A l th o u g h  there have been cases from other areas of 
the country where the army has been deployed, information on these has not been 
readily available. In addition to the cases appended to this section, petitions have been 
filed in response to rapes allegedly committed by members of the armed forces in the
"■ Interviews were conducted and case material collected during fieldwork in Guwahati and 
Shillong in June 1993.
Inderjit Barua v State o f Assam and another AIR 1983 Del 513; Human Rights Forum, Manipur 
& another v Union o f India; Naga People's Movement fo r  Human Rights v Union o f  India; People's 
Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v Union o f India; People's Union fo r  Human Rights (represented 
by Ramesh Kumar Jain and others) v Union o f  India and others AIR 1992 Gau 23; Editor, "Boodhbar” 
V Union o f  India and another. The clallenges to the 1958 Act by the People's Union for Democratic 
Rights (PUDR), the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Inderjit Barua and the 
Manipur Human Rights Forum have been pending in the SC since 1983 and are due to be listed before 
a constitutional bench. The appeal filed by the People's Union for Human Rights (PUHR) has been 
tagged onto these petitions, together with that filed by the Editor “Boodhbar”, which was tagged onto 
the PUHR petition.
Naga People's Movement fo r  Human Rights (NPMHR) v Union o f  India and others AIR 1990 
Gau 1 ; Civil Liberties and Human Rights Organisation (CLAHRO) v State; Manipur Baptist Convention 
and another v Union o f India and others. The petitions were tagged together by the High Court for final 
hearing. Members of the NPMHR and the Manipur Baptist Convention Women's Union (MBCWU), 
the petitioners in two of the cases, formed a common platform, the Co-ordinating Committee on the 
Oinam Issue (COCOI), along with others, from which they were able to deal with issues o f concern to 
all the groups.
Included in this section are Sebastian M  Hongray v Union o f  India AIR 1984 SC 571 / 1984 (1) 
SCALE 106 [629] and AIR 1984 SC 1026; two cases with the cause title H N Wanchoo v State o f  J  
& K; di petition filed by the PUCL in J & K; another case with the cause title H N Wanchoo v State; 
Gautam Uzir v State o f Assam and others; cases from Mizoram; C Thangmura v Union o f  India; 
People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v Union o f  India and others; Vanlalhruala, Chairman, Aizawl 
Bazar/Town Damaged Committee v Union o f India.
141
north-east"^ and to prevent women from being abused in custody or during 
interrogation"^ and the detention of children."*
A survey of the relevant statutory law reveals the extent of the powers 
confeiTed on the armed forces in the north-east. Both the the Assam Disturbed Areas 
Act. 1955 and the Armed Forces fSpecial Powers^ Act. 1958 give wide ranging 
powers to the army. The term “disturbed area” is not defined and protection is 
afforded to those acting under the Acts. Similarly, members of the Assam Rifles, one 
of the major bataillons of the army stationed in the north-east, have been empowered 
by the Assam Rifles Act. 1941 to act in place of the police. The Assam Disturbed 
Areas Act. 1955 was enacted to make better provision for the restoration and 
maintenance of public order in those areas of Assam considered to be disturbed."^ 
With the division of the State of Assam, the Act has subsequently been adopted by 
other states, including Nagaland and Meghalaya. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) 
Act. 1958, as amended in 1972 and 1986, empowers the Governors of the States of 
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura to 
declare any area within their state to be a “disturbed area”, as protection against 
internal disturbance.'^®
For example, see the section on 'Injustices Specific to Women' for All India Democratic 
Women's Association and another v State o f  Tripura and others.
In addition to the Supreme Court order in Editor, “Boodhbar” op cit note 113, which has been 
included in the section on challenge to enactments, and duplicated in the section on 'Injustices Specific 
to Women', the order of the Guwahati HC in the Niloy Dutta v District Magistrate, Sibsagar District 
(1991) 2 GauLR 217 has only been included in the chapter on 'Injustices Specific to Women'.
See the cases on 'Prisons' in the section on Children' for Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay v State o f  
Punjab and another AIR 1984 SC 1895.
Section 3 confers powers on the state government to declare areas to be “disturbed areas”, 
Section 4 confers powers to fire upon person contravening certain orders, for the maintenance of public 
order, Section 5 confers powers to destroy arms, fortified positions and hideouts and Section 6 provides 
for the protection of persons acting under sections 4 and 5 by specifying that;
No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted except with the previous 
sanction of the State Government against any person in respect of anything done or purporting 
to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 and 5.
Section 3 confers the power to declare areas to be disturbed areas, if  an area is: 
in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of the civil 
power is necessary.
Section 4 confers special powers on the armed forces, including the power to use force against persons
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In the north-east these enactments have been used by the State in aid 
of the civil power in sensitive border areas to protect national security, and manage 
the problems raised secessionists demands, corruption, tribal identity and the influx 
of people from outside the area, in particular refugees from Bangladesh. The increased 
army presence and inability of people in the area to vent grievances against army 
personnel, has led to the use of the writ jurisdiction of the High C o u r t . T h e  
constitutionality of both the 1955 and the 1958 enactments have been challenged in 
petitions filed by human rights organisations and individuals in the Guwahati High 
Court.
Writ petitions have been filed in response to specific occurences. In 
July 1987, the Assam Rifles Camp at Oinam village, Senapati District, Manipur, was 
attacked by certain unknown persons, believed to be members of the National Security 
Council of Nagaland (NSCN), an organisation committed to the secession of Nagaland 
from the Union of India. Nine soldiers were killed, three others were seriously injured 
and a large quantity of arms and ammunition was stolen. In response, the Assam 
Rifles launched 'Operation Bluebird' to recover the arms and ammunition. The petition 
contended that the army operation was begun even though the FIR, reporting that arms 
had been looted, was not filed until a week after the attack, and described the three 
month “reign of terror” that was unleashed in Oinam and the surrounding areas.
or places, to enter and search without warrant and, in section 4(c):
arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom 
a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence 
and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest;
Section 5 specifies that arrested persons are to be made over to the police with the least possible delay, 
Section 6 provides protection to persons acting under Act:
No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous 
sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or 
purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.
See Luithui, Luingam and Haksar, Nandita, Nagaland File, (Lancer International, New Delhi, 
1984) for a study of the political situation in Nagaland, from the perspective o f the petitioners. Both 
authors were members of the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights, an organisation that declared 
itself to be committed to the secession of Nagaland from the Union of India in 1993.
Included in the contentions were claims that in the course of just a few weeks fifteen people 
were shot dead after being subjected to torture; that all the villagers, including pregnant women, the 
sick, and paralysed persons were made to stand for months in playgrounds exposed to torrential rains 
and scorching heat; that six babies died, as did many others; that hundreds were beaten; that people
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Moreover, it was alleged that the army had taken over the civil administration, and 
had arrested government personnel, including the District Collector. The petitions filed 
asked the Court to strike down the enactments, to vindicate the rights of the people, 
provide compensation and punish the guilty men.
As those challenging the legitimacy of State power do so with a 
particular vision of civil society, and at considerable personal risk, the network of 
human rights activists is connected throughout the region. Most of the petitions are 
also connected in some way, and the court orders received in one case, have informed 
and determined the content of other petitions filed. Care has been taken to frame 
petitions carefully and in detail so as to ensure that the case will be given due 
consideration by the Court.
Access to Justice
The standing of the petitioners to bring issues, relating to army powers, 
before the courts has not been questioned at all. Mostly filed with the help of a 
supportive a d v o c a t e ,o r  by advocates themselves , the  grievances were framed for 
adjudication by the Court and in a form acceptable to it.‘^  ^ Access to justice issues 
were raised, when the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights asked the Guwahati 
High Court to prevent the Assam Rifles from prolonging the procedure for the
were subjected to the many kinds o f torture and degredation; that labour was extracted from the 
residents o f the area; that women were raped and assaulted.
Fieldwork led to extensive discussion with members o f Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti and with 
NPMHR, PUHR, PUDR and PUCL activists, all o f whom knew one another's work and provided the 
others with support when necessary. Inevitably, factions had also arisen because of the differing 
approaches to political action, and interpersonal relationships.
For example, the petitions filed by the NPMHR were compiled with the support and efforts of 
advocate Nandita Haksar.
125 For example, the PUHR membership was de facto confined to lawyers.
The petition Editor, '‘Boodhbar” op cit note 113 contained detailed legal submissions referring 
to national and international law.
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provision of legal aid, and another petitioner noted that rich and powerful petitioners 
had been able to get legal redress.Nonetheless, there was one instance of a telegram 
being registered as a petition in the Guwahati High Court during the proceedings of 
the case filed by the Manipur Baptist Convention Women's Union}^^
The Court's Response
The petitions filed challenging enactments were pending in 1995, as are 
those filed on the Oinam Issue. In the only order given regarding the constitutional 
validity of an enactment, the Delhi High Court upheld the Assam Disturbed Areas Act. 
1955.'^^ Although pending in appeal in the Supreme Court, the order in this case has 
prevented other petitions from being filed in the Guwahati High Court challenging the 
constitutional validity of this enactment, and has therefore created fissures between 
human rights activists in the region, as many felt that the petition was neither framed 
nor argued with enough care.
The Oinam litigation has been protracted by the procedure of hearing 
evidence and the miscellaneous petitions filed by the Assam Rifles duing the pendency 
of the petitions. The Guwahati High Court refused to accept newspapers as evidence 
as they had not been verified by the journalists concerned, possibly because of the 
politicisation of the print media, and the Court contradicted itself on the criteria for 
the institution of an enquiry by the Court. It was in one of the appeals from the
Vanlalhruala op cit note 115. 
'■* Op cit note 113.
Inderjit Barua op cit note 113.
Naga People's Movement fo r  Human Rights and Manipur Baptist Convention op cit note 114. 
In an order D /-15/12/87, after rejecting the newspaper evidence, Justice Hansaria concluded, at
15:
There is no doubt in our mind that in a case o f the present nature, we would be 
justified in ordering enquiry only on existence of two conditions: (i) compelling circumstances; 
and (ii) full satisfaction about establishment of a prima facie case relating to violation o f  
fundamental rights. This apart, an enquiry to be ordered by us carmot be omnibus; it has to be
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High Court's order in this litigation that a short, but important, judgment was given 
by the Supreme Court which tacitly acknowledged the excesses committed by the 
armed f o r c e s .T h i s  order has been widely referred to in the Oinam cases and 
provided a point of reference when the case was taken to the United Nations.
Only one habeas corpus petition has been included in this section - that 
filed by Sebastian Hongray, complaining that two people had been abducted by the 
armed f o r c e s .T h e  importance of this judgment to PIL has been great, and it has 
been referred to in numerous other cases.Exemplary costs were awarded and the 
Court held the respondents in civil contempt of court. Tentatively reacting to petitions 
filed in the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, including those relating to extra-judicial
confined to specific act(s). Further, it has to be by a person, body or agency which commands 
confidence of both the sides. Though the first condition seems to exist in the present case, we 
are not satisfied, in view of our aforesaid analysis o f the materials on record, about the 
existence of the second of the aforesaid conditions. We have pointed out about the dearth of 
materials put on record which is in sharp contrast with those supporting the case of 
respondents No.l and 2. The prayer for enquiry is therefore presently rejected.
Justice Sangma reinforced this conclusion:
the State of Manipur stated ... that the Government has directed the district administration to 
assess the alleged damages to the property etc. and that the report thereof was being awaited. 
I believe that by the word “etc” they mean to include the alleged excesses to the lives and 
limbs of innocent people.
Editor, “Boodhbar” op cit note 113.
See United Nations Document CCPR/C/SR.1039, 'Summary record o f the 1039th meeting, held 
at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 26 March 1991: Human Rights Committee, 41st session', 
(monograph. United Nations, New York, 1/4/91), United Nations Document CCPR/C/SR.1040, 
' Summary record of the 1040th meeting, held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 26 March 1991: 
Human Rights Committee, 41st session', (monograph. United Nations, New York, 1/4/91), United 
Nations Document CCPR/C/SR.1041, 'Summary record o f the 1041st meeting, held at Headquarters, 
New York, on Wednesday, 27 March 1991: Human Rights Committee, 41st session', (monograph. 
United Nations, New York, 2/4/91) and United Nations Document CCPR/C/SR. 1042, ' Summary record 
of the 1042nd meeting, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 27 March 1991 : Human Rights 
Committee, 41st session', (monograph. United Nations, New York, 2/4/91); Amnesty International, 
India: examination of the second periodic report by the human rights committee', (AI Index: ASA 
20/05/93, March 1993).
See Haksar, Nandita, “Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958. A Report on Human Rights 
Violations in North East India”, (New York, March 1991). This unpublished paper described how 
between 27/11/90, when Assam was declared to be a disturbed state under the Act, and 10/3/91 ninety- 
nine habeas corpus petitions had been filed on behalf o f people arrested and tortured by the armed 
forces.
For example, see Bhim Singh, MLA v State o f J  & K  and others AIR 1986 SC 494 / (1985) 4 
SCC 677.
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killings, the High Court has instituted enquiries. Responding to allegations that the 
Border Security Force had illegally opened fire, the Guwahati High Court directed that 
the injured persons receive any necessary specialised treatment, without deciding on 
the legality of the firing. Similarly the High Court acknowledged the illegality of 
certain acts carried out by members of the armed forces in Mizoram by ordering that 
the pending compensation be paid.'^^
The Contribution of PIL
The Court has been constrained by the paramount considerations of
national security and law and order when giving its orders. The restrictions have
meant that very few substantive results have been realised. Even where enquiries have
been instituted and orders given, the administration has been slow in implementing
these orders. The petitions filed by H N Wanchoo, a noted activist from Jammu &
Kashmir who later died, illustrate this point:
His petitions to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir were for 
judicial enquiry into the killing of innocent Kashmiris by the security 
forces, the torture of detainees in custody, rapes committed by soldiers, 
information regarding numbers and identities of detainees and 
conditions in jails.
It is a matter of shame that he met with no success. Even when 
the High Court passed directory or mandatory orders in response to his 
petitions, the local administration simply did not obey them. The orders 
of the High Court were ignored brazenly, unblushingly and 
insolently.
Some of the petitioners have used law, through PIL and habeas corpus 
petitions as a mechanism to expose the injustice of the system of governance.
Gautam Uzir op cit note 115.
See People's Union for Civil Liberties op cit note 115 and Vanlalhruala op cit note 115.
1.18 See Varadarajan, P M, 'H N Wanchoo', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 13 No 1, Jan 1993, 16.
Ibid at 16. See also Sachar, Rajinder, 'Kashmir - Need for a Better Understanding', PUCL 
Bulletin, Vol 13 No 7, July 1993, 15-16.
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including the courts. The existing feeling that the Constitution has little relevance to 
the peoples of border areas, for example of the north-east, has been reinforced by the 
ineffective use of PIL. Practical problems have been compounded by prevalent 
corruption and political complexities. When asked why he was unable to secure the 
compensation requested in the PIL cases from Mizoram, the advocate for the 
petitioners stated that if he tried to speed up the development of the case in Court, the 
judges would assume that he has a financial stake in the outcome of the litigation, and 
treat the petitions accordingly.
With the exception of one o rde r , l i t t l e  has resulted from the challenge
to enactments. As the petitions on the Oinam issue remained pending, the NPMHR,
despairing of the legal process, approached the United Nations with its grievances.
Hearings before the Human Rights Committee lasted for two days, on March 26 and
27, 1991. After the hearings, members of the NPMHR documented the event:
We went in the hope that the Government of India might modify its 
attitude under international pressure. We were successful in raising 
concern among human rights organisations about the anguish of our 
people. But we are not sure whether the attitude of the Government of 
India will change.
At the Human Rights Committee we discovered that although 
India has acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights which guarantees the Right to Self-determination but India has 
interpreted it to mean the right is only for people “under foreign 
domination and that these words (Article 1) do not apply to sovereign 
independent States or to a section of the people or nation - which is the 
essence of national integrity”
It is unsurprising that in an paper presented to the UN Committee on
Human Rights, Nandita Haskar, the advocate for the NPMHR stated:
There is no possibility for the vast majority of people living in 
disturbed areas to reach either a lawyer or the court. The High Court 
is too far, the expenses are prohibitive and justice is slow. There is also 
an anti-tribal bias in the Bar and Bench. The Court is slow to give 
relief when rights of tribal peoples are affected. Even when the High
Editor, "Boodhbar” op cit note 113.
'NPMHR goes to the United Nations', 1991. See 'International Influences' in chapter one.
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Court gives relief it is limited.
She noted that the (now deceased) Major General responsible for the atrocities 
committed on Nagas in Manipur during Operation Bluebird had been given Republic 
Day honours, inspite of the cases pending against him in the Guwahati High Court. 
Even the National Human Rights Commission set up by the Government in 1993 has 
not been empowered to hear complaints against the armed forces. Certainly the 
framework within which the courts have felt able to operate has been limited, but PIL 
can certainly be described as a last resort for people who feel the force of the strong 
arm of the State.
Injustices Specific to Women
The petitions filed specifically relating to gender and women's issues 
relate to violence, challenges to enactments,discrimination,*'^'^ prostitution*'*^ and a 
collection of diverse cases.*'*^  Violence has taken many forms - non-specific,*'*^
Haksar, Nandita (1991) at 27.
Petitions on Muslim personal laws - Susheela Gopalan & Others v Union o f  India and Shehnaaz 
Sheikh and others v Union o f  India; Madhu Kishwar and others v State o f  Bihar and others 1991 (2) 
SCALE 148 [794]; Mary Roy v State o f Kerala & Ors 1986 (1) SCALE 36 [250] and a case filed by 
Mary Roy against the District Collector, Kottayam.
Brij Bala v State o f H.P. and others (1984) 2 SLR 408; a petition challenging amniocentesis 
testing; Catholic Association o f  Bombay and others v State o f Maharashtra and others.
Sheela Barse; Gaurav Jain v Union o f  India and others AIR 1990 SC 292 and 1991 (1) SCALE 
201 [963]; People's Council fo r  Social Justice v State o f  Kerala and others; Vishal Jeet v Union o f  
India and others AIR 1990 SC 1412 / (1990) 3 SCC 318; Bholanath Tripathi v State o f  UP. 1990 
(Supp) SCC 151.
The petition filed on contraception; Kasturi Lai Sharma v State o f  UP. 1990 (Supp) SCC 748; 
Anjalakshmi v State o f  Tamil Nadu and others.
Coomi Kapoor, Ashwini Sarin, Arun Shourie v State o f M P  and others and the case relating to 
unwed mothers in Thiruvelli.
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harassment for d o w ry ,s a ti ,’'^  ^rape,*^° the army and the police’^ ’). Many of the cases 
were filed in response to the broad-based failure of the legal system to resolve the 
grievances of w o m e n ,th e  writ jurisdiction of the Court in PIL has been mobilised 
for some of the worst instances of injustice. These cases were filed in tandem with the 
growth of the women's movement and investigative journalism, the support of some 
legal su ccesse san d  an increasing tendency to look towards the Court.
The petition filed by Saheli after a woman had died; Neelam Varma and others v Union o f  India', 
State (Delhi Administration) v Laxman Kumar AIR 1986 SC 250; Joint Women's Programme v State 
o f  Rajasthan AIR 1987 SC 2060; All India Democratic Women's Association v State o f  Haryana and 
others', the murder of Shashi Bala for dowry.
All India Democratic Women's Association and Janwadi Mahila Samiti v Union o f  India and 
others and Shree Rani Satiji Mandir and others v Union o f  India.
Relating to the gangrape of Rameezabee by policemen; P Rathinam v Union o f  India and 
another 1987 (2) SCALE 317 [1464] and 1993 (2) SCALE 126 [631]; In the matter of: Judical Enquiry 
into Gang-Rape Demanded, and, Concerted Demand for Judicial Probe (1988) 1 GauLR 489; All India 
Democratic Women's Association and another v State o f  Tripura and others', All India Democratic 
Women's Association v Union o f  India and others and Gudalure M  J  Cherian & Ors v Union o f  India 
& Ors 1991 (2) SCALE 241 [1305]. One of the earliest PIL cases on rape was in the form o f a letter 
sent by advocate R S Sodhi to the Hindustan Times, which was registered as a petition in the SC. 
Lotika Sarkar, Centre for Women's Development Studies, interview. New Delhi, 4/91. A seminal case 
that was to initiate debate and legislation on rape was that of Mathura, a young girl raped by two 
policemen. After the Supreme Court judgment, Tukaram and another v The State o f  Maharashtra (1979) 
2 SCC 143, acquitting the accused head constable, Tukaram and the constable, Ganpat o f the charge 
of rape, there was a public outcry. This prompted a group o f four legal acadamics to write a letter to 
the Chief Justice o f India complaining of the “cold-blooded legalism” of the Supreme Court. See Baxi, 
Upendra; Dhagamwar, Vasudha; Kelkar Raghunath and Sarkar, Lotika, 'An Open Letter to the Chief 
Justice of India', (1979) 4 SCC (J) 17.See Dalvi, C R, The Mathura Case', New Quest, Vol 27, May- 
June 81, 141-150 for an example of the hostility towards Mathura and her case; also see Decision of  
Supreme Court in case of Tukaram Vs. State of Maharashtra', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 7 Session 2 
Vol 2, 18/3/80, 165-166. Although nothing resulted in this particular case, the law o f rape was 
subsequently amended.
Janwadi Mahila Samiti and another v Union o f India', Editor, “Boodhbar” v Union o f  India and 
another, Niloy Dutta v District Magistrate, Sibsagar District (1991) 2 GauLR 217.
For background material see Dhagamwar, Vasudha, Law Power and Justice, (Sage Publications, 
New Delhi, second edition, 1992); Sathe, S P, Towards Gender Justice, (Research Centre for Women's 
Studies, Bombay, 1993); Sivaramayya, B, Inequalities and the Law, (Eastern Book Company, Delhi, 
1984); Rapoor, Ratna (ed). Special Issue on Feminism and Law', National Law School Journal, Vol 
1, 1993. Also see Quintilian, Emelina O and Tiongco, Jose M, An Introduction to Women in 
International Law, (Pilipina Legal Resources Center, Philippines, 1991).
See for example Air India v Nergesh Meerza & Ors. 1981 (3) SCALE 192 [1275] / AIR 1981 
SC 1829.
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Women's groups have most often framed the issues for the Court, or 
have intervened in cases to give them a PIL ch arac te r/O n e  of the strategies of the 
All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) and of non-political 
organisations, like Saheli and the Joint Women's Programme, has been to activate the 
judiciary and use law to get specific reliefs/^^ Framing the issues for resolution within 
the existing legal framework has often been difficult. The petition filed by Manushi 
for the women of the Ho tribe asked for the court to confer individual property rights 
on the women, a concept alien to the tribe. Codification of laws has changed the focus 
of rights to such an extent that deciding to use law for the women of the Ho tribe 
compromised their own conception of their grievance.
By focusing on certain issues, the media has been an important factor 
in inspiring petitioners and courts. The attention given to the death of Roop Kanwar 
on the funeral pyre of her husband (sati) and reports on the sexual activity of nuns 
have brought sati and the right to privacy, respectively, to the fore.'^^ Many of the 
cases in this section have been filed as a result of newspaper articles, for example 
after the sale of a girl called Kamala, and after reports of rape in the press.
Women have been abused in a variety of ways, as demonstrated by the
In addition to the cases documented, other petitions have been filed. For example the Women's 
Legal Aid Cell, Gauhati filed a petition in the Guwahati HC on behalf of a woman who was raped and 
murdered. A relative of the woman had approached the Cell but did not want to be involved in legal 
proceedings. On production of a false medical certificate the accused had been allowed to go out on 
bail until his illness was cured. The HC responded to the writ petition by cancelling the bail, and 
transfering the petition to the original District Court. Suniti Sonowal, Women's Legal Aid Cell, 
interview, Gauhati, 6/94. See also the section on The Police' for SAHELI op cit note 80 and/4// India 
Democratic Women's Association op cit note 81 for examples o f other cases filed by women's 
organisations.
‘^ Mn addition to the documented cases, a petition was filed in the Madras High Court in 1992 or 
1993 by a Joint Action Committee of Women's groups regarding the depiction of women in posters 
displayed film and cinema theatres. Geeta Ramaseshan, advocate, interview, Madras, 15/4/93.
Madhu Kishwar, interview. New Delhi, 1/91. Also see Kishwar, Madhu, 'Public Interest 
Litigation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards', Manushi, No 81, Mar-Apr 1994, 11-23; Kishwar, 
Madhu, Toiling without Rights: Ho Women of Singhbhum', Economic and Political Weekly, 17/1/87, 
95-101.
For a case specifically relating to the girl-child, see Brinda Karat and another v The State in the 
section on Children'.
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cases on violence. The harassment of young women for dowry has become an 
increasing problem, because of the expectation of substantial “gifts” of money and 
material goods from a woman's natal family, not just at the time of marriage, but for 
years later, have led to numerous, alarming reports on “dowry deaths”.’^ * The cases 
on sati'^^ and rape reveal other patterns of violent behaviour. All but one of the cases 
on rape are concerned with gang-rape by policemen or members of the armed forces. 
The need for accountability and legality in the actions of police and army personnel 
is highlighted in the last set of cases on violence.
The petitions filed challenging enactments, as violative of the 
constitution, provide an insight into the problems and inequities of the existing legal 
framework. Because of the sensitive nature of the issues raised, in both political and 
social terms, petitioners perceived the Court as the only forum which has the power 
to manage the grievances impartially. Challenges to the Muslim Personal Laws 
(Application) Act. 1937 and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Act. 1986 point to the discriminatory nature of the provisions.C hallenges to the 
Chhota Nagpur Tenancv Act. 1908 and the Travancore Christian Succession Act. 1902 
are concerned with land and property distribution. Similarly, the cases on 
discrimination provide an insight into the many forms that discrimination can take. 
The cases on prostitution demonstrate how not all the cases have been filed in support
There are provision and specific legislation making the giving or receiving o f dowry and illegal 
act. For example, see the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act. 1986. See Jethmalani, Rani, Dowry and 
the Law - Subversion o f  Human Rights in Gandhi, P K, Social Action through Law, (Concept Publishing 
Company, New Delhi, 1985), 114-126.
For a discussion of the issues, see Narasimhan, Sakuntala, Sati: A Study o f  Widow Burning in 
India, (Viking, New Delhi, 1990). The Commission o f Sati (Prevention! Act. 1987 defines sati in 
section 2 (c):
“sati” means the act o f burning or burying alive of -
(i) any widow along with the body of her deceased husband or any other relative or with any 
article, object or thing associated with the husband or such relative; or
(ii) any woman along with the body of her relatives irrespective or whether such burning or 
burying is claimed to be voluntary on the part o f the woman or otherwise
Also see Dreze, Jean, Widows in Rural India, (Development Economics Research Programme, London 
School o f Economics, Aug 1990) and the cases on family pensions, as discussed in 'Public Policy and 
Administration' in chapter four.
See Flavia, Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread: Procedures and Case Law on Maintenance, 
(Majlis, Bombay, 1992) for general background information to the petitions on Muslim personal law.
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of women. Even amongst the petitioners, perspectives have differed. One petitioner 
displayed little sensitivity to prostitute women; by grouping them with goondas and 
hooligans. This petition displayed disregard for women in need of greater protection 
of the law and not of further marginalisation.
Access to Justice
The locus standi of women's groups has been upheld by the Court, both 
as petitioner and as intervenor. The case of the dowry death of Sudha Goel,'^^ 
although not a PIL, deserves mention because women's organisations intervened 
compelling the Supreme Court to reconsider the verdict of the High Court. Other 
interventions by such groups can be found in the case of the rape of Rameezabee and 
in the petitions challenging Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. 
1986. Petitions challenging this particular enactment have been filed both as PILs and 
as cases by aggrieved women raising issues beyond the scope of the individual 
grievance.
On rape, there are cases filed by advocates, women's organisations and 
taken up sue moto by j u d g es .A f te r  the rape of two nuns in Gajraula, two petitions 
were filed, one by an advocate in Madras and the other by AIDWA. While hearing 
the petition by the advocate, the Court rejected the petition filed by AIDWA. This was 
in disregard of the attempts made by the organisation to resolve the case locally, 
before filing the petition. Moreover, the Court failed to acknowlege that the nuns on 
whose behalf the petitions were filed, had given their consent and support to AIDWA's 
petition. It was felt that the Court had not considered all the relevant factors when
People's Council for Social Justice op cit note 145.
State (Delhi Administration) op cit note 148.
Pressure was exerted in the case of the rape of Mathura, op cit note 150.
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deciding on the merits of the petitions. 164
The PIL content in the two letters which were registered as PILs is 
limited to the question of access to justice. Not having been defined, the distinction 
between the letter-petition and PIL has remained blurred and any innovation in the 
procedure continues to be described as PIL. The case filed by Mary Roy is also 
difficult to locate. Her initial petition, challenging the validity of the Travancore 
Christian Succession Act. 1902 was not filed as a PIL, but as an aggrieved individual 
challenging an enactment. However, the developments after the Supreme Court 
Judgment allowing her first petition and the continuing harassment she faced, caused 
her to become a PIL petitioner The petition she filed in the High Court of Kerala 
on behalf of Corpus Christi School was as a PIL.^^ ^
The judicial process itself has been one of the major obstacles in getting 
effective access to justice. The Supreme Court noted the five month delay in listing 
one letter.'^® Similarly the petition filed for the Ho Tribe women was initially delayed 
by incorrect listings, and later, when the registry of the Supreme Court lost some of 
the papers relating to the case.*^  ^ Other delays have been caused for petitioners, for 
example, when the Court directed that the petitioner approach the Allahabad High
Kirti Singh, advocate, interview, New Delhi, 11/11/93. In the case of Niloy Dutta op cit note 
151, a similar situation emerged, with lawyers filing petitions with a different perspective and for 
different reliefs. Niloy Dutta, advocate, interview, Guwahati, 8/6/94.
Brij Bala op cit note 144 and Anjalakshmi op cit note 146. Both cases were registered as PIL 
letter petitions in the High Court registries, prompted a relaxation of procedures and were accorded 
preference in listings.
Lekha Suresh, advocate, interview, Emakulam, 19/8/93.
For details o f the controversy that ensued and o f the subsequent litigation see D'Mello, Pamela, 
'Report: Jesus Christ Superstar - Banned', The Lawyers, Vol 5 Nos 11&12, Nov-Dee 1990, 34-35; Roy, 
Mary, First Person: The Wages of Dissent', The Lawyers, Vol 7 No 6, June 1992, 12; Gita, J, Fighting 
for right of equality', Indian Express, 7/3/92; Venugopal, P, 'Undoing the 'excess' o f a SC verdict', 
Indian Express, 12/6/92.
Bholanath Tripathi op cit note 145.
Madhu Kishwar, interview. New Delhi, 12/1/91.
154
Court, as a more suitable forum 170
The Court's Response
One of the most striking characteristics of the cases challenging 
enactments has been the delays in listings. Exacerbated by rising communal violence 
and the sensitive nature of the issues, petitions challenging the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. 1986 have been grouped together and remain 
pending. Similarly the petitions filed on sati have been pending inspite of the efforts 
of the advocates dealing with the cases. The complexitity and sensitive nature of these 
cases - in political and social terms - provides a plausible explanation for the 
continued delays. Individual relief to those petitioners with a personal stake in the 
outcome of the litigation has not been forthcoming.
In a number of cases relating to violence, the Court has taken up the 
issue and monitored the progress of the case. In the dowry case filed by the Joint 
Women's Programme, the Court, obiter, suggested that dowry cells be established. 
Recognising the failure of the lower judiciary and the enforcement agency to deal with 
instances of dowry violence the Supreme Court directed that the verdict of the lower 
court be implemented.*^^ Commissions of enquiry have been appointed by the Court, 
recognising that the collection of evidence may otherwise be insufficient.*^^
In the Guntaben rape case*^  ^the investigation ordered by the Court took
Kasturi Lai Sharma op cit note 146.
All India Democratic Women's Association op cz? note 148.
See Catholic Association op cit note 144. In addition to those documented, another petition was 
filed in the High Court of Madras in 1983 or 1984 asking the Court to inquire into a suspected dowry 
death. An enquiry was ordered. Pennurimai lyakkam, an organisation working in the slums and the 
Democratic Women's Association were impleaded in the petition. Meanwhile the husband was convicted 
for life in the Sessions Court, acquitted in appeal to the High Court and an appeal was filed in the
Supreme Court by the state. S S Vasudevan, advocate, interview, Madras, 14/4/93.
P Rathinam op cit note 150.
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the evidence of 584 p e r s o n s . T h e  CBI investigation took many years to be 
completed and the Court had to concede that there may have been a deliberate delay 
in the proceedings by the state. Moreover, there is no evidence that the policemen 
found to be guilty were prosecuted, and it is notable that, although the rape took place 
in 1986, it was not until 1993 that the Court awarded compensation. In another case 
the Guwahati High Court awarded an “ad hoc interim ex-gratia payment” without 
waiting for the guilty police officers to be p u n i s h e d . I n  the Gajraula rape case the 
Court did not award compensation, and even refused to suggest that the CBI 
investigate the incident.
In a series of three orders, two in the Supreme Court and one in the 
Guwahati High Court, on the extent of army and police powers, the Courts have 
tacitly accepted the allegations that women have been sexually abused and harassed 
by members of the f o r c e s . I n  spite of the tentative approach to dealing with cases 
filed against the army and the police, the Court has ordered that guidelines be 
framed for the interrogation of women and has issued directions on the treatment of 
women so as to ensure their safety.
The petition filed on behalf of unwed mothers asking the Court to order 
the Government to conduct DNA testing was dismissed, with the Court “hoping” that 
the tests would be conducted.This  discretion, exercised by the courts in dealing 
with PIL petitions, is most apparent when the Madras High Court sat out of hours to
See [anon], 'Amnesty International; The Case o f Gunta Behn', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 8 No 9, Sept 
88, 4-8 & 27.
In the matter of: Judicial Enquiry into Gang-Rape Demanded, and, Concerted Demand for
Judicial Probe. Also see the section on 'Environment and Resources' for the case o f the Rajasthan
Kisan Sangathan v State o f  Rajasthan and others AIR 1989 Raj 10.
All India Democratic Women's Association op cit note 150.
Janwadi op cit note 149.
See the sections on 'The Army' and on The Police', supra.
See case re: unwed mothers, op cit note 147.
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hear about the plight of a young bride, whose fiance had been imprisoned. 180
As in cases brought to the Court as regular matters, the courts' response 
to the PIL petitions relating to prostitutes has not considered the women as people in 
need of sympathetic treatment. The children of prostitutes have been ordered to be 
separated from their mothers^®  ^ and the Court ordered that one woman be put in a 
rescue home, without considering the conditions that persist in such homes. 
However, the Supreme Court did direct the enforcement of Acts that would safeguard 
the interests of the girl-child and asked the goverment to enquire into the devadasi and 
jogin t radi t ions ,even while refusing to direct that a CBI enquiry be instituted.
The Contribution of PIL
With the exception of the orders given on the army and the police, the 
Court has limited its role to reacting to injustices brought before it in a piecemeal 
fashion. When petitioning the Court, many of the women's groups hoped to vindicate 
the injustices done by getting a favourable Court order. This has been possible in few 
of the cases. Even where the Court has directed enquiries and/or awarded 
compensation, this has taken many y e a r s . T h e  cases speak for themselves, indicating
Anjalakshmi op cit note 146. 
Gaurav Jain op cit note 145.
Bholanath Tripathi op cit note 145. See the section on 'Prisons and State Institutions', in 
particular the cases on institutions for women.
The devadasi tradition is one in which girls are given or sold to a temple as a dancers, and are 
compelled to become prostitutes. The jogin tradition is similar.
Vishal Jeet op cit note 145.
Referring to a PIL case, the Minister o f Health and Family Welfare, responding to a question 
in the Lok Sabha regarding hearings before the Drugs Controller (India) at 40;
the concerned firms. Voluntary Organisations, Doctors etc. have submitted voluminous 
documentary evidences .. Decision in the matter will be taken after examining the documents 
received at the hearings.
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the ways in which resort to law can be a futile experience. The importance of the 
media in highlighting issues and informing the courts has been noted, when the 
Supreme Court expressed its concern that the High Court had been affected by the 
publicity given to the case.’^  ^ In one order, the response of the State Government in 
tending to the needs of the women who had been raped was described as a show of 
respect to the Court's anticipated v e r d i c t . T h i s  seems to be an exception. The 
Rameezabee case is a discouraging example of the use of law. The women's group in 
Bangalore which took up the rape issue became disenchanted with the legal process 
and did not follow up the case. Rameezabee herself has become disillusioned with the 
interference of women's organisations, the press and the legal system.
The dynamics of the sati case reveal some of the reasons for the erratic 
and tentative response of the Court to the cases filed. Subsequent to the last 
documented order in 1989, the respondents made a statement that while they do not 
believe in Sati-da (sati murder), they do believe in Sati. This position has been echoed 
by the National Commission for Women. Women's organisations then vehemently 
protested against what was perceived as an endorsement of the worship of the “pure 
woman”. T h e  Supreme Court has refused to become embroiled in this issue, simply 
by not hearing the case.
At the time when the amniocentesis petition was filed, proposed 
amendments and bills were introduced in the Lok Sabha and the Maharashtra 
Assembly to ban amniocentesis tests, which were being used to determine the sex of
By not stipulating a time frame for the examination o f these “voluminous” documents, implementation 
could be protracted. See 'Supreme Court judgement requse o f Oestrogen and Progesterone', Lok Sabha 
Debates, Series 8 Session 8 Vol 29, 30/7/87, 39-40.
State (Delhi Administration) op cit note 148.
In the matter of: Judical Enquiry op cit note 150. Contrast with Munna and others v State o f  
Uttar Pradesh and others (1982) 1 SCC 545, a case on prisons in the section on Children', infra.
See Kannabiran, Vasantha, 'More About Rameeza', Sangarsh, Vol 1, 1; Donna, 'Rameeza Bee - 
Justice Denied', Sangarsh, Vol 2, 3.
Kirti Singh, advocate, interview, New Delhi, 11/11/93.
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foetuses, so that female foetuses could be aborted. Nothing happened as a result of the 
petition or the b i l l s , b u t  even if acts were passed they would not circumvent the 
problem. Without any mobilisation on the issue and support for a ban on popular sex 
determination tests, there is little that can be done by the Court. Thus, the actual effect 
of some orders belies their seeming intent. Having been approached by a woman who 
had not been permitted to compete for the post of patwari, the Court directed that she 
be allowed to compete fairly for the post through the District Employment 
E x c h a n g e . I t  is unlikely that Kumari Brij Bala will ever be considered because of 
the numbers of people registered in the exchange.
The limitation of the courts in dealing with injustices specific to women 
have to be seen in the light of all the cases in PIL. The petitions that relate to the 
woman in other contexts are found in all the other sections on urban space, labour, 
bonded labour, the environment etc.'^^ Again the recurring theme of land distribution 
is illustrated by the cases filed regarding the Travancore Christian Succession Act. 
1902 and the Chhota Nagpur Tenancv Act. 1908 in the context of gender rights. The
Gopinath, Deepti, 'Comment: Amniocentesis Petition Admitted', The Lawyers, Vol 1 No 10, Oct 
1986, 14.
191 Brij Bala op cit note 144.
Bina Agarwal noted, “one rarely hears of a woman tehsildar or patwari being appointed for land 
record keeping and revenue collection.” Agarwal, Bina, A field  o f  one's own. Gender and land rights 
in South Asia, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994) at 485.
See [anon (ed)]. Women in Politics: Forms and Processes, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New Delhi,
1992) for a collection of papers by members o f women's research and development organisations, and 
Venkateswaran, Sandhya, Living on the Edge: Women, Environment and Development, (Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, New Delhi, 1992).
See Agarwal, Bina, 'Gender and Legal Rights in Agricultural Land in India', Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol 30 No 12, 25/3/95, A39-A56 at A52:
Removing the noted legal inequalities is likely to involve a continuing process of 
contestation and struggle. In this context, on the one hand there have been some significant 
cases, such as those filed by Mary Roy and Madhu Kishwar. By drawing upon constitutional 
guarantees o f sex equality to challenge persisting gender inequalities in enactments concerning 
inheritance, these cases have opened up yet another chapter in the contestation over women's 
legal rights in land that began almost a century ago. (This is important even though (as noted) 
the judgement in Mary Roy's case evaded the issue, and a judgement in the case filed by 
Madhu Kishwar is still pending.) On the other hand, the placing of most land reform laws 
beyond challenge on constitutional ground, through their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, has 
taken away a major means o f changing the gender-unequal land-related legislation still
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difficulties of having to deal with the legal system and its actors has been accentuated 
in this section. The biases of the legal profession and the legal system function to 
further disadvantage women, adding complexities that transcend social or economic 
class.
Children
Petitions have been filed concerning children in p r i s o n s , i n  
institutions,’^  ^child labour,inter-country adoption’^ ® and the gi r l -chi ld .As  children 
are unable to litigate for themselves, these cases form a distinct category, separate 
from other PILs. Most of the children on whose behalf petitions have been filed do 
suffer from the social and economic disabilities that were identified by the courts in 
the early PILs on prisons and prisoners. However, children form an even more
prevailing in many states.
Also see Agarwal, Bina, (1994) at 224-225.
Munna and others v State o f  Uttar Pradesh and others (1982) 1 SCC 545; Sanjay Suri & Anr 
V Delhi Administration, Delhi & Anr 1987 (2) SCALE 276 [1257]; M  C Mehta v State o f  Orissa and 
others', Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay v State o f  Punjab and another AIR 1984 SC 1895; Sheela Barse 
and another v Union o f  India and others (children in jails) 1986 (2) SCALE 1 [1], AIR 1986 SC 1773 
/ (1986) 3 SCC 596 and 632; Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v Union o f  India and Others (1989) 
2 SCC 325 / AIR 1989 SC 1278, 1989 (2) SCALE 73 [400].
Sheela Barse v Secretary, Children's Legal Aid Society and others (children's home) (1987) 3 
SCC 50 / AIR 1987 SC 756; Gautam Uzir and another v Assam Seva Samity and others.
Rajangam, Secretary, District Beedi Workers' Union v State o f  Tamil Nadu and others (1992) 
1 SCC 221; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union o f  India and others (child labour) 1986 (Supp) SCC 553; 
Sheela Barse v Union o f  India', M  C Mehta v State o f  Tamil Nadu and others (1991) 1 SCC 283 / AIR 
1991 SC 417, 1991 (2) SCALE 82 [464]. Also see Sheela Barse v Secretary, Children's Legal Aid  
Society and others ibid.
Laxmi Kant Pandey v Union o f  India (1984) 2 SCC 244, AIR 1992 SC 118.
Pratul Kumar Sinha v State o f  Orissa AIR 1989 SC 1783; Brinda Karat and another v The 
State. For other cases relating to children see the section on 'Injustices Specific to Women' for Gaurav 
Jain V Union o f  India and others, Vishal Jeet v Union o f  India and others, the case on amniocentesis 
testing and the cases challenging enactments. Also see the section on 'Education' and on 'Prisons and 
State Institutions', in particular for Kadra Pehadiya and others v State o f  Bihar.
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disadvantaged class. Unable, by definition, to petition the courts themselves, they have 
had to rely on the parens patriae role of the state. The cases for children have 
mobilised PIL in an attempt to force the state to acknowledge this role by focussing 
on the non-implementation of statutory and constitutional provisions for children.
The Constitution has recognised the special needs of children in Articles 
15(3), 24, 39(e), 39(f) and 45. It was using the mandate provided by these articles and 
by the Children's Acts of different states,^°° that the cases on prisons were filed. It was 
only in 1986 that juvenile justice issues were codified in a central enactment, the 
Juvenile Justice Act. 1986. All the cases on children in prisons were filed before 1986, 
and reflect the concerns that were later to form the basis of the legislation. The illegal 
confinement of children in jails for long periods, the treatment of mentally and 
physically handicapped children and the conditions in jails were all brought to the 
attention of the Court by journalists or because of news repor ts .Simi lar  issues were 
raised in the cases relating to institutions, again at the instance of a journalist or of 
news reports.
The Juvenile Justice Act was passed to provide a uniform legal 
framework for juvenile justice and to prevent children from being lodged in jails and 
police lock-ups. It provides for the specialised treatment of children who are victims 
of social mal-adjustment, delinquency or neglect, and sets up a machinery for the 
treatment and care of such children, including Juvenile Courts, Juvenile Welfare 
Boards and Observation Homes. Norms and standards of juvenile justice 
administration, different from the usual criminal procedures, have been established for 
the investigation, trial and detention of children, and special offences have been
The Children's Act. 1960 was applicable to Delhi and the other Union Territories and all the 
states, except Nagaland, had their own acts. The Juvenile Justice Act, enacted in 1986 is based on the 
1960 Act. For a survey of laws relating to the child and other papers see: Report o f  a Seminar: Rights 
o f  the Child, (National Law School o f India University, Bangalore, 1990).
For other cases on prisons see the section on 'Prisons and State Institution'.
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defined. Voluntary agencies are included in the care and treatment of these children.
Another special legislation was passed to protect the rights of the child, 
the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation! Act. 1986. °^  ^ This Act prohibits the 
employment of children in certain industries and regulates their employment in others. 
For the purposes of the Act, a child is defined as a person who has not completed 
fourteen years of age. This Act allows child labour to continue in certain industries, 
repealing the Employment of Children Act. 1938 which totally prohibited the 
employment of children, defined as any person below the age of 15. By lowering the 
age of a child to 14, the new Act denies the protection of legislation to those between 
14 and 15 years of age. No minimum age of employment is set, so it is possible that 
a child as young as four may be employed in permissible industries, and no regulation 
with respect to children working in the unorganised sector, for example domestic 
workers. The Act includes expanded standing provisions in section 16(1), which states:
Any person, police officer or Inspector may file a complaint of an
offence under this Act in any Court of competent jurisdiction.
A Schedule is annexed to the Act specifiying the occupations and processes prohibited 
under it. Both these sections can be supplemented by the Central Government.^®'*
For a discussion of children in prisons see the National Expert Committee on Women Prisoners 
Report. Volumes I  and II (Ministry o f Human Resource Development, 1987). The Committee was 
chaired by Justice V R Krishna Iyer.
See Burra Neera, 'Legislation: Old Flaws in New Indian Child Labour Bill', Lawasia Human 
Rights Newsletter, Vol I No 5, March 1987, 7-8; Mathew, P D, 'Laws Relating to Child Labour' 
(unpublished paper presented at 'Workshop on “Child Labour in India”', Indian Social Institute, New 
Delhi, 9/8/86). Barse, Sheela, Child Labour in Powerloom Industry at Bhiwandi', (unpublished paper 
presented at 'Workshop on “Child Labour in India”', Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 9/8/86); Barse, 
Sheela, 'Children Playing With Fire in Glass Factories of Firozabad', (unpublished paper presented at 
Workshop on “Child Labour in India”', Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 9/8/86); papers presented 
at 'International Seminar on Child Labour', (Gandhi Labour Institute, Ahmedabad, 4-7/12/87. Special 
Issue: Child Labour in India', The Lawyers, Vol 3 No 7, Aug 1988.
When the Act was notified, occupations and processes were prohibited including: Occupations - 
the transport of passengers, goods or mail by railway, and certain employments related to railways. 
Processes - bidi-making; carpet-weaving; cement manufacture; cloth printing, dyeing and weaving; 
manufacture of matches, explosives and fire-works; mica-cutting and splitting; shellac manufacture; soap 
manufacture; tanning; wool-cleaning; building and construction industry. Read in conjuction with Article 
24 of the Constitution, this schedule permits the employment of children in industries not specifically 
mentioned, even though they may be hazardous.
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Apart from these enactments, other labour laws are applicable to child
labour and the issues that have been raised are complex/^^ Used in specific industries,
child labour displays all the features present in the adult labour force. Many are
working in bondage or in the unorganised sector and there are labour touts and
contractors. A study published in 1992 noted the links between caste, illiteracy and
bondage in the incidence of child labour:
Indications are that most child labourers belong to the illiterate groups, 
small and middle peasants, most of whom are from among the 
scheduled castes and tribes. These are also the groups to which most 
bonded labourers belong.^®^
A distinction was made between the child worker and the child labourer. Whereas the
latter is one who is involved in full-time work in order to survive and makes a direct
contribution to the economy of the family, the child worker works part time within the
family whilst still making a full time direct contribution to the family economy. The
exact number of child labourers is not known, but:
Their working conditions, the process through which they enter the 
work force, the exploitation and hazards under which they work, their 
low wages and efforts made to keep them illiterate and poor, show that 
it is a vested interest and not a harsh reality that some would like to 
call it.^ °^
The litigation on child labour began in 1983, before new legislation was 
passed. A series of newspaper reports appeared investigating child labour in the 
fireworks and match factories of Sivakasi, in Tamil Nadu.^°  ^ The reports noted that 
children were employed, illegally, despite both industries having been scheduled as 
hazardous for children in the 1938 Act. A national debate, on the employment of
For other references to child labour see the section on 'Labour' for Labourers Working on Salal 
Hydro Project v State o f  Jammu and Kashmir and others (1983) 2 SCC 181 and the section on 'Public 
Policy and Administration' for Kishen Patnayak and another v State o f Orissa AIR 1989 SC 677 and, 
generally, the section on 'Bonded Labour'.
Fernandes, Walter, Child Labour and the Processes of Exploitation', Indian Journal o f  Social 
Work, Vol 53 No 2, April 1992, 171-190, at 171-172.
Ibid at 186.
See Varghese, Jose, Law Relating to the Employment o f  Children in India, (Socio Legal 
Resource Centre, Secunderabad, 1989) at 4.
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children in Sivakasi in particular and on child labour in general, began, after which 
a petition was filed by advocate M C Mehta. Again in April 1984, news reports 
exposed the forced child labour employed in the Mirzapur carpet industries. These 
reports detailed the abduction and sale of children from Palamu district of Bihar to a 
carpet weaver of Mirzapur District of Uttar Pradesh and prompted Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha to file a petition.^”^
Access to correct information and data presents a perennial problem that 
is particularly harmful in the context of children, who cannot themselves approach the 
courts. The State has denied the incidence of child labour in industries where it is 
known to be common.^ Many of the petitions in this section have relied on 
newspaper reports in the expectation that the Court would take the initiative in 
responding to injustices perpetrated upon children.
Access to Justice
Reacting to news reports and to letters sent by Sheela Barse and 
Rajangam, it appears that the Supreme Court has not permitted any obstacles to 
dealing with the cases on children. Even in a matter filed by M C Mehta on child 
labour that had been finally disposed of the Court took suo moto notice of newspaper 
reports of an accident in the area.
The Court's Response
In procedural terms the Supreme Court has responded flexibly to the
Varghese, Jose (1989) at 4. See the section on 'Bonded Labour' infra for details o f this 
organisation.
Varghese, Jose (1989) at 6. whereas the Union Labour Minister stated that there were were no 
children below the age of 14 years working in the potteries o f Khuija, social worker, Neera Burra, had 
identified about 5,000 children below 14 years of age in those very potteries.
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petitions filed. Enlarging the scope of petitions, the Court has admitted to the 
existence of problems relating to children on a large scale.^ '^ In all the prison cases, 
and some others enquiries were ordered and the Court has monitored the progress of 
the case and the implementation of its orders.^^  ^ Whilst the Court ensured the well­
being of Ameena, an under age girl who had been married to a Saudi Arabian 
husband,^in another case the Court expressed its limitations, stating that it was only 
able to monitor implementation of its orders because Tihar Jail was located in Delhi, 
which indicates that proximity to the Supreme Court was a factor in ensuring better 
implementation.^
It is not only the implementation of the Supreme Court's own orders 
that were monitored, but also the implementation of the existing statutory 
framework.^Interesting directions have been given. In the case of the Children's 
Home in Bombay, the Supreme Court held that the home could be treated as “the 
state” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, thus making all the 
fundamental rights available against the state, also available against the administrators 
of the home.^*  ^This was an important statement because there have been few instances 
where the Court has been prompted to discuss the scope of Article 12 of the 
Constitution in PIL matters, most of which have been filed against the State or its 
instrumentalities (see chapter seven).
In the area of child labour, notwithstanding the innovations of 
procedure, the Court has responded with a rhetoric in support of the child that has 
been undermined by its actual orders. Although the employment of children in the
See Sheela Barse op cit note 195 and Rajangam op cit note 197. 
Gautam Uzir op cit note 196.
Brinda Karat op cit note 199.
Sanjay Suri op cit note 195.
For example, see Munna op cit note 195.
Sheela Barse op cit note 196.
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manufacture of matches had been banned by the Child Labour (Prohibition and 
Regulation) Act. 1986, the Court justified its continuance in the context of packing 
matches away from the site of manufacture, because the “tender hands of the young 
workers” were more suitable to the task.^'^ The Court permitted, without exception, 
the employment of children in an industry in which child labour had been prohibited, 
and directed that children only be paid a percentage of the minimum wage.^^* 
Moreover, the Court tacitly permitted illegal practices to continue by directing that the 
State authorites decide whether contract labour be employed and take responsibility 
for the phasing out of child labour - a practice for which the authorities ought to have 
been held answerable. The liability of the Sivakasi industries to ensure the well-being 
of the labourers was translated simply into the payment of compensation and 
insurance, absolving other responsibilities for the safety of workers.^
Detailed principles and norms for inter-country adoption have been 
framed, with the help of specialist organisations.^^® Nonetheless, areas of concern were 
not resolved. For example, while the Court did consider the question of the future of 
the children adopted abroad, after they reach majority, no direction was made 
providing for a support framework for these young people.
Even though none of the orders detailed in this section have been from 
the High Courts, there is evidence that the High Courts have responded to issues 
relating to children.^^' In the appeal filed by Sheela Barse from the order of the 
Bombay High Court, on a children's home in Bombay, the Supreme Court expanded 
the scope of the earlier High Court orders, whilst censuring the Bombay High Court
Ignorance of working conditions led the Court to assume that separation of the processes of  
manufacture and packing was possible. Rajangam op cit note 197 at 285.
For example, see M  C Mehta op cit note 195.
Laxmi Kant Pandey op cit note 198. See Anthony, M J, 'Can Supreme Court judges asume role 
of law-makers?'. The business and Political Observer, 27/11/91.
See Munna and Sanjay Suri op cit note 195.
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from making disparaging remarks against the petitioner, and ordering that she be paid 
Rs.5,000 costs/^^ It is not just in this case that journalist and activist, Sheela Barse, 
encountered the displeasure of a Court. When approaching the Supreme Court to get 
relief for children in prisons, she had been compelled to make repeated trips to Delhi 
only to find that the case had been adjourned. Her frustration led to a disagreement 
with the advocate-on-record for the case, who successfully applied to the Court to be 
discharged. Taking over the case as a petitioner-in-person, Sheela Barse again faced 
repeated adjournments. Expressing her disillusionment with the Court's inability to 
ensure compliance and the unbearable delays, four years after filing the appeal she 
attempted to withdraw her case.^^  ^ Disregarding this protest, which highlighted the 
ineffectiveness of judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court admonished the petitioner 
for attempting to thwart the public interest and asked the SCLAC to take over the 
case. Although it responded out of concern for those affected by the petition, the 
Court failed to acknowledge Sheela Barse's efforts in bringing the case to court and 
supplying detailed information. Few subsequent orders have been reported, as the new 
petitioners were unable to attend to this case with the diligence of Sheela Barse.
The Contribution of PIL
If the cases are examined within the framework of judicial activism, 
then it can be observed, generally, that the Supreme Court has responded to the needs 
of children. Conversely, if the cases are examined from the perspective of the needs 
of children, then the Supreme Court's response would have to be described as 
superficial. However, it is only through using the Courts that statutory institutions 
were set up under the Juvenile Justice Act. 1986.^ ^^  ^ The follow up of the litigations 
has been a problem. For example, like most petitioners to the Court for children in
“ ■ Sheela Barse op cit note 196. 
Sheela Barse op cit note 195.
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee op cit note 195. See 'Consumer Issues' for the case 
concerning the implementation of consumer protection legislation, Common Cause, A Regd Society v 
Union o f  India & Ors 1989 (2) SCALE 98 [541].
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prisons, M C Mehta was unable to follow up the case after the children were released 
from jail and the question of rehabilitation of released children was never raised.
In the cases on prisons and institutions, the Court has been willing to 
assert its judicial role vis-a-vis the state authorities, and has extended its concern even 
to discuss the character of an ideal jail.^^  ^ The superficiality of the Court's response 
is most apparent in the cases on child labour, both through the orders themselves and 
an examination of the legal process, with its delays. The Court has been unable to 
mobilise the State to the necessary extent, as is apparent from the petition filed by 
Rajangam.^^^ The legislation that regulates rather than abolishes child labour, has 
allowed the violations of the rights of the child to remain unchecked.^^* Thus with a 
compromising legal framework and a judiciary which has proven its unwillingness to 
tackle the causes and consequences of child labour, it is unsurprising that these cases 
are still pending in the Supreme Court.
International Covenants have been an important reference point for the 
Court in discussing child labour.^^  ^The mobilisation of the issue outside the Court has 
focussed on these covenants and on the foreign exchange issue by encouraging foreign 
importers of finished products, such as carpets, not to purchase goods made with child
M C Mehta op cit note 195. 
Sanjay Suri op cit note 195.
The Court's role has been perceived as positive in the press, for example: [anon], 'Ban on child 
labour in beedi trade'. Times o f  India, 20/11/90.
The committee appointed by the Supreme Court in M C Mehta op cit note 197 reported that 
none of the court directions were being implemented. See [anon], ' Sivakasi units flouting SC directions', 
Indian Express, 19/11/91, in which it was reported:
Though a statement was made on behalf o f the Tamil Nadu government that children are not 
employed in firework factories the committee found the children working in these even on 
Sundays.
Also see Bhatnagar, Ramesh, 'Welfare fund for child workers likely', Times o f  India, 21/11/91.
Such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 1989.
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labour/^° The importance of education and other welfare provisions has also been 
highlighted.^^' The expansion of standing in the courtroom has led to liberal 
procedures to be included in the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 
1986.^^  ^ Aside from these incremental gains, it is impossible to gauge the effects of 
litigation on the extent of child labour, just as the situation of children released from 
prisons needs more study. In real terms it would seem that the situation of the girl- 
child as prisoner, labourer and sexual object remains much the same, as litigation has 
had little effect.
'Carpets at What Cost' (pamphlet, Consumer Unity and Trust Society, Calcutta, 1993). [anon]. 
Carpet industry bans child labour'. The Pioneer, 22/7/93 reported that the Carpet Export Promotion 
Council adopted a voluntary code of conduct to eliminate the use of child labour.
Sengupta, Amit, The education option to end child labour. The Pioneer, 20/5/93.
--- Section 16 o f the act states that “Any person, police officer or Inspector may file a complaint 
of an offence under this Act in any Court o f competent jurisdiction”.
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Labour
The petitions filed on labour can be categorised into sections on the 
closure of indus t ry , the  unorganised sector ,heal th  and safety,^^  ^and the rest of the 
cases/^^ All the cases on labour should be examined together with the cases in the 
sections on 'Bonded Labour' and 'Urban Space', in which cases relating to bonded 
labour, hawkers and street vendors can be found.^^^
Most of the PIL cases filed for workers have been for those in the 
unorganised sector, where the structure of the industry is not easily identifiable. In this 
sector the state has taken upon itself a parens patriae role, assuming that labour
Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v Union o f  India and others 
AIR 1981 SC 344; Workers o f  M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. v M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. (1987) 2 SCC 
588.
Hira Lai & Anr v Zilla Parishad, Kanpur & Ors 1982 (1) SCALE 123 [545]; Sanjit Roy v State 
o f Rajasthan AIR 1983 SC 328; People's Union fo r  Democratic Rights (PUDR) and others v Union o f  
India & Ors 1982 (1) SCALE 158 [817] and AIR 1982 SC 1473 / 1982 (1) SCALE 159 [818]; 
Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v State o f  Jammu and Kashmir and others (1983) 2 SCC 
181 and (1984) 3 SCC 53; Ram Kumar Misra v State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1984 SC 537; for 
contract workers in Kandla Port; Rohit Vasavada and Anr. v General Manager, IFFCO, Kalol and Ors. 
1983(2) GLR XX1V(2) 1529; Nagendra Dutt Jagudi v State o f  UP. 1987 (2) SCALE 306 [1301]; for 
the workers on the Sabarmati Coal site in Ahmedabad; Special Works and Research Centre through 
Sanjit Roy and others v State o f  Rajasthan 1986 (Supp) SCC 561 and 1986 (2) SCALE 232 [905]; Lok 
Adhikar Sangh v State o f  Gujarat and others', Valiben Bhikhabhai Parmar and others v Dena Bank and 
others', Vidyulatta Vivek Pandit and others v State o f  Maharashtra and others and Vivek Raghunath 
Pandit and others v Inspector Incharge, Ganeshpuri Police Station and others.
M K  Sharma and others v Bharat Electronics Ltd [BEL] and others (1987) 3 SCC 231; 
regarding factory conditions in Kozhikode.
Sand Carrier's Owners' Union and others v Board o f  Trustees fo r  the Port o f  Calcutta and 
others AIR 1990 Cal 176.
There are man relevant cases in other sections. For cases on Industrial Tribunals and Labour 
Courts see 'Judges, Courts and Lawyers' for Inder Mohan v Union o f India etc [C W P No 2646 o f  
1982, Delhi]; M  C Mehta v Union o f  India and others 1986 (Supp) SCC 562. For cases on prison 
labour, see Prisons and State Institutions' for/« the matter of: Prison Reforms Enhancement o f  Wages 
o f Prisoners etc. AIR 1983 Ker 261; Poola Bhaskara Vijayakumar v State o f  Andhra Pradesh and 
another AIR 1988 AP 295; Gurdev Singh and others etc. v State o f  Himachal Pradesh and others AIR 
1992 HP 76. For a case o f forced labour in police custody, see the section on the Police' for Peoples 
Union o f  Democratic Rights through its Secretary and Anr v Police Commissioner, Delhi Police 
Headquarters & Anr 1989 (1) SCALE 114 [599]. For cases on child labour see the section on 
Children'.
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cannot take care of itself even when empowered by legislation. For example, 
provisions in the the Contract Labour ^Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 and the 
Inter-State Migrant Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) 
Act. 1979 confer a duty upon the State to look after the well-being of workers. In 
spite of this the State has been the worst offender.^^* Far from realising the rights of 
these workers, enactments such as the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Emplovees 
^Exemption from Labour Laws) Act. 1964 have permitted labour laws and minimum 
wage standards to be legally suspended.^^^ Moreover enactments like the Contract 
Labour fRegulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 only confer rights on those workers paid 
by a registered contractor and it is only when an aggrieved worker brings violations 
of health and safety rules to the attention of the authorities, that action can be taken. 
Thus PIL has proven to be a necessary check on breaches of the rights of workers 
which would otherwise remain unchecked. "^*®
The blurred distinction between litigation in the form of a class actions 
and that which can be identified as PIL, is apparent in many of the cases. '^^’ Numerous
In addition to the documented cases, a petition, Anin Sinha v State o f  Bihar (W P No 6352 of  
1982) was filed in the Supreme Court in 1982 by the People's Union for Democratic Rights invoking 
the Inter-State Migrant Workers Act. 1979 on behalf o f over 1.5 lakh migrant labourers from Orissa, 
employed by contractors at the behest of the State Government. Provisions o f the 1979 Act had been 
suspended by the State Government. The then Director-General of the Union Ministry o f Labour wrote: 
Take for example, the procedure for filing a claim under [a] section o f the Minimum Wages 
Act in the event of short payment. No doubt various claim authorities have been notified at 
different points but their number is small and the distance o f thier headquarters from the place 
of employment is so long that it makes the task o f filing claims extremely dificult. Besides, 
under the prevailing conditions where the relationship between the employer and the employee 
is so based more on economic and commercial considerations that otherwise and where an 
employee is confronted every moment with the prospect o f instant discharge, dismissal and 
termination from employment, it is futile to expect him to file a claim 
See Mishra, Lakshmidhar, 'Laws for Labour' in Gandhi, P K (1985), 104-113 at 112; Patel, Sujata, 
Contract Labour and Public Interest Litigation', Economic and Political Weekly, 17/12/83, 2151-2153.
In order to avoid having to pay minimum wages and provide facilities, projects would be 
deliberately conducted under this Act.
A general introduction to the issues of concern to many o f the petitioners can be found in 
Labour Movement and Legislations in India. A Manual fo r Activists, (Society for the Participatory 
Research in Asia, Delhi, 198?).
The two cases relating to the closure of industry. Fertilizer Corporation and Workers o f  M/s 
Rohtas Industries op cit note 233 are both class actions which have to be discusse^ because o f the 
importance o f the Court's judgments to PIL. Similarly, the case filed by the Sand Carrier's Owners'
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class actions, for example on equal pay for equal work '^^  ^ and the régularisation of 
labour have been filed. The easily identifiable nature of industries in this sector, 
extensive unionisation and the precedent of class actions set by PIL laid the 
foundations for using law in this way.
Organistions and social action groups have played a significant role in 
bringing the situation of workers in the unorganised sector to the Court. Sanjit Roy 
of the Social Work and Research Centre (mistakenly called the Special Works and 
Research Centre in the reported judgment) has filed two cases, both on the payment 
of minimum wages. Similarly, the cases filed by the People's Union for Democratic 
Rights and the Lok Adhikar Sangh, were filed in response to written and oral reports 
of injustice. Those filed by the latter organisation were both in response to newspaper 
articles, as were the petitions filed for the workers on the Salal Hydroelectric Project 
and in the Kandla Port. Other petitions filed by the Self Employed Women's 
Association (SEWA)^ "^  ^ and the Vidhayak Sansad^"  ^ resulted from a long-term 
involvement with the people represented.
Union op cit note 236 has been discussed because o f the Court's pronouncements on PIL. M  K  Sharma 
op cit note 235 has been accounted for, as it is perceived as a PIL, but is a class action. See chapter 
two for a discussion.
For examples of class action cases on equal pay for equal work see: Randhir Singh v Union o f  
India and others AIR 1982 SC 879; Inder Pal Yadav and others v Union o f  India and others (1985) 
2 SCC 648; Surinder Singh v Engineer-In-Chief C.P.W.D. (1986) 1 SCC 639; Ram Kumar and others 
V Union o f  India and others AIR 1988 SC 390; Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under P&T  
Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v Union o f  India and others (1988) 1 SCC 122; 
Jaipal and others v State o f  Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 354; Federation o f  All India Customs and Central 
Excise Stenographers v Union o f  India (1988) 3 SCC 91; Halli Gowda and others v Managing Director, 
K  S R T C and another AIR 1989 SC 1117; Bhagwati Prasad v Delhi State Mineral Development 
Corporation AIR 1990 SC 371; Ram Sukh and others v State o f  Rajasthan and others AIR 1990 SC 
592; Food Corporation o f  India Workers' Union v Food Corporation o f  India and others AIR 1990 SC 
2178; Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v Union o f  India and others AIR 1991 SC 1173; Sandeep 
Kumar and others v State o f Uttar Pradesh and others AIR 1992 SC 713.
See the section on 'Urban Space'.
See the section on 'Bonded Labour' for other cases filed by this organisation together with the 
Shramjeevi Sangathana in Thane District, Maharashtra.
172
Access to Justice
Allowing letters as writ petitions meant that early PIL cases filed by 
Sanjit Roy and the People' Union for Democratic Rights were admitted by the 
C o u r t A g a i n  the difference between letter-petitions and PIL cases has to be noted. 
Although the original letter regarding the closure of an industry was sent by the 
workers themselves, the PIL character of the litigation was affirmed when examining 
the nature of the grievance and the fact that access to justice was only possible for 
these workers after procedural rules had been relaxed.^ "^^
In one of the earliest expositions of PIL Justice Krishna Iyer discussed 
standing and linked it with the nature of the grievance brought to Court. '^^  ^The right 
of a worker to approach the Court questioning the closure of an industry was upheld. 
The Court also discussed the scope of PIL and locus standi in its notable judgment 
in the Asiad Games workers case.^ "** However, the High Courts have not always 
followed the precedent sent by the Supreme Court. '^^^
Only one case was rejected on the grounds that an alternative forum 
was available.^^° Similarly, after granting interim relief in the petition, the Gujarat 
High Court directed the petition to the Industrial Tribunal.^^'
Other cases such as Workers o f  M/s Rohtas Industries op cit note 233, Ram Kumar Misra op 
cit note 234 and Rohit Vasavada op cit note 234 originated in letters.
Workers o f  M/s Rohtas Industries op cit note 233. 
Fertilizer Corporation op cit note 233.
24 8 People's Union for Democratic Rights op cit note 234.
For example when the availability of locus standi was limited by the Calcutta High Court in 
Sand Carrier's Owners' Union op cit note 236.
In Vidyulatta Vivek Pandit op cit note 234, after originally asking the Labour Commissioner to 
appear in Court, the Bombay High Court asked the petitioners to approach the Industrial Tribunal.
Valiben Bhikhabhai Parmar op cit note 234.
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The Court’s Response
One of the first cases in which the Court ordered an inquiry and 
monitored the implementation of its orders was in the Asiad Games case, notable for 
the Court's innovative treatment of the procedural impediments to access to justice and 
also for the Court's order in which importance was given to the Directive Principles 
of State Policy. The scope of forced labour in Article 23 of the Constitution was 
expanded to include the compulsion of economic circumstances.^^^ Subsequently, this 
order was used to declare the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Emplovees (Exemption 
from Labour Laws) Act. 1964 as unconstitutional under Article 23 of the 
Constitution^^^ - the first time that this Article had been used in this way.^ "^* In a 
concurring judgment. Justice Pathak upheld the order but stated that the Act violated 
Article 14 of the Constitution rather than Article 23. This difference of perspective 
between the judges reflects a general and continuing disparity about how to deal with 
issues relating to the “have nots”. Few later judgments have been as resourceful when 
analysing fundamental rights for workers.
Commissions have been regularly appointed, and in one case two 
separate commissions were appointed,^^^ to provide the information and insight that 
would otherwise not be available. Not only has the Court been unable to rely on the 
State for adequate information,^^^ the Court has itself had to take on the responsibility 
of monitoring the implementation of its orders.
While on occasion the government has been praised for its co-operation
People's Union for Democratic Rights op cit note 234.
Sanjit Roy op cit note 234.
Contrast with Poola Bhaskara Vijayakumar op cit note 22.
For the workers on the Sabarmati Coal site in Ahmedabad, op cit note 234. 
For example Workers o f  M/s Rohtas Industries op cit note 233.
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during the Court's enquiries and in implementing the Court's o r d e r s , m o s t  of the 
cases have been characterised by a reluctance to cooperate. The obduracy of the State 
machinery is more glaringly apparent in other cases, such as that of the Sabarmati coal 
workers, when the government was unwilling to frame a statutory scheme on the 
grounds that it would not be successful, without analysing or attempting to rectify the 
causes of the anticipated failure. The Court could only “trust” that necessary action 
would be taken by the State, but was disappointed by the results. In another case, the 
Court was compelled to monitor the implementation of its order, to appoint a 
committee and directed the sugar factories to pay the costs of the litigation.^^^
The Court has had to analyse various enactments before giving orders, 
decide which of the many labour laws would be applicable in the case under 
consideration and, before assigning responsibility for the implementation of its 
judgments, decide who would be responsible for the implementation of the provisions 
of the Acts.^^^
The nebulous distinction between bonded labour and other forms of 
exploitation was made apparent by the courts.^^ ® However, the Judicial comprehension 
of labour issues has been poor, lacking clarity and sensitivity to the workers 
themselves. Without considering that the Labour Commissioner may be hiding the 
existence of bonded labour from the Court, the statement that there was no bonded 
labour was accepted at face value.^^'
In Hira Lai and Special Works and Research Centre op cit note 234. As the latter petition was 
filed after the court's order, because the government flouted the Supreme Court's directions in Sanjit 
Roy op cit note 234, the praise seems misplaced.
Lok Adhikar Sangh op cit note 234.
Ibid, the Court had first to decide who were the principal employees before determining their 
duties. In Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project op cit note 234, contractors and sub-contractors 
were directed to register themselves as contractors under the Contract Labour ^Regulation and Abolition! 
Act. 1970 so that provisions o f the Act would apply to them.
See Ram Kumar Misra, Rohit Vasadava, People's Union fo r  Democratic Rights and Sanjit Roy 
op cit note 234.
In Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project op cit note 234 reference was made to the 
employment of children, and to the applicability o f the Bonded Labour System TAbolition^ Act. 1976.
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A number of specific legal developments have ensued. The right of 
workers to demonstrate has been upheld.^^  ^ Responding to the fear of radiation, the 
Court has held that while there was no immediate danger to workers, Bharat 
Electronics Limited should provide insurance.^^^
The Contribution of PIL
Just as the issues brought to the Court related to the non­
implementation of labour laws, the use of legal mechanisms has resulted in the non­
implementation of the Court’s judgments. There has been sympathy and, in some cases 
dynamism in the Court, for the workers, but this in itself brought little in the way of 
substantive results.
The landmark judgment in the Asiad case^ '^^  received much attention at 
the time and has been quoted in innumerable later cases. Despite this there was no 
change in the conditions of work on the Asiad construction sites. By the time orders 
had been passed by the Supreme Court, few workers remained, as the time taken for 
the Court to act was just too long. The court-appointed ombudsmen visited the 
construction sites when most of the work had been completed and the majority of the 
unskilled migrant labourers had already left. Following the main Supreme Court order, 
when labour inspectors started supervising the work, it was found that the contractors 
were still bypassing the laws, that they were preventing the workers from reporting 
their situation to the ombudsmen and that they were attempting to hide major 
accidents. At least 100 major accident cases were treated at one nursing home alone
Vivek Raghunath Pandit op cit note 234.
M  K  Sharma op cit note 235. Contrast with Nagendra Dutt Jagudi op cit note 234 in which the 
Court ordered that criminal proceedings be initiated against the management. See the section on health 
in the section on 'Public Policy and Administration' for a case filed by M C Mehta on radiation in 
which the Supreme Court directed that insurance cover be provided for the employees at risk. Also see 
'Children' for Rajangam op cit note 197.
People's Union fo r  Democratic Rights op cit note 234.
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during the 18-month period ending in July 1982/^^
In legal terms, the orders on labour have displayed little innovation. 
With the exception of the ruling in the Asiad case which clarified the scope of Article 
23 of the Constitution and used the Directive Principles of State Policy, there have 
been few incisive comments. As in most of the other sections, the lack of comment 
or criticism of the statutory framework which governs labour relations is conspicuous. 
Relief has been provided on a case by case basis, whilst the broader issue of liability 
and the duty to protect workers has not been considered. One major innovation of PIL 
for workers has been procedural, in the wide acceptance of class actions.^^^
The way in which the case on the workers of Sabarmati coal site was 
brought to Court reflected on the eventual outcome, as have the differences in the 
approach of activist groups working in the area. This petition had been filed by a 
group of lawyers, the Lok Adhikar Sangh, apparently without consulting or informing 
the Ahmedabad Women's Action Group, a social action group which was already 
working in the area.^^  ^Members of the women's group felt that the petitioner's focus 
was to secure a legal victory, but not on the implementation of that victory. Reports 
indicate that the case was eventually withdrawn at the request of the management, 
who had superficially fulfilled the requirements of the Court order.
ASIAD 82', (monograph published by Gobinda Mukhoty, President PUDR, Delhi, Oct 1982)
at 5.
See Hardoi Roadways (Private) Union, Hardoi and another v Cantonment Board, Shahjahanpur 
and others AIR 1991 All 59 for an example o f a case which demonstrated that class actions are still 
not wholly accepted. The Allahabad High Court refused to give locus standi to a Union of workers on 
the grounds that an individual can challenge the action o f an authority.
In addition to this case, another petition from Gujarat involved a number of activist groups. It 
was filed in the Gujarat High Court by a co-operative society in Ahmedabad constituted o f persons 
plying handcarts for carrying bales of cloth in the Maskati Cloth Market challenging the constitutional 
validity of the Cloth Markets or Shops Unprotected Workers (Regulation o f Emplovment and Welfare^ 
Rules. 1981 because certain areas were excluded from the scheme, which was framed without any 
application o f mind as it can only operate if  workers/employees are registered. The High Court 
appointed a Commissioner to look into the matter. An application was then filed stating that the 
petitioners were not handcart pullers and the petition was not filed bona fide. Another organisation in 
Ahmedabad, SEWA, then intervened in the petition.
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Far from bettering the situation of the migrant sugar cane cutter, another 
unreported case brought by the Lok Adhikar Sangh appears to have worsened it. Even 
before the petition was filed, the State Government was aware of the conditions of 
work. In May 1986, the Rural Commissioner for Labour in Gujarat had stated in a 
memo:
... if some public litigation were to be filed for and on behalf of these 
migrant workers, the Government could be placed in the most 
embarrassing position.^^^
Even after the intervention of the High Court, the State Government did not co­
operate. Moreover, as noted by an analyst of the case:
The biggest problem seems to me to be the fact that the Lok Adhikar 
Sangh was not content with the role of advocate, but in the second 
instance started to negotiate with employers as defender of the 
migrants' interest. Once they had succumbed to this predilection they 
found themselves in a position in which they entered into agreements 
on behalf of clients who had not given permission for them to do so 
and who were scarcely aware of what was being done in their name.^^^
The Court's orders were flouted and the factory owners became more sophisticated in
the methods of exploitation of the workers. An appeal was filed by the management
of the co-operative factories, and the litigation continues. It seems that many of the
workers have lost the employment they had. It is in this instance that the strength of
entrenched business interests in the maintenance of the cheapest possible labour force
is most visible.
The judgments in both the cases filed by Sanjit Roy mobilised many 
social action groups within Rajasthan and resulted in a series of judgments on
Quoted in Breman, Jan, 'Agribusiness and Labour in South Gujarat', (Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, London, unpublished paper for discussion, presented on 21/10/88) at 9. Also see Breman, Jan, 
'Seasonal Migration and Co-operative Capitalism. Crushing of Cane and o f Labour by Sugar Factories 
of Bardoli', Economic and Political Weekly Special Number Aug 1978, 1317-1360; Breman, Jan, '“I 
am the Government Labour Officer ...” State Protection for Rural Proletariat of South Gujarat', 
Economic and Political Weekly, 15/6/85, 1043-1055; [anon], 'Exploitation continues despite the laws'. 
The Hindu, 13/12/86. For a detailed study of these labourers see Breman, Jan, O f Peasants, Migrants 
and Paupers. Rural Labour Circulation and Capitalist Production in West India, (Oxford University 
Press, Delhi, 1985).
Breman, Jan (1988) at 17-18.
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minimum wages in the Rajasthan High Court.^^° The Supreme Court judgments have 
been used in lower courts, providing support for those who seeking change through 
the administration, and raising the status of the petitioning organisation and providing 
a justification for action. Implementation of the judgments themselves has been 
monitored by the Social Work and Research Centre, which had prepared for a 
successful outcome in the Supreme Court.^^* In the cases that have had some success, 
this can be attributed to the work of non-govemmental organisations, rather than to 
the administration.
Bonded Labour
Available documents of petitions filed relating to bonded labour are 
easily categorised into those filed by the organisation Bandhua Mukti Morcha,^^^ those 
relating to the Raipur area of Madhya Pradesh,^^  ^ those relating to the Thane District 
of Maharashtra,^ '^^ and a collection of disparate cases from the rest of the country.^^^
See [anon], Minimum Wages in Government Sponsored Rural Employment Programmes, 
(Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur, 1991).
Sanjit Roy himself described how he sent the first letter to the Supreme Court after being assured 
by Justice Bhagwati that the Court would treat the matter sympathetically. Sanjit Roy, interview, 
Tilonia, 16/2/92.
Kameshwar Prasad Sharma, 'Slave' President, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Bihar v State o f  Bihar 
and others 1983 (2) SCALE 160 [897], 1983 (2) SCALE 161 [897] and 1993 (2) SCALE 31 [127]; 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union o f  India & Ors (Haryana Mines I) AIR 1984 SC 802 / (1984) 4 SCC 
161, 1991 (1) SCALE 79 [295] and AIR 1992 SC 38; Bandhua Mukti Morcha, through Chairman, 
Swami Agnivesh v State o f  Haryana & Ors. (Haryana Mines II) 1983 (1) SCALE 121 [543]; Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v State o f  Tamil Nadu 1986 (Supp) SCC 541.
Chattisgarh Krishak Mazdoor Sangh v State o f M P &  Ors. 1984 (3) SCALE 93 [603]; Upendra 
and others v State o f  M  P and another 1986 (Supp) SCC 558; Rajinder K. Sail v State o f  M.P. 1988 
(1) SCALE 176; Balram & Ors v State o f  M  P Etc. 1989 (2) SCALE 125 [667].
Included in this section are details o f two petitions with the same cause title, which were heard 
together: Vivek Pandit v State o f  Maharashtra.
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All the cases invoke the Bonded Labour System (Abolitionl Act. 1976 which was 
enacted to give effect to Article 23 of the Constitution by providing for the release 
and rehabilitation of bonded labourers. The Act states that a bonded labourer is one 
who has incurred a bonded debt under the bonded labour system.^^  ^ The Act also 
states that any worker to whom the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of 
Emplovment and Conditions of Service) Act. 1979 and the Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 would apply and who is working in conditions 
specified in secion 2(g) would be classified as a bonded labourer under the Act. The 
Act also provides for the establishment of vigilance committees at district level for the 
implementation of the Act and for punishments for offenders.
Bonded labour exists in many industries and can take many forms. A 
report of the Anti-Slavery Society, in 1841, estimated that ten million people were 
working in conditions of debt bondedness, and indicated that this figure may be 
inadequate.^^^ In a study of bonded labour in agriculture published in 1981, 2,617,000 
bonded labourers were identified in ten states.^^  ^The study described how 97.5% of
Neeraja Chaudhary v State o f  M  P  AIR 1984 SC 1099 / 1984 (1) SCALE 148 [874]; Mukesh 
Advani v State o f M P  AIR 1985 SC 1363; P Sivaswamy v State o f T N  1983 (2) SCALE 45 [240] and 
(1988) 4 SCC 466; State o f Karnataka and others v Taluk Labour Union (Regd.); T Chakkalackal v 
State o f  Bihar JT 1992 (1) SC 106; details o f cases in the Madras High Court.
Section 2(g) defines the bonded labour system as where an agreement is entered into between 
a debtor an creditor under a number of conditions, and with specified effects. The conditions are 
broadly: in consideration of an advance; in pursuance of any customary or social obligation; in 
pursuance o f an obligation devolving on him by succession; for any economic consideration; by reason 
o f birth in any particular caste or community.
Punishments are laid out in sections 16-20 o f the Act: for the enforcement o f bonded labour or 
for the advancement of bonded debt - up to three years imprisonment and also fine up to Rs.2,000; for 
the extraction of bonded labour - up to three years imprisonment and also fine up to Rs.2,000 (out of 
which a payment of Rs.5 is to be given to the bonded labourer for each day worked); failure to restore 
the property of a bonded labourer - up to one year imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 1,000 or both (out 
of which a payment of Rs.5 per day is to be given to the bonded labourer for the time that property was 
not restored); abetment has the same punishment as the offence.
[anon], 'Slavery in British India', Anti-Slavery Reporter, XXXlll, Vol 11 No 6, 24/3/1841. 
Population estimates for 1850 range from 183 to 247 millions, see Visaria, Leela and Visaria, Pravin, 
'Population (1757-1947)' in Kumar, Dharma and Desai, Meghnad (eds). The Cambridge Economic 
History o f India. Volume 2: c.l757-c.l970, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983), 463-532.
Marla, Sarma Bonded Labour in India: A National Survey on the Incidence o f  Bonded Labour, 
Final Report, January 1981 (Academy of Gandhian Studies, Hyderabad, 1981).
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the bonded labourers identified were men and 2.3% women. The five most common 
ways to become bonded were: inter-generational bondage; child bondage;^*® loyalty 
bondage; bondage through land allotment; widow bondage. Two types of bondage 
were identified in the study - customary (traditional) bondage where the relationship 
between the bonded labourer and the landlord is characterised by a high degree of 
paternalism and personalisation, and modem bondage in which the relationship 
between debtor and creditor is more impersonal and complex. It was found that 
bonded labour was a phenomenon which could be stmcturally identified with the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, as 86.6% of the bonded labourers came from 
the under-privileged sections of harijans and adivasis (scheduled castes: 61.5%, 
scheduled tribes: 25.1%).^^'
Together with labour laws, the Bonded Labour Svstem t Abolition) Act. 
1976, provides legal protection and support for those labourers recognised as bonded 
labour under the Act. However, it was not until social action groups, working for the 
release and rehabilitation of bonded labour, began to petition the Supreme Court that 
the protection of this Act was used. Nothing had been done for such labourers by the 
local administration, which, at best, denied the existence of bonded labour and often 
supported its use. The labourers themselves, unaware of their rights and unable to 
engage with the legal process, were not in a position to petition the court. Journalists 
and organisations took note of the powerlessness of these labourers, and of their legal 
rights. Approaching the Supreme Court became the only solution to a stmcturally 
entrenched problem.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha began working with bonded labour in 1981 and 
was immediately successful in releasing some of the bonded labourers working in the 
stone quarries of Haryana. The release of these labourers generated reactions both in
See the cases on child labour in the section on 'Children'.
Also see Mehta, Piareylal, 'Constitutional Philosophy of Bonded Labour in India: Myth and 
Reality', Indian Social Legal Journal Vol 15 Nos 1&2, 1989, 125-143.
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Parliament and the media and gave the labourers themselves a sense of their rights 
As no money was made available for the rehabilitation of the released labourers and 
the administration was unresponsive, the organisation decided that a case should be 
filed.^^  ^ Hopes about what could be gained from the Court were high as it was 
envisaged that the labourers would be identified, released and rehabilitated.^*'^
A similar situation arose at about the same time in Thane District of 
Maharashtra. While working with bonded labourers in 1981, Vivek and Vidyulatta 
Pandit found that the administration was both apathetic and ignorant of the existence 
of bonded labour.^*  ^ The Government of Maharashtra, without constituting Vigilance 
Committees, as prescribed by the Act, to investigate the existence of bonded labour, 
claimed that there were no bonded labourers in the s ta te .U n a b le  to mobilise 
adequately the administration and labourers through the organisation, Vidhayak 
Sansad, the Pandits visited Justice Bhagwati, then a sitting judge of the Supreme 
Court, in May 1983. After listening to their story, the judge suggested that a letter be 
written to the Supreme Court. However, it was decided not to approach the Court 
immediately. Instead, with the support of only a few politicians and a large portion 
of the press, 200 bonded labourers in the area were freed. It was not until December 
1983 when the magnitude of the problem and the limitations of local action were 
realised, that it was decided to take recourse to law. After meeting with Justice
[anon], 'Agnivesh rescues bonded labour', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 1 No 2, May 1981, 20.
In addition to the documented cases, other petitions have been filed. W P No 1628 of 1983 was 
filed by Bandhua Mukti Morcha in the SC on behalf o f bonded brick kiln workers in Haryana.
For documentation and analysis o f these cases see Bonded Labour and its Abolition. Volume 
1; Report', (National Centre for Human Settlement and Environment, New Delhi, [1986?]); Bonded 
Labour and its Abolition. Volume 2: Documents. Part I; Statutes, Reports and Circulars', (National 
Centre for Human Settlement and Environment, New Delhi, 1987); Bonded Labour and its Abolition. 
Volume 2: Documents. Part II: Case Material', (National Centre for Human Settlement and 
Environment, New Delhi, 1987).
When the Commissioners appointed by the Court visited the area, they found that the Collector 
of Thane District was not aware of the Bonded Labour Act and that no provisions for rehabilitation had 
been made.
The denial o f the existance of bonded labour was reported in several newspapers of the time 
including the Nagpur Times on 2/1/83.
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Bhagwati again, two letters were sent to the Court on his advice - one asking for the 
identification of bonded labourers and the other for their release.
In Chattisgarh (Raipur)^^  ^political and organisational activity developed 
together as a struggle was begun by bonded labourers and activists both inside and 
outside the courts.^*  ^ It is only in this group of cases that bonded labourers were 
themselves parties to the petitions. All the petitions were similar in content as the 
petitioners were linked through social action groups and organisations.
The definition of bonded labour has given rise to confusion. The 
administration itself has not been clear about who is a bonded labourer. One 
member of the Madhya Pradesh cadre of the Indian Administrative Service noted that 
the confusion about the definition of bonded labour could be seen from the various 
circulars periodically issued by the government. He noted that these circulars would 
often highlight the presence of physical force and confinement as a necessary 
ingredient of bonded labour, contrary to the Act.^^° Thus, it was the Supreme Court 
that was approached for a number of reliefs, first to identify the bonded labourers, 
then to order their release and to provide them with proper rehabilitation.^^*
Most bonded labourers in this region are Kamiyas, and the debts o f the father are passed on to 
their sons.
For example see Sail, Rajendra K 'Madhya Pradesh: Released Bonded Labourers form a Trade 
Union' PUCL Bulletin, Vol 9 No 4, Apr 1989, 7-9.
For other cases in which bonded labour was discussed see the section on Labour' for: Ram
Kumar Misra, Rohit Vasavada and Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project op cit note 234.
Julaniya, Radhey Shayam, Bonded Labour. Experiences and Views of an Administrator',
[(unpublished paper, 1989?)].
See Noorani, Public Interest Litigation', EPW, [?], 1568-1569; Radhakrishnan, K, Public 
Interest Litigation on Bonded Labour', Andhra Law Times (1986) 1 J 8-12.
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Access to Justice
The only major obstacle to gaining access to the courts has been the 
limited knowledge of the writ jurisdiction of the courts and of the statutory and 
constitutional provisions available. Once that hurdle was overcome, with the specific 
encouragement of judges like Justice Bhagwati and the national media, letters were 
sent to the Supreme Court from all over the country. The cases from Tamil Nadu are 
an example of the kinds of cases filed outside the Supreme Court. Filed by the High 
Court Legal Aid Committee (HCLAC), these petitions have often taken the form of 
habeas corpus petitions, asking for the release of labourers from bondage.
The Court’s Response
The letter sent to the Supreme Court in 1981 by Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha led to one of the most important judgments in PIL. Delivered on December 
16,1983 many months after the hearings had concluded, the main judgment was given 
by Justice Bhagwati, with concurring judgments by Justice R S Pathak and Justice A 
N Sen.^^  ^ Dismissing objections to the admissibility of the petition, the Court stated 
that there would be a presumption of bondedness if it were found that the labour in 
question was forced. The Court realised that to ask each labourer to provide proof of 
debt-bondedness would be untenable, and held that whenever the existence of forced 
labour is proven, the onus would be on the employer to discredit this claim. After a 
detailed examination of the relevant enactments, the labourers in question were defined 
as interstate migrant labourers as well as bonded labourers. Twenty-one directions 
were issued outside the scope of the original petition and the State of Haryana was 
lectured about the need to be more responsive and to perform the role of a welfare 
state. During the course of the litigation the Court monitored its directions and 
appointed a number of commissions of enquiry. Even with the Court's efforts, the case 
has been protracted, marked by the continuing intransigence of the employers and the
Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Haryana Mines I) op cit note 272.
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administration.
The appointment of commissions, the monitoring of progress and the 
resistance of the administration form a common theme that runs throughout the orders. 
Monitoring rehabilitation became a more onerous task than was an tic ip a ted ,a n d  
implementation of the Act has been repeatedly ordered.
Although the terms of reference of the commissions appointed were 
clearly defined, the method of conducting the enquiry and the conclusions reached 
have often limited the Court's directions. In one enquiry report, all the allegations 
about the existence of bonded labour were found to be true but no criticisms were 
directed at the adminstration or the District M agistrate.A nother enquiry found that 
although there was no bonded labour, labour laws were being flouted, a situation to 
which the Court responded with hopes and p r a y e r s .I t  is possible that the dangers 
of inquiring into allegations of the existence of bonded labour have affected the 
resulting reports. Members of one enquiry commission were threatened, “by the 
contractor and his henchmen”, and needed police protection to complete their 
investigations.^^^
That courts are restricted by the information put before them is 
illustrated by a case filed by Bandhua Mukti M o r c h a Originally concerned with 
providing protection and rehabilitation to released bonded labourers, the attention of 
the Court became focussed on allegations that the petitioner-organisation had
However the imperative to act was great. In Neeraja Chaudhary op cit note 275 the Court was 
compelled to monitor the rehabilitation o f labourers it had released, describing the terrible choice 
between freedom and hunger forced upon them.
Vivek Pandit op cit note 274.
Mukesh Advani op cit note 275.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha, through Chairman, Swami Agnivesh v State o f Haryana & Ors. referred 
to in Desai, A R (ed). Violation o f Democratic Rights in India. Volume I, (Popular Prakashan, Bombay,
1986) at 185.
Kameshwar Prasad Sharma op cit note 272.
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misappropriated funds. Without examining the matter in detail, the Court accepted in 
full the report of the District Judge, closed the monitoring of the case and refused to 
allow the petitioner to file any more applications. Other problems relating to enquiries 
have also been apparent, for example when the administration refused to testify to the 
existence of bonded labourers.
In spite of the evidentiary problems and the burden of monitoring, one 
important result of the Court's intervention was the support given to the work of social 
action groups.^^  ^These groups were used to monitor the implementation of the Court's 
orders and given an important role on the vigilance committees.^®® Another feature of 
the Court orders in this section has been the tendency to direct the States concerned 
to pay the costs of the investigations ordered by the Court.^ ®^  The links between legal 
aid and PIL, both methods of securing access to justice, were used to the advantage 
of bonded labourers.
The Contribution of PIL
There have certainly been a number of benefits from using PIL for 
bonded labourers. In Raipur, it was only after the Court's intervention that the first 
bonded labourers were released in 1983.^ ®^  Migrant bonded labourers from other States
T Chakkalackal op cit note 275. Also see Chattisgarh Krishak Mazdoor Sangh op cit note 273 - 
it is interesting to note that the order given by the Court in this case was implemented three months 
before an election was to be held. Jose Verghese, advocate, interview, New Delhi, 25/2/92.
In the main judgment in Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Haryana Mines I) op cit note 272 and in 
Neeraja Chaudhary op cit note 275 the value o f the work of such organisations was stressed. Also see 
Centre o f Legal Research and another v State o f  Kerala AIR 1986 SC 2195, as discussed in 'Judges, 
Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
3 0 0 See P Sivaswamy op cit note 275.
For example in Upendra op cit note 273 and P Sivaswamy op cit note 275. In Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha (Haryana Mines 11) op cit note 272 and Mukesh Advani op cit note 275, CILAS was asked to 
pay the costs.
Sail, Rajendra K, 'Madhya Pradesh: released bonded labourers form a Trade Union', PUCL 
Bulletin, Vol 9, No 4, Apr 1989, 7-9 at 9.
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were returned home and there was a widespread feeling that law could be mobilised 
for the disadvantaged. The growth of activist groups, and credibility lent by successes 
in the form of Supreme Court judgments, meant that more bonded labourers became 
aware of their rights, and the oblig^ions of the state towards them. It is certainly true 
that without the courts, the 1976 Act would not have been implemented at all, nor 
would its provisions have become known.
The interpretation of the Bonded Labour Svstem (Abolition) Act. 1976
through the documented PIL orders permitted uncertainties as to what conditions
determined the applicability of the Act. °^  ^In a valuable case study, Oliver Mendelsohn
described the real problem as one of deciding what constitutes forced labour rather
than whether the forced labour could be said to derive from a loan.^ °"^  Mendelsohn
went on to follow the fortunes of labourers working in the stone quarries:
By 1989, and despite a spectacular success in the form of the Supreme 
Court judgement, the Faridabad campaign had to be counted a failure.
Very few workers had effectively been rehabilitated as bonded 
labourers; wages had risen only moderately; and health and safety 
conditions were scarcely different from a decade ago. Swami Agnivesh 
concedes this failure himself and has now abandoned organising in the 
quarries, though he persists with the residual litigation.^°^
He notes that the rehabilitation payments and packages were not realised for those
labourers who were actually released, as the courts could only provide a one time
solution. Attempts to sensitise the administration were critical. However, as bonded
labour is not just a social or political issue, but also an economic issue, what was
needed was a fundamental change in labour relations - a change that the courts could
not effect.^°^
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Haryana Mines I) op cit note 272, Justice Bhagwati defined bonded 
labour as any labour which was forced by economic hardship, but did not define force.
See Mendelsohn, Oliver, 'Life and Struggles in the Stone Quarries o f India: A Case-study', 
Journal o f  Commonwealth and Comparative Political Studies, Vol 29 No 1, Mar 1991, 44-71 at 49.
Ibid at 46. Swami Agnivesh confirmed this view in interview in New Delhi in February 1991 
and The work of the Bonded Liberation Front', (seminar at the Centre o f South Asian Studies, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University o f London, 6/11/91).
Ibid.
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The procedural mechanisms for identifying bonded labourers have 
proven inadequate and innovative methods of manipulating the Act have been found. 
In a petition filed by the Santhal Pargana Antyodaya Ashram on behalf of 3,457 
bonded labourers from three blocks in the Santhal Pargana region of Bihar, the Court 
appointed a enquiry Commission.^”^  Documentation from the Ashram described the 
problems in verification of debt-bondedness, which was done by community workers 
in the face of opposition from vested interests. Because of the fear instilled by the 
organisation and its support from the Supreme Court, the Commissioners reported an 
increase in the prevailing wage. However since the Court order, many local landlords 
began enrolling bonded labourers so that they could trade in 'rehabilitation aid'.^°  ^
Three cases of well-to-do farmers being officially enrolled as bonded labourers were 
documented.
Even though punishments have been provided for by the Act, few 
bonded labour keepers have been punished.^"^ None of the Court orders in PIL have 
directed that any action be taken by the lower judiciary against those who have flouted 
the provisions of the Act. In the main judgment in PIL for bonded labourers, the Court 
analysed the Act without mentioning the punishments for crimes committed in relation 
to bonded labour.^ It is not just landlords, but the administrators and the legislators 
themselves who are violating the laws.^ '^ A study of the Act noted that the cases
0^7 Y/ p (C) No 13450 o f 1983 in the Supreme Court o f India.
[anon], 'Class Litigation by Bonded Labour', Sarokar (Newsletter o f the Santhal Pargana 
Antyodaya Ashram, B. Deoghar - 814, Bihar), Vol 1 No 1, July 1985, 1-2.
The first ever reported conviction under the Bonded Labour System lAbolitioni Act. 1976 was 
not until 27/2/87 when a landlord from Thane was sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment 
and fined Rs.2,000. See [anon] 3-month R1 for landlord', Indian Express, 12/3/87; Vinayak, R, 
'Liberated', Illustrated Weekly o f  India, 10/5/87; Wagh, Dayanand, 'Loosening the Knot', India Today, 
15/4/87.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Haryana Mines 1) op cit note 272.
W P o f 1810 o f 1984 was filed in the Karnataka High Court regarding landlords who keep 
bonded labourers for work in their fields and gardens. One such landlord was a Member o f the 
Legislative Assembly.
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against bonded labour keepers are kept pending for many years.^*  ^ These vested 
i n t e r e s t s ,  w h i c h  h a v e  p r e v e n t e d  
the Act from being implemented, have also prevented Court orders from being 
implemented. Landlords and politicians have been accused of perpetuating the practice 
of keeping labour in bondage.^Nonetheless, certain changes have been initiated:
The verification has instilled some fear in to the hearts of the 
bondmasters. In a society where police and courts have been used by 
the oppressors as means of coercion, it has also dispelled fear from the 
hearts of the oppressed. Culminating in May-June when the new crop 
cycle is about to begin, the verification has intensified the issues. There 
are interesting situations developing in different villages. That there has 
been a change including increase in prevailing wage ever since the 
organisational process began in 1982 is confirmed by the officers of the 
Commission.^
Furthermore, the question of bonded labour has gained significance in national and 
international arena, adding to the growing force of national opinion against the 
bondage of workers.^
Pandit, Vivek, “Bonded Labour System: Is there will to abolish it?”, (unpublished paper. New 
Delhi, 8/2/90). See also Pandit, Vivek, “Bonded Labour and Voluntary Agencies", People's Action, Vol 
5 No 6 in which Lok Sabha question No 2842 on 14/3/88 was referred to. Replying to a query about 
bonded labour, the Government stated that its records show that 64 bonded labourers in Gujarat and 823 
in Kerala were identified and released. Pandit states that not a single case was registered against the 
culprits.
See Sail, Shashi, 'Letters. Hunger Strike by Bonded Labourers', The Lawyers, Vol 4 No 1, Jan 
89, 3; Sail, Rajendra, 'Letters. Supreme Court Order Ignored', The Lawyers, Vol 4 No 4-5, Apr-May 
89, 4; Bhat, Nirmila, 'Warrants Attention', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 6, June 87, 15; [anon], 'Madhya 
Pradesh: Rally Against Corruption by Bonded Labourers', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 10 No 4, Apr 1984, 22; 
Lakshmi, Viyaya, 'Amnesty under Fire', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 9 No 6, June 1986, 16; [anon], 
Rehabilitation of Bonded Labourers: Diary o f Corruption', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 10 No 3, Mar 1990, 
28.
[anon]. Class Litigation by Bonded Labour' at 1.
See Action on directives issued by Supreme Court in its Judgement on Bandhua Mukti Morcha', 
Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 2 Vol 6, 13/5/85, 101-102; Implementation of Supreme Court 
Judgement regarding Bonded and Migrant Labour', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 2 Vol 6, 
13/5/85, 236-37; ' Supreme Court inquiries from Bihar Government on bonded child labour in Mirzapur 
(U.P.)', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 7 Vol 22, 1/12/86, 142-43. Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, 
Rick (1992) have noted, at 242:
The Bonded Liberation Front, which came into being in India in 1981 to fight debt bondage 
.. is represented on ASl's [Anti-Slavery International's] committee and was in 1984 included 
in ASl's UN delegation on the subject.
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Concluding Remarks
Focusing on issues concerning the disadvantaged/deprived and 
marginalised/excluded, most of the questions central to the study of Social Action 
Litigation (SAL), as opposed to PIL, have been raised in this chapter. The cases 
discussed display the concerns and the response, in the early 1980s, for social justice 
and for disadvantaged citizens. Most of the definitive statements on procedures, setting 
out the parameters of PIL, have been included in the case studies here. However, for 
each of the issues considered, the ambit has extended beyond the parameters of SAL. 
Even when considering state institutions, for example, the Courts have had to reject 
petitions on the grounds of mala fides. Some themes have emerged, and extend into 
the second set of case studies in chapter four, as the breadth of PIL, already 
conspicuous, becomes even more striking. These themes include the inability of the 
Court to respond to many of the petitions with adequate depth, the consistent non­
implementation of court orders and the continuing crisis of the legal system.
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Chapter Four - Case Studies #2
As PIL continued, a larger range of petitions were considered in the 
courtroom. Following from the issues discussed in chapter three, the cases in this 
chapter extend into environment/resource rights, the judicial process and the 
inconclusive category of cases “where PIL ends?”.* The case studies in chapter four 
differ from those in chapter three, in that most of the petitions discussed here were 
filed after PIL became an established legal mechanism. The same pattern of analysis, 
used in chapter three, is continued. Beginning with a discussion of the issue, 'Access 
to Justice', The Court's Response' and The Contribution of PIL' are analysed. 
'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' is the one exception, as the discussion relates to the judicial 
process and cannot be evaluated in the same linear manner.
The first three sections on 'Urban Space', 'Environment and Resources' 
and ' Consumer Issues', are interconnected, and have been considered concurrently. The 
discussion of 'Urban Space' encapsulates the potential dichotomy between PIL and 
SAL discussed in chapter two. Petitions concerning street vendors and pavement 
dwellers are set alongside public interest issues concerning construction, and also 
petitions filed outside the scope of PIL in any form. Most numerous are the petitions 
filed relating to Environment and Resources', a burgeoning area of legal action. The 
smaller sections on Education' and 'Politics and Elections' are followed by cases on 
Public Policy and Administration', which include a range of concerns which is as 
extensive as the response of the courts. The case studies are completed with an 
analysis of the petitions concerning 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers', and brief concluding 
remarks.
' See the categorisation of issues in chapter two.
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Urban Space
Many of the problems arising in urban spaces, encompassing a wide 
range of issues and controversies and affecting all those who participate in the life of 
cities and towns, have been articulated for resolution by the Court. This section will 
set out the cases relating to hawkers and street vendors,^ slum, pavement and hutment 
dwellers (hereafter referred to as slum dwellers),^ other housing issues,"  ^ land and its 
use,^ recreational land,^ construction^ and municipal services.^ The competing interests
■ Self Employed Women's Association and others v Municipal Corporation o f  Ahmedabad and others 
1986 (2) SCALE 291 [1254] and SEWA and another v Commissioner o f  Police and another, Bombay 
Hawkers' Union and others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and others AIR 1985 SC 1206 / (1985 
) 3 SCC 528; Footpath Dukandar New Lajpat Rai Market Patri Union (Regd.) and Ors v M C D  & Ors 
1986 (2) SCALE 169 [711]; Pramod Kumar v N  D  M  C & Ors \9S1 (I) SCALE 305 [1300].
 ^ Olga Tellis and others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and others AIR 1986 SC 180; K  
Chandru v State o f  Tamil Nadu & Ors 1985 (2) SCALE 3 [31]; Slum Dwellers o f  Slamagar and others, 
Pennurimai lyakkam v State o f  Tamil Nadu; Karnataka Kolageri N  S Sanghatana and others v State 
o f  Karnataka and others; Ram Prasad Yadav (Deceased) and Bombay Mineral and Allied Industries 
Employees' Union and Bombay Coal and Coke Workers' Union v Chairman, Bombay Port Trust and 
others (1989) 2 SCC 378; the petition filed by SPARC and Nazamunissa Shaukat Ali and another v 
Municipal Corporation o f  Greater Bombay and others; Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare 
Association (Regd.) and another v State o f  Karnataka and others (1991) 2 SCC 604; for slum dwellers 
in Madras by the Annai Sathyanagar-part B Hutment Dwellers Welfare Association; regarding slum 
dwellers in Bhubaneshwar.
Desh Raj Khurana and others v Delhi Administration 1987 (1) SCALE 321 [1313]; three petitions 
filed by Common Cause regarding Delhi Development Authority Flats, the Municipal Corporation of  
Delhi and plots of land for housing in Gurgaon, Haryana.
 ^ V Lakshmipathy and others v State o f  Karnataka and others AIR 1992 Kant 51; S S Sobti v Union 
o f India and others AIR 1982 Del 51; Bhaghubhai H. Devani v Porbander Municipality and others AIR 
1984 Guj 134; Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Bangalore v Mrs. Kantha Chandra and 
others AIR 1989 Kant 1 ; Forward Construction Co and others v Prahbat Mandai (Regd.), Andheri and 
others AIR 1986 SC 391 / (1986) 1 SCC 100; M B  Sadashivaiah and others v City Improvement Trust 
Board, Mysore and others 1988 (3) KLJ 91; Sachidanand Pandey and another v State o f  West Bengal 
and others AIR 1987 SC 1109; Parisar Society Ltd and others v State o f  Maharashtra and others; 
Madras Citizens Progressive Councel v The Secretary to Govt, o f  Tamil Nadu and other AIR 1991 Mad 
390; regarding the dereseration of plots in Bombay; Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited, 
Bombay v Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti Bombay and others 1991 (1) SCALE 33 [109]; a challenge to 
parts of the “Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991”; Prof A Lakshmisagar and 
others v State o f  Karnataka and others AIR 1993 Kant 121.
 ^ T Damodhar Rao and others v Special Officer, Municipal Corporation o f  Hyderabad, and others 
AIR 1987 A? 171 ; Bangalore Medical Trust v S Muddappa and others AIR 1991 SC 1902; D D  Vyas 
and others v Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad and another AIR 1993 All 57; G K  Salil 
V State o f  Kerala and others.
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of those at different points on the socio-economic scale are revealed. The petitions 
expose a bias against the poorer sections of the population, in part a consequence of 
the restricted availablity of land, making it a scarce resource, and the policy and 
statutory framework in which problems are resolved.
As part of the impetus for the greater organisation of hawkers and street 
vendors in recent years, PIL was a starting point for using the legal system. The Court 
has been an suitable forum to begin a process of increased awareness for these groups, 
both easily identified for legal classification and with particularised problems.^ 
Creative evidentiary procedures, feeding from the unique climate of concern for the 
“disadvantaged and deprived” sustained by PIL, were mobilised by the expanding 
use of class actions."
’ r  Rugmani and another v C Achutha Menon and others AIR 1991 SC 983; two petitions with 
the cause title Bombay Environmental Action Group and others v Pune Cantonment Board', Consumer 
Action Group and another v State o f  Tamil Nadu and others', Rajatha Enterprises v S K  Sharma and 
others (1989) 1 SCR 457; regarding the construction o f the Sassoon Fish Harbour; challenging building 
permission for a multi storey building on grounds of St Mary's School, Bombay; Palani Hills 
Conservation C ouncil.. represented by its President Navroz Mody v State o f  Tamil Nadu and others', 
Palani Hills Conservation Council rep. by its Secretary Philippa Mukherjee v State o f  Tamil Nadu and 
others.
* Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand and others AIR 1980 SC 1622; a petition complaining 
of the contaminated water supply in Bangalore; Citizens Action Committee, Nagpur v Civil Surgeon, 
Mayo (General) Hospital, Nagpur and others AIR 1986 Bom 136; Janki Nathubhai Chhara and another 
V Sardarnagar Municipality, Sardar and another AIR 1986 Guj 49; L K  Koolwal v State o f  Rajasthan 
and others AIR 1988 Raj 2; Aparana Kashyap v State o f H P  and other 1991 FLT 164 Vol 2 Part 3; 
Ram Sahai Varma v State o f  M  P  and another AIR 1989 MP 334; M  C Mehta v State o f  Orissa and 
others AIR 1992 Ori 225; Consumer Action Group v Commissioner, Corporation o f Madras and 
another.
 ^ The statutory framework and constitutional safeguards, led activist groups to believe that the 
problems of vendors and hawkers could be dealt with. One such group, the Self Employed Women's 
Association (SEWA), was encouraged to file a petition on behalf o f a group o f vegetable vendors in 
Ahmedabad because o f the perception that the specific grievances could be managed by the Court. See
Self Employed Women's Association op cit note 2.
See the categorisation of issues in chapter two.
" Bombay Hawkers' Union op cit note 2 has been included, having sprung from PIL, and 
contributed to procedural innovations. In addition to this case, and Municipal Council, Ratlam note 8, 
there are other class action petitions which have been included. In Footpath Dukandar op cit note 2 and 
Pramod Kumar op cit note 2, the court has blurred the boundary between class actions and PIL, by 
describing the petitions as PlLs (see chapter two). This has enabled the Court to frame its order with 
less regard to established forms of legal reasoning - schemes have been framed and new legal remedies 
devised. In addition to these cases. Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association op cit note
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The situation of slum dwellers is similarly poor/^ Slums fall into two 
categories: authorised and unauthorised. In the former, the Slums Census, carried out 
by each local municipal authority, is the basis upon which slum dwellers get political 
rights, ration cards, electricity and water supplies. Despite these provisions, a 
permanent state of illegality exists as a parallel or “black” economy th riv e s .T h e  
colonies themselves are legally distinct from other types of housing, governed by 
special enactments and granted little protection. For those slums established on 
government land, the allocation of land is discretionary upon the state. While 
distributing its largesse, the state can denotify slums when land is required for other 
purposes. Unauthorised slums are even less desirable for their residents, as the State 
is absolved of even minimal obligations.
Inhabited largely by domestic servants. Class IV employees (manual 
workers), scavengers, unorganised and organised labour, slums have become an 
essential component of city life while at the same time being a source of 
embarrassment. Slum dwellers are in a constant state of indigence and insecurity, at 
the mercy of the police and other authorities, for example through wide powers of 
eviction, and illegal activities within the slums themselves. Even when notices of 
eviction have been issued, these mean little to the inhabitants as there is a constant 
flux within the slums and little knowledge of legal rights and procedures. Framing the 
issues for a petition has been a difficult task as the rights of slum dwellers in relation 
to the state are not absolute. Because of this the daily struggle of slum dwellers is not 
something that the courts have been asked to, or have even attempted to, deal with.
The first major PIL case on slums, and one of the landmark cases in
3 has been included because of the Supreme Court order, overturned the High Court order, by stating 
that a PIL petition would be appropriate in such a situation.
See Desai, A R and Pillai, S Devadas (eds). Slums and Urbanisation, (Popular Prakashan, 
Bombay, 2nd edition, 1990); Venkataramani, R, 'Litigation for the Slum Dweller' in Gandhi, ? K
(1985), 142-145.
For example, licences are difficult to obtain for basic utilities and trade.
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PIL, Olga Tellis, w a s  filed in reaction to horrific evictions and to the defencelessness 
of the evictees. Other cases have tried to prevent increased poverty caused by 
evictions - the theft of belongings and the lack of alternative accom m odation.In this 
way the petitioners have attempted to carve out rights and have forayed into a legal 
system, often without the necessary information or documentation, perhaps only 
hoping for temporary, fragmentary relief.
The cases on 'other housing issues’ have to be read in tandem with 
cases in other sections, as housing encompasses more than the slums and residential 
colonies discussed here, but protective homes and custodial institutions,’^  as well as 
concern for displaced persons.’^  Petitions relating to housing epitomise the transition 
from social action' to public interest’ litigation and the shift of emphasis from the use 
of PIL for the “have-nots”, to its use as a mechanism to gain access to justice in any 
matter of public interest.’^
Numerous petitions on land and its use’ have been filed, mostly in the 
High Courts. Having unsuccessfully approached the municipal authorities, petitioning 
the Court in a PIL has been an easy and accessible strategy. The restrictions of 
standing in statutory provisions and the limited response available from lower courts
Op cit note 3.
'Mn addition to the cases documented petitions have been filed in the SC asking the Court to 
prevent evictions and/or to provide alternative accommodation to the residents o f slums in Delhi, for 
example, K  K  Neogi v Delhi Administration W P No 8988 o f 1981) filed for the residents o f Gole 
Market (in which the demolition of the slum was stayed), and others filed for the residents of 
Seemapuri, Minto Road and Motia Khan. See Desai, A R (ed). Violation o f Democratic Rights in India. 
Volume I  (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1986). Such petitions were also filed in the HCs. For example 
in a Madras case, the Court held, in 1990, that the authorities should not evict slum dwellers without 
providing them with an alternative site, because o f the imperative of due process. S S Vasudevan, 
advocate, interview, Madras, 4/93.
See the sections on 'Prisons and State Institutions' and on Children' in chapter three.
See the section on 'Environment and Resources', infra.
18 See the petitions filed by Common Cause', op cit note 4.
See the cases on politicians in the section on Politics and Elections' for B M  Gangadhariah v 
H D Devegowda AIR 1989 Kant 294.
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has increased the tendency to use the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for a myriad 
of issues not relating to poverty. Unlike the cases relating to hawkers, vendors and 
slum dwellers, on-going mobilisation and organisation is not a feature of the cases on 
land and its allocation. Even organisations like the Bombay Environmental Action 
Group (BEAG) have had little long term involvement in the issues relating to the 
dozens of cases it has filed,^° in spite of a long-standing concern for environmental 
issues.
Cases filed by environmental organisations, on urban land use and 
constructions, have emerged from a broader concern for the evolution of the city itself. 
The need to ensure that a city has “lungs” (green spaces) and recreational areas, that 
the cultural heritage is preserved,^* and that corruption in city life is checked, are 
concerns that have motivated organisations and individuals to frame issues so that they 
become amenable to resolution in court. Access to relevant information is vital in 
order to check specific violations, which have to be demonstrated according to 
specified legal criteria. Links have been made between different petitioning groups, 
such as Parisar, in Pune, and BEAG, enabling the latter to file cases relating to civic 
concerns in Pune. Information is easier to access when contacts are shared and 
knowledge pooled. For example, by providing copies of government orders to the 
Court, at considerable effort, the Consumer Action Group in Madras, has ensured that 
the Court will heed its petitions.
The theme of competing interests between social classes that emerges 
in this section, also manifests itself in a struggle between the citizen and the 
municipality, in the cases on municipal services. The courts have been asked to check 
the incompetence of the municipal authorities in maintaining cleanliness and providing
In two such cases, for example, the Court stayed construction activity. One case ehallenged the 
proposed construction plans by the defence services in Colaba, and another challenged the constructions 
along the coastline of Raigad District, across the harbour from Bombay. Shyam Chainani, interview, 
Bombay, 19/3/92.
See the case on 'Heritage' in the section on 'Environment and Resources' infra.
■■ Sri ram Panchu, advocate, interview, Madras, 15/4/93.
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basic utilities. The first such case was heard in the Supreme Court in 1980/^ having 
come, in appeal, from the Magistrate's Court. Integral to the relaxation of procedural 
mechanisms that initiated PIL, this case has been included in the discussion. All the 
cases on municipal services, and indeed in this section as a whole, ask the Court to 
ensure that the municipality, as a part of the state, carries out its duties, and many 
have been filed in the relevant High Courts.
The complexity of the statutory framework for issues relating to urban 
space have demanded precision and care when framing petitions.^"  ^ However, the 
prevalent concern for environmental concerns has motivated some of the petitioners 
to invoke Article 47 of the Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy.^^
Access to Justice
Neither the locus standi of the petitioners in the cases on hawkers, 
vendors and slum dwellers, nor the justiciability of the issues raised, has been 
questioned by the courts. Standing was no longer contested when poverty or indigence 
was being brought to the attention of the Court, and pronouncements on access 
continued to advance till the mid 1980's (see chapter five). In a complex case 
concerning the fundamental rights of slum dwellers who had been evicted, two distinct 
groups (the People's Union for Civil Liberties and the Lawyers Collective) became 
involved in the litigation. The question of the estoppel of fundamental rights was 
definitively decided, as the Court stated these rights could not be suspended.^^
Municipal Council, Ratlam op cit note 8, also see the discussion 'PIL Begins' in chapter two, and 
the survey o f procedural provisions in chapter one.
24 See chapter five for a discussion of lawyers and legal skills.
For example see G K  Salil op cit note 6. See Appendix A for the full text o f Article 47 of the 
Constitution.
Olga Tellis op cit note 2. The PUCL filed the original petition in the Bombay High Court, and 
responding to the State Government's concession that the deportation was illegal, made a statement, on 
behalf o f the petitioners, that no claim to a fundamental right to live on the pavement was being made. 
Invoking a sophisticated economic argument, the Lawyer's Collective argued that the slum and
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Before the expansion of standing had become widely accepted, High 
Courts were reluctant to foster some PILs that were being filed/^ It is possible that 
the courts were being cautious - as the Supreme Court had itself acknowledged that 
a clash between two public interests is possible, and that someone always has to 
benefit.^* By 1980, in its search for new remedies, the Court had widened the scope 
of its concern and the kinds of issues that would be justiciable.^^ Even in 1991, the 
Madras High Court upheld the standing of the petitioners when filing a petition in the 
nature of vox populi, the voice of the people.^®
Amongst the cases on land and its use is one of the most important 
cases on access to justice and justiciability. In 1987, deciding whether the land in 
question should be used for a zoo or for a hotel, the Court expressed its fear that its 
decision may be perceived as interfering in matters of public policy by usurping 
executive and legislative functions.^* It was suggested that guidelines be framed which 
would address the need for PIL litigants and the courts to to exercise self-restraint in 
the kind of issues and cases litigated as PILs. This decision has been relied upon in 
many subsequent cases, providing judges with a useful precedent if a petition is to be 
rejected .O ther notable legal developments occurred, for example when the Supreme 
Court held that res judicata would only apply to a PIL if the earlier litigation was also 
a PIL.'^
pavement dwellers have the right to squat on the pavements, and openly objected to the PUCL's earlier 
stance. The Supreme Court admitted the latter's petition, alleging violation o f fundamental rights, in 
spite o f the earlier petition, which had not claimed the violation o f fundamental rights.
For example see S S Sobti and Bhaghubhai H. Devani op cit note 5.
Forward Construction Co op cit note 5.
Municipal Council, Ratlam op cit note 8.
Madras Citizens Progressive Council op cit note 5.
Sachidanand Pandey op cit note 5.
For exmple, when considering the jusiticiability of deciding the legality o f a construction, under 
PIL, \n T  N Rugmani op cit note 7, the Court referred to Sachidanand Pandey op cit note 5 to hold that 
while a petitioner may have bona fides, the issue raised may not be maintainable.
Forward Construction Co op cit note 5.
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The Court's Response
An examination of the cases relating to urban space epitomises judicial 
reaction throughout the case studies. For example, the courts have been unable to 
provide any lasting relief for slum dwellers, but all the petitions filed on municipal 
services (drainage, sanitation etc) and recreational land have been allowed and 
directions issued. Seen within the broader framework of the cases on labour and 
bonded labour (see chapter three), the Court's response to problems of hawkers and 
vendors has been sympathetic. The Court has become involved in monitoring the 
formulation of schemes and in urging recalcitrant municipal corporations into action.^ "^  
Recognising the importance of the issues involved, one case was referred to a five 
judge bench.^^ The need for evidence when passing orders has led to a focus on 
establishing the identity of those affected.^^ However, from early on, the beginnings 
of a tendency for the Court to prioritise the prevention of public nuisance on public 
streets over considerations of poverty is apparent.^^
Similarly, in Olga Tellis^^ the Supreme Court held that pavements were 
primarily for pedestrians. In this key judgment for PIL, Justice Chandrachud discussed 
fundamental rights in a way that had not previously been done by the Court and held 
that fundamental rights cannot be waived. In response to the plea of the petitioners 
regarding fundamental rights, a new precedent for judicial rhetoric was set in a 
judgment which held that the right to livelihood was included in the right to life under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. In reality, nothing was provided for the pavement and 
slum dwellers themselves. When considering the substantive aspects of the case, the 
Court was less innovative. While acknowledging that the evidence before it was
For example, Footpath Dukandar op cit note 2. 
Pramod Kumar op cit note 2.
Self Employed Women's Association op cit note 2. 
Bombay Hawkers' Union op cit note 2.
Op cit note 3.
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insufficient, the Court did not address the need for it to use reliable data. Arguments 
put forward by advocate Indira Jaising were not referred to, and after expressing deep 
concern about the situation of pavement dwellers, the Court did not even allow them 
the right to be heard before being evicted. It was held that any slum could be moved 
if the land occupied was needed for a “public purpose”. Thus the Court's declaration 
on fundamental rights was not translated into concrete relief or into the formulation 
of rights and duties in relation to the pavement dwellers. Even if the Court had 
ordered some specific reliefs, by the time the judgment was given they would have 
been redundant. Four years had lapsed since the evictions were carried out.
Litigating for pavement dwellers after this judgment, a worker of the
Society for the Promotion of Area Resources Centres (SPARC) in Bombay, noted:
Right after Olga Tellis did a census in 1985, we leamt from Olga Tellis 
not to go straight to the court, of course. The judgement had declared 
that the right to life included the right to livelihood, but in the 
judgement the court declared that these pavement dwellers were illegal.
There was nothing before saying they are illegal, and this ambivalent 
situation was better.^^
The judgment has effectively prevented SPARC from being able to challenge eviction,
so the activists focussed on the theft of the belongings of the evictees by employees
of the municipality.W hen, in an unprecedented move. Justice Sujata Manohar of the
Bombay High Court took evidence and allowed the petition,'^’ she went no further than
provide specific relief, expressing her regret that she felt unable to frame guidelines
covering future evictions.
Much of the ligitation on slums has centred upon factual disputes, 
which are difficult to decide definitively. Stay orders have been passed preventing 
evictions, and the court has defined the length of residence in a slum as a factor which
Mona Daswani, SPARC, interview, Bombay, 16/3/92. Olga Tellis, as referred to by Daswani, was 
the journalist who reported the evictions, and who later appeared on the cause title o f the case.
The work of SPARC and other such organisations is discssed in Friedmann, John, Empowerment. 
The Politics o f  Alternative Development, (Blackwell, Cambridge MA, 1992), specifically footnote 5 at 
144.
Nazamunissa Shaukat All op cit note 3.
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determines rehousing. The Court has conferred discretion upon the State Governments
and municipalities, effectively empowering the same officials described as offenders
in the petitions. A few positive legal pronouncements have been made.'^  ^ However,
when faced with the eviction of slum dwellers in Bhubaneshwar which had been
ordered to ensure that land could be made available to Members of the Legislative
Assembly, Members of Parliament, Ministers and High Court judges, the Orissa High
Court appointed an enquiry, but did not act immediately. As the Supreme Court noted
in 1989, when faced with a similar issue:
It is not possible for this Court to say that whether there would be 
greater injury to public interest by the removal of the unauthorised 
hutment dwellers or by preventing the Port Trust from putting its own 
land to proper use."*^
The Courts have been more sympathetic to environmental considerations 
than to the needs of slum dwellers."^ In one case the Court held the State accountable 
for the existence of pollution before it received any affidavits from the respondents."^  ^
The cases on recreational land were decided on environmental considerations. 
Envisioning promenades in the local park'*  ^ and ensuring that public land is put to 
correct use in the context of statutory provisions, the Court has been strident about the 
need for protection of the environment. It was only in one case that the Court 
considered the need to encourage tourism to be the primary consideration, overriding 
concerns for the environment."^^
For example, the Court modified the stance taken in Olga Tellis op cit note 3, when after 
consideration of the Directive Principles of State Policy it held, in Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section 
Welfare Association op cit note 3, that slum dwellers do have a right to be heard. In Slum Dwellers o f  
Slamagar op cit note 3, the Supreme Court held that slums dwellers were to be moved to sites located 
at reasonable distance from the place of employment o f its residents.
Ram Prasad Yadav (Deceased) and Bombay Mineral and Allied Industries Employees' Union and 
Bombay Coal and Coke Workers' Union (1989) 2 SCC 378 at 381-382.
See Parisar Society op cit note 5.
V Lakshmipathy op cit note 5.
4 6 D D Vyas op cit note 6.
Sachidanand Pandey op cit note 5. Cases on 'tourism', an emerging concern, are discussed in the 
section on 'Environment and Resources' infra.
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The right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution was further 
expanded to include the right not to be slowly poisoned by a polluted atmosphere/^ 
Even in the some of the orders on land use and constructions, which are characterised 
by detailed discussion of statutory and constitutional provisions, the scope of 
environmental concerns was evident/^
The Contribution of PIL
The judgments on hawkers and vendors in PIL sparked off a series of 
cases in the Supreme Court. Brought as class actions, these cases have elaborately 
decided upon the rights and duties of the hawkers/vendors and of the municipalities. 
The law has advanced beyond PIL as these groups have become more organised and 
aware of the possibilities of legal action. Whatever the gains, the limitations of legal 
action for poverty issues is also apparent. That the Court could not prevent the 
repeated harassment of vendors by the police illustrates the importance of an on-going 
struggle in which the use of law is only one element.^® Details of a petition on behalf 
of street vendors in Raipur underlines the sharply polarised interests dealt with in this 
section:
Raipur Municipal Corporation has started the eviction of small shop­
keepers and vendors for “illegal encroachment”. Armed with an order 
from the MP High Court, and misinterpreting the Olga Tellis case 
judgement of the Supreme Court, the Municipal Administrator, Ajay 
Nath, and the Commissioner R. D. Pandey, have rendered many self- 
employed people jobless and site-less. In the name of “beautifying the 
city” the administration has discriminated in favour of the rich and
T Damodhar Rao op cit note 6. In this case the Court noted that, because o f the development of  
environmental law, Article 21 o f the Constitution had been distanced from the preoccupation with the 
individual, echoing a concept that had been introduced in Municipal Council, Ratlam op cit note 8.
For example, the in response to the petitions filed by the Palani Hills Conservation Council, op 
cit note 7.
Self Employed Women's Association op cit note 2. As the petitions are still pending in the Court, 
and ensuring implementation o f the orders has been difficult, SEW A paid less attention to the law. 
Alternative sites were found for some of the vendors, police brutality was highlighted through 
demonstrations and much work has been done to increase awareness. Ela Bhatt, interview. New Delhi, 
4/2/91.
202
powerful in the city. While on the one hand, small vendors have been 
shifted to Shastri Bazar, the rich business community's “illegal 
encroachment” particularly at Sadar Bazar has been spared by the 
Raipur Municipal Corporation.^*
The Court has not applied itself to the many problems of slums, and has 
confined itself to piecemeal relief. Having been defined as illegal, the legal position 
of pavement dwellers has often been worsened by legal intervention on their behalf. 
Moreover, for those working in slums, like SPARC, litigation has been an intolerable 
burden. Some educational benefit has been gained from the slum cases, the severe 
limitations of legal action have been leamt, but in the use of law to get immediate 
relief, like the stay of evictions, PIL has been a useful strategy. The significant 
contribution of slum cases is found in Olga Tellis, a s  the Court's pronouncements on 
fundamental rights have been widely quoted. However, the endemic poverty that has 
led to the formation of slums has not been mentioned by the courts, and the continual 
immiserisation and criminalisation of slum dwellers has never been addressed.^^
Thus, in the clash between interests, PIL rarely benefitted those in most 
need of judicial intervention. It has however encouraged the courts to be responsive 
to the environmental concerns for urban sp a c e .P IL  has made little difference for
PUCL&DR (Raipur), 'Letters: Ruthless Demolitions in Raipur', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 7, July- 
Aug 1987, 4.
Op cit note 3.
” See the section on 'Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three for cases which can be more 
fully understood in the context of urban problems:
Since the main reason why most o f the undertrials are in jail is because they have not 
been able to avail of the bail order, the Lawyers Collective has set up a network o f lawyers 
practising in Metropolitan Magistrates courts all over the city, to appear on behalf o f those who 
are unrepresented. They attempt to release them on personal bond and then to see that they are 
represented at the trial stage. One problem is that most undertrials are “homeless”. They do 
not have a permanent address and live on pavements, slums or at a railway station. Since 50% 
of the population of Bombay lives in slums, this should not be surprising, but for the law this 
means they do not have a permanent place of residence, though they have been bom and 
brought up on the pavements.
Gopinath, Deepti, Warrants Attention: Prison Rights Project', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 10, Oct 1987, 
16-17.
This is apparent in the case o f the Sassoon fish harbour in Bombay - after the Court stayed 
construction, the project was amended to make a provision for a garden.
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those who wish to litigate on land use and construction issues, unless environmental 
issues have been raised. Once access to justice has been gained, these cases have been 
dealt with as regular petitions. In two important judgments, in the cases filed by the 
Bombay Environmental Action Group against the Pune Cantonment Board, the Court 
held that access to information must be provided, not just to the group in question but 
to any social action group or interest group or pressure group. It is now possible for 
any such group to demand to see any sanction, grant or plan approved by the local 
authority. Given that the municipality is involved in every aspect of urban life, being 
able to provide the Court with proof that, for example, regulations are being flouted, 
increases the chance of a favourable verdict.
Even in the cases filed by organisations in this section, concrete details 
have not been available on the implementation of judgments of the Court. However, 
this is one area of concern in which the petitioner can see if the Court's directions 
have been carried out, for example, if a slum has been cleared or if  a building has 
been constructed.
Environment and Resources
The cases on resources and environmental issues have been combined 
to form a single, large, section. Interconnected, these cases relate both to the 
environment in which we live and to our relationship with that environment. Just as 
eco-systems are affected both by pollution and by changes in the way in which people 
live, connections are apparent between the manner in which development is taking 
place and all the elements of the eco-system. Thus the cases on big dams have brought 
two seemingly different issues to the Court - environmental concerns about the policy
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of big dams, and concern for those people who will be displaced 55
The cases in this section are considered in categories: roads and 
bridges,information,^^ h eritage ,tou rism ,live lihood ,peop le  and land,^  ^ wildlife
An extensive literature exists on dams in particular, and environmental policy in general. See 
Thukral, Enakshi Ganguly, Big Dams, Displaced People, (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1992); 
Fernandes, Walter and Thukral, Enakshi Ganguly, Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation, 
(Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1989); Bandyopadhyay, J; Jayal, N D; Schoeletti, U and Singh, 
Chhatrapati, India's Environment. Crises and Responses, (Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun, Second Edition,
1987); Agarwal, Anil; D'Monte, Darryl and Samarth, Ujwala, The Fight fo r  Survival. People's Action 
for Environment, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1987); Viegas, Philip and Menon, 
Geeta, The Impact o f Environmental Degredation on People, (Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1989); 
State o f  India's Environment, A Citizen's Report: Floods, Flood Plains and Environmental Myths, 
(Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1991); Nayar, K D, 'Environment and International 
World Views. Two Steps Backward', EPW, 3/3/90, 457-462. Other influential writing includes Shiva, 
Vandana, Staying Alive, (Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1988); Shiva, Vandana, The Violence o f the 
Green Revolution, (Research Foundation for Science and Ecology, Dehra Dun, 1989); Agarwal, Anil 
and Narain, Sunita, Towards Green Villages, (Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1989). 
For a discussion of the PIL cases see du Bois, Francois, '“Well-being” and “the Common Man”: A 
Critical Look at Public Interest Environmental Law in South Africa and India' in Robinson, David and 
Dunkley, John (eds). Public Interest Perspectives in Environmental Law, (Wiley Chancery, London,
1995), 135-152; Dias, Ayesha, Judicial Activism in the Deevelopment and Enforcement of  
Environmental Law: Some Comparative insights from the Indian experience'. Journal o f  Environmental 
Law, 1994, 243-262. Some of the unreported cases documented have been taken from Singh, Gayatri; 
Anklesaria, Kerban and Gonsalves, Colin (eds). The Environmental Activists' Handbook, (Colin 
Gonsalves, Bombay, 1993).
State o f Himachal Pradesh and others v Umed Ram Sharma and others AIR 1986 SC 847; B 
Sakarama Somayaji v Assistant Commissioner, Kundapura, D.K. and others AIR 1992 Kant 364; P  K  
Raghavan & others v State o f  Kerala & others.
M  C Mehta v Union o f  India (Information on the environment) AIR 1992 SC 382.
B. V. Narayana Reddy and others v State o f Karnataka and others AIR 1985 Kant 99; the case 
filed by M C Mehta about the Taj Mahal.
Professor Sergio Carvalho v The Staff o f Goa and three others 1989 (1) GLT (276) and 1989 
(1) GLT (266); Jairaj v Chief Conservator o f Forest and others', Niyamavedi v State o f Kerala and 
others AIR 1993 Ker 262.
Social Work and Research Centre, Banswara and another v State o f  Rajasthan and others AIR 
1987 Raj 26; Andhra Pradesh Adimajati Seva Sangham and others v Guntur Municipal Council and 
others AIR 1987 AP 193; V Srinivasan v State o f  Tamil Nadu and others', Kerala Leprosy Patients 
Organisation Committee v State o f  Kerala and others AIR 1992 Ker 344.
Petitions relating to forest and tribal lands in Maharashtra: Sharad Patil, President, Satya Shodak 
Gramin Kastkari Sabha and three others v State o f Maharashtra', Ratanji Motiram Mavchi and four 
others v State o f Maharashtra and another; Pradeep Prabhu and others v State o f Maharashtra and 
others. Petitions relating to the rest of the country: Banwasi Sewa Ashram v State o f  Uttar Pradesh
(1986) 4 SCC 753 / AIR 1987 SC 374, 1991 (2) SCALE 38 [261], AIR 1992 SC 920 and 1993 (1) 
SCALE 103 [613]; Sudip Mazumdar v State o f Madhya Pradesh 1994 (2) SCALE 25 [329], also see
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and an im als,po llu tion  and environmental degradation,^^ big projects and the 
environment,^"^ big dams,^  ^ mines and quarries,^^ and on the Sriram gas leak.^  ^ The
the order discussed in Chapter 1; P Bawa Chaudhary v State o f  M  P  & Ors 1989 (2) SCALE 200 
[1012]; Kutti Padmarao, Gen Sec v State o f  A P  1986 (Supp) SCC 573; Kota Shivaram Karanth & Ors
V State o f  Karnataka & Ors 1987 (1) SCALE 185 [691] and JT 1992 (3) SC 167; People's Union fo r  
Civil Liberties (PUCL), Mizoram Branch and another v State o f  Mizoram and others', C Thangmura
V State o f  Mizoram and others'. Social Reformation and Development Club by its Secretary Shri 
Leishangthem Kumar Meetai v State o f Manipur, through the Secretary (Revenue) Government o f  
Manipur, Imphal & Others (1992) 1 GauLR 163; Hundung Victims o f  Development through its 
convenor Mr David Mahung v North Eastern Council and others', A Public interest litigation by 
intervenor - Paharu Ram Boro on behalf o f  the Tribal public o f  Boko (Kamrup) Tribal Belt v Nilima 
Kalita and others', Molly Madhavan v State o f Kerala.
Filed by the Aaranyak Nature Club; The Social Action and Legal Aid Society v The State o f  
Kerala and others', Satyavani and another v A P Pollution Control Board and others AIR 1993 AP 257.
There are several groups of cases: general, forests, wetlands, fisheries, water, air and noise. 
General: Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti v  State ofU .P. and others AIR 1990 SC 2060; 
Mathew Lukose v Kerala State Pollution Control Board 1990 (2) KLT 686; Environmental Lawyers' 
Movement and others v State o f  Kerala and others. Forests: V M  Abraham v State o f  Kerala and others', 
Bibhab Kumar Talukdar v State o f  Assam', Geetha Timbers, Chalakudy v State o f  Kerala and others 
AIR 1991 Ker 350 / 1990 (1) KLT 402 (F.B.); K  K  Vasant v State o f  Karnataka and another AIR 1992 
Kant 256; Environmental and Ecological Protection Samithy v Executive Engineer 1991 (2) KLT 493 
and Executive Engineer v Environmental & E.P. Samithi 1993 (1) KLT 800. Wetlands: People United 
fo r Better Living in Calcutta - Public and another v State o f  West Bengal and others AIR 1993 Cal 215; 
Consumer Action Group v Union o f India and others. Fisheries: regarding prawn fisheries in Chilika 
Lake. Water: S Ravinder Singh Kaleka and others v Union o f  India and others AIR 1984 P & H 235; 
M C Mehta v Union o f  India (pollution of the River Ganges) (1987) 4 SCC 463, (1988) 1 SCC 471, 
1988 (1) SCALE 99 [441], 1991 Supp (1) SCC 181, 1991 (2) SCALE 87 [478] and 1992 (1) SCALE 
42 [196]; Environment Protection Council v Union o f  India and Ors 1986 (2) SCALE 231 [904]; 
Subhash Kumar v State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1991 SC 420 / (1991) 1 SCC 598; F K  Hussain v 
Union o f  India AND Attakoya Thangal v Union o f India AIR 1990 Ker 321 / 1990 (1) KLT 580; Rajiv 
Singh alias Lallan Singh v State o f Bihar and others AIR 1992 Pat 86. Air: M  C Mehta v Union o f  
India and others (1991) 2 SCC 137; M  C Mehta v Union o f  India and others (air pollution o f Delhi - 
vehicles and industries) 1992 Supp (2) SCC 85, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 86 and (1992) 3 SCC 25; V 
Subramanian v Union o f India and another 1990 (Supp) SCC 77; Murali Purushothaman v Union o f  
India 1993 (1) KLT 595. Noise: Dr Y T Oke, Secretary, Anti Noise Committee, Bombay and others v 
State o f  Maharashtra and others', Rabin Mukherjee and others v State o f  West Bengal and others AIR 
1985 Cal 222; Consumer Action Group v State o f Tamil Nadu and others.
Bombay Environmental Action Group and another v State o f  Maharashtra and others AIR 1991 
Bom 301 and Dahanu Taluka Environment Protection Group and another v Bombay Suburban 
Electricity Supply Company and others (1991) 2 SCC 539; Goa Foundation and another v Konkan 
Railway Corporation and others AIR 1992 Bom 471; All Goa Citizens Committee fo r  Social Justice 
and Action and others v Union o f India and others'. Consumer Action Group and others v Union o f  
India and others.
Regarding Silent Valley, Kerala: Society for Protection o f  Silent Valley and another v Union o f  
India and others. Machhu, Gujarat: Consumer Education & Research Centre (CERC) & Ors v State 
o f  Gujarat & Ors 1981 GLR (XXII) 712. Ko el Karo, Bihar: V P Lakra and another v State o f  Bihar 
and others. Kagan, Bihar: Karjan Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samiti v State o f  
Gujarat and others 1986 (Supp) SCC 350. Tehri, Uttar Pradesh: Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti
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cases cannot be read in isolation as there much overlap between the issues raised.^^
The statutory framework concerning environmental protection includes 
the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution^ Act. 1974 and the Air (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution^ Act. 1981.^  ^ The Constitution TFortv-second Amendment) Act. 
1976 introduced environmental issues into the Constitution, through the fundamental 
duties, and in 1986 the Environment fProtectionf Act was enacted/^ However, the 
legal context of environmental action is much wider than these enactments, including
and others v State o f  U P and others (1990) 2 Supp SCR 606. Narmada, Gujarat: Chhatra Yuva 
Sangharsh Samiti v State\ filed by the Lok Adhikar Sangh. Hasdeo Bango, Madhya Pradesh: Gramin 
Sewa Sanstha v State o f  M P and others 1986 (Supp) SCC 578. Sharavati, Karnataka: Honnavara 
Taluka Parisara & others v State o f  Karnataka & others. Chimony, Kerala: A X  Varghese v State o f  
Kerala.
Rural Litigation and Entitlement (R L & E) Kendra, Dehradun and others v State o f  Uttar 
Pradesh and others AIR 1985 SC 652, 1985 (2) SCALE 25 [119], (1987) 1 SCR 637 / 1985 (2) 
SCALE 113 [906], AIR 1987 SC 359, 1987 (2) SCALE 164 [790], AIR 1988 SC 2187, AIR 1989 SC 
594, (1990) 3 SCR 72 and AIR 1991 SC 2216; Krishna Nagar Gram Panchayat Tadepaeli v State o f  
A P & Anr 1983 (2) SCALE 125 [735]; Kinkri Devi and another v State o f  Himachal Pradesh and 
others AIR 1988 HP 4; Mukthi Sangarsh Movement v State o f  Maharashtra and others 1990 (Supp) 
SCC 37; Tarun Bharat Sangh, Alwar v Union o f  India and others AIR 1992 SC 514 and 1994 (2) 
SCALE 68 [516].
M C Mehta v Union o f  India & Ors (Sriram gas leak) 1985 (2) SCALE 151 [1280], 1986 (1) 
SCALE 23 [153], (1986) 2 SCC 176, (1986) 2 SCC 325 and (1987) 1 SCC 395. The Supreme Court's 
orders have received much attention, including Jain, D C, 'Case Analysis o f M C Mehta & Another v. 
Union o f India AIR 1987 SC 1086', AIR 1988 J 52-55.
See the section on 'Urban Space', supra, in particular the cases relating to the management of  
waste and water by municipal services.
See Pathak, R S, Human rights and the development o f the environmental law in India', 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin, July 1988, 1171-1180. See the section on International Influences' in 
chapter one.
See Singh, Gayatri; Anklesaria, Kerban and Gonsalves, Colin (eds) (1993), Rosencranz, Armin; 
Divan, Shyam and Noble, Martha L, Environmental Law and Policy in India: Cases, Materials and 
Statutes, (Tripathi, Bombay, 1991); Ramakrishna, Kilaparti
The Emergence o f Environmental law in the Developing Countries: A Case Study of India', Ecology 
Law Quarterly, Vol 12, 1985, 907-935. Abraham, C M, 'The Effects and Defects of our Pollution 
Laws', 1986 KLT J 41-43; Sangal, P S, Some Recent Developments in the Field o f Environmental 
Prospects for the Future', Delhi Law Review, Vol 13, 1991, 44-71; Robinson, Nicholas A, Marshalling 
Environmental Law to Resolve the Himalaya-Ganges Problem', Delhi Law Review, Vol 13, 1991, 1-25; 
Leelakrishnan, P, 'Law o f Public Nuisance: A Tool for Environmental Protection', Journal o f  the Indian 
Law Institute, Vol 28 No 2, 1986, 229-231.
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the Forest Conservation Act. 1980/^ legislation governing industry and insurance, 
company laws and contract laws. Other statutes have also been invoked to uphold 
rights to resources, for example the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 and state laws such 
as the Madhva Pradesh Displaced Persons (Resettlemenf) Act. 1985. Amendments to 
the Factories Act in 1987 and the enactment of the Public Liabilitv Insurance Act. 
1991 have been added to the available legal remedies.
In spite of the protection afforded by some of these statutes, the cases 
in this section show the State to be the worst offender, against people and the 
environment. For example, the national policies of water and land use fail to provide 
for basic needs, like adequate drainage, a problem compounded when such policies 
are translated into individual projects. PIL cases show how industrial policy has, on 
a number of occasions, failed to account for the human and social costs of projects, 
such as the alienation of people from their land.^^
Filed by social action groups, human rights organisations, voluntary 
organisations, advocates and individuals, the range of issues raised by petitions is vast. 
When framing an issue for adjudication by the courts, common problems have arisen. 
With no right to know, access to information has been difficult. Most petitioners have 
been unable to support their petitions with the necessary documentation, as there are 
few who have either the resources, or influence, to access the necessary information. 
As in all other sections, newspapers have been the major source of information for
See Fernandes, Walter and Kulkami, Sharad (eds), Towards a New Forest Policy, (Indian Social 
Institute, New Delhi, 1983).
In is interesting to note that this enactment was passed after the question o f liability had arisen 
in the courts because o f the Bhopal gas leak in 1984 and the Sriram gas leak in 1985. See 'Supreme 
Court judgement in Sriram Food and Fertilisers Ltd. case', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 8 Vol 
26, 10/3/87, 194 - in response to a question about the need for legislation after the SC judgment on 
absolute liability, the Minister for Industry stated that the government was examining the question of  
an adequate compensation scheme. For an analysis o f the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 see Vaswani, 
Kalpana; Dhagamwar, Vasudha and Ganguly-Thukral, Enakshi, The Land Acquisition Act and You, 
(Multiple Action Research Group, New Delhi, 1990).
See D'Monte, Darryl, Temples or Tombs? Industry versus Environment: Three Controversies, 
(Centre o f Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1985).
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many petitions
In the section on roads and bridges, the need for the state to provide 
adequate resources, to enable people to move freely and to communicate, is 
highlighted. In the one case on information, advocate M C Mehta petitioned the 
Supreme Court asking that people be made aware of their social obligation to the 
environment. Additional to the two documented cases on heritage, other cases have 
alluded to such concern. A growing concern for tourism, its effect on people and on 
the environment, have prompted petitions to be frled.^  ^Petitions have not just focused 
on environmental considerations when challenging attempts to develop tourist areas, 
but, like that filed challenging the pollution of the Taj Mahal, have pointed to the 
revenue gained from tourism in an attempt to persuade the Court to act.
The cases on livelihood and on people and land, chronicle poverty and 
the manner in which it can be exacerbated by p o licy .F iled  on behalf of “illiterate
Including those filed the Social Action and Legal Aid Society, Bibhab Kumar Talukdar and 
Kinkri Devi.
For example the petition filed by the Goa Foundation challenging the Konkan railway alignment 
mentioned that churches and temples would be affected by the rail-line. Another petition was filed in 
the Kerala High Court in 1993 by advocate A X Verghese challenging the extraction of marble by a 
Multi-National Corporation for export by cutting and exploding Sage Cages in Iduki District o f Kerala. 
Admitting the petition, the Court issued a stay order. A X Verghese, advocate, interview. Cochin, 
18/8/93.
A petition Mr Anilkumar v Government o f India (O P No 5779 o f 1987-K) was filed in the 
Kerala High Court through the Manishada Nature Club on behalf o f the people of Quilon District. While 
promoting tourism, the District Collector was apparently destroying centuries old mangrove vegetation 
by building a tourist complex. The petition asked the Court to prevent this construction. Another petition 
was filed in the Simla High Court in 1993 by SPOKE (Society for the Preservation of Kasauli and its 
Environs) challenging the legality of the construction activity in the area. The Court issued a stay on 
all construction activity in and around Kasauli, which included many government projects, including 
a rural water supply scheme. Many residents of Kasauli have been alienated by the organisation which 
they consider to be one of Delhi-based people who wish to preserve the area as their personal estate. 
See 'Kasauli Clash', India Today, 15/8/93. See the section on 'Urban Space' for similar petitions, such 
as that filed by the Palani Hills Conservation Council.
Another petition was filed on behalf o f fishermen in Madras whose catamarans (boats) had been 
confiscated by the administration, in an attempt to beautify the area. S S Vasudevan, advocate, 
interview, Madras, 13/4/93. A petition Consumer Education and Research Society v Gujarat Water 
Supply and Sewerage Board and another (S C A No 6895 o f 1987) was filed in the Gujarat High Court 
because of the scarcity of drinking water in areas of Gujarat with a large tribal population. The petition 
invoked the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act, 1978 along with Articles 14, 21, 38, 39(c),
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and gullible tribals” (the description used by the respondents in the petition filed by 
Andhra Pradesh Adimajati Seva Sangham) petitions have implicitly challenged the 
development^^ and environmental policies of the government, as in the series of cases 
filed on forest and tribal lands in Maharashtra/^ These cases demonstrate how the 
creation of a legislative framework transformed people who had dwelt in the forests 
of Maharashtra for generations, with a relationship of interdependence with the land, 
into “encroachers”,®° who then become the object of harassment and corruption/’ One
41 and 47 of the Constitution, asking the Court to direct the respondents to submit information about 
existing schemes for the supply o f drinking water to certain villages and to ensure that adequate 
drinking water is supplied. The petition asked that the State be directed to take over the scheme from 
Panchayats which had been unable to maintain existing schemes because o f the lack o f financial 
resources, or of trained personnel.
See Hundung Victims o f  Development op cit note 61
Other petitions were filed which have also been grouped with these cases: a petition, Pradip 
Prabhu v State o f  Maharashtra (W P No 1106 o f 1982), was filed in the Supreme Court by an activist 
of Kashtakari Sanghatan who filed a documented petition in 1986. In a series o f violent clashes from 
May to September 1982 activists of the organisation were attacked and later prevented from lodging 
First Information Reports (FIRs) at the local police station, in a systematic manner. The petition stated 
that the police were, themselves, burning the crops of these tribals on the basis that they were 
encroachers on the land. In 1983 the Supreme Court ordered that standing crops should not be burnt 
or destroyed by officers, nor should they be allowed to be burnt by anyone. Another such petition 
Sitaaram Motiram Pawar and two others v State o f  Maharashtra and two others (W P No 15206-15298 
of 1984) was filed in the Supreme Court by a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) activist working in the 
adivasi area o f Nashik District, with parallel contentions to those in Sharad Patil's petition. In an order 
D /-18/10/84 the Court ordered the respondents to stop destroying existing crops and to allow the 
adivasis to sow new crops. In a later order the Court held that any encroachments after its order in 1984 
were liable to be removed, as the respondents claimed that encroachment was increasing at an alarming 
rate causing heavy damage to forests. Further petitions have been filed in the SC in 1989 by aggrieved 
groups o f adivasis. The Court ordered that an enquiry be carried out by a retired District Judge. In a 
later order when hearing the application for stay, the Court, noting that the petition was lacking in 
certain material facts, asked the counsel for the petitioners to file a proper affidavit, and later asked that 
the documents establishing land titles of the petitioners be placed on record.
Organisations petitioning the courts have asserted that these tribal peoples had already been 
fulfilling the objectives of the forest departments, for example in forest management, development, 
conservation and planting o f trees.
A petition was filed in the Bombay High Court in 1989 by Shramik Mukti Sangathana, an 
organisation working with tribals, challenging the illegal alterations made in the mutations register 
which changed the title deeds in favour o f tribals to the names of non-tribals, with specific reference 
to nine tribal members o f the organisation, claiming standing under Order 1 Rule 8 o f the Code o f Civil 
Procedure. 1908. The petition was admitted and the Court issued a stay order. Vijay Sathe, interview, 
Usgaon, District Thane, 27/3/93. Other petitons have been filed: in the Bombay High Court on the same 
issue; in the Gujarat High Court, P Rathinam v State (W P No 304 o f  1986), was filed asking the Court 
to dispose of a number of petitions filed in the High Court in 1984 and 1985, on behalf o f the tribal 
cultivators challenging attempts to dispossess them; in the Kerala High Court in 1991 by the Girijan 
Samiti o f Attapadi because fertile land belonging to tribals had been taken over by wealthy settlers,
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case challenged the criminal cases filed in Uttar Pradesh against tribals for 
encroachment/^ while another described how tribals in Kerala, who had been relocated 
after having been displaced, were later accused of encroaching upon land that had 
been allotted to them/^ It is in this section that the issue of resettlement and 
rehabilitation of those displaced by government policies or projects was first raised/'^ 
As in other sections, it is primarily indigenous peoples, including scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes, who would benefit from the success of these petitions.
The link between international trade and corruption is apparent in the 
cases on wildlife and animals,*^ and also in the many cases relating to environmental 
degradation and pollution.Petitions spanning concern for pollution and degradation 
in general,^^ to forests,*^ to fisheries*^ relate to other cases in this section and the
forcing them to move to land with little irrigation. Although 2000 tribals had submitted complaints 
under the Prevention o f Alienation of Tribal Lands Act, 1975, nothing was done. The High Court 
ordered that these applications be disposed o f as expeditiously as possible, but no land had been 
returned to the tribals by mid-1993. A X Verghese, advocate, interview. Cochin, 18/8/93.
Banwasi Sewa Ashram op cit note 61.
Molly Madhavan op cit note 61.
Another petition was filed in the Madras High Court by a group in Pondicherry, on behalf o f 
those displaced when a new harbour changed wave patterns. The petition was dismissed. Sriram Panchu, 
advocate, interview, Madras, 15/4/93.
A petition was filed in the Kerala High Court by advocate A X Verghese complaining that a 
destructive plant, the Australian Black Wattle, used in the tarming industry, planted in and around 
Iravikal National Park, would disturb the eco-system o f the area, which was the habitat for many 
endangered species including the Nilgiri Tahr. The Court stayed any further planting within a 3 km 
radius of this national park, but did not order that existing plants he uprooted. A X Verghese, advocate, 
Kerala, 8/93. Another petition was filed in the Delhi High Court by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
against four major ivory marts which were violating the 1986 and 1991 amendments to the Wildlife 
(Protection) Act, 1972. These amendments prohibited the trade in animal articles including animal skins 
and ivory from Indian elephants, the trade imported ivory, and the display and storage o f animal or 
ivory articles in commercial places. The Court directed that all ivory items in the premises o f all ivory 
marts in the country should be placed in a separate room which is locked and sealed, with curtains 
across its window should be curtained, [anon], 'Newsfile: Ban on display of ivory'. The Lawyers, Vol 
8 No 10, Nov 1993, 31.
See the section on 'Urban Space' for: V Lakshmipathy op cit note 5.
Other petitions have been filed: in the Karnataka High Court by the Transnational Centre and 
affected villagers alleging that the two large Birla pulp-fibre factories were polluting the air and the 
water of the Tungabhadra River, and affecting the local residents, cattle and crops. See [anon], Birla 
Plants Polluting the Tungabhadra', The Lawyers, Vol 1 No 11, Nov-Dee 1986, 26; in the Bombay High
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section on 'Urban Space'. With the exception of one petition, the concern for air^° and 
noise‘s' pollution is in relation to urban areas.
Court by villagers of Chitali, Ahtnednagar Zilla Sheth Mazoor Union and the Centre for Human 
Ecology, Bombay, stating that the distillery in Chitali in Ahmednagar District, owned by Western 
Maharashtra Development Corporation, was emitting spentwash pollution into the village. The 
Aurangabad Bench o f the High Court admitted the petition and the affidavit o f the Maharashtra 
Pollution Control Board partly endorsed the contentions of the petitioners. The Board has decided to 
prosecute the distillery. See letter D/-20/8/93 from Benson George, Centre for Human Ecology, 
Bombay, to Rukmini Sekhar; W P (C) No 1228 o f 1989, People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union 
o f  India and others, was filed in the SC in 1989 regarding pollution by the Cawnpore Sugar Works 
Ltd., Padrauna Factory Branch; in the Madras High Court in 1993 by Friedrich Schulze Buxloh and 
other residents o f Auroville stating that garbage was being dumped by Pondicherry into Auroville, Tamil 
Nadu and that gastro-enteritis and typhoid had increased, violating the petitioner's right to a healthy 
environment. Sriram Panchu, advocate, interview, Madras, 15/4/93.
In addition to the documented cases, other petitions have been filed: in 1988, in the Nagpur 
Bench of the Bombay High Court, the Bombay Environmental Action Group challenged the resolution 
passed by the Maharashtra Government in 1987 denotifying 3,500 sq km o f of forest lands in Vidarbha, 
which had been classified as “Zudpi Jungle” (scrub forest). This was passed despite the request from 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government o f India asking the State Government not to 
denotify the land. Shyam Chainani, interview, Bombay 19/3/92; in the Guwahati High Court, in 1988, 
Pranab Pathak challenged a contract allotted by the Government for the removal o f twenty thousand 
trees of Bogai Khas, a reserved forest. The petition stated that as this forest did not contain twenty 
thousand trees, the contractor would fell many in nearby virgin forests to make up the numbers. During 
the pendency o f the petition, Mr Pathak was threatened and advised to drop the case, but the High Court 
did issue a stay on the felling o f the trees. Pranab Pathak, advocate interview, Guwahati, 5/6/93; in the 
Kerala High Court in 1989, a member o f the Social Action and Legal Aid Society in Emakulam, 
challenged the sale of part of a rain forest, a coffee plantation, at a “throwaway” price o f Rs. 1.35 
crores (the estimated price was Rs. 5 crores). Concerned at the general destruction of forests in Wynad 
District, the petition observed that because the estate was not easily accessible, any permit given could 
be easily misused and that corruption was rife. James Vincent, advocate, interview, Emakulam, 17/8/93; 
in the Madras High Court, S Balasubramaniam, editor of Tamil weekly, Ananda Vikatan, detailed plans 
of Tamil Nadu Tea Plantation Corporation Ltd. Coonoor which was felling trees in order to expand its 
tea plantation area, in collusion with timber contractors and powerful politicians. The petition asked the 
Court to prevent the felling, after which the Court issued a stay order. See [anon], 'Felling o f trees: 
Court restrains Govt.', The Hindu, 18/11/92, quoted in Legal Perspectives, No 25, 74.
A petition was filed in the Guwahati High Court by Aaranyak Nature Club. In 1988 the 
Government had granted leases for the establishment of fisheries within forests (wetlands) - the habitat 
of many fish and birds - in violation o f the forest enactments which state that no forest can be used for 
revenue purposes. The Court cancelled the fishery leases. Pranab Pathak, advocate, interview, Guwahati, 
5/6/93.
In addition to those documented, a petition was filed in the High Court o f Karnataka (W P No 
17780 of 1987) by the Samaj Parivartana Samudaya regarding the air pollution caused by toxic effluents 
emitted from the Mysore Cements Factory at Ammasandra.
Another petition was filed in the Madras High Court in 1988 by the Consumer Protection Council 
complaining of the noise pollution from the air horns o f Government buses. R Gandhi, advocate, 
interview, Madras, 14/4/93.
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Concern for the environment and for resource rights also merge in the 
cases on big projects and the environment, and on big dams.^^ While some petitions 
focus on the viability of the project itse lf,o thers  have focused on the environmental 
aspects or the resettlement and rehabilitation of those displaced. Framing the petitions 
on dams, for resolution in the courtroom, has been difficult. One petition filed on 
behalf of oustees of the Narmada Project in Gujarat referred to the report of the 
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award which gave exhaustive directions in the 
matter of rehabilitation of the displaced families, without making any distinction 
between lawful occupants of lands and those who could be identified as “illegally” 
cultivating forest lands/waste lands.^ "^  The lack of clarity in the policy on oustees, 
eligibility and levels of rehabilitation have initiated concern, while exacerbating 
difficulties in translating a perceived injustice into a legal wrong. Some petitioners
In addition to the documented cases relating to the Silent Valley project in Kerala, Machhu dam 
in Gujarat, Koel Karo and Kaijan dams in Bihar, Tehri dam in U P, the Narmada project (Sardar 
Sarovar), Hasdeo Bango dam in M P, the Sharavati project in Karnataka and the Chimony dam in 
Kerala, other petitions have been filed: Andhali, Maharashtra: A petition was filed in the Bombay High 
Court invoking the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act. 1976 which had been 
applicable to the dam project at Andhali, Satara, since 1978. Apparently none of the provisions of the 
Act had been enforced as people had been forcibly evicted, their property destroyed, and left destitute. 
See Gopinath, Deepti, 'No Rehabilitation for Project Affected', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 2, Feb 1987, 
15-16; Kaptai, Mizoram: A petition was filed in the Guwahati High Court in 1990 by C Thangmura, 
describing the situation of the Mizos and Chakmas who live along the Bangladesh/Mizoram border in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The former state o f East Pakistan had constructed the Kaptai or Kamapully 
dam, and later the Bangladesh Government had closed the outlet o f the dam causing the water level to 
rise and innundating the border lands which were being cultivated by many Chakmas and Mizo people. 
The petition contended that while the Bangladesh Government had adequately compensated the affected 
people, the Indian Government had not. The Court was asked to direct the Government of Mizoram to 
pay compensation. Pranab Pathak, advocate, interview, Guwahati, 5/6/93; Adukkom, Kerala: A petition 
(O P No 16843 of 1992 Meenachil Nadeethada Samrukshana Samithy v Government o f  Kerala) was 
filed in the Kerala High Court challenging the proposed construction o f Adukkom Dam, stating that the 
dam would have an adverse environmental impact, that it would not provide adequate irrigation and 
drinking water and that it could induce earthquakes.
As in the petitions filed challenging the Konkan railway alignment and the route of the east coast 
road, a petition was filed in the Kerala High Court in 1988 by the Aaranyak Nature Club challenging 
the proposed construction of the Jogighopa-Gauhati railway line through a wetland called Deepor Bheel, 
the river basin and only natural water reservoir o f Guwahati. This route was being used as the 
alternative involved higher costs, but the petition stated that not only is Deepor Bheel essential to the 
drainage of Guwahati, but it is the winter habitat o f Siberian birds. Pranab Pathak, advocate, interview, 
Guwahati, 5/6/93.
Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini op cit note 65.
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have concentrated on rehabilitation^^ in preference to a focus on the policy on big 
dams or environmental considerations, as a pragmatic manoeuvre, expecting the Court 
to be more sympathetic.^^
Concern for the environmental effects of mines and quarries form a 
distinct group of cases, as does the petition detailing the litigation after the Sriram gas 
leak. There have been PIL elements to the litigation relating to the gas leak from the 
Union Carbide factory in Bhopal on 4/12/84. Civil and criminal cases were filed 
seeking, amongst other things, compensation for those affected by the leak. 
Applications in the form of PILs were filed during the pendency of the compensation 
claim, asking the Court for a number of reliefs: for information from Union Carbide 
Corporation on the leaked gas (MIC), for the restoration of medications and records 
that had been impounded, and for the closure of the Union Carbide Corporation 
research laboratory in Bhopal that had continued to function after the leak. After the 
the compensation claim was settled in 1989, by the Supreme Court,^^ review petitions 
were filed, some of which were in the form of PILs. Passing judgment on the review 
petitions, the Supreme Court stated:
When the settlement was reached a group of social activists, the 
Press and even others claiming to be trustees of society came forward 
to question it.^ *
In addition, other PIL petitions were filed, including Dr Nishit Vohra & Others v State 
o f Madhya Pradesh and others'^ '^  which was concerned with the provision of medical 
relief and rehabilitation of the victims of the gas leak. The litigation that resulted from 
the Bhopal gas leak is in many ways the most important of the 1980s, representing a 
microcosm for the study of the Indian legal system, and even of the relationship of 
the Court to economic liberalisation. Numerous attempts were made to locate the
Karjan Jalasay Yojana op cit note 65.
Jose Verghese, advocate, interview. New Delhi, 25/2/92.
Union Carbide Corporation v Union o f  India (1989) 3 SCC 38.
Union Carbide Corporation v Union o f  India AIR 1992 SC 248 at 259. 
W P No 11708 of 1985.
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relevant documents, because of the complexity of the PIL aspects of the Bhopal- 
related litigation and the massive scale of human suffering. As the relevant 
documentation has not been available, the PIL aspects of the litigation cannot be 
discussed here.'°°
Access to Justice
Standing has not been an impediment in the petitions in this section, as 
only two have been rejected on this preliminary consideration.'®* The litigation on the 
environment began after procedural questions had been resolved by the Supreme
An extensive literature exists on all facets of the Bhopal gas leak. Much of the relevant material 
is cited in Cassels, Jamie, The Uncertain Promise o f  Law: Lessons from Bhopal, (University o f Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1993), as reviewed in Morehouse, Ward, 'Justice at Bhopal', The Ecologist, Vol 24 No
4, July-Aug 1994, 157. Also see Anderson, Michael R, Public Interest Perspectives on the Bhopal 
Case: Tort, Crime or Violation of Human Rights' in Robinson, David and Dunkley, John (eds) (1995), 
153-171. For documentation and analysis see Baxi, Upendra and Paul, Thomas, Mass Disasters and 
Multinational Liability: The Bhopal Case, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1986), Baxi, Upendra, 
Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe. The Bhopal Case, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 
1986), Baxi, Upendra and Dhanda, Amita, Valiant Victims and Lethal Litigation. The Bhopal Case, (N 
M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1990) and Ramanathan, Usha, Thinking Mass Disaster Law, Himalaya: 
Man and Nature, Nov-Dee 1993, 1-5. Also see Muchlinski, P T, 'The Bhopal Case: Controlling 
Ultrahazardous Industrial Activities Undertaken by Foreign Investors', Modern Law Review, Vol 50 No
5, Sept 87, 545-587. Most of the November 1994 issue o f The Lawyers appraises the continuing legal 
response to the gas leak, in particular see Jaising, Indira, Bhopal: The saga of a legal sellout'. The 
Lawyers, Vol 9 No 11, Nov 1994, 4-10. Of particular interest is the parens patriae role adopted by the 
Government o f India when the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act. 1985 was passed. 
Many reports were published by organisations working for justice for gas affected people. See Agarwal, 
Anil; Merrifield, Juliet and Tandon, Rajesh, 'No Place to Run. Local Realities and Global Issues of the 
Bhopal Disaster', (Highlander Center and Society for Participatory Research in Asia, 1985), 'We Must 
Not Forget. A Plea for Justice for the Bhopal Victims', (International Coalition for Justice in Bhopal, 
Penang, 1987), Compensation Disbursement. Problems and Possibilities', (Bhopal Group for 
Information and Action, January 1992). More generally see Hazarika, Sanjoy, Bhopal. The Lessons o f  
a Tragedy, (Penguin Book, New Delhi, 1986), Weir, David, The Bhopal Syndrome. Pesticides, 
Environment and Health, (Earthscan Publications Limited, London, 1987), Jones, Tara, Corporate 
Killing, Bhopals Will Happen, (Free Association Books, London, 1988), Morehouse, Ward and 
Subramaniam, Arun M, The Bhopal Tragedy. What Really Happened and What it means fo r  American 
Workers and Communities at Risk, (A Preliminary Report for the Citizens Commission on Bhopal, 
Council on International and Public Affairs, New York, 1986); Dembo, David; Morehouse, Ward and 
Wykle, Lucinda, Abuse o f  Power. Social Performance o f  Multinational Corporations: The Case o f  
Union Carbide, (New Horizons Press, New York, 1990).
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti and Subhash Kumar op cit note 63 were both 
rejected on the grounds that the petitioner was not approaching the Court with bona fides.
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Court. Given the number of cases documented, the proportion of cases in which the 
justiciability of the issue was limited was s m a l l , a l th o u g h  three petitions were 
directed to an alternative forum. The importance of PIL as a non-adversarial form 
of litigation has been stressed and procedures have been relaxed unselfconsciously by 
the courts. In the M C Mehta case on the pollution of the River Ganges, the Supreme 
Court took on the case under Article 32 of the Constitution by addressing the 
municipal corporation, and not the tanneries which were causing the pollution.
Letters have been routinely registered as writ petitions. One was 
dismissed without a hearing when the advocate appointed for the petitioner did not 
attend a hearing in the High Court. Access has been limited for some petitioners 
because of financial constraints - having been unable to gain relief in the High Court, 
one organisation was unable to appeal to the Supreme Court, as it lacked the necessary 
funds,aff i rming  the “pathology” of the legal system.
The Court's Response
There are innumerable examples of the Court ordering commissions of 
enquiries and/or monitoring the development of the case, to ensure that its directions 
were carried out, including the celebrated litigation concerning limestone quarries in 
D e h r a d u n .T h a t  the courts have displayed enthusiasm and concern for the
Niyamavedi op cit note 59, the Social Reformation and Development Chib op cit note 6 \, K  K  
Vasant op cit note 63 and Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti op cit note 65.
Kota Shivaram Karanth op cit note 61, V Subramaniam op cit note 63 and Mukti Sangharsh 
Movement op cit note 66.
M C Mehta (pollution o f River Ganges) op cit note 63.
A Public interest litigation by intervenor op cit note 61.
Kerala Leprosy Patients op cit note 60.
See note 115 in chapter one for Mendelsohn, Oliver (1981).
Rural Litigation & Entitlement (R L & E) Kendra op cit note 66.
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environment and the resource rights of citizens is indisputable. The definition of the 
right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution has been refined. The Supreme Court has 
held that access to roads is access to life i t s e l f , a n d  Article 21 of the Constitution 
was described as the needle of the balance when discussing environmental and 
ecological questions.Non-justiciable constitutional provisions, such as Articles 48A 
and 51A(g) of the Constitution, have influenced the Court in its decision-making.
Nonetheless, the positive and welcoming response of the courts has not 
extended into the vision or creativity required by the issues raised in the petitions. The 
Court's response has been conditioned and limited by differing conceptions of the 
issues involved, such as environment or development. Although there has been a 
considerable acceptance of environmental considerations this has been done within 
norms formally codified in policy and legislation. In certain cases, the Court has 
extended its jurisdiction, stating that to enable an assessment of the environmental 
impact and viability of the project in question, it would need to be told of its 
economic viability and sources of finance.'H ow ever, the Bombay High Court has 
spoken of the petitioner's misplaced sympathy for heritage."^ Whenever the question 
of national interest has been raised the Court has given preference to this argument."^ 
In the tussle between the state conception of “development” and the petitioners' 
conceptions of the “environment”, concern for the realisation of development has 
prevailed.
Another conflict can be perceived as the Court has not acknowledged
State o f  Himachal Pradesh op cit note 56.
Environmental and Ecological Protection Samithy op cit note 63.
'People United fo r Better Living op cit note 63.
"■ Goa Foundation op cit note 64.
Be it in relationship to tourist revenue {Professor Sergio Carvalho op cit note 59), employment 
and foreign exchange {Sathyavani op cit note 62), public funds {Executive Engineer op cit note 63), the 
importance o f the power that will be generated by a thermal power project {Bombay Environmental 
Action Group op cit note 64) or economic and defence considerations {Rural Litigation & Entitlement 
(R L & E) Kendra op cit note 66).
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the possibility of an integral relationship between people and the land which they 
inhabit. Less concern was shown for displaced people who were being killed or 
maimed when collecting scrap from an army firing range, than for the felling of 
t r e e s . I n  a petition on the rehabilitation of oustees of the Narmada dam project, the 
Gujarat High Court described the petition as one which raised a non-legal issue. 
Similarly, the tribal “encroacher” in Maharashtra has been waiting for over a decade 
for substantive results from the Court and the environmental imperatives of creating 
sanctuaries and reserved forest areas have not been discussed in terms of people’s right 
to common property resources. In one petition the High Court failed to respond to the 
plight of people with leprosy, who have been marginalised by society and the state, 
when it was held that the beggars caused a nuisance.^
A number of interesting directions have been given, for example when 
the Supreme Court extended the scope of a l i t igation, 'and the orders given while 
cases were being dismissed."^ In the case of the Sriram gas leak. Justice Bhagwati 
made observations that do not form part of the directions or order, on liability. Neither 
the scope of Article 12 of the Constitution was decided, nor was the liability of the 
company. Nonetheless, this kind of juristic activism, in its appraisal of judicial 
thought, has had advantages. Directions made by the Supreme Court outside the scope 
of a case {obiter dicta) are binding in law, and, as such directions are often irrelevant 
to the outcome of the case, they are rarely challenged in appeal."^
See Sudip Mazumdar op cit note 61 for detail of the order that wire fencing be erected.
Chhatra Yuva Sangarsh Samiti op cit note 65.
' See Kerala Leprosy Patients op cit note 60 in which the Court ignored the discrepancies in the 
claims of the state government.
Rural Litigation & Entitlement (R L & E) Kendra op cit note 66.
See Dahanu Taluka Environment Protection Group op cit note 64 and P K  Raghavan op cit note 
56 - while dismissing the petition, the Kerala High Court urged that a road be constructed. In V 
Srinivasan op cit note 60, allowing the petition, the Court decided not to order that interest be paid on 
the wages owed to the recipients of help under the Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme 
in the hope that this saving, done at the expense o f those with few resources, would be an incentive for 
the State to frame further schemes for the rural poor.
See Article 141 of the Constitution.
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Evidentiary problems have been common,’^ ® and numerous commissions 
have been appointed/^' One litigation was transformed, in the courtroom, from a 
concern for environmental degradation, to one concerned with boundaries, and the 
case filed regarding the Chimony dam became simplified into a polarised question of 
trees versus the dam. The courts and petitioners have asserted that commissioners have 
not accounted for all relevant f a c to r s .O n e  enquiry commissioner, horrified at the 
way in which the Court had misused his report, returned the money given to him for 
his work.'^"^
There have been a number of cases in which costs were awarded and 
the expenses of those conducting the enquiry were paid by the respondents.’^  ^ In a 
notable exception the petitioner was ordered to pay punitive costs for having 
approached the Court without bona fides, and not in the public interest.
The Contribution of PIL
The issues have been polarised into oppositions - development versus 
the environment, employment versus ecology, even trees versus a dam. Inherently, the 
Court has been unable to question the development paradigm. The interests of 
indigenous peoples have been differentiated from environmental considerations, both 
by the government and by the courts, leading to a situation where only one can be the
In the petitions filed on forest and tribal lands in Maharashtra, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
appointed enquiries and even ordered that a soil test be conducted to ascertain land titles.
See Banwasi Sewa Ashram op cit note 61.
Tarun Bharat Sangh op cit note 61.
Jairaj op cit note 63, Pradeep Prabhu op cit note 61 and Hundung Victims o f  Development op 
cit note 61.
124 See Professor Sergio Carvahlo op cit note 59.
Conversely in Professor Sergio Carvahlo op cit note 59 the petitioners and respondents shared 
the costs of the enquiry.
Subhash Kumar op cit note 63.
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focus of attention. A bias is apparent as the needs of less visible tribal peoples have 
lessened in importance as a consequence of the focus on environmental problems. The 
courts have responded only when displacement, resettlement and rehabilitation 
concerns have been raised, and when neither development nor the environment are 
under threat.
It is through using PIL, that environmental activists and social action 
groups have leamt about law and its limitations. By the 1990's, PIL was being 
mobilised as one part of a stmggle in which the Court was not the major arena. The 
delays, the unwillingness of the Court to respond to basic questions and the poor 
implementation of Court decisions, have informed this perspective. Of the six 
environmental controversies discussed in a 1993 survey of the environment, 
documentation has been available for PIL cases filed in at least five: Chilika Lake in 
Orissa, the Narmada Project, the Konkan Railway, the East Coast Road and the Ganga 
Action Plan. It is interesting to note that law is mentioned in just two of the 
controversies, and it is only in an article by advocate M C Mehta that there is a 
lengthy discussion of the Supreme Court's directives in a case relating to the pollution 
of the River G a n g e s .H e  notes that these directives only had the effect of controlling 
industrial pollution of the river, and not in implementing the broader-based Ganga 
Action Plan.
The limiting and limited nature of using PIL has been understood and
internalised as the activist no longer places law at centre-stage:
legal action ... can serve to act as a brake/deterrent on the sponsoring 
project authorities. If a stay order is obtained from the court this itself 
sometimes gives time for matters to be discussed, compromises to be 
evolved and for the project authorities themselves to make changes in 
the project to minimise the adverse environmental impact. .. quite often
'Survey o f the Environment', {The Hindu, 1993).
'■* Mehta, M C 'Ganga action plan; Tied up in red tape' in ' Survey of the Environment', 127-131. 
The fervour created by this case cannot be underestimated leading to a discussion in the Lok Sahba, 
'Closure and shifting of industries following Supreme Court Judgement', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 
Session 10 Vol 39, 10/5/88, 271-72.
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the very threat of legal action is sufficient.
whilst valuing the opportunities that law provides:
It should however be kept in mind that although the legal scope [of 
PIL] is worth exploring, it must be accompanied by other forms of 
social action. ... Financial and other resources will be required to carry 
on a sustained long-term struggle. Teams of committed lawyers and 
legal activists must also exist. Although the counsel for the villagers .. 
has been able to involve journalists, social activists and academics in 
the issue .. he also says 'one cannot fight tanks with pillow cases'.
Implementing whatever orders have been issued has also become a focus. After the
order on noise pollution in the petition filed by the Consumer Action Group, the All
India Catholic University Federation distributed the order amongst all the groups in
Tamil Nadu working with consum ers . In  the absence of implementation, a contempt
petition could then be filed with material in support of the petition and pressure from
the public.
Discussing the implementation of the Court's orders in Banwasi Sewa 
Ashram, P r e m  Bhai described how, although the case only related to one factory and 
many of the claims had not been allowed by the Court, 15,000 claims were filed in 
local courts as a result of this petition. However six other factories have caused 
displacement in the area. In response the Ashram, together with another organisation 
R E A L S , h a s  had to file local cases. Up to 1992, 213,000 cases were filed for the 
land entitlements of tribals in one district alone. The twenty-one advocates and fifty 
paralegals engaged in sorting out the displacement issues were insufficient. The non­
implementation of Supreme Court directives and the recalcitrance of the administration
Chainani, Shyam, 'Role of Civic Groups in Regional and Municipal Environmental Policy - An 
experience of the Bombay Metropolitan Region', (Bombay Environmental Action Group, 21/3/87) at 
27-28.
'Battling 5 Star Tourism in the Courts: A Brief Report of the Agonda - Canacona Beach Resort 
in South Goa' in 'Dossier on Tourism and Law', (Legal Resources for Social Action & Equations, April- 
May 1993), 31-35 at 34.
Henry Tiphagne, interview. New Delhi, 31/7/93.
Op cit note 61.
Rural Entitlement and Legal Services is probably the full name of the organisation.
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thus led to tens of thousands of claims and counter-claims being filed at a local 
leve l .S imilar ly ,  the petition filed by the Lok Adhikar Sangh would need local 
action for implementation of the High Court's orders, as, in violation of these orders, 
the Sardar Sarovar project authorities started removing people without full 
resettlement. Construction of the dam continued and standards prescribed by the 
High Court and the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award were flouted. Despite 
the ban on blasting that eventually resulted from Kinkri Devi's petition, blasting 
con t inued .Even  the compensation awarded by the Supreme Court to the victims of 
the Sriram gas leak fell well within the scope the company's insurance cover, 
rendering futile the Court's pronouncement that compensation must have a deterrent 
effect, by encouraging the introduction of stricter safety mechanisms.
The one notable success in preventing a major project from being 
carried out was that of Silent Valley in Kerala where a dam was to have been 
constructed. The Kerala High Court did not uphold the claims of the petitioners, but 
support for the cause of the environmentalists, including that from the media and 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, eventually prevented the construction of the dam.'^^
Prem Bhai, interview, New Delhi, 9/4/92.
Singh, Aijun, 'Narmada oustees: Doomed by the dam', The Pioneer, 22/6/93.
[anon], 'Struggle intensifies in Narmada Valley: People Resist Police Terror, Leaders on Hunger 
Strike', Legal Perspectives No 29, 53-59 at 53
Subhash Mendapulkar, SUTRA, interview, Himachal Pradesh, 12/7/93.
Prof M K Prasad, interview, Emakulam, 8/93. See also Prasad, M K, The Silent Valley Case: 
An Ecological Assessment', Leelakrishnan P (ed). Law and Environment, (Eastern Book Company, 
Lucknow, 1992), 116-125.
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Consumer Issues
This short section with few cases - on services/^^ goods,’"‘° and on 
implementing the consumer protection legislation^"^  ^ - should not be mistaken for an 
indication of the total number of cases on consumer issues or the power of groups 
representing consumers, as this area of law has burgeoned outside of the writ 
jurisdiction. . The cases on municipal services, hospitals, pollution and public 
administration, are examples of petitions that will affect the “consumer” in a broader 
sense of the term, as citizens who form a part of the environment and participate in 
a com m uni ty .T he  documented cases to be found here interpret the definition of a 
consumer in a narrow framework.
The Consumer ^Protections Act. 1986 was framed to provide redress for 
the consumer of goods or services. Section 2(1 )(b) of the Act, describes a complainant
Consumer Education and Research Centre, Ahmedabad and others v State o f Gujarat and others', 
P Nalla Thampy Thera v Union o f  India and others AIR 1984 SC 74; Akhil Bharatiya Grahak 
Panchayat v Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and another AIR 1983 AP 283; Akhil Bharatiya 
Grahak Panchayat (Bombay Branch) and others v State o f  Maharashtra and others AIR 1985 Bom 14; 
M  Balagovindam, advocate v Union o f  India and another, Vinod Kumar Gupta v Indian Airlines and 
others AIR 1984 J&K 35.
Ashok Kumar Mittal v Maruti Udyog Ltd. and another AIR 1986 SC 1923.
Common Cause, A Regd Society v Union o f  India & Ors 1989 (2) SCALE 98 [541] / 1990 (2) 
SCALE 16 [94] / JT 1992 (3) SC 602 / 1991 (2) SCALE 273 [1446] / 1993 (1) SCALE 5 [17]; 
Cosmopolitan Hospital & Anr v Vasantha P Nair 1992 (3) SCALE 59 [228].
See the sections on 'Urban Space', 'Prisons and State Institutions', 'Environment and Resources' 
and Public Policy and Administration'.
An oft cited example of an issue that crosses the boundary between consumer and environment 
issues can be seen in the petition filed in the Madras High Court in 1981 by advocate S S Vasudevan 
complaining o f the impurity o f the water supplied to the City of Madras for drinking purposes. The 
High Court ordered the Public analyst to submit a report and gave directions for the water to be 
purified. S S Vasudevan, advocate, interview, Madras, 14/3/93.
In interview the founder o f the Consumer Education and Research Centre noted “there is hardly 
any difference between environment and consumer issues so far as safety is concerned. To give the 
most often used, the most usual example o f contaminated drinking water - what concern is this? Is it 
just a consumer issue or is it also concerned with the environment?”. Manubhai Shah, Consumer 
Education and Research Centre (Ahmedabad), interview, London, 15/5/92.
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as
(i) a consumer; or
(ii) any voluntary association registered under the Companies Act. 1956 
or under any other law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the Central Government or any State Government, who or which 
makes a complaint.
[(iv) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers 
having the same interest]
This provision, along with the relaxed standing provisions that were written into other
enactments in 1986,^ '^ '^  directed many of the grievances and challenges of the nascent
consumer movement away from the use of PIL in the Supreme Court and High
Courts. Thus, with the exception of the cases on the Consumer Protection Act, 1986,
all the petitions referred to here were filed before 1985.
Access to Justice
The Court conferred standing on the Consumer Education and Research 
Centre, to challenge a fare increase, and also on other consumer associations. In one 
instance, the Supreme Court considered the improvement of railway services to be 
outside the Court's jurisdiction and hindered by financial constraints, but nonetheless 
awarded c o s t s . I n  another case, the justiciability of the petition came under scrutiny 
when the Court recognised that PIL may lose credibility if it is mis-used for trivial 
private grievances, such as the refund of a wait-listed ticket for a journey on Indian 
Airlines.
As added by an amendment in 1993.
See 'Alternative and Corollary Innovations in chapter six.
See Singh, Guijeet, “Consumer Protection Law in India: A Socio-Legal Study”, (PhD thesis. 
Department o f Law, School o f Oriental and African Studies, August 1993).
P Nalla Thampy Thera op cit note 139.
Vinod Kumar Gupta op cit note 139.
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The Court’s Response
Apart from a case in which guidelines were framed for the sale of 
Maruti cars/^° it is only in the petition filed by Common Cause asking the Supreme 
Court to implement the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 that Court orders displaying 
some of the recognisable characteristics of a PIL are seen. The scope of the litigation 
was expanded and monitored and contempt notices were issued against the State 
Governments who did not respond to the Court.
The Contribution of PIL
Being able to use the relaxed standing provisions reinforced the value 
of consumer organisations, as in the early recognition of groups like the Akhil 
Bharatiya Grahak Panchayat, and Common Cause. This relaxation of procedures, 
combined with recognition of consumer issues, meant that legislation was framed to 
cope with the increasing demands. As many individual consumer issues or cases are 
not issues of large public interest, PIL would have been unsuitable as a mechanism 
to remedy of injustices perceived by the c o n s u m e r . I t  has functioned as a 
springboard for ameliorating the lot of the consumer of goods and services, as it led 
to the legal recognition of the needs of consumers and to establishment of a new
Ashok Kumar Mittal op cit note 140. Another petition was filed in the Supreme Court by 
Common Cause relating to the out of turn allotments of Maruti vehicles out of the discretionary quota 
to politicians and other personalities. The petition was not admitted. See Shourie, H D, Common Cause: 
A romance with public causes (monograph. New Delhi, 1993).
See the section on 'Public Policy and Administration' for the cases on pensions. Other petitions 
have been filed by this organisation in the Supreme Court. One highlighted the inefficiency and huge 
profits made by the telephone department; as a result o f the petition, the telephone department was able 
to separate from the Department of Posts, enabling the telephone department to utilise its surplus for 
the improvement and expansion of its own services. Another, filed in 1988, challenged sections 36A, 
36E and 46 A of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act. 1969 as it excluded public sector 
enterprises and private consumers from its ambit - the petition was rejected as the Court felt that it had 
been prompted by private industry. See Shourie, H D, Common Cause: A Romance with Public Causes 
(monograph, New Delhi, 1993).
M Balagovindam op cit note 139.
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judicial forum, the Consumer Forum.
Education
Cases, filed on aspects of education, can be seen in sections on 
policy,^ '^  ^ schools,admissions,appointments,*^^ examinations and ch ea t in g ,an d  
other c a s e s . T h e  petitioners, many of whom are individuals who would otherwise 
be unable to question certain decisions or the decision-making process, focus upon the 
higher education system. The right to education, prescribed by Articles 41, 45 and 46 
of the Constitution, all Directive Principles of State Policy, has often been cited.
For details see Singh, Guijeet (1993).
Manubhai Pragaji Vashi v State o f Maharashtra and others AIR 1989 Bom 296; Parents Forum 
for Meaningful Education and others v Central Board o f  Secondary Education and others.
Pratap Kishore Misra v State o f  Orissa and others AIR 1988 Ori 273; Kedar Nath Singh 
Gautam v Secretary, Board o f  High School <&. Intermediate Education U.P. at Allahabad and another 
AIR 1991 All 381.
Jitendra Nath Banerjee v West Bengal Board o f  Examination fo r  Admission to Medical, 
Engineering and Technological Degree Colleges and others AIR 1983 Cal 275.
Krishna Kant Jaiswal v Vice Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi and others AIR
1984 All 350; Balbir Singh Grewal and another v G D Tapase and others AIR 1985 P & H 244; 
Naginder Singh v Punjab University, Chandigarh and others AIR 1990 P & H 157; Biswajit Sinha & 
Another v Dibrugarh University, Represented by the Vice-Chancellor & 8 Others (1990) 2 GauLR 374; 
H K  Chopra v Post Graduate Institute o f  Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh and others AIR 
1992 P & H 30; Ajit Kumar v State o f  Bihar and others and Shambu Prasad Singh v State o f  Bihar and 
others.
Allahabad University Teachers' Association and others v Chancellor, Allahabad University, 
Lucknow and others AIR 1982 All 343; Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil and others v D r Mahesh Madhav 
Gosavi and others (1987) 1 SCC 227; Nandjee Singh v P.G. Medical Students' Association and others 
(1993) 3 SCC 400; letter petition from Kerala.
J  Mohapatra and Co and another v State o f  Orissa and another (1984) 4 SCC 103; State o f  
Himachal Pradesh v Parent o f a Student o f Medical College, Simla and Others (1985) 3 SCC 169 / AIR
1985 SC 910.
For a survey of the law see Jayakumar, N K, 'Law o f Education', Annual Survey o f  Indian Law, 
Vol 27, 1991, 535-550.
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The cases relating to admissions and appointments reveal corruption. 
The limited places for higher education, and the status afforded to those in University 
and Polytechnic posts, has led to contentious litigation in the High Courts.
Gaining access to the information necessary to file a petition has often 
been difficult.*^’ Approaching the High Court was really a last resort for the Parents 
Forum, which had earlier tried to discuss its grievances with administrators of the 
Central Board of Secondary Education and with politicians.'^^
The importance of education and educational policy has been evident 
in Supreme Court judgments in recent years. In two recent cases the right to education 
has been upheld. In 1992, Justice Kuldip Singh held:
“Right to life” is the compendious expression for all those rights 
which the courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified 
enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the 
individual is free to pursue. The right to education flows directly from 
the right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an 
individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to 
education. The State Government is under an obligation to endeavour 
to provide educational facilities at all levels to its citizens.
The fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the 
Constitution of India including the right to freedom of speech and 
expression and other rights under Article 19 cannot be appreciated and 
fully enjoyed unless a citizen is educated and conscious of his 
individualistic dignity. '
In effect, the Directive Principles of State Policy in Articles 41, 45 and 46 of the
Constitution were held to be justiciable and incorporated into the fundamental rights,
a point which was clarified in a subsequent case:
the provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and 
complementary to each other and that fundamental rights are but a 
means to achieve the goal indicated in Part IV. It is also held that the 
fundamental rights must be construed in the light of the directive
The Parents Forum for Meaningful Education and the Bihar State Progressive Democratic 
Students Union of India complained of problems in gaining access to many of the documents and 
evidence required to support their petitions.
Kavita Sharma, Parents Forum for Meaningful Education, interview, New Delhi, 26/10/93.
Mohini Jain v State o f  Karnataka & Ors 1992 (2) SCALE 17 [90] at 94.
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principles. ...
The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal 
liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be construed in the light of the 
directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution.
Despite this concern, with the exception of the petition filed by the 
Parents Forum For Meaningful Education, none of the PILs have asked the Court to 
consider the general framework of education policy.Grievances ,  while motivated 
by broader concerns for the education system, have been articulated in terms of a 
particular injustice.
Access to Justice
The letter jurisdiction of the High Courts has been invaluable for those 
seeking immediate judicial redress, as in the case registered in the Kerala High Court 
in response to a letter complaining that an answer sheet had been leaked.
The locus standi of all the petitioners in the cases relating to 
appointments to educational posts has come under scrutiny. High Courts have held that 
PIL cannot be used to mask a conflict between two individuals,'^^ and one petitioner 
was described as having malicious intent and was directed to pay Rs. 5,000 as punitive 
c o s t s . W h e n  admitting other petitions, the need for vigilance has been stressed. 
There is little conformity in the directions - while in one instance, not only was the
Unni Krishnan, J  P and others v State o f Andhra Pradesh and others (1993) 1 SCC 645 at 730 
and 732.
The petition filed by Ajit Singh, concerned with bias and nepotism in education posts, was not 
framed in a manner that highlighted its PIL content. The issues were later addressed in the petition filed 
by Shambhu Prasad Singh, op cit note 157.
Also see Manubhai Pragaji Vashi op cit note 166.
Krishna Kant Jaiswal op cit note 157.
H K  Chopra op cit note 157.
See Balbir Singh Grewal and Biswajit Sinha op cit note 157.
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principal of a school denied standing, the Court held that he had no legal right to 
approach the Court, the Allahabad University Teachers' Association was given 
standing and a publishing company, acting in the public interest, was permitted to 
approach the Court/
The definitional problems discussed in chapter two are prevalent here. 
Describing one case as “a sort of PIL”, the Court reinforced the internal ambiguities 
in the definition of An important precedent was set when the Supreme Court
held that in a case of public importance, private litigation assumes the character of a 
PIL,‘^  ^ but circumscribed this in another case, stating that instances where “cases 
where what is strictly an individual dispute is sought to be converted into a public 
interest litigation should not be encouraged”.
The Court’s Response
Although many of the petitions were decided on facts or after a 
discussion of the relevant enactments, the significant part of the courts' orders has 
been the decision on whether to admit the petition. Other legal points have been raised 
regarding the extent of the courts' p o w e r s . T h e  Bombay High Court linked the 
funding for legal education with the provision of legal aid, stating that legal education
Kedar Nath Singh Gautam op cit note 155. Contrast with the cases on provided resources in the 
section on 'Environment and Resources' supra.
J  Mohapatra op cit note 159.
Biswajit Sinha op cit note 157. The Calcutta High Court treated a petition filed as a class action 
by aggrieved candidate, Jitendra Nath Baneijee, as a PIL.
Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil op cit note 158.
Nandjee Singh op cit note 158.
In Biswajit Sinha op cit note 157 the High Court affirmed its jurisdiction to decide upon the 
validity of the decision of a selection committee.
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was vital if the goal of providing legal aid was to be realised. 176
Some issues were left to the discretion of administrative o f f ice r s ,an d  
the only inquiry instituted was in response to allegations of a leaked examination 
paper in Kerala. This caution is echoed in the Supreme Court judgment in the appeal 
filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh, an important decision for PIL. The High Court 
direction that legislation be framed to prevent the ragging of students was overturned 
by the Supreme Court on the basis that the court cannot usurp executive or legislative 
functions.
The Contribution of PIL
Despite the decisions on the Directive Principles on State Policy, 
there has been little evidence of a widespread concern, in the courtroom, for the right 
to education and its provision for all people, even when the Court has been asked to 
do so. This hesitant response is a characteristic of all the orders on education issues, 
particularly because the courts have been confronted with many different types of
Manubhai Pragaji Vashi op cit note 154. Other petitions have been filed on legal education, for 
example, O P No 16324 of 1992 S James Vincent v Union o f  India and others. Filed in the Kerala High 
Court in 1992, this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, asked the Court to stop the practice 
in Government Law Colleges of conducting three and five year courses simultaneously, to prevent three 
year courses from being conducted and to remove the restriction on the age o f entry. See 'Judges, 
Courts, Lawyers', infra, for other cases in which PIL has been used to bolster the legal profession and 
the judiciary.
In Parents Forum for Meaningful Education op cit note 154 the Delhi High Court left the 
unresolved issues to the discretion of the Central Board o f Secondary Education, the very institution 
against whom the complaints had been filed and whose policies had been criticised by the Court in an 
earlier decision. In Allahabad University Teachers Association op cit note 158, the High Court left the 
matter to the discretion of the Chancellor, again the respondent to the petition. In J  Mohapatra op cit 
note 159 the Supreme Court felt unable to give directions, but framed guidelines for the future.
State o f  Himachal Pradesh op cit note 159.
See Mohini Jain op cit note 163 and Unni Krishnan op cit note 164.
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petitioner, and with various motivations. 180
Politics and Elections
Many petitions have been filed relating to elections'*' and politics,'*^ 
by advocates, politicians, social workers and public spirited individuals. PIL has been 
used to challenge the legality of electoral and political decisions and events that 
cannot easily be questioned elsewhere and as yet another tactic in the political 
struggle. PIL has been used as another tool in the personal or political battles of those 
wishing to gain political power, or publicise their perspective.'*^
For example, the Chandigarh High Court held that a journalist and social worker had ulterior 
motives when approaching the Court \ n H K  Chopra op cit note 157. The cases on reservation policy, 
o f relevance to students, have been discussed in 'Public Policy and Administration', see the section on 
'Public Policy and Administration', infra, for a discussion o f Indra Sawhney and Ors v Union o f India 
and Ors JT 1992 (6) SC 273.
P Nalla Thampy Terah v Union o f India and others 1985 (Supp) SCC 189; Anand Mohan v 
Union o f India and others AIR 1987 All 351; A C Datt v Rajiv Gandhi and others AIR 1990 All 38; 
V.R. Sreerama Rao v Telagudesam, a political party, and another AIR 1983 AP 96 and V. R. V. Sree 
Rama Rao v Telagu Desam, a Political Party, and others AIR 1984 AP 353; Digvijay Mote v Union 
o f  India and others’, D C Saxena v Union o f  India and others.
Petitions on politics and corruption, and politicians. Politics and corruption; Kailash Meghwal 
and others v State o f Rajasthan and others AIR 1983 Raj 182; Madurai Adheena Peedathipathi, 
Madurai v State o f Tamil Nadu AIR 1984 Mad 241; Duyal Chandra Bhuyan and others v Secretary to 
the Government o f Assam, Panchayat and C.D. Department and others AIR 1986 Gau 56; A G Prayagi 
V State o f M.P. and others AIR 1987 MP 25; Kallara Sukumaran v Union o f  India and others AIR 1987 
Ker 212; Sunil Kumar Mondai and others v Union o f India and others AIR 1989 Cal 197; Maharishi 
Avadhesh v State o f U P AIR 1991 All 52; J  Kapathianga v State o f  Mizoram and another (1991) I 
GauLR 226; /  K  Jagirdar v State o f  Karnataka and others AIR 1992 Kant 175; Bimal Prasad Das v 
Bijayananda Patnaik and others AIR 1992 Ori 10; Kamal Saikia v Union o f  India & Others’, Kallara 
Sukumaran v Raghuchandra Bal 1993 (I) KLT 699. Politicians: Rajendran v Vakkom Puroshothaman 
1985 KLT 40; K  C Chandy v R Balakrishna Pillai 1985 KLT 762; Panna Lai Agyan and others v 
Hon'ble Speaker, Sri Balram Jakgad, and others AIR 1988 All 167; Vidadala Harindhababu v N. T. 
Ramarao, Chief Minister o f the State o f Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and others AIR 1990 AP 20; 
Dhronamraju Satyanarayana v N  T Rama Rao and others AIR 1988 AP 62 and Dhronamraju 
Satyanarayana v N T Rama Rao and others AIR 1988 AP 144; B Purushotham Reddy v Nallapureddy 
Srinivasulu Reddy AIR 1988 AP 178; B M  Gangadhariah v H  D Devegowda AIR 1989 Kant 294; P  
N Dubey v Union o f India and others AIR 1989 MP 225; Kashinath G Jalmi and another v Speaker 
and others AIR 1993 SC 1873.
As in Maharishi Avadhesh ibid.
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Access to Justice
All but one petition was filed in a regular manner, putting forward 
detailed contentions.’^ '^  Having discussed standing, in most orders the Court 
acknowledged the bona fîdes of petitioners,’^  ^ while a few did not get a welcome 
reception.Standing has not proven as much of an obstacle in the petitions, as has 
the question of justiciability and the Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter. Even in 
those cases where standing has been conferred on the petitioner, petitions have been 
rejected on the grounds of justiciability.’^  ^ Dismissing a petition, the Court held that 
the oath of office of a Minister imposes a moral not a legal obligation.’^ * Other 
petitions were rejected on both standing and justiciability.’*^  In three petitions the 
courts cited alternative remedies as the reason for dismissing the applica tions,or  the 
delay in filing.’^ ’
Sent in the form o f a telegram by the Madurai Adheena Peedathipathi.
P Nalla Thampy Terah, V R Sree Rama Rao, Kailash Meghwal, I K Jagirdar, Bimal Prasad Das 
and Kashinath Jalmi.
See Duyal Chandra Bhuyan op cit note 182, Anand Mohan op cit note 181 and A G Pray agi op 
ciY note 182.
For example, A C Datt op cit note 181, Kailash Meghwal, Kallara Sukumaran, Vidadala 
Harindhababu and Kashinath G Jalmi op cit note 182. In Panna Lai Agyan and P N  Dubey op cit note 
182 the Court rejected the evidence submitted in the form of newspaper clippings.
K C Chandy op cit note 182.
Anand Mohan op cit note 181 and A G Prayagi op cit note 182.
A C Datt op cit note 181, D  C Saxena op cit note 181 and P N  Dubey op cit note 182.
In y4 C Datt op cit note 181 the Allahabad High Court noted that the petitioner had manipulated 
the timing when filing his petition. Contrast with /  K  Jagirdar op cit note 182 in which the delay in 
filing the petition was condoned. In Dhronamraju Satyanarayana op cit note 182 the Court noted that, 
the evidentiary requirements in the writ rules had been relaxed.
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The Court’s Response
Given the availability of alternative remedies, the separation of powers 
in the constitutional scheme, and the nature of the issues brought, the response of the 
courts to petitions in this area has been limited. Having been asked to remedy the 
financial inequities of the election process, the Supreme Court felt constrained by the 
intent of the election laws from resolving a problem “regarded universally as an evil 
of big magnitude”, w i t h o u t  referring to the Directive Principles of State Policy and 
other Supreme Court decisions that could have supported a more potent judgment. 
Again, when confronted with the alleged illegality of elections in Punjab, Jammu and 
Kashmir, and Assam, the Supreme Court, after holding that Article 324 of the 
Constitution, regarding the powers of the Election Commission, is amenable to judicial 
review, did not examine the facts of the petition, nor did it issue notice to the Election 
Commission.When asked to consider the legality of the declaration of elections to 
the Raj y a Sabha, the Delhi High Court raised wider issues relevant to the case, but 
chose not to expand the scope of the case.’^ '^  Responding to a complaint about the 
illegal issue of citizen certificates to immigrants in Assam, the Guwahati High Court 
found the grievance to be substantiated, but gave no concrete directions.
Responding to petitions raising communal issues and problems. High 
Courts have made no substantive orders, considering that the questions raised were not 
justiciable - nonetheless the suggestions made and tone of the orders have depended 
upon the proclivities of the judges.’^ ^
P Nalla Thampy Terah op cit note 182.
Digvijay Mote op cit note 181. A similar petition was filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court 
in 1993 by Satya Pal Anand. The Election Commission sought the transfer of this petition as it related 
to facts similar to a writ filed by the Commission in the Supreme Court. S Muralidhar, advocate, 
interview, 12/11/93.
194 D C Saxena op cit note 181.
Kamal Saikia op cit note 182. In Bimal Prasad Das op cit note 182, the Orissa High Court 
exonerated the Chief Minister of responsibility for his statement that corrupt officials be beaten.
Maharishi Avadhesh op cit note 182 and ^ C Datt op cit note 181. See the cases on religion in 
'Public Policy and Administration' infra.
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In three cases, it was held that the Court cannot direct the government 
to appoint a commission of e n q u i r y I n  only one instance was the petition allowed 
and concrete relief p ro v id e d .T h e  Guwahati High Court held that the dissolution of 
124 village councils was not lawful, as the villagers had not been given a hearing.
The Contribution of PIL
The petitions and their treatment reflect the growing misuse of PIL for 
motivations which the courts have not explored. In contrast with the cases on 
'education', by conferring standing on many of the petitioners, the courts have avoided 
making controversial pronouncements on the bona fides of petitioners, who themselves 
have status in the community. Instead the Courts have rejected the petitions on the 
grounds of justiciability, and any directions given have been patchy. Even where the 
Court has recognised the need for intervention, for example when a bench of five 
judges was constituted to hear charges against the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, 
the assistance of the Attorney General sought, as amicus curiae, and prima facie 
findings recorded, no substantial relief was g r a n t e d .T h e  jurisdiction of the High 
Court was stretched to no avail, as it was unable to grant or mould reliefs. It is 
possible that the Courts have had a hidden agenda as by discussing the issues before 
rejecting the petitions, the manoeuvres of PIL petitioners and their motivations have 
been exposed.
The petitions in this section have attempted to use the legal process for 
issues that are not amenable to the judicial forum. Although by using PIL access to 
the courts became easier, no amount of procedural relaxation could entice the courts 
to adjudicate on matters which were beyond their jurisdiction or upon which they did
Kallara Sukumaran, Maharishi Avadhesh and Dhronamraju Satyanarayanan op cit note 182. The 
latter case was unusual, as the Court appointed the Advocate-General, described as an officer 
representing the interest o f the public, as amicus curiae.
J  Kapathianga op cit note 182.
Dhronamraju Satyanarayana op cit note 182.
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not wish to become involved.^”” The political sensitivity of the issues and their 
complexity has meant that the legal forum, albeit an easy option, is not the most 
suitable.
Public Policy and Administration
The many cases filed on all aspects of public policy can be considered 
in groups on: health,^”' media,^°  ^religion,^®  ^reservation policy,pensions,^®^ executive
An example of the vaccilating approach of the courts is seen in a petition filed in the Karnataka 
High Court. It was contended that the former Chief Minister, Ramakrishna Hedge, had violated 
provisions o f the Urban Land fCeiling and Regulation! Act. 1976 when he granted permission for the 
sale o f land at an undervalued rate to Revajeetu Builders and Developers because one of the partners 
in the company was related to him. The sale was quashed by a single judge, but a division bench upheld 
the validity o f the sale on the basis that this was not the only instance where exemptions were given. 
The judges urged caution in PIL matters, referring to the many pseudo PILs filed. Another example is 
the petition filed in the Supreme Court in 1993 by the Jan Hit Abhiyan asking the Court to direct the 
Union Government and the CBI to investigate Harshad Mehta's allegation that he had paid Rs.l crore 
to Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao on 4/11/91. In an order in July 1993, Chief Justice M N 
Venkatachaliah and Justice S Mohan refused to list the matter for urgent hearing stating:
The country will also watch how the judicial processes are politicised.
See Ataulla, Naheed, 'The Karnataka Scene', Sunday Times o f  India, 6/9/92.
General cases: Vincent Panikulangara v Union o f  India AIR 1987 SC 990; Jagat Singh v Delhi 
Administration & Others 1989 (2) SCALE 1498 [767]; A S Mittal and others v State o f  U P  and others 
AIR 1989 SC 1570. On radiation: M  C Mehta v Union o f  India and others’, Shivarao Shantaram Wagle 
and others v Union o f  India and others (1988) 1 SCC 452 / (1988) 2 SCC 115. Relating to alcohol: 
George Mampilly and another v State o f  Kerala and another AIR 1985 Ker 24; B Krishan Bhat v 
Union o f  India (1990) 3 SCC 65; Vypeen Vishamadhya Koottakola Virudha Samithy v State o f  Kerala 
and others. On HIV/AIDS: Lucy R D'Souza and others v State o f Goa and others AIR 1990 Bom 355; 
T Vasudeva Pai v Union o f  India 1990 (1) KLJ 403; "Niyamakendran” v State o f Kerala and others'. 
Aids Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan v Union o f  India and others.
Ramesh s/o Chotalal Dalai v Union o f  India and others (1988) 1 SCC 668; Odyssey 
Communication Pvt. Ltd v Lokvidyayan Sanghatana and others (1988) 3 SCC 410; P Jagajeevan Ram 
and etc. v Government o f  India and others AIR 1989 Mad 149 and S Rangarajan v P  Jagjivan Ram 
and others (1989) 2 SCC 574; M  K  Agarwal and another v Union o f  India and others AIR 1994 Del 
242.
General case: Chandanmal Chopra and another v State o f  West Bengal AIR 1986 Cal 104. 
Relating to the Ayodhya issue: V M  Tarkunde & Anr v Union o f  India & Ors 1989 (2) SCALE 188 
[937]; Acchan Rizvi v State o f  Uttar Pradesh & Ors 1992 (2) SCALE 85 [457], 1992 (2) SCALE 150
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decision making,negligence^®^ and a disparate collection of issues.^”* It is in this 
section that the breadth of PIL cases is displayed. Permeating every aspect of life, the 
administration has been criticised though the forum of the Court, with the expectation 
that the Court will be able to act on behalf of Indian citizens, whatever the issue.
The cases on health can been seen in groups on general cases and those 
on radiation, alcohol and HIV/AIDS. Concern for the health and well being of citizens
[706], 1992 (3) SCALE 65 [246], 1993 (1) SCALE 9 [28] and 1993 (1) SCALE 46 [174]; Mohd. Aslam 
Alias Bhure v State o f  U.P. & Anr 1993 (2) SCALE 196 [994]; filed after the demolition of the mosque.
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari ABSK Sangh (Railway) v Union o f India and Others (1981) 
1 SCC 246; Surendra Kumar Lanka & Ors v Union o f  India & Ors 1992 (1) SCALE 47 [212]; Indra 
Sawhney and Ors v Union o f  India and Ors JT 1992 (6) SC 273; National Federation o f  Blind v Union 
Public Service Commission and others (1993) 2 SCC 411.
General cases; D S Nakara and others v Union o f  India AIR 1983 SC 130; ‘‘Common Cause” 
a Registered Society and others v Union o f  India AIR 1987 SC 210. On family pensions: P K  Martiyani
V Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr 1983 (2) GLR XXIV (2) 927; Poonamal 
and others v Union o f  India and others 1985 (3) SCC 345; Katheeja Bai v Superintending Engineer and 
others (1984) 3 SCC 518; Kochupennu Lakshmi v Chairman, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 
Trivandrum AIR 1984 Ker 97; Ram Pyari v Union o f  India and others AIR 1988 Raj 124; Thressia v 
K.S.E.B. AIR 1988 Ker 206; Brijithamma v State o f  Kerala 1990 (1) KLT 399; B Rarmlamma v State 
o f  Andhra Pradesh 1993 (1) SCALE 27 [90].
General cases: Babubhai Jashbhai Patel and others v Union o f  India, New Delhi and others AIR 
1983 Guj 1 ; D C Wadhwa and others v State o f Bihar AIR 1987 SC 579 / (1987) 1 SCC 378; Rudraiah 
Raju K and others v State o f  Karnataka and others 1986 (1) KLJ 164; Jagram v Gwalior Town and 
Country Development Authority Gwalior and others AIR 1987 MP II; Kishen Patnayak and another
V State o f  Orissa AIR 1989 SC 677 / 1989 (1) SCALE 4 [32]; R R Délavai v Indian Overseas Bank 
and others AIR 1991 Mad 61; Vineet Kumar & Anr v Board o f  Control fo r Cricket in India 1989 (2) 
SCALE 145 [764]; R Palaksha v State o f  Karnataka and others 1990 (1) KLJ 251; Quilon District 
Private Bus Operators Association, Kollam-I v State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam and 
others AIR 1992 Ker 267. On taxation: R K  Garg v Union o f  India and others (1981) 4 SCC 675; 
Common Cause, A Registered Society v Union o f India and others (1987) 4 SCC 44; Vishwabharathi 
House Building Co-operative Society Limited and another v Bangalore Development Authority, 
Bangalore and another AIR 1991 Kant 133. Relating to corporate finance: NParthasarathy v Controller 
o f  Capital Issues and another (1991) 3 SCC 153; Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v Union o f  India 1990 
(Supp) SCC 440. The Bofors cases: Central Bureau o f  Investigation and Anr v Harinder Singh 
Chaudhary & Anr 1990 (2) SCALE 244 [1172]; Janata Dal v H  S Chowdhary 1991 (2) SCALE 71 
[400] / (1991) 3 SCC 756 and (1992) 4 SCC 305 / 1992 (2) SCALE 67 [338].
Jaram Singh v State o f H P a n d  others AIR 1988 HP 13; Gautam Uzir v Assam State Electricity 
Board (ASEB) and others', In Re: The news item under the caption ‘‘Boy sustains electric shock” 
published in the Meghalaya Guardian dt. 22.11.1991.
P Rathinam and another v Union o f  India and another, P N Narasimha Murthy v Regional 
Transport Officer and Licensing Authority fo r  grant o f  Driving School Licence & another 1990 (1) KLJ 
143.
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has led to a focus on specific instances of administrative failure and on the policy 
frame work. These cases contain an implicit challenge to the development paradigm
of the Govemment.^^° The problems of increasing alcohol abuse^*' are reflected in 
cases on the sale of arrack in polythene sacks^'^ and the sale of “spurious” 
(adulterated) liquor.^Petitions relating to HIV/AIDS reflect widespread apprehension 
about responses to the spread of this virus and treatment of the affected patient. In a 
comprehensive petition, the Aids Bhedhav Virodhi Andolan have challenged the Court 
to respond to the discrimination against those practising homosexuality, while
Also see the section on 'Injustices Specific to Women' for cases relating to amniocentesis and 
contraception, the section on 'Environment and Resources' for innumerable cases on the detrimental 
effects of pollution and environmental degredation on health, the section on 'Health and Safety' in the 
section on 'Labour' and the cases on 'Hospitals' in the section on 'Prisons and State Institutions'. For 
an example of a case in which medical charges have been paid, see Rajiv Singh op cit note 63, in which 
the Patna High Court ordered that compensation and the costs of treatment be paid to all those who 
suffered because o f the discharge of effluents from a chemical factory. In addition to the documented 
cases, other petitions have been filed asking the Court to direct the State to provide basic preventive 
and curative health care. One such petition. People's Union fo r  Civil Liberties v Union o f  India and 
others (C W J No 9370 of 1989) was filed in the Bihar High Court asking the Court to direct that steps 
be taken to eradicate the widespread, killer disease Kalazar, to ensure that pesticide (DDT) is sprayed 
throughout the affected districts, to send a team of physicians and pathologists to each block to identify 
and treat the disease, to ensure an adequate supply of the drug Pentamedine, to institute an enquiry and 
to direct the central government to provide funds to the state government to deal with the disease. Other 
petitions were filed: in the Madhya Pradesh High Court by the PUCL regarding the huge number of 
deaths in the Bastar region o f Chattisgarh from blood dysentry, see [anon], 'News - Madhya Pradesh', 
PUCL Bulletin, Vol 11 No 5, May 1991, 25; in the Kerala High Court by the Secretary General o f the 
Indian Epilepsy Association challenging sections 4(b)(iii) and 5(ii) o f the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955 
which state that in order for a marriage to be valid, neither party should suffer from recurrent fits o f  
epilepsy, and that epilepsy is a ground for annulment o f a marriage. Bharucha, E P, Haazir Hai', The 
Lawyers, Vol 3 No 6, June 1993, 22-23.
See the petitions filed relating to drugs manufactured by multi-national corporations, Vincent 
Panikulangara op cit note 201, and the irradiation of foodstuffs, Shivarao Shantaram Wagle op cit note 
201. For a more general discussion, see the section on Environment and Resources' supra.
' Other petitions have been filed in the Kerala High Court on this issue, including B Krishnakumar 
and another v State o f  Kerala and others (O P No 5272 o f 1991), filed in 1991 by an advocate 
challenging the sale of arrack in polythene sachets. This policy had been introduced by the Government 
o f Kerala in 1983-4 and was challenged on the grounds that adulteration o f alcohol takes place causing 
tragedies such as that in Vypeen in 1982, that the sachets can be easily concealed by school children 
and college boys, that the packaging can be toxic and that the shelf-life of the arrack cannot be 
determined. The petition asked for a prohibition of the manufacture and sale o f polythene sachets of 
arrack.
See George Mampilly op cit note 201.
Vypeen Vishamadhya op cit note 201. Also see Rudhraiah Raju and R Palaksha op cit note 206.
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expressing its concern for the spread of the virus.
All of the documented cases on the media, relate to film and television, 
recognising the importance of these media. Extensive government control^and the 
lack of standing to challenge decisions under existing statutory provisions, has left 
petitioners with little option but to mobilise the courts.^Prevalent fears about the 
repercussions of the introduction of foreign newspapers reflect a deeper concern about 
the activities of foreign organisations in India.^*  ^Media cases have been less important 
for PIL than the media itself, as it was newspaper reports that led to the earliest PILs 
being filed.^'^ In this section alone, six cases were filed in this manner.^’^  Although 
newspaper reports have not always been accepted as evidence,^^° courts have taken 
notice of such reports, before taking upon themselves an investigatory role to enquire
See Mehra, Madhu, 'Law penalises gays' sexual conduct', The Pioneer, 23/8/94; Click, Robert 
A, Law Ethics and HIV. Proceedings o f  the UNDP Intercountry Consultation, Cebu, Philippines 3-6 
May, 1993, (United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi, 1993); Huddart, Jenny and Lyons, 
Joyce V, NGO Responses to HIV/AIDS in Asia. Case Studies, (United Nationas Development 
Programme, New Delhi, Oct 1992); Community Responses to HIV and AIDS. Experiences from India 
and Thailand', ((United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi, 1992); 'AIDS and Asia: a 
development crisis', (A United Nations Development Project Report, New Delhi, [1992?]).
In addition, a petition was filed in 1989 in the Supreme Court by an organisation called Common 
Cause (see Consumer Issues', supra) claiming that the broadcast media was being misused and 
challenging the constitutional validity of the monopoly of Doordarshan and All India Radio. See 
Shourie, H D (1993).
In addition to the documented cases, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court in 1991 by a 
group of advocates challenging the ban of an Eyewitness cassette purporting to carry interviews of 
suspected Kashmir militants who have alleged “barbaric treatment” o f the Army in Jammu and Kashmir, 
[anon], ' Supreme Court to hear “Eyewitness' Plea”, PUCL Bulletin, Vol 12 No 1, Jan 1992, 17. Another 
petition was filed in 1991 in the High Court o f Jammu and Kashmir by the PUCL challenging the 
telecasting o f the extra-judicial confession of militants in a programme on Doordarshan and incidents 
of custodial violence and killings. Imroze, Parvez, Srinagar PUCL', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 11 No 12, Dec 
1991, 16-17.
M K  Agarwal op cit note 202.
■'* For example, see Hussainara Khatoon and others v Home Secretary, State o f  Bihar (1980) 1 
SCC 81, as discussed in Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three.
Vypeen Vishamadhya, T Vasudeva Pai and "Niyamakendran” op cit note 201, P K  Martiyani, 
Ram Pyari and Brijithamma op cit note 205.
See T Vasudeva Pai op cit note 201. For another example see the section on Prisons and State 
Institutions' in chapter three for Siddha Raj Dhadda v State o f Rajasthan AIR 1990 Raj 34.
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into the facts. The Supreme Court has taken suo moto notice of newspapers reports 
and published letters.^^’ Aside from being mobilised by the media, courts have 
mobilised the media to assist it in PIL cases.^^^
Amongst the cases on religion^^  ^ is one petition asking the Calcutta 
High Court to ban the Koran. The audacity of the demand is only matched by the 
detail of the arguments in the petition, and demonstrates the perception that PIL can 
be used for many grievances.C om m unal tensions in Ayodhya, even before the 
demolition of the Babri Mosque, were brought before the Court for resolution. PIL 
was mobilised in the absence of other effective methods of making the administration 
accountable and because of the failure of the administration to deal with growing 
problems and hostility.^^^
All the cases on reservation policy are more in the nature of class 
actions than PIL, mobilising the relaxed procedures available because of PIL. The 
Mandai judgment can only be described as a PIL because one of the petitions was
Ram Pyari and P K  Martiyani op cit note 205, For another example o f this see the section on 
'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter four for In the matter of: Judicial Enquiry into Gang-Rape 
Demanded, and, Concerted Demand for Judicial Probe 1988 1 GauLR 489.
For examples of the way in which the media has been mobilised, see chapter three for Delhi 
Judicial Service Association v State o f Gujarat & Anr 1989 (2) SCALE 140 [748] in the section on the 
'Police', Sheela Barse & Another v Union o f  India & Others (children in jails) 1986 (2) SCALE 1 [1] 
in the section on Children'. Also see M  C Mehta op cit note 57. See the section on Prisons and State 
Institutions' in chapter three for Sheela Barse v State o f Maharashtra (access to prisons) (1983) 2 SCC 
96.
For examples o f the many cases relating to religion, see the section on the 'Police': R S Sodhi, 
Advocate, People's Union fo r Civil Liberties v State o f U P &  Ors 1991 (2) SCALE 81 [463] and the 
section on Injustices Specific to Women' for cases on personal laws and Sati, relating to religion.
Chandanmal Chopra op cit note 203.
See Muralidhar, S, Countdown on the Ayodhya Litigation', The Lawyers, Vol 8 No 2, Mar 
1993, 4-10; Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Its finest hour', Frontline, 18/11/94, 17-21. In addition to the existing 
cases, another petition, relating to Ayodhya and the media, was filed in 1993 in the Bombay High Court 
by two citizens against Mr Bal Thackeray of the Shiv Sena and the editor o f Saamana for their writings 
before and during the riots in Bombay in January 1993. See [anon], 'Bombay Riots: Communalization 
of the State', The Lawyers, Vol 8 No 11, Dec 1993, 5-6. See Maharishi Avadhesh v State o f U P  and 
A C Datt V Rajiv Gandhi and others in the section on Politics and Elections' supra.
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filed by an advocate^^^ - many had been filed by students directly affected by the 
po l icy S im i la r ly ,  the cases on pensions^^  ^ have been included because Common 
Cause, a voluntary organisation, was a petitioner, along with aggrieved pensioners. 
The cases on family pensions form a unique category of PILs, as the imagination of 
many judges was captured, leading to the initiation of cases suo moto.
The four sections on executive decision making - general, taxation, 
corporate finance^^  ^- are a collection of disparate cases.^^° A seminal case that brought 
the blatant abuse of constitutional powers by the then Governor of the State of Bihar, 
to the notice of the Supreme Court, was based on detailed research.^^' In another 
notable case, the appalling conditions of starvation in the District of Kalahandi were
Indra Sawhney op cit note 204.
See Galanter, Marc, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Class in India, (Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1984).
In addition to the documented cases, a petition was filed under Article 32 o f the Constitution 
questioning the constitutional validity of the pensions given to Members of Parliament. See Shourie, 
H D (1993).
In addition to the cases documented, George Fernandes filed a petition in the Guwahati High 
Court regarding use and management of public money relating to the equity of Prag Bosumi Synthetics 
Ltd. Parag Kumar Das, editor Boodhbar, interview, Guwahati, 3/6/93.
Other petitions have been filed by members of the PUCL, in addition to those documented, 
including a one filed by Dr Yashpal Chibber based on a report in India Today o f 28/2/91 which 
reported abuse of the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The petition stated that phones were 
being tapped indiscriminately because no rules been framed under the Act to protect the citizen from 
improper interception and disclosure of information, [anon], 'Phone Tapping', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 11 
No 4, Apr 1991, 4-5 & 13. A petition, Parvez Imroz and another v Union o f India and another (W P 
No 20121/91) was filed in 1991 in the HC o f Jammu and Kashmir, listing the Amnesty International 
Secretariat, London as the second respondent and asking the Court to direct that Amnesty International 
be allowed to visit the Kashmir valley and report on the human rights conditions there. Another petition 
was instituted in the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1992 or 1993 by asking the Court to quash the 
notification under section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, promulgated by the District 
Magistrate, Chandigarh and that the practice of repeatedly issuing such orders be stopped. Apparently 
prohibitory orders under section 144, which prohibited the assembly o f five or more persons, 
processions, speeches, slogan shouting, dhamas etc., had been in operation in the Chandigarh, either in 
its entirety or in parts, from 1985. [anon], Newsfile: Litigation Briefs', The Lawyers, Vol 8 No 1, Jan- 
Feb 1993, 31.
D C Wadhwa op cit note 206. The petition was based on a book - Wadhwa, D C, 
Repromulgation o f  Ordinances: A Fraud on the Constitution o f  India, (Gokhale Institute of Politics and 
Economics, Pune, 1983). For a discussion of the ordinance promulgating powers, and of this case in 
particular see Ray, Amal (1987) at 275-279; Rao, T Venkata Subba, Doctrine of Colourable Re- 
Promulgation of Ordinances: Wadhwa's Case, AIR 1987 SC 579', AIR 1988 (J) 49.
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brought to the attention of the Court.^^  ^ However the other three cases, concerning 
cricket, liquor distribution, corruption and the allocation of bus permits, again display 
the breadth of issues for which PIL has been mobilised/^^ The taxation case filed by 
R K Garg bridges the gap between the PIL for the disadvantaged and deprived and 
PIL for broad public interest issues. This challenge to the Special Bearer Bonds 
(Immunities and Exemptions) Act. 1981 was not brought by an aggrieved person but 
through the expanded standing of PIL/^'^ The cases on corporate finance reflect the 
growing concern with the conduct of large corporations and financial institutions.^^^ 
As with the Mandai issue, the litigation on Bofors was clearly an attempt to get the 
Court to resolve a political issue.^^^
Kishen Patnayak op cit note 206. This case cuts across many of the categories into which PIL 
petitions have been placed, involving labour, child labour and health issues within the scope o f policy 
dealing with poverty. For a discussion in the context of basic needs, see Pande, B B, 'The 
Constitutionality o f Basic Human Needs: An Ignored Area of Legal Discourse', (1989) 4 SCC (J) 1; 
Muchlinski, P T, '“Basic Needs” Theory and “Development Law”' in Snyder, Francis and Slinn, Peter 
(eds) (1987), 237-270. Petitions of similar breadth were filed in the Aurangabad Bench o f the Bombay 
High Court by the Association for Consumer Action Safety and Health, together with S Krishnadas of 
the Human Rights Law Network. The petition referred to those affected by the earthquake o f September 
1993, in particular those in Latur and Osmanabad, asking the Government to provide health facilities, 
to provide basic amenities and to remove anomalies in the distribution of compensation. In an order in 
March 1994 by Justice N Chapalgaonkar and Justice M S Vaidya, the petitions were admitted. Quote 
from The Hindu o f 22/3/94 in Legal Perspectives, No 61. Professor M D Nanjundaswamy, President 
o f the Karnataka Raitha Sangha, filed a PIL in protest against the entry o f foreign investors in India. 
He has aked to the do direct the Karnataka government to file a suit questioning the usurpation of its 
power and jurisdiction that will result from the signing of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade) Treaty, as the states will lose their exclusive executive and legislative power, if  the treaty 
is implemented, thus jeopardising the federal structure o f the polity. He has also questioned the 
patenting of seeds, which would compromise farmers' rights to use the seeds produced by themselves, 
the affect the treaty would have on the sale of drugs. This detailed petition critiqued the process of  
negotiotion, the provisions in the GAT treaty and the effect the treaty would have. Notice has been 
issued by Justice N Y Hanumanthappa. See [anon], 'Averting the GATTostrophe'. The Lawyers, Vol 
9 No 2, Feb 1994, 30-31.
In addition to the documented cases, a petition was filed under Article 32 o f the Constitution in 
1991 or 1992 by Common Cause. Mandatory directions were issued to all banks in the country to 
deduct income tax o f 11.5% from the interest on deposits o f more than Rs. 2,500. The petition stated 
that many o f the people with these accounts have incomes which are below the income tax bracket, 
including old pensioners, widows and agriculturalists, and therefore challenged the Government's 
directions. See Shourie, H D (1993).
This case, like many others, does not include a discussion of standing but begins with an 
examination o f the facts o f the case.
Also see Life Insurance Corporation o f  India v Escorts Ltd and others (1986) 1 SCC 264.
See the section on Politics and Elections'.
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Access to Justice
Identifying widowed women as marginalised, judges have been quick 
to respond to financial distress, registering letters as writ petitions. While other cases 
originated in l e t t e r s ,a l l  but one of the suo moto actions related to family pensions.^^^ 
One of the earliest cases in which standing was discussed, relaxed and conferred on 
a large body of persons, has been included in this section because of its relevance to 
the emergence of PIL.^^  ^It is not just the doctrine of locus standi that has preoccupied 
the courts, but also the justiciability of the issues raised. '^^” Dr D C Wadhwa, a 
Professor of Political Science, was permitted to approach the Supreme Court, but only 
for the general issue concerning the re-promulgation of ordinances and not to 
challenge specific declarations. However, advocate R K Garg's petition was admitted 
and decided upon without any reference to the standing of the petitioner to bring such 
a case. The courts have been unclear about the definition of PIL, for example, when 
a case brought by members of a housing society and ratepayers was described as a 
PIL. '^ '^
Standing was denied to a petitioner who complained about the 
application for a permit for a driving school, on the grounds that no public interest 
was i n v o l v e d .T h e  Supreme Court has enunciated the limits of admissibility in 
PIL.^ "^  ^Considering justiciability, it was held that the judicial forum was inappropriate
Kishen Patnayak op cit note 206, Jaram Singh op cit note 207 and Gautam Uzir op cit note 207. 
In Re: The news item op cit note 207.
23 9 Akhil Bharatiya op cit note 204.
Standing was conferred in George Mampilly op cit note 201 and Quilon District op cit note 206 
on the basis that an issue of public importance was being brought to the courts.
Vishwabharathi op cit note 206.
P N  Narasimha op cit note 207.
For example, in Janata Dal op cit note 206.
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to decide on many of the “technical and specialised matters” r a i s e d , t h a t  policy 
preferences or priorities should not be decided through the c o u r t s , a n d  that the 
prayers in some petitions were outside the purview of the Court's jurisdiction/"^^ 
Nonetheless, when it has considered it necessary, the Court has responded/"^^ The 
inclinations of the judges hearing a petition have, largely, determined whether 
reactions were construed in a relaxed or rigid manner/"*^
The Court's Response
The range of responses from the courts match the range of issues upon 
which orders were made. The importance of freedom of speech and expression has 
been u p h e l d .T h e  State of Bihar has been prevented from permitting the abuse of 
the executive power through the repromulgation of ordinances.Judicial review has 
been exercised and the importance of the Directive Principles of State Policy has been 
stressed.^^' Reservation policy was examined in the famous Mandai j u d g m e n t .T h e  
Court considered the reservation of places in higher education establishments for 
members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, entering
Vincent Panikulangara op cit note 201 and Shivarao Shantaram Wagle op cit note 201. 
B Krishan Bhat, Lucy D'Souza and National Federation fo r  the Blind op cit note 201.
2 4 6 Chandanmal Chopra op cit note 203, R Palaksha op cit note 206 and Babubhai op cit note 206.
In P Jagajeevan Ram op cit note 202 the Madras High Court stated that the jurisdiction of the 
courts in PIL could extend beyond the particular prayers in a case and the narrow bounds o f statutory 
review, and \nR  K  Garg op cit note 206 the extraneous questions relating to the Ordinance, which had 
lapsed, were considered because of the “considerable argument placed before the Court”.
While in Vishwabharathi op cit note 206 it was held by the Karnataka High Court that the 
question o f delay does not arise in PIL, Vypeen Vishamadhya op cit note 201 was dismissed for this 
very reason. In Kochupennu Lakshmi op cit note 205 and Ramesh op cit note 202 procedural 
requirements of evidence were relaxed.
P Jagajeevan Ram op cit note 202.
D C Wadhwa op cit note 206
George Mampilly op cit note 201 and D S Nakara op cit note 205.
Indra Sawhney op cit note 204.
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into the detail of what had become a complex and volatile political and social 
problem.^”  A similar position occurred when the Court was asked to deal with the 
petitions filed on the Ayodhya issue, which was to escalate into communal conflict at 
the end of 1992, between factions of Hindu and Muslim communities. The brief 
directions given were monitored by the Court.
The cases on the non-payment of family pensions form a unique 
category in PIL. Brought to the attention of the Court by the aggrieved widowed 
woman herself or as a suo moto action, these cases formed an integral part of the PIL 
movement and the expanding access to justice.^ "^  ^ In a petition on the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS, the scope of the litigation was expanded and the Court issued a number 
of directions .Responding to the poverty in drought ridden Kalahandi, an 
investigation was conducted and two committes appointed - the second after the 
Supreme Court found the measures taken as a result of the first enquiry were 
inadequate.^^^
Having been admitted, the hearing of the petition asking the Court to 
ban the Koran was transferred to another bench after the original judge. Justice 
Kastagir, had given a press interview on the case. It was then dismissed on the 
preliminary grounds that the petition was not ju s t i c iab le .A  similar turn around can 
be seen in the case concerning the irradiation of imported butter, when after the 
petition was admitted and an enquiry ordered, it was dismissed on the grounds of 
justiciability.^^^ Such instances highlight the lack of cohesion on the bench.
See Galanter, Marc (1984) for an extensive discussion of the issues involved.
See Appendix B for the PIL Guidelines which lists family pensions as a PIL subject.
255 “Niyamakendran” op cit note 201.
Enquiries were ordered in other cases, including Jaram Singh and In Re: The news item op cit 
note 207.
Chandanmal Chopra op cit note 203.
Shivarao Shantaram Wagle op cit note 201.
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In cases where the State or its authorities have been negligent, the 
courts have awarded compensation.^^^ In addition to directing that the widowed women 
be given their rightful dues, compensation has been given^^° and costs awarded. 
These awards have been discretionary, and in one instance granted on humanitarian 
considerations to those whose eyesight had been damaged,^^^ even though the issue of 
negligence was not discussed. The Court has directed that guidelines be ffamed.^^  ^The 
case filed by M C Mehta on radiation was monitored by the Court which directed that 
insurance cover be provided for the employees at risk.^ "^^
One notable judgment was when the Supreme Court struck down
section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which made an attempt to commit suicide
a punishable o f f e n c e . I t  was held that:
It is a cruel and irrational provision, and it may result in punishing a 
person again (doubly) who has suffered agony and would be 
undergoing ingnominy because of his failure to commit suicide. Then 
an act of suicide cannot be said to be against religion, morality or 
public policy, and an act of attempted suicide has no baneful effect on 
society.
Jaram Singh and Gautam Uzir op cit note 207. In addition to the documented cases, a petition 
was filed based on a letter sent to the Guwahati High Court in 1988 by an advocate asking that suo 
moto action be taken on the basis of a newspaper article which appeared in a local newspaper, Dainik 
Asom on 27/7/88. This article reported the death of a two year old child who fell through an uncovered 
manhole into a drain under the footpath. An enquiry was instituted as the Court observed that “A young 
life was lost due to the negligence of Gauhati Municipal Corporation”. Gautam Uzir, advocate, 
interview, Guwahati, 6/6/93.
Katheeja Bai, Thressia and B Rarmlamma op cit note 205. 
Ram Pyari op cit note 205.
262 A S Mittal op cit note 201.
Ibid and “Niyamakendran” op cit note 201, Katheeja Bai op cit note 205 and Jagat Singh op 
cit note 201.
See the section on 'Labour' for M  K  Sharma and others v Bharat Electronics Lts [BEL] and 
others (1987) 3 SCC 231, another case where the Court directed that workers be insured against the 
harmful effects o f radiation.
P Rathinam op cit note 208.
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The Contribution of PIL
The Court's response has been varied. The Bofors case has significance 
for the course of PIL as the limitations of using PIL as a way of gaining access to the 
courts were enuncia ted .The  Court stated that PIL cannot be a panacea for all ills, 
stressing that it was primarily intended for issues relating to the un/under-represented. 
Conversely, in another political controversy relating to the Mandai Commission, the 
Supreme Court formed a bench of nine judges, and promptly gave a long judgment 
after the petition was listed before many other pending matters, thus diffusing a 
volatile political situation.^^^ One group of petitions had brought the public interest 
aspect of the issue of shares and debentures to the Court, which held that it was not 
necessary to decide on the hona fides or mala fides of the applicants.^^^ In this way, 
the Court was able to provide support to the other institutions of the state by 
mobilising PIL as a strategy to resolve political issues.
In other cases, where less has been at stake, the obligation of the state 
has been emphasised.^^^ The Court expanded the parameters of class action and gave 
a judgment in support of government pensioners as a c l a s s . W i t h  the exception of 
cases in which policy matters were decided, there have been difficulties in
Janata Dal op cit note 206. The Supreme Court refused to allow advocate H S Chowdhary 
standing on the grounds that he was attempting to influence the course o f the investigation into the 
allegations of corruption. The advocate for H S Chowdhary complained about the treatment of the 
petition in the courts, as it was only after more than forty hearings that it was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court on preliminary grounds. Moreover, the Supreme Court described Chowdhary as a proxy for the 
accused, without hearing the petitoner himself. Mitta, Manoj, 'From Public to Proxy', The Sunday Times 
o f India, 6/9/92. It is interesting to note that the Court, while quashing the suo moto investigation o f  
the High Court, did not go into the reasons for this - it seems that the Supreme Court considered that 
the issue was just not justiciable.
Indra Sawhney op cit note 204.
Narendra Kumar Maheshwari op cit note 206.
Vincent Panikulangara op cit note 201.
■™ D S Nakara op cit note 205, a labour law decision on pensions. See Baxi, Upendra, ' Socialism 
for the Superannuated: A Critique of Nakara', AIR 1983 (J) 105. The parameters set were to be limited 
by later decisions: Krishan Kumar v Union o f  India and others (1989) 2 SCC 504 and Krishena Kumar 
V Union o f  India and others (1990) 4 SCC 207.
246
implementing the few substantive decisions given. Having directed that disposable 
syringes be provided throughout Kerala to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDs, the Court 
was virtually ensuring that its orders could not be carried out.^^’ As each syringe costs 
Rs.4 the amount that would needed to be spent in Kerala would be more than the 
entire budget for primary health care for the state.^^^
Judges, Courts, Lawyers
There has been a substantial amount of case law in PIL on all aspects 
of the judiciary and the legal system, on jud g es ,co n tem p t  of court,^ "^* courts,
“Niyamakendran” op cit note 201.
K S Madhusoodanan, advocate, interview, Ernakulam, 17/8/93.
The cases have been sub-divided into: S P Gupta and after: S P Gupta, V M  Tarkunde, J  L Kalra 
and others v President o f  India and others etc [amended to Union o f  India and others] 1981 (Supp) 
SCC 87 / AIR 1982 SC 146; Subhash Sharma and others v Union o f  India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 574; 
Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records Association and another v Union o f  India 1993 (Supp) SCALE 
[87] / (1993) 4 SCC 441, and also 1993 (1) SCALE 111 [658], 1993 (2) SCALE 43 [174] and 1993 
(2) SCALE 66 [305]; K  Ashok Reddy v Government o f  India and others (1994) 2 SCC 303. The 
Ramaswami cases: Sub-Committee fo r Judicial Accountability v Union o f India and Ors. 1991 (2) 
SCALE 160 [844]; Krishnaswami v Union o f India & Ors 1992 (1) SCALE 87 [484] and 1992 (2) 
SCALE 66 [311]; Sarojini Ramaswami v Union o f  India & Ors 1992 (2) SCALE 65 [257]; Capt. 
Virendra Kumar, Adv v Shiv Raj Patil, Speaker, Lok Sabha 1993 (3) SCALE 61 [303]; Lily Thomas, 
Advocate v Speaker, Lok Sabha & Others 1993 (3) SCALE 105 [543]. Appointments/vacancies: V M  
Tarkunde v Union o f  India and others (1983) 1 SCC 428; Subir Chowdhury v Union o f  India and others 
AIR 1984 Cal 1; K  P Verma v State o f  Bihar and others AIR 1989 Pat 276; All Kerala Poor Aid Legal 
Association v Chief Justice 1990 (1) KLT 1; M L  Sachdeva v Union o f India & Anr 1990 (2) SCALE 
196 [926]; Kumar Padma Prasad v Union o f  India and others AIR 1992 SC 1213; R Gandhi v State 
o f  Tamil Nadu and another, R K  Jain v Union o f India 1993 (2) SCALE 168 [843]. Conditions of 
service: All India Judges' Association v Union o f India (1992) 1 SCC 119 and (1993) 4 SCC 288; M  
L Puri V Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh and others AIR 1993 P & H 287. General: R 
J Mehta v His Lordship the Chief Justice, Venkat Srinivas Deshpande and others AIR 1982 Bom 125; 
A run Kumar v Union o f India AIR 1982 Raj 66; Gautam Uzir and another v State o f Assam and 
another, Dalip Singh Gill v Union o f  India and others AIR 1993 P & H 263; Hon'ble Chief Justice, 
High Court Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur & Ors v Mohan Kumar & Ors 1993 (4) SCALE 154 [656] and 
1994 (1) SCALE 18 [82].
Charan Lai Sahu v Union o f  India and another (1988) 3 SCC 255; R Purushotham Reddy v 
Nallapureddy Srinivasulu Reddy AIR 1988 AP 178; P N  Duda v P Shiv Shanker (1988) 3 SCC 167; 
Captain Virendra Kumar v Union o f  India 1993 (3) SCALE 97 [492].
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lawyers and legal aid/^^ Unlike the cases in the other sections, these represent 
attempts by the judges to sort out their own house, define their powers and duties, and 
to ensure that their role in state functioning is secure. Most of the cases are concerned 
with public interest questions of the judiciary itself, to which the courts have 
responded in detail. After the lengthy exposition of PIL, standing, justiciability and 
procedures in S  P Gupta^^^ access to the courts for issues relating to the judiciary has 
been facilitated by the courts, as advocates embraced the potential that PIL offered.
The legal system was ready for the introspection and commentary that 
PIL brought (see chapters one and six). The politicisation of judicial appointments,^^* 
the connections between judges and advocates (in the form of family relations and 
regional affiliations), the potential for corruption,^^^ and the status and power available
Inder Mohan v Union o f India etc, M  C Mehta v Union o f  India and others 1986 (Supp) SCC 
562; S P Sampath Kumar v Union o f  India and others AIR 1987 SC 386; Social Action and Legal Aid 
Society v Union o f  India and others.
Free Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur v State o f  Bihar 1990 (1) SCALE 45 [145]; Ranjan 
Dwivedi v Union o f  India 1983 (1) SCALE 111 [487]; Rajendran v Ayyappan 1985 KLT 307; Centre 
o f Legal Research and another v State o f  Kerala AIR 1986 SC 2195; Aeltemesh Rein v Union o f  India 
(1988) 4 SCC 54; Satish Chandra Misra v State o f U P  and others AIR 1990 All 119; regarding the 
appointment o f law officers in Bombay, Nagpur and Aurangabad.
I l l Op cit note 273.
See, for example, Gupta, Anupam 'Cover Story: The Judges' Transfer Policy', The Lawyers, Vol 
9 No 2, Feb 1994, 4-10.
In addition to those documented, other petitions have been filed: in the Madras High Court by 
a social worker referring to an article which appeared in the Hindustan Times on 26/3/91, reporting 
advocate Shanti Bhushan's statement that the former Attorney General Parasaran had confided in him 
that half a dozen judges of the Court were corrupt. The Court was asked to direct a CBI probe to find 
out the names of the judges and to take further action against them. In an order by Justice 
Baktavatsalam, it was held that the Court cannot act upon statements which are hearsay, and the petition 
was dismissed. See Devil's Advocate, Adaalat Antics: By the Judges for the Judges', The Lawyers, Vol 
6 No 7, July 1991, 32. A petition was filed in the Allahabad High Court challenging the proposed 
appointment o f Justice A P Singh (brother o f former Chief Justice o f India, K N Singh) and Justice K 
N Sharma to the High Court. The petition contained allegations o f corruption against the former and 
stated that there were several contempt of court petitions pending against the latter. Refusing to entertain 
the petition, the Court suggested that since a similar petition was pending in the Supreme Court 
regarding the appointment of A K Srivastava to the Guwahati High Court, the petition may be filed in 
the Supreme Court. A petition was then filed in the Supreme Court, but before it could be heard, oath 
was administered to Justice A P Singh and so his name was deleted from the petition. See Devil's 
Advocate, Adaalat Antics: How Justice A. P. Singh Made It', The Lawyers, Vol 6, No 12, Dec 1991, 
at 32. Another petition was filed in 1992 by the President of the Sikkim Citizen's Forum stating that 
the Chief Justice o f the Sikkim High Court, B N Misra had concealed his income in a tax return. The
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to those deciding cases in the courts, have perpetuated the biases of the system. The 
court machinery itself had exacerbated the problems - unable to cope with the number 
of petitions filed, the long pendencies of cases, the bias inherent in many of the laws 
and within the system itself, unequal access to justice has persisted for most (see 
chapter five). The cases in this section have not been filed to benefit the disadvantaged 
and deprived specifically. While requests for the provision of firee legal aid^ °^ and the 
establishment of more Labour Courts,^^  ^ would facilitate access to justice, the issues 
raised in many of the cases aimed to ensure the integrity of the legal system.
The cases on judges have led to discussions with implications not just 
for the specific issue in question but for the judicial process. As indicated in chapter 
one, the 1970s had witnessed the overt use of judicial appointments to indicate the 
support or displeasure of the government.The  judgment in the petitions brought by 
S P Gupta and the subsequent petitions were framed in response to the erosion of 
autonomy in the judiciary and the policy of transferring judges. Petitions filed relating 
to allegations of corruption made against Justice V Ramaswami, relating to 
appointments and vacancies, concerned with conditions of service, and those of a 
general nature, have contributed to the discussion. The sanction of judges' strength was 
held to be justiciable^®  ^and the Court has directed that vacancies in courts be filled.^ ®'^  
In a judgment in the Delhi High Court, the argument that financial considerations 
affect the decision to establish more courts was discounted and the appointment of
petition came up for hearing in the Supreme Court to decide whether it should be heard there or in 
another High Court, as the Sikkim High Court had only two judges. See [anon], 'Newsfile: Litigation 
Briefs', The Lawyers, Vol 7 No 10, Oct 1992, at 31.
Centre o f  Legal Research op cit note 276.
Inder Mohan op cit note 275.
See Baxi, Upendra, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics, (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 
1980); Seervai, H M, The Supreme Court Judgment in the Judges' Case', (speech delivered at a public 
meeting on 28/1/82).
Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records Association op cit note 273.
R K  Jain and Subhash Sharma op cit note 273.
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more judges was o r d e re d ,a n d  the Supreme Court has refined the interpretation of 
the constitutional provisions determining the requisite qualifications for a judge.^^^ 
When asked to adjudicate upon the conduct of Justice V Ramaswami, the procedures 
of investigation and impeachment were clarified in the Supreme Court. The 
independence of the judiciary was articulated^^^ and the need for judicial accountability 
enunciated.^** With continuing delays in the courts,^*  ^ persistent controversies about 
the appointment, qualifications and conduct of judges and of the independence of the 
judiciary and its accountability, it is unsurprising that these issues came to the courts 
as PILs.
The two documented cases on conditions of service are examples of the 
way in which PIL has been used to manage particularised interests. While justifying 
its orders within the framework of judicial independence and the “divine act” of 
dispensing justice,^^® the courts have decided upon their own perquisites, retirement 
ages and types of cars.^^‘ Cases in other sections demonstrate the willingness of the
Inder Mohan op cit note 275. See 'Consumer Issues' for the case filed by Common Cause asking 
the Supreme Court to order the implementation o f the Consumer Protection Act. 1986, Common Cause 
op cit note 141.
Kumar Padma Prasad and Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records Association op cit note 273.
See the majority order in Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records Association op cit note 273. A 
petition was filed in the Supreme Court objecting to the appointment of judges on Commissions o f  
Enquiry, after sitting judges o f the Supreme Court were appointed to conduct the Fairfax enquiry, 
described by the petition as essentially a political task. It was contended that such appointments had no 
connection with the judges' judicial duties, so the Court was asked to quash the appointment of the 
Commission. See Jaising, Indira, 'Editorial: Fairfax Enquiry', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 4, Apr 1987, at 
2 .
Sub-Committee op cit note 273.
A petition was filed in the Supreme Court in 1986 by an organisation called Common Cause 
stating that the pendency of criminal cases was violative o f Article 21 o f the Constitution. The petition 
contained suggestions for categories o f cases and ways o f dealing with their backlog. On admitting the 
petition, the Court impleaded all the State Governments and referred the matter to a Constitutional 
Bench. See Shourie, H D (1993).
Chief Justice Ranganath Misra 'mAll India Judges' Association op cit note 273 at 132.
In addition to which other petitions have been filed, for example, in the Bombay High Court by 
Judges of the city civil court, asking the Court to direct the government to provide housing to them. In 
an order by Justice Pendse, the Court stated “do you want the people to believe that we judges are 
deciding cases for our own benefit?” and dismissed the petition. See Devil's Advocate, ' Adaalat Antics:
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courts to act and issue directions when their own integrity is at stake/^^ Similarly, the 
Court has reacted strongly to any aspersions against itself. With the exception of the 
Law Minister, Shiv Shankar, the courts have censured those advocates who have dared 
to question the efficiency and integrity of the legal system, even though the malaise 
has been acknowledged by the Court itself Despite the scandal surrounding the 
impeachment motion lodged against Justice Ramaswami in 1991, the courts have been 
unwilling to directly admit to the endemic problems of corruption and inefficiency in 
providing equal access to justice.
The core issues that can be identified in relation to lawyers are their 
conduct, privileges and the provision of legal services. The high status afforded to 
members of the legal profession, the lucrative nature of lawyering and the easy access
By the Judges for the Judges', The Lawyers, Vol 6 No 7, July 1991, at 32. Another petition was filed 
in the Punjab and Haryana High Court by advocate P S Patwalia demanding the allotment o f houses 
to judges. In an order by Justice S S Sodhi and Justice K P Bhandari, the Court stayed all allotments 
of houses to government servants of category IV and above, until judges are suitably housed. A petition 
was filed in the Supreme Court asking for a direction that telephones be provided to sub-judges and that 
more petrol be provided for judicial officers who, under the Criminal Procedure Code, are required to 
tour the area. See Devil's Advocate, 'Adaalat Antics: More Litigation - For the judges. By the Judges, 
Of the Judges', The Lawyers, Vol 8 No 3, Apr 1993, 32. A petition was filed in the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court asking the Court to direct the government to provide all judges with airconditioned cars. 
Admitting the petition, the Court ordered that all judges be provided with the cars. See Devil's 
Advocate, 'Adaalat Antics; More News on Housing', The Lawyers, Vol 6 No 8, Aug 1991, 32.
For example, see the section on 'The Police' for the Nadiad Incident, the only documented PIL 
case in which the Supreme Court has given specific punishments to the police officers who handcuffed 
a Chief Judicial Magistrate In the Matter o f Complaint received from Delhi Judicial Service Association 
Tis Hazari Court, Delhi 1989 (2) SCALE 119 [654], for Pratul Kumar Sinha v State o f  West Bengal 
in which the Calcutta High Court discussed the security o f the Court premises, and for for Punjab and 
Haryana High Court Bar Association chandigarh through its secretary v State o f  Punjab and others 
1993 (4) SCALE 147 [636]. See Manubhai Pragaji Vashi op cit note 154, Foreshore Cooperative 
Housing Society op cit note 5, Kallara Sukumaran op cit note 182 and B Purushotham Reddy op cit 
note 182.
Other contempt actions have been initiated suo moto, for example a contempt petition (No 2 of 
1993) was registered by the Chief Justice U L Bhat in the Guwahati High Court against the publisher 
and printer o f the North-East Times in response to an article on 26/4/93 entitled 'Why are criminals 
going scot-free?'. The report stated that courts were allowing criminals and lawyers to take advantage 
of legal loopholes hence allowing criminals to be set free and that the police was not allowed to look 
into the background of every case. In an order D/-9/6/93 the respondents were held to be in Contempt 
of Court and the Court accepted the offer that an unconditional apology be published. Another petition 
filed in the Supreme Court by Common Cause about the functioning o f the Judiciary in the country, was 
dismissed in limine as the Court observed that there were already certain guidelines and norms laid 
down for judges. See Shourie, H D (1993).
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to the courts, have led to a number of cases being filed.^ "^^  PIL cases have documented 
the incidence of lawyers strikes, and the need to prevent them.^^  ^ The mutually 
dependent relationship between advocates and judges is seen in a number of cases, 
when, for example, the Court was petitioned on behalf of judges.^^^ However, there 
have been a number of instances in which the judges have asserted their functional 
superiority, whilst delineating the parameters of PIL. Petitioner and advocate, Raj 
Kanwar, was described as a busybody and berated for attempting to prolong 
proceedings.^^^ The Court prevented an advocate from raising questions about judicial 
transfers that it considered could only be brought by an aggrieved judge.^^* Similarly, 
when a PIL was filed on behalf of lawyers, it was held that PIL was “not to be 
thrusted on abled section of society fully conscious of their interest and benefit”.^ ^^
See M  Balagovindam op cit note 139, in which an advocate petitioned the Kerala High Court 
asking for preferential telephone connections. In addition to the documented cases, a petition was filed 
in the Madras High Court complaining that K Subramaniam, the Advocate General of Tamil Nadu, 
charged day fees o f Rs.35,000/- from the Tamil Nadu Government for appearances outside of the State 
and challenging, in particular, the Rs.3 lakhs fee that he had charged for appearing in the Cauvery case. 
The Court dismissed the petition saying that fees payable to the Advocate General are in the nature of 
a contract and that the courts could do nothing about them. See Devil's Advocate, 'Adaalat Antics: AGs 
Fees Unconscionable', The Lawyers, Vol 7 No 2, Feb 1992, at 32. Another petition was filed in the 
Bombay High Court by advocate S Ragi Simhan challenging a the decision-making procedure for the 
designation o f a senior advocate. The petition, filed in the public interest, even though Simhan had been 
passed over for designation himself, was admitted by Justice A C Agarwal and Justice N D Vyas. 
Simhan, S Ragi, The importance of being a senior advocate'. The Lawyers, Vol 9 No 2, Feb 1994, 21- 
23.
Hon'ble Chief Justice op cit note 273. See the section on the 'Police' for the Nadiad Incident and 
Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association Chandigarh through its secretary v State o f  Punjab 
and others 1993 (4) SCALE 147 [636]. In addition to those documented, a petition was filed in the 
Supreme Court in 1989 by Common Cause challenging the frequent strikes by lawyers which cause 
serious damage to the interests o f their clients, prevent speedy justice and thus violate Article 21 o f the 
Constitution. The petition asked that the code of conduct for lawyers laid down by the Bar Council of 
India under the Advocates Act. 1961 should include a provision stating that lawyers cannot resort to 
strikes. On the suggestion of the Court, the Bar Councils and Advocates General o f all the States were 
impleaded in the petition. The Bar Association of India and the Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records 
Association supported the contentions of the writ petition, as have all the Advocates General of the 
states, except one. See Shourie, H D (1993).
M  L Puri op cit note 273.
Krishaswami op cit note 273.
K  Ashok Reddy op cit note 273. This limits the the kinds o f issues that could be brought by 
advocates, in their capacity as public interest litigants.
Satish Chandra op cit note 276 at 121.
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Although the importance of legal aid has been stressed by the courts in a number of 
j u d g m e n t s , t h e  Supreme Court held that Article 39A of the Constitution was not 
enforceable, and that one advocate-petitioner could not have legal representation of his 
choice.^®'
The most important aspect of the judgments in this chapter are that, 
without PIL and the expansion of locus standi, none of the issues relating to judges 
would have been examined in the way that they were. In the cases spanning more than 
a decade, judicial review has been expanded to incorporate issues that were previously 
in the domain of policy, and not ju s t i c iab le .A s  a result of the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements the Government was compelled to bring in an amendment to the 
Administrative Tribunals Act. 1985. °^  ^ It was ensured that the vacancies on the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission were filled^ ®"* and that more 
Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals were established.^”^  There was no question of 
approaching another forum to deal with these petitions, and the Court has examined, 
wholeheartedly, the issues raised. Information on judicial appointments would not have 
been made available, or indeed desirable, to the public without PIL.^””
Together with the increase of the courts' jurisdiction has been a greater 
exposure of the biases and limitations of the Court. Although, in one case, the Kerala 
High Court was unwilling to admit to any bias in appointments,^”^  Justice Pandian of
See the chapter on 'Prisons and State Institutions' for examples.
Ranjan Dwivedi op cit note 276.
From S P Gupta op cit note 273, decided in 1981, to Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records 
Association op cit note 275, decided in 1993.
S P Sampath Kumar op cit note 275. This case has been described as advancing the basic 
structure' doctrine. Sudarshan, R (1990), endnote 81 at 68.
M L Sacfideva op cit note 273.
Inder Mohan op cit note 275.
Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records Association op cit note 273.
All Kerala Poor Legal Aid op cit note 273.
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the Supreme Court provided a table to show the paucity of Scheduled Caste,
Scheduled Tribe and women judges in the higher judiciary.^°^ In the same judgment
in 1993, Justice Punehhi provided a well-articulated and thoughtful dissent to the
majority order, which had asserted the supremacy of the Chief Justice of India’s
opinion in the appointment of judges. Justice Punehhi observed that the legislature,
executive and judiciary must work together in the public interest, citing the example
of a child who needs both parents, to illustrate how the majority judgment was an
attempt to assert the judiciary’s independence and powers, contrary to the
constitutional scheme. It would seem that the Supreme Court tired of the discussion
when, in 1994, the standing to raise questions about transfers of judges was limited
to the aggrieved person.^°^ In 1992, the Supreme Court had given a comparable order,
stating that only Justice Ramaswami could petition the courts with regard to the
process of impeachment.^As Justice Bhagwati, commenting on the case, said:
“What has happened is a misuse of PIL. When I evolved PIL years 
ago, I never imagined it would be used for the personal interests of a 
Ramaswami”.^ ”
In the cases alleging that Justice V Ramaswami and Chief Justice S K 
Jha were guilty of corrupt practices, the Supreme Court has been unable and unwilling 
to respond to the charges levelled. A sitting judge of the Supreme Court, Justice V 
Ramaswami was suspected of financial irregularities while he was Chief Justice of the 
Punjab and Haryana High Court. After the allegations were mooted, an impeachment 
motion was filed in the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian Parliament). The
Supreme Court Advocate-on-Records Association op cit note 273. See chapter six for a 
discussion o f this.
K  Ashok Reddy op cit note 273.
Krishnaswami op cit note 273.
Quoted by Mitta, Manoj, 'From Public to Proxy', The Sunday Times o f  India, 6/9/92. In this 
article, Mitta also questioned the actions of Kapil Sibal, the advocate for Krishnaswami:
Sibal admitted in the court that Krishna Swami obtained all those documents from Ramaswami 
himself. How did Sibal justify that Krishna Swami's petition was a PIL? It is because Krishna 
Swami had come on behalf o f a person who, by virtue of his high office, could not personally 
make his plea.
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Supreme Court was petitioned, and asked only to adjudicate questions of law and 
jurisdiction, but was unable to influence the eventual outcome of the impeachement 
motion, which exonerated Justice Ramaswami, in spite of the finding of the Sub- 
Committee on Judicial Accountability which had found him to be guilty. The situation 
of Chief Justice Jha was somewhat different. Aggrieved by the alleged bias in the 
appointments made by him, in his capacity as Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court, lawyers had begun to agitate and strike. Chief Justice Jha then approached 
the Supreme Court himself. The Court refrained from deciding upon the transfer of 
the Chief Justice and upon the issue of inter-bench transfers of the three High Court 
judges which had triggered off the agitation in Madhya Pradesh. The furore abated 
only when Chief Justice Jha died.
In the petition concerning the appointment of Kumar Padma Prasad to 
the Guwahati High Court, the High Court was censured by the Supreme Court for 
taking suo moto notice of corruption charges.^ The Supreme Court did not allude to 
these charges in its final order. That the petition asserting that the judiciary need not 
be consulted in the appointment of law officers in Bombay, Nagpur and Aurangabad, 
was dismissed, reinforces a tendency in the courts only to examine issues which it 
considers important for its integrity as an independent institution of the state. 
Moreover, the difference in the Supreme Court's response to the petitions filed by S 
P Gupta in 1981 and by the Supreme Court Advocates-on Records Association in 
1993 indicates the different imperatives of the Court over time, and its relationship 
with other branches of governance.^
Kumar Padma Prasad op cit note 273.
For a discussion o f the issues raised by these cases see Dhavan, Rajeev; Sudarshan, R and 
K-hurshid, S, Judges and the Judicial Power, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1985).
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Concluding Remarks
With the exception of 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers', the structure of the 
analysis in chapters three and four remains the same for each issue. What differs, 
throughout both chapters, is the perspective of the discussion. As the nature of the 
issues, their articulation as legal problems and their resolution in the courtroom are 
unique, the analysis has focussed on the particularities of the cases in each of the 
sections. By including considerations such as the manner in which the petition is 
framed and presented to the Court, the people involved, the evolution of legal doctrine 
and the political context, themes have emerged pertaining to court action. In 
procedural terms, innovations of remedy have been introduced, but these have evolved 
little since the early days of PIL. The response to issues has been diverse and 
unpredictable, with strident action in some instances belied by reticence in others.
Notwithstanding the imperatives of the issues, and their resolution in 
the courtroom, implementation has been consistently problematic, dependent upon 
factors beyond the control of the courts. Moreover, the delay and bias endemic in the 
legal system have remained.^In spite of these practical reservations, there has been 
a continuing discourse in the Court about what justice means, and how access to 
justice for all can be ensured.
It is in cases concerning public policy that the continuing judicial 
discourse on PIL is most apparent. Along with orders on other issues in this chapter, 
judges have enunciated the aims of PIL by rejecting petitions on preliminary grounds. 
The length of the judgment given in Janata Dal^^  ^ is testament to the continuing 
concern on the part of some judges, that PIL be used for poverty-related issues. Judges 
took the opportunity to comment on PIL, as part of a continuing educative process 
about the use of law for those previously excluded from the judicial arena. The gravity
For an analysis see chapter seven. 
Op cit note 206.
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of orders which emphasise the limits of judicial review, provide a warning to potential 
PIL litigants, who may not have a focus on social justice/
The following two chapters explore questions raised in the case studies. 
In chapter five the pivotal role of the registries of the courts in the management of 
PIL petitions is explored. The case studies demonstrate that while the violation of 
rights continue,^PIL has been appropriated as another legal mechanism available to 
the lawyer and litigant. Chapter six explores this incongruity, central to the PIL/SAL 
discussion (see chapter two), by analysing the relationship between legal process and 
those involved in PIL. The motivation, expectation and perspective of the actors 
involved are appraised, and 'alternatives and corollary innovations’ are discussed. 
Finally, the conclusions, in chapter seven, draw together the strands of concern 
observed in the case studies.
See Chandanmal Chopra op cit note 203.
Upendra Baxi has noted that;
Judicial discourse, inaugurated by active citizens' epistles to the Supreme Court now archives 
the growing lawlessness of the Indian state.
Baxi, Upendra (1991) at 82. Issues o f continuing concern documented are documented in: Desai, A R 
(ed). Violation o f  Democratic Rights in India. Volume I, (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1986); Desai, 
A R (ed). Repression and Resistance in India: Violation o f  Democratic Rights o f  the Working Class, 
Rural Poor, Adivasis and Dalits, (Sangam Books Ltd, London, 1990); Desai, A R (ed). Expanding 
Governmental Lawlessness and Organised Struggles: Violation o f Democratic Rights o f the Minorities, 
Women, Slum Dwellers, Press and Some Other Violations, (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1991).
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Chapter Five - Administering Justice
The Supreme Court and each High Court has a Registry which deals 
with all the administration arising from the management of legal documents and court 
procedure. This includes care of records, judges and courtrooms, the filing and listing 
of petitions and the supervision of the payment of any fees. The role of the registries 
of the courts has been vital for PIL, as much of its evolution has depended on the 
administration of petitions. With the relaxation of procedural rules, and the urgency 
of some of the issues raised, the registries have had to evolve mechanisms to manage 
PIL. The existing workload has been supplemented by the influx of letters, as judges 
have called for assistance in the monitoring of petitions and the distribution of costs.
The management of letters sent to the courts is of central concern. Even 
before PIL, courts had been sent letters asking for the resolution of grievances. 
However, with the onset of PIL, an increasing number of letters were received by the 
Courts, strengthening demands for the establishment of systems to process these 
letters.' The importance of the “epistolary jurisdiction”  ^ of the courts in facilitating 
access to justice is apparent from the discussion of Tetters as writ petitions' in chapter 
two and the case studies in chapters three and four.^ Moreover, as petitions filed in a 
regular manner continue to be subject to the routine administrative procedures of the 
Court, a study of the management of letters by the courts and the skills of the lawyer 
responsible for the case (see chapter six) becomes indispensible.
When asked in the Lok Sabha in 1983 about the number of PIL cases
‘ See 'Resistance to PIL' in chapter two.
 ^ Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of  
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 398.
 ^ In particular, the sections on 'Access to Justice'.
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pending in the Supreme Court, the information provided by the Registry put the 
number at seventy-two.'* This number was to increase over the next decade, 
concurrently with demands on the resources of the registries, making it impossible to 
accurately quantify the hundreds of PILs that are pending, or disposed of. Relying on 
data and information collected during fieldwork in India, this chapter considers the 
Registry of the Supreme Court and those of eight High Courts, located throughout 
India.^
The Supreme Court
In August 1985, during his tenure as Chief Justice, Justice Bhagwati 
established a PIL Cell in the Registry of the Supreme Court. Staff especially appointed 
to this Cell were to attend, systematically, to all the letters sent to the Court in the 
hope of being treated as PIL petitions. Because of the large numbers of letters 
received, addressed to the Court, the Chief Justice and other individuals, guidelines 
were framed to enable the staff to determine, consistently, which letters could be 
considered for treatment as PIL petitions.^ The Judge appointed to scrutinise PIL 
matters would finally decide if a litigation was to be initiated in response to a letter, 
using these guidelines. All the judges share the responsibility for overseeing PIL 
matters in rotation, so the decisions made differ according to the rota. This has 
continued to date, and a number of stages are involved when a letter arrives in the 
Court.
Lok Sabha Debates Seventh Series Volume XL, 16/4/83 'Public interest cases pending in Supreme 
Court' 54. Question from Shri Anbarasu to the Minister o f Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Shri 
Jagan Nath Kaushal) at 54. There is a slight discrepancy in the figures as, in P  VKapoor and another 
V Union o f  India and another. Justice B N Kripal of the Delhi High Court noted that the number of  
petitions filed in the Supreme Court between 1980 and 1982 “appears” to be 75.
 ^ See 'Methodology' in chapter three. The information and analysis is not fully comparable, as the 
extent and type of co-operation differed in each Court.
See Appendix B for a full listing of these guidelines.
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After being examined by registry staff, a large proportion of letters are 
immediately lodged (filed away) as being unsuitable for consideration as a PIL. Some 
are disposed of in a “miscellaneous” manner, and are accounted for in the section of 
lodged letter-petitions. All the remaining letters are then “put up” before the judge 
appointed to the task, together with a note summarising the complaint and indicating 
what action might be taken. Of letters seen by the judge, some are registered as writ 
petitions (W P in the table below), others are sent to the Supreme Court Legal Aid 
Committee (SCLAC) or the Legal Aid and Advice Board (LAAB) of the relevant 
State for further action, and some would be sent to the concerned department of the 
central or state government. Complaints relating to the police, either where action has 
not been taken, or complaints of police harassment, are forwarded to the Director 
General of Police in the relevant state and are accounted for in the section of letters 
sent to the concerned department. As the Supreme Court only has the facility to deal 
with letters written in Hindi and English, all other letters are initially discarded. In a 
country with many official languages and dialects, this effectively excludes those at 
any distance from the Supreme Court, with its base in a predominately Hindi-speaking 
part of North India.^ Petitions and letters on the same subject are grouped together^ 
by the Supreme Court Registry. The table below shows the number of letters received 
and the action taken on them.^
’ There have been repeated calls for the establishment of another branch o f the Supreme Court in 
South India, or for the relocation of the Court in a more centrally. For examples of continual demands 
by legislators, see ' Setting up o f a Supreme Court Bench in South India', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 
6 Session 7 Vol 23, 13/3/79, 253-54; 'Shifting the Supreme Court in a Central Place', Lok Sabha 
Debates, Series 6 Session 7 Vol 23, 12-16.
 ^ This has occurred with PILs that have originated both in the form of letters and in the form of 
regular petitions, for example those filed relating to Sati or to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorced Act. 1986, as discussed in 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three. Similarly in 
Indra Sawhney and Ors v Union o f India and Ors JT 1992 (6) SC 273, as discussed in Public Policy 
and Administration' in chapter four, the Supreme Court received many letters and petitions, many of 
which were sent by aggrieved students.
All data supplied by the Registry o f the Supreme Court. Numerical inconsistencies appear in the 
original figures.
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PIL STATEMENT FROM 5/8/85 TO 30/42/94
r
Total no of Letters j 
received j
r
W P 1
T
SCLAC j State 1 
LAAB j
r
Concerned j 
Dept 1
Mise/
Lodged
5/8/85 to 
31/3/88 57307 253 3044 15371 10783 24765
1/4/88 to 
31/12/88 11195 46 214 2275 1908 7112
1989 16691 72 431 2857 2391 10807
1990 17878 27 445 2843 2518 12164
1991 17672 20 523 1775 2253 13037
1992 16822 18 1055 2072 1174 12473
1993 15779 40 1146 1941 1167 11235
1/1/94 to 
30/4/94
6320
(1066 
to be 
put up)
4 431 867 711 3239
Total 159666 480 7289 29947 22905 94832
While a number of PIL petitions have originated in letters, many are 
filed in a regular fashion, as the following statement shows. In recent years the 
majority of PILs have been filed in a correct form by an advocate, to avoid the 
uncertain outcome of sending a letter. Such regular petitions receive special treatment 
by the Supreme Court Registry, including the exemption from court fees. The onus 
on the Registry is compounded as PIL petitions impose a greater obligation to ensure 
Court orders (such as monitoring, investigations and the payment of costs) are carried 
out. In all other ways the passage of the petition through the Court is not distinguished 
from regular matters, and PIL petitions are not routinely given preference in listings.
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except at the discretion of registry staff, or a judge 10
Statement of Public Interest Writ Petitions Civil & Criminal 
under Article 32 of the Constitution for the 5 years 1984-1988
Years Total Disposed Pending
Letters 
converted 
into writ 
petitions
1984 133 41 92 4
1985 118 48 70 34
1986 240 128 112 166
1987 167 43 124 63
1988 105 44 61 46
Total 763 304 459 313
The High Courts
India,
In any consideration of the eighteen High Courts located throughout 
the significance of regional particularities cannot be underestimated.
The courtcraft o f a lawyer can ensure that listings are favourable to a client. See chapter six for 
a discussion.
" In all there are eighteen High Courts, as listed: High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad; 
High Court of Assam at Guwahati (with benches at Imphal, Shillong, Aizawl, Kohima, Agartala) for 
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura; High Court o f Bihar 
at Patna (with a bench at Ranchi); High Court o f Gujarat at Ahmedabad for the Union Territory of  
Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Gujarat; High Court of Delhi at New Delhi; High Court o f Goa at Panaji 
for the Union Territory of Daman and Diu and Goa; High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Simla; High
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Differences can be identified according to issues and functional criteria, including ease
of access to the court. Some generalisations can be made about the representation of
problems in the courtroom: that communal problems are endemic in Uttar Pradesh;
that political manoeuvres and violence are a problem in Assam; that concern for the
environment and resource rights is prevalent in Kerala; that bonded labour is
concentrated in specific areas, including Raipur in Madhya Pradesh and Thane District
of Maharashtra. Many of the cases documented on prisons and injustices specific to
women have been filed by groups or individuals in Delhi, because of relative
proximity of the petitioner to the Supreme Court (see chapter three). Upendra Baxi,
in interview, stressed the importance of mapping out the acceptance of PIL and social
justice in each of the High Courts. He described the Gujarat, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh
and Bombay High Courts as being progressive, and the Patna, Allahabad and Madras
High Courts as not being so.^  ^While this categorisation may have some validity, Jill
Cottrell's conclusion, after examining 114 High Court cases, has been borne out.
This is very slim evidence on which to decide how far PIL has become 
a reality at the High Court level. Informal evidence suggests that 
substantial numbers of cases may be in the pipeline, at least in some 
states, and time will tell what part this type of litigation will play in 
establishing the accountability of the executive, and to whom.‘^
In those states where fieldwork has been conducted the variety of unreported PIL
cases discussed (see chapters three and four) serves to indicate the large number of
petitions filed throughout India. While the specific culture of eaeh High Court,
reflecting the distinctiveness of each state, does have a bearing on the success of a
petition in the courtroom, there are many other determinants that have to be accounted
Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar (with a bench at Jammu); High Court o f Karnataka at 
Bangalore; High Court of Kerala at Emakulam for Kerala and the Union Territory o f Lakshawdeep; 
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (with benches at Indore and Gwalior); High Court of  
Maharashtra at Bombay (with benchs at Aurangabad and Nagpur); High Court o f Orissa at 
Bhubaneshwar; High Court o f Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh for Haryana, Punjab and the Union 
Territory of Chandigarh; High Court o f Rajasthan at Jaipur (with a bench at Jodhpur); High Court o f  
Sikkim at Gangtok; High Court of Tamil Nadu at Madras for the Union Territory of Pondicherry and 
Tamil Nadu; High Court of Uttar Pradesh at Allahabad (with a bench at Lucknow); High Court o f West 
Bengal at Calcutta for the Union Territory of Andoman and Nicobar Islands and West Bengal.
'■ Upendra Baxi, Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University, Delhi, 5/8/93.
Cottrell, Jill, 'Courts and Accountability: Public Interest Litigation in the Indian High Courts', 
Third World Legal Studies, 1992, 199-213 at 213.
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for. Factors not easily appraised, including the length of pendency and the 
management of the letters received by the courts, are of equal significance to the 
orders passed. If a grievance in a letter is not considered suitable for adjudication by 
the Court, or a petition is not listed, then orders cannot be given.
The numbers and nature of the PIL petitions heard in each High Court 
differs, and is also conditional upon the proclivities of the judges on each bench (see 
chapter six) and on the tendency to approach the courts for relief. Marc Galanter 
described how the use of writs differs between different states, estimating that in the 
Bombay High Court approximately 80% of the writ petitions are concerned with rent 
and tenancy of agricultural land, effectively transforming the court into a “court of 
appeals from a non-appealable land tribunal”. H e  observed the marked differences 
in the procedure for listing writ petitions, some are heard by division benches while 
others are heard by a single judge,*^ an observation that has been vindicated by 
fieldwork. In Guwahati all PIL petitions are heard by a division bench, a decision 
taken because of the public importance of the issues raised, however, in other High 
Courts many PIL petitions are heard by single judge benches.
In an effort to harmonise the treatment of PILs filed in the form of 
letter petitions, a resolution was passed by the All-India Chief Justices Conference on 
January 1, 1991, that a PIL Cell be established in each High Court “to enable the 
poor, oppressed and economically or physically handicapped to seek judicial relief’.'  ^
Aside from some newspaper reports on the conference, the resolution was not made 
public. Nonetheless, High Courts have responded. Data and information has been 
collected from the High Courts of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Madhya
Galanter, Marc (1984) at 500.
See Galanter, Marc (1984) at 499.
Mahajan, Krishan, Public interest litigation cell set up - HCs yet to implement resolution', Indian 
Express, 3/1/92.
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Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh. 17
Maharashtra
Even before the 1991 resolution, a Public Grievances Cell had been set 
up in 1986, following Justice Sujata Manohar's request to the Acting Chief Justice, on 
April 24, 1986:
We are receiving several complaints from the public as to injustice 
being experienced by them at the hands of the persons in authority. 
Government, semi-Govemmental Organisations, Corporations and such 
others who either deliberately or due to some other reasons do not 
attend to their grievances. ... It becomes difficult for the Honourable 
Judges to take cognizance of such complaints unless they are properly 
scrutinized and streamlined though a proper channel.
On the authority of the Chief Justice of the High Court, a set of “Guidelines for the
Admission of Letter Petitions as Writ Petitions” were produced. Specific grievances
were listed, to determine which letters could be treated as writ petitions, and the
procedure for the management of letters was prescribed.’*
From the middle of 1986 to October 1990, 628 letter-petitions were 
received by the Cell, of which 209 were treated as writ petitions. Although the Cell 
had not been publicised, in a deliberate attempt to curtail the anticipated deluge of 
mail, the number of letter-petitions continued to increase. In spite of repeated requests 
for staff to deal with the workload, sent by the Registrar of the High Court to the 
Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Law and Judiciary Department, in 1986, 
1990 and 1992, no reply had been received by March 1992. Staff seconded from other 
departments managed the Cell.
See 'Methodology' in chapter three. Data and information collected from Bombay for Maharashtra 
in March 1992, from Bangalore for Karnataka in December 1992, from Madras for Tamil Nadu in April 
1993, from Indore for Madhya Pradesh in April 1993, from Guwahati and Shillong for the north-east 
region in June 1993, from Simla for Himachal Pradesh in July 1993 and from Emakulam for Kerala 
in August 1993. Information on Andhra Pradesh is taken from Mohan, P Bhaskara, Public Interest 
Litigation - A Study', AIR 1993 J 17.
See Appendix B for a full listing of these guidelines.
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Karnataka
A PIL cell was established on February 6, 1992 to monitor the letters 
sent to the High Court in the hope of being treated as PIL petitions. Before this date 
any letters went to an existing department, “Lower Courts Administration I”, where 
no records had been kept and none of the letters received had been registered as PILs. 
In a note dated December 11, 1992, the Section Officer of the Writ Scrutiny Branch 
stated “During this calendar year, this cell has received as many as 212 
petitions/letters (through post) and in most of these cases no public interest is 
involved”. The letters were examined according to the PIL guidelines. Of these 212 
letters, 158 had been scrutinised by December 1992, and three were registered as PILs: 
one from a prisoner, one registered as a habeas corpus petition and one relating to 
dowry harassment.
Files in the Registry established that while most of the letters could not
be considered for treatment as a PIL, others which could were rejected, because they
did not fall within the guidelines. Moreover, PIL matters were far outnumbered by
habeas corpus petitions, as the note dated December 11, 1992 stated:
This Cell has also been receiving telegrams/petitions from the public 
alleging that the person referred to in the Telegram has been detained 
by the Police Authorities and such Telegrams are being registered as 
a matter involving public interest. During this Calender year 112 such 
telegrams are being registered as writ petitions involving some public 
interest (Harassment by Police). It may also be stated here that 
whenever petitions involving public interest are being filed in Person 
by paying the prescribed Court Fee, the same is being registered as a 
writ petition, and thereafter posted before the Hon'ble Court for further 
orders.
Again, despite repeated requests, staff had not been sanctioned for the Cell, so existing 
staff had been assigned to the Cell.
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Tamil Nadu
A PIL cell was set up on July 13, 1992, to scrutinise letter petitions 
according to the PIL guidelines. Between July 13, 1992 and March 31, 1993, 1545 
letter-petitions were received, of which six were registered as PIL petitions, 47 were 
registered as habeas corpus petitions, nine were registered as criminal O.P. (original 
petition), one was registered as a criminal appeal and 368 were sent to the State Legal 
Aid and Adivce Board. Of the 1114 remaining, many were lodged (filed away), and 
some were sent to the concerned authorities, for example to a District Judge, the 
Superintendent of the Central Prison or other jail authorities.
More than 50% of the letters complained of kidnap, torture, murder or 
false investigation by the police. All these letters were put before the public prosecutor 
and then before the Deputy Inspector General of Police who sends the letters on to the 
officer in charge of the district, the area Superintendent, or in the case of Madras, to 
the Commissioner of Police.'^ A response to the papers sent was received by the High 
Court in approximately 15% of these cases. Without waiting for a reply, the Court 
files away the letters, as it considers its duty to have been done.
Requests have been made for staff for the PIL Cell. For example, a note
prepared for the Registrar in early 1993 by the Deputy Registrar in his capacity as
Head of the PIL Cell, recorded:
... the Government has been addressed in the High Court's ROC, letter 
No 1956-A/91-92 dated 21-11-91 for sanction of one post of A.E. in 
the scale of pay of Rs 2000-3200, one assistant in the scale of pay of 
Rs. 1100-1660 and one post of Office Assistant in the scale of pay of 
Rs.750-945 for attending to the work pertaining to the Public Interest 
Litigation Cell in the High Court, Madras.
As no staff had been sanctioned, existing staff were appointed in charge of the cell.
This procedure exists in this and other High Courts in spite o f the proven inefficiency o f the 
police, as seen in Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association Chandigarh, through its secretary 
1993 (4) SCALE 147 [636] and Association for the Protection o f  Public Rights and Interest, as 
discussed in 'The Police' in chapter three.
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Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench
PIL Cells have been established in the main bench of the High Court 
at Jabalpur and at both the benches at Indore and Gwalior. If either of the two latter 
benches considers that a letter could be registered as a PIL petition, it is sent to 
Jabalpur, as stipulated in an “Order from the CJ of the MP HC, Justice S K Shah”, 
issued in 1991:
All the letters/postal petitions received at the main seat or at the 
benches at Indore/Gwalior shall be processed and dealt with under my 
orders at main registry.
No letters/postal petitions shall be registered without my orders, 
irrespective or any directions of Bench of any Hon’ble Judge on his 
behalf.
The procedure was clarified in a “memo of 19/1/91 from Additional Registrar Jabalpur
to the benches at Indore and Gwalior” stated:
I am directed by the Honourable the CJ to communicate that 
complaints received in respect of prisoners from Jail regarding their 
detention, habeas corpus, for remission, release on parole etc., 
harassment in detention by the Jail Authorities, the matters without 
reference to the Main Registry, be registered immediately and placed 
before the Hon'ble Court for orders.
In Jabalpur, all the letters received are scrutinised according to the PIL guidelines, by
an assistant and by the Additional Registrar (Judicial), before being submitted to the
Chief Justice for orders. If the Chief Justice considers that a petition should be
registered, it is listed before the relevant bench for orders. Letters sent to the Indore
bench, detailing injustices which are considered to fall within the guidelines, are
forwarded to Jabalpur by registered post twice a month. From February 1, 1993 to
April 15, 1993, 140 letters were received, of which 46 were sent to Jabalpur and 94
were bail applications which were registered in the High Court at Indore.^°
A copy o f each application was sent to the jail authority, upon whose recommendation bail was 
granted. Usually such letters were sent to the Court after bail had been denied, so few o f these 
applications were allowed.
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North-East
The Guwahati High Court covers the seven states of the North-East: 
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura. The 
main bench is located at Guwahati in Assam, and each of the other states has a 
permanent or visiting bench. A PIL Cell, established on February 12, 1992 to 
scrutinise letter petitions according to the PIL guidelines, began to operate on May 
16,1992. As all the letters received are sent directly to Guwahati, when approached 
for information, the Deputy Registrar at the Shillong Bench in Meghalaya suggested 
that the Registrar in Guwahati be approached for information. The Chief Justice, 
sitting on a Divisional Bench, would always hear PIL matters because of their public 
interest import. Between May 16, 1992 and December 31, 1992, 42 complaint 
petitions (the name given to letter-petitions) were received, of which: one was 
registered as Civil Rule (PIL)^‘ and three were registered as Civil Rule {Habeas 
Corpus)}^
Responding to some of the other letters received, the Registry called for 
a report from the concerned authority - the police in most cases - and sent a reminder 
if no response was received. The matter was only considered to be disposed of once 
a report had been received and examined by the Chief Justice. Although a sanction for 
staff had been requested, it had not been received so existing staff had been appointed 
to deal with letter petitions.
Discussion with Registry staff revealed that the existence of the PIL 
guidelines has limited the responsiveness of the High Court to complaints sent, 
although occasional exceptions had been made. An example of such an exemption was 
when a woman wrote to the High Court in distress because her husband was missing. 
Apparently, a petition had been registered, even though the issue did not fall within
See 'Environment and Resources' in chapter four, tor 4^ Public interest litigation by intervener 
Paharu Ram Boro on behalf o f  the Tribal public o f  Boko (Kamrup) Tribal Belt.
In all three, the Court asked for a report.
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the PIL Guidelines.
Himachal Pradesh
The procedure of separately recording letters received by the Court was 
established by Chief Justice P D Desai in 1985. A total of 4421 letters were received 
by the High Court between 28 February, 1986 and 16 July, 1993. Details of each letter 
were entered into a ledger in alphabetical order of the sender. At first the High Court 
devised its own system of classification, but later this was done according to the 
guidelines issued by the Supreme Court. As little information on the letters was 
discernible from the ledger entries, a numerical survey was done of the letter “S”, 
chosen because it includes records of suo moto actions. Most of these suo moto 
actions were based on newspaper reports in local Hindi language dailies or in the 
Indian Express, and were concerned with the poor provision of municipal services. All 
of these newspaper articles were published between August 1989 and December 1990, 
having been brought to the notice of the Chief Justice by a Registrar of the High 
Court who was, in the words of another Registry employee “a socially conscious 
man”. The rest of the entries comprised of letters, more than ten of which would be 
received each day. Details were entered into the ledger, and comments added by the 
section officer, the marriage counsellor (if relevant) and the Additional Registrar. The 
file would then be sent to the Chief Justice for a decision on whether the letter should 
be registered as a writ petition, or dealt with in another way.
Of the 642 entries in the letter “S” for the period February 28, 1986 and 
July 16, 1993, 59 were registered as writ petitions, 55 were suo moto actions, two 
were registered as habeas corpus petitions, three were tagged with another petition, 
three were shown to counsel, in 39 “Form N” was issued, in seven “Form O” was 
issued, in three “Form Q” was issued, 107 were forwarded to the concerned 
a u th o rity ,288 were filed (or lo d g e d ) in  27 the petitioner was told to file a regular
In some, the concerned authority was asked to submit a report.
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writ petition in the High Court or a lower court, one was returned to the petitioner, 
in two no action was taken, in 27 the action taken in these entries was not written, 18 
entries were indecipherable and there was one missing entry. The system of issuing 
Forms N, O and Q had been instituted in 1986, but by 1993 no one could remember 
what these categories were. In those letter-petitions in which the Court had asked for 
a response or an affidavit, the matter was pursued if no reply was received. In July 
1993, the High Court Registry seemed unaware of the number of letter-petitions which 
had been registered by the Court as a list prepared of all disposed of PILs totalled 19 
cases, only two of which were instigated by letters, both in 1993. It can be assumed 
that hundreds of PIL petitions that have been admitted are pending, awaiting action 
by the Court.
After the 1991 resolution, the State Government was requested to 
sanction staff for the cell, but no reply had been received. The staff already posted to 
look after the ledger continued to do so.^ ^
Kerala
No PIL Cell had been constituted for dealing with letter-petitions, but 
a person had been assigned to the task of dealing with the letters according to the PIL 
guidelines. It seems that the Registry had not contemplated setting up a separate cell 
for PIL. Notwithstanding personal requests to the Chief Registrar and the Chief Justice 
of the Kerala High Court, the ledgers of the High Court were not made available for 
research, and no data or information was forthcoming.
In over half o f which the registry had asked for an affidavit before deciding to file the letter.
Also see Massey, I P, 'Movement o f Judicial Activism and Social Change in Himachal Pradesh' 
in Bhatia, K L (ed), Judicial Activism and Social Change, (Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 
1989), 477-502.
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Andhra Pradesh
A PIL Cell was opened on 23 October, 1991 to deal with the many 
telegrams and letters received by the Court. Over 100 cases were taken up by the cell 
by the end of 1992, of which 50 were habeas corpus petitions. The cases which have 
been taken up as writ petitions were handed over to LAAB, which then allotted them 
to an advocate.^^
Concluding Analysis
People all over India have been writing to the courts in the hope of 
getting redress, both those with a formal knowledge of PIL and those who perceive 
the courts as a place where justice is available. The response of the courts has 
depended upon the vision of the judges and the support of personnel in the registries. 
The PIL Guidelines, written by Justice Bhagwati, were intended to provide consistent 
parameters throughout the country. Conversely, their operation has limited litigation 
evolved as an open-ended mechanism to resolve injustices. The guidelines have never 
been amended, reviewed or analysed for their effectiveness. Few complaints are 
successfully registered as writ petitions as the practice of registering letters as writ 
petitions has become bureaucratised, separating PIL from the realities which it sought 
to address (see chapter two). This is most apparent in the analysis of the High Court 
at Madras, where the application of the guidelines has meant that allegations against 
the police are not dealt with by the Court, but are returned to the police department 
concerned.
Aside from the corruption, which has been documented in the PIL cases
See Mohan, P Bhaskara (1993) at 23.
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on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers'^^ and the elite bias inherent in the courts, chronicled by
the emergence of PIL, many practical problems remain within the court system.
Attempts to persuade the government to release funds to staff the PIL Cells have
generally been futile. The huge delays and arrears which clog the system and prevent
cases from being dealt with speedily^* have permeated the use of PIL. The process of
a letter through a registry can mitigate against the effective resolution of urgent
grievances. The Court itself is aware of the delays, and has held, when sent a letter
complaining that a woman had been illegally confined:
If a matter of this nature is not considered urgent enough for being 
listed on a priority basis, no other matter deserves to be listed on a 
priority basis. We find that every other day matters where even the 
judgements of the lower courts are not filed and incomplete records are 
placed before the Court and we are required to adjoum the matters till 
the documents are filed.^^
Nonetheless, the procedures followed by the Supreme Court,^° and by the Indore bench
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court,^* belie this concern. More difficult to analyse are
the reasons for lengthy delays in the listing of many of petitions discussed in the case
studies. Whether attributed to the judge, the registry staff, the lawyer, or a more
extensive collusion, these delays have remained endemic in the court system.
See chapter four. Since it began in 1986 The Lawyers has documented and exposed the corruption 
and nepotism endemic in the court system.
See Baxi, Upendra, The Crisis o f  the Indian Legal System, (Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New  
Delhi, 1982), particularly for the chapter on 'The Courts in Crisis' at 58-83; Dhavan, Rajeev, Litigation 
Explosion in India, (Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, 1986).
In Nilima Priyadarshini v State o f  Bihar AIR 1987 SC 2021 at 2022. Responding to a letter 
received by the Court on November 21, 1986, the Court observed that the application had been placed 
before it on January 15, 1987, two and a half months after it had been received by the Registry, and 
described this as a mockery of the judicial process. It was directed that the matter o f delay be put before 
the Chief Justice, that action be taken against the relevant officials and a machinery be devised to 
ensure that such abberrations would not be repeated. Also see Bholanath Tripathi v State ofU .P. 1990 
(Supp) s e e  151 in ' Injustices to Women' in chapter three when the Court acknowledged the unfortunate 
five month delay in the filing o f the petition.
See Sheela Barse v Union o f  India (non-criminal lunatics) (1993) 4 SCC 204, as discussed in 
'Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three, for details o f the delay between the receipt of the letter 
and the posting o f the petition.
In sending letters to Jabalpur only twice a month.
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The criteria for admitting letters as writ petitions and for listing matters, 
has determined the profile of PIL, by ensuring certain types of petitions are heard, and 
that others are not. The impetus of judges who transformed the reception given to 
letters and PIL petitions, has resulted in the formation of a bureaucratic culture which 
has resticted the responsiveness of the courts to instances of injustice.
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Chapter Six - The Court and the People
Telling the story from 1979 through the aspirations and motivations 
of the numerous people involved in PIL, the discussion is divided into two broad time 
periods. 'PIL Begins' spans the period to the end of 1986. The retirement of Chief 
Justice P N Bhagwati from the Supreme Court in 1986 is taken as an expedient point 
at which to break the analysis. His absence from the bench signalled the end of a 
period in which support for PIL was evident; it also ended the pioneering period in 
PIL, during which time PIL was established, and symbolised the waning enthusiasm 
for the potential effects of using PIL. In tandem with PIL, numerous other initiatives 
formed part of the focus on legal mechanisms to extend access to justice. These are 
surveyed in 'Alternative and Corollary Innovations' at the end of this chapter.
PIL Begins
The intent behind Social Action Litigation motivated the initiatives that
led to the establishment of PIL (see chapter two). Concurrent initiatives by disparate
people and groups fostered the relaxation of procedural norms and the introduction of
concern for the disadvantaged/deprived and marginalised/excluded (see chapter two).
The political situation had fostered similar concerns in different regions;
The announcement of the Emergency on 26 June 1975 proved to be a 
supremely catalytic event. While political activists and intellectuals 
were ostracised and imprisoned, a major turning-point had been reached 
in the consciousness of what constituted democracy'. In an effort to 
stifle dissent, thousands were imprisoned - some for the entire 19 
months that the Emergency lasted. The press was gagged, and a host 
of new legislations severely restricted both traditional and new and 
independent challenges to the centralisation of power - from habeas
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corpus to the rise of a vigorous literature of dissent through 
politicisation of influential journals, and so on/
This chapter will examine the people who, witnessing the emergency, were to form
the movement that nurtured PIL. Members of the bench and bar, activists and the
press combined in an effort to realise the constitutional promise and to protect their
own positions. This was to take place in the Supreme Court, ideally located in Delhi
amidst judges, activist groups, politicians, administrators, and international agencies.
Significant participants in this elite community, legal academics, such 
as Upendra Baxi of Delhi University and Lotika Sarkar of the Centre for Women's 
Development Studies, supported PIL in direct and indirect ways. Direct involvement 
came in the form of PIL petitions and letters/ indirect involvement in the form of 
informal and conference discussions,^ and scholarly writing which increasingly focused 
on the exclusion of many from the legal system. Connections were made with PIL in 
the USA and other international developments, whose influence on Indian law is 
apparent.'^ Rajeev Dhavan, having left his lecturing post at a British university, was 
the a key participant in the establishment of CILAS.^
The section begins with a consideration of'Judges' and Lawyers'. After 
a discussion of 'Activism', the involvement of the 'Media' is evaluated. Finally the 
Funding' of PIL is reviewed.
' Kothari, Smitu, 'The Human Rights Movement in India: Crisis and Challenges' in Forsythe, David 
P (ed) (1989), 94-109 at 96.
 ^ For example, see the section on 'Prisons and State Insitutions' in chapter three for Upendra Baxi 
V State o f U P & Ors (Agra protective home) 1982 (1) SCALE 84 [502].
 ^ See the section on Funding, supra.
It has been observed that Upendra Baxi and Krishan Mahajan, a legal journalist:
are exposed to international developments in the sphere o f law and its use in society and who 
find themselves far surpassed in material affluence by even the mediocre practitioners take a 
plunge into the realm of social responsibility' and 'social relevance' with the gusto o f a 
crusader.
See Gandhi, J S (1987) at 121.
 ^ See Dhavan, Rajeev, Public Interest Law in India: A Investigative Report, (Report to the National 
Committee for the Implementation o f Legal Aid Schemes, New Delhi, 1981).
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Judges
The discussion of access to justice in the Supreme Court of the 1970's
was the preoccupation of only a few judges. Concern for civil liberties had been
apparent in earlier decades, but little for distributive justice. George Gadbois has
amply documented the homogeneity of Indian judicial decision making, connecting it
with the characteristics of the Supreme Court judge during the first decade of
constitutional government.^ Similarly, Marc Galanter has observed that judges and
lawyers share a common legal education and a common professional milieu:
members of the higher judiciary possess some distinctive 
characteristics. They tend to be drawn from prosperous and high status 
families, to have been educated in elite institutions, to have had 
distinguished professional careers and, with few exceptions, very little 
political involvement.^
The composition of the judiciary changed little during the first three decades of
constitutional government. Of the 352 High Court judges sitting in 1977, only four
were members of scheduled castes and none was a member of a scheduled tribe.^
Women judges were more poorly represented. There were only two sitting prior to
 ^ Gadbois, George H, 'The Supreme Court o f India as a Political Institution', in Dhavan, Rajeev; 
Sudarshan R and Khurshid, Salman, Judges and the Judicial Power, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 
1985), 251-267; Gadbois, George H, 'Indian Judicial Behaviour', EPW, Annual Number, January 1970, 
149-166. His analysis is extended in Gadbois, George H, The Supreme Court o f India; A Preliminary 
Report of an Empirical Study' in Grover, Verinder (ed). Courts and Political Process in India, (Deep 
& Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1989), 9-37. Whilst noting a confluence o f judicial thought, Gadbois 
described the kind o f man who became a Supreme Court judge:
a Hindu, birth in a socially prominent and economically comfortable family, legal education 
at a prominent Indian university or at one o f the Inns o f Court in London, more than two 
decades o f private law practice before the High Court o f the state o f his birthplace, non­
involvement in active politics and ten years of experience with consequent seniority as a 
member of a High Court.
Gadbois, George H, 'Selection, Background Characteristics, and Voting Behavior o f Indian Supreme 
Court Judges, 1950-1959' in Schubert, Glendon and Danelski, David J (eds). Comparative Judicial 
Behaviour, (Oxford University Press, London, 1969).
 ^ See Galanter, Marc, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Class in India, (Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1984) at 481. Also see Dhavan, Rajeev (1977).
* Galanter, Marc (1984) note 23 at 481.
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1977, and six during 1977, after appointments were made.^
The impact of the appointments combined with the structure of the legal 
system, delineating a separation of powers between the legislature executive and 
ju d ic ia ry ,to  determine the decision-making in the Supreme Court. Sobhanlal Datta 
Gupta observed:
the logic of the mode of composition of the Supreme Court makes it 
conservative in outlook and encourages it to adopt a legalistic, formal, 
non-sociological view of the laws. This outlook has been further 
nurtured by the way the judges are recruited in service."
In his analysis of judgments given by the Supreme Court between 1950 and 1959,
Gadbois noted that only seven percent had dissenting opinions. Of these, the largest
proportion sought to uphold the rights of the citizen against the state. Rajeev Dhavan
described these as token dissents, as they did not extend beyond the judgment in
which they were given.H ow ever, in the mid-1970's, judges like Justice V R Krishna
Iyer began to give judgments that ran counter to the prevailing tendencies in the
C ourt.A ppointed by Indira Gandhi at a time when poverty had become a political
issue, as witnessed in the garibi hatao (remove poverty) initiative, Justice Krishna Iyer
Keshwaar, Sanober, 'Women Judges: Who will make it to the Supreme Court?', The Lawyers, Vol 
3 No 1, Jan 1988, 4-11.
This separation is indistinct in certain parts o f India, for example in the north-east, and in 
institutions such as the panchayat (village gathering) nyaya panchayat (village courts). See Galanter, 
Marc and Baxi, Upendra, 'Law and Society in Modem India' in Galanter, Marc (1989), 54-91.
' ' Gupta, Sobhanlal Datta, Justice and the Political Order in India. An Inquiry into the Institutions 
and Ideologies: 1950-1972, (K P Bagchi & Company, Calcutta, 1979) at 131. He went on, at 187, to 
quote from S P Sathe who had observed:
“Although the judicial restraint is very credible, it is submitted that the restraint has stemmed 
more from a restricted view of the judicial function entertained by the Court rather than from 
a conscious effort to make the Constitution responsive to the needs o f the society”.
Gadbois, George H (1970) at 151. He contrasted this with the United States Supreme Court in 
which over fifty percent of judgements have been dissensual.
Dhavan, Rajeev, The Supreme Court o f  India: A Socio-Legal Critique o f  its Juristic Techniques, 
(N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1977) at 31-32. For an analysis o f the literature on the “ideological 
profiles of the Court in action”, including a brief discussion of the work of George Gadbois, Sobhanlal 
Datta Gupta and Rajeev Dhavan, see Baxi, Upendra, Towards a Sociology o f Indian Law, (Satvahan, 
New Delhi, 1986) at 110-112.
Dhavan, Rajeev (1977) at 33.
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represented a new kind of judge in the courtroom/^
It was the politicisation of judicial appointments that was to facilitate 
PIL by allowing the introduction, on to the Court, of a few judges motivated by social 
justice considerations. Justice D A Desai became known for the pro-tenant stance he 
took in his judgments'^ and Justice O Chinappa Reddy has been described as “a 
humanist”.'  ^The guiding principles of these judges were unusual. Justice V R Krishna 
Iyer, far from being guided by the dictates of the rule of law, was motivated by his 
own spirituality and the ethos of justice in Ancient India - he was unwilling to be 
bound by the confines of rule-mindedness or the structure of the court.S im ilarly  
Justice P N Bhagwati was motivated by his concern for social justice, in his 
encouragement of PIL.'^
Even before PIL, the writ jurisdiction was more accessible than other 
criminal or civil remedies, being comparatively expeditious and cheap.Exam ined in 
the context of the greater use of constitutional remedies, the development of PIL was
See chapter one for a discussion o f the “committed” judiciary.
For a discussion of the controversy over the appointment of these judges see Dhavan, Rajeev and 
Jacob, Alice, Selection and Appointment o f  Supreme Court Judges. A Case Study, (N M Tripathi Pvt 
Ltd, Bombay, 1977).
See Venkataramani, R (ed). Judgements by O Chinappa Reddy - A Humanist, (International 
Institute of Human Rights Society, New Delhi, 1989).
Iyer, V R Krishna, 'Public Interest Litigation', (lecture delivered at the School o f Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, 10/5/88).
See Bhagwati, P N, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation', (transcript o f address 
delivered at Columbia University on 3/10/84, Jagrut Bharat, Dharwad, 1985), 1-23. The limitations of  
Justice Krishna Iyer's vision, in terms of gender issues, has been noted by Bina Agarwal, who referred 
to a judgement he gave in 1980, whilst upholding the Uttar Pradesh Zamidari Abolition and Land 
Reforms Act. 1950:
He argued: no submission to destroy this measure can be permitted using sex discrimination 
as a means to sabotage what is socially desirable'. While admitting that the advantage granted 
to major sons and not to daughters was sex-discriminatory, he nevertheless justified the rule 
on the ground that in effective terms the entire land goes to the father as the tenure holder (and 
not to the son) for feeding this extra mouth'. Presumably adult daughters didn't need to be fed! 
Agarwal, Bina (1994) at 221.
Galanter, Marc (1984) at 498-9.
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not an abberation, but lay dormant in the hands of the Supreme Court judge/^ Not
only are the courts bound by orders of the Supreme Court but also by the broader
expressions of its judges in obiter dicta?^ In addition to judicial powers, the executive
powers of a judge include powers of admission, scheduling cases for hearing, the
formation of benches or panels, the grant of a stay order, powers of scheduling
reasoned judgments and of allowing/disallowing a review.^^ It has been suggested that
the Court was “activist” prior to the I970's, in a technical sense, in displaying an
inclination towards certain policy objectives (see chapter two). It was a particular type
of judicial activism. '^^ For some, the period after the emergency was the first time that
the Court had displayed any “activism”. According to Upendra Baxi:
[an activist judge] is a judge who is aware that she wields enormous 
executive and legislative power in her role as a judge and this power 
has to be used militantly for the promotion of constitutional values.
A few judges, by fostering the use of the writ jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, began to challenge what Upendra Baxi described as the class bias in
See Agrawala, B R (1989) and Gadbois, George H (1989).
Such pronouncements could not be challenged in review as they did not affect the outcome o f  
a case. Nonetheless, these pronouncements did enter law and were binding. See Article 141 o f the 
Constitution and Galanter, Marc^(1984) at 490.
Baxi, Upendra, On the shame of not being an activist: thoughts on judicial activism' in 
Tiruchelvam, Neelam and Coomaraswamy, Radhika (eds) (1987), 168-178 at 169. He also mentions 
'suggestive jurisprudence' by which judges communicate to lawyers, explicitly and implicitly, the way 
in which a case might be decided.
Justice P N Bhagwati elucidated a distinction between the form of judicial activism existing in 
the Supreme Court in the first three decades of constitutional government, and the actions of judges in 
initiating and supporting PIL and access to justice:
technical activism may be contrasted with what I would like to call “Juristic activism”. Juristic 
activism is not concerned with the appropriation o f increased power, but is concerned as well 
with the creation of new concepts 
Bhagwati, P N, 'Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation', (transcript o f address delivered at 
Columbia University on 3/10/84, Jagrut Bharat, Dharwad, 1985), 1-23 at 7. Also see the constitutional 
imperatives in chapter two,
Baxi, Upendra, 'On the shame of not being an activist: thoughts on judicial activism' in 
Tiruchelvam, Neelam and Coomaraswamy, Radhika (eds) (1987), 168-178 at 172. Also see essays in 
Dhavan, Rajeev, Sudarshan, R and Khurshid, Salman, Judges and the Judicial Power, (N M Tripathi 
Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1985).
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the sentencing of offenders, and the non-implementation of enactments/^ It has been 
suggested that PIL started in the district and High Courts, without attracting much 
attention/^ However, Supreme Court judges. Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice P N 
Bhagwati have each been described as the “fathers of PIL”, the former having been 
the initial proponent of PIL and the latter because of his numerous, well-publicised 
judgments and orders.
Many of the aspects of concern to judges at the beginning of the 1980's 
can be seen in the section on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' (in chapter four), in the 
unfolding of PIL (in chapter one) and in writing within and outside the courtroom.^^ 
The perceptiveness and skill of Justice V R Krishna Iyer and then Justice Bhagwati 
in their obiter dicta fostered new perspectives and the scope of constitutional rights, 
such as Article 21 of the Constitution, was expanded. For the first time, the non- 
justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy were relied upon and Fundamental 
Duties taken into account in deciding cases.^^
In addition to these pronouncements on the substance of issues, the 
judges who supported PIL encouraged petitions to be filed and ensured that matters 
were heard (see chapters three, four and five). A number of organisations located the 
beginnings of their case in a conversation with Justice Bhagwati.^® His role in CILAS
Baxi, Upendra (1982) at 27-29.
Referring to P. K. Martiyani v Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr. 1983 
(2) GLR XXIV(2) 927, as discussed in 'Public Policy and Administration' in chapter four, a petition 
initiated suo moto by Justice Thakkar of the Gujarat High Court in 1979, Upendra Baxi described this 
as one example of instances in which this judge acted suo moto. See Baxi, Upendra, 'On the shame o f  
not being activist; thoughts on judicial activism' in Tiruchelvam, Neelan and Coomaraswamy, Radhika 
(eds) (1987), 168-178 at 176. Also see Agrawala, S K (1985) at 20 and 'Suo Moto' in chapter two.
See Bhagwati, P N (1985); Singh, Parmanand, 'Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji's Perception of  
Judicial Function in Public Interest Litigation - A Tribute', Delhi Law Review, Vol 13, 1991, 145-153; 
Gupta, Shriniwas, 'Judicial Universe o f Justice Bhagwati', 1985 KJLT (J) 69.
For a discussion of these constitutional provisions, see chapter one and for a full listing see 
Appendix A.
A number of activists have referred to encouragement from Justice Bhagwati: Bunker Roy sent 
a letter to the Court after Justice Bhagwati suggested that he do so (Bunker Roy, Social Work and 
Research Centre, Tilonia, 16/2/92) - see Labour' in chapter three for Sanjit Roy v State o f  Rajasthan
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had ensured both his exposure to activist groups concerned with using law and in the 
press. Administrators in the Registry, recognising that PIL was being promoted by just 
a few judges, would assign PIL matters to them, ensuring a sympathetic hearing for 
petitions and letters.
The rift that had become apparent in the Supreme Court of the 1970's, 
before and during the emergency, was exacerbated by the use of PIL. The breach 
between judges imbued with concern for access to justice and those concerned with 
upholding the values that had motivated the Court, was expressed both within the 
Court and outside it.^' Justice V D Tulzapurkar,^^ in a speech, set out the concerns of 
many on the Court. Similarly, Justice S Murtaza Fazal Ali and Justice E 
Venkataramiah, when raising what became known as the “ten commandments” in 
Sudipt Mazumdar v State o f Madhya Pradesh^^ expressed reservations about the
AIR 1983 SC 328. Vivek and Vidyulatta Pandit met the judge in May 1983, and again in December 
1983, before sending letter-petitions to the Supreme Court (Vivek Pandit, Vidhayak Sansad, interview, 
25/3/93) - see 'Bonded Labour' in chapter three for Vivek Pandit v State o f  Maharashtra. A civil 
liberties activist described a meeting he had arranged with Justice Bhagwati, in the hope that something 
could be done about “encounter deaths”, but left feeling disillusioned:
We got a good impression of Justice Bhagwati and we thought he could help. He said, no, 
don't go in for these encounter death petitions, go in for a petition on minimum wages and I 
will appoint a commission. He also told us to file on bonded labour. Then we decided against 
it and thought that Justice Bhagwati was trying to please the Government.
Other petitions have reached the Court in an unorthodox manner because of this judge. When invited 
by Justice Bhagwati in 1981 to attend a CILAS meeting but unable to attend, Ela Bhatt sent a letter of 
refusal in which she questioned the purpose of legal aid, in the absence of relevant laws, except those 
which are anti-poor and anti-employment. She elaborated the substantive way in which laws take away 
rights and cited the example of the Manek Chowk hawkers. Justice Bhagwati treated the letter as a writ 
petition (Ela Bhatt, Self Employed Women's Association, New Delhi, 4/2/91) - see 'Urban Space' in 
chapter four for Self Employed Women's Association and Ors v Municipal Council o f  Ahmedabad and 
Ors 1986 (2) SCALE 291 [1254]. Other judges encouraged activist groups to use law, for example, 
during the opposition to the Silent Valley project in Kerala:
Justice Krishna Iyer suggested we go to the local court and if  necessary we should go to the 
High Court, informally, in conversation. We could not think that the case would get admitted 
because o f standing etc
(M K Prasad, KSSP, Emakulam, 15/8/93) - see Environment and Resources' in chapter four.
See chapter one for background.
Tulzapurkar, V D (1983). See Gandhi, J S (1987) at 22 for a critique o f this speech which he 
calls “veiled sycophancy”.
See chapter one.
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methods adopted by fellow judges, to nurture PIL. '^* Justice Tulzapurkar, who had 
upheld civil liberties in judgments under emergency rule, covertly referred to Justice 
Bhagwati^^ when he stated that a judge must decide without fear or favour:
Will anybody think that a Judge will do so if he sends fawning and
flattering congratulations to political leaders on assumption of office?^^
Fears about the increasing caseload of the Court that may become unmanageable by 
the opening of the floodgates to the Court, about the appropriateness of certain judges 
being actively associated with PIL and the perceived bias of certain judges were to 
persist. In his famous concurring judgment in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union o f  
India and others (Haryana Mines I),^  ^ Justice Pathak raised similar fears, whilst 
advocating a “judicious mix of restraint and activism” on the part of ju d g es.S o m e 
of these issues were addressed when PIL guidelines were framed, as PIL became an 
established and therefore more acceptable as a form of litigation. The divisions in the
For detail and discussion see 'Resistance to the changes' in chapter two.
See Seervai, H M, Constitutional Law o f India. Volume /  (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 3rd 
edition, 1983) at 1062-1063. He quotes from judgements and speeches given by Justice P N Bhagwati, 
to show the “other side” of this judge. When Indira Gandhi was defeated in the elections o f 1977, 
Justice Bhagwati wrote in a judgement (quoted by Seervai at 1062):
Never in the history o f this country has such a clear and unequivocal verdict been given by 
the people, never a more massive vote of no-confidence in the ruling party. When there is such 
crushing defeat suffered by the ruling party and the people have expressed themselves 
categorically against its policies, it is symptomatic o f  complete alienation between the 
Government and the people. It is axiomatic that no Government can function efficiently and 
effectively in accordance with the Constitution in a democratic set up unless it enjoys the good  
will and support o f  the people. Where there is a wall o f  resentment and antipathy in the hearts 
o f  the people against the Government, it is unlikely that it may lead to instability and even the 
administration may be paralysed, (italics supplied)
However, on her successful election in 1980, Justice Bhagwati wrote her a letter of congratulations 
which began (quoted by Seervai at 1063):
May 1 offer you my heartiest congratulations on your resounding victory in the elections and 
your triumphant return as the Prime Minister of India. It is a most remarkable achievement of 
which you, your friends and well-wishers can be justly proud......
It is a very difficult task which lies ahead o f you, but 1 am sure that with your iron will and 
firm determination, uncanny insight and dynamic vision, grand administrative capacity and vast 
experience, overwhelming love and affection o f the people and, above all, a heart which is 
identified with the misery of the poor and the weak, you will be able to steer the ship of the 
nation safely to its cherished goal and the glorious vision o f the founding fathers o f the 
Constitution will become a living reality.
Tulzapurkar, V D (1983) at 17.
AIR 1984 SC 802, as discussed in Bonded Labour' in chapter three.
Ibid. at 841.
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Supreme Court were to alter the reception given to PIL petitions:
In the midst of great opposition and sharp cleavage of opinions among 
the judges, the chief justice [Justice P N Bhagwati] has relentlessly 
projected a deep judicial concern for the liberation of the poor and the 
victimised. The interim direction jurisprudence developed by him seeks 
not only to fashion schemes for the immediate relief of the victims, it 
also contains proposals for the reform of the legal institution. 
O.Chinappa Reddy, G L Oza, D P Madon, R.N.Misra and Balkrishna 
Eradi JJ have all gone along with the chief justice.
R.S.Pathak J (as he was then) along with V D Tulzapurkar and 
S Mukheijee JJ have all favoured a very cautious approach in dealing 
with PIL petitions.^^
Lawyers
Historically, lawyers have played an important part in modem India. 
Mohan Karamdas (Mahatama) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were both lawyers, and 
many members of the Constituent Assembly had studied law.'*° As with judges, most 
lawyers were from more advantaged backgrounds and few were women. Thus the 
predisposition of lawyers working in the higher courts shaped professional concems.'^^ 
Law since independence was conditioned by the specialist practice of formal law,'^ ^
Singh, Parmanand (1986) at 505.
For further discussion see Gandhi, J S (1987) at 110-111; Schmitthener, 'Development of the 
Legal Profession in India' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, Francis (eds) (1987), 678-688; 
Derret, Duncan M, 'Lawyers as Leaders' in Pandey, B N (ed). Leadership in South Asia, (Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 1977), 55-82; Stig Toft, “A Study o f Indian Lawyers”, 
(unpublished Magister's thesis, Copenhagen University, June 1979).
See Galanter, Marc (1984) at 481; Anklesaria, Phiroze, 'Women and the Profession of Law', AIR 
1985 J 1; Menon, Balagangadhara, 'Inequalities against Women - A Challenge for Women Lawyers', 
(1983) 2 s e e  (J) 31.
Amongst others, Bernard Cohn has described this as “lawyer's law”, law in the courtroom, as 
distinct from local law-ways and Indian legal culture. See 'Notes on Disputes and Law in India' in 
Cohn, Bernard, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays, (Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1990), 575-631 at 607-608. Also see Cohn, Bernard S, Some notes on Law and Change in North 
India', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol 53 No 1, Oct 1959, 79-93 at 93 where he 
noted:
Since British procedure and justice appeared capricious to the Indians, someone with a bad 
case was as prone to go to court as someone with a good case. The standard was not the 
justice o f his case, but his ability to outlast his opponents.
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which, during its operation in India, engendered corruption and an excessive focus on 
the tactics of lawyering/^ Having observed that district court lawyers are 
unprofessional to an extreme, use touts to secure business and progress in their careers 
through intimate familial or caste networks, J S Gandhi concluded that similar 
orientations would be found in lawyers practising in the Supreme and High Courts/'* 
To an extent this has been borne out by this fieldwork, as Supreme Court lawyers do 
use networks to further their practice. Whether this amounts to unprofessional 
behaviour depends upon the individual, as certain community networks are inevitable 
because of language and regional links.
In addition to the characteristics of legal practice, the hierarchy of 
lawyers in the Supreme Court and High Courts has shaped the functioning of the 
profession. This hierarchy consists of senior advocates, advocates-on-record and junior 
advocates.'*^ The senior, who is designated as such by the Court, acts on the instruction
Khare has contrasted lawyer's law with native, indigenous law. He quotes Lon Fuller in The Morality 
o f Law, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964) at 106 who has defined lawyer's law as “the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance o f rules” (at 74). Analysing the term, Khare 
then defines lawyer's law more fully as “a public institutionalized mechanism for maintaining public 
order, facilitating cooperative action, legitimizing power, authority and influence, and defining and
reinforcing rights and responsibilities” (at 74). He further describes it as “'foreign' and .. profane. It
does not integrate itself with the sacred order and is not 'bom' out of dharma'' (at 75), and later 
decribes court law as “culturally symbolic o f many 'vices' ranging form telling a lie and gambling to 
ruthlessness and individual oppression” (at 79). See Khare, R S, Indigenous Culture and Lawyer's Law 
in India', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol 14, 1972, 71-96. For further comments on 
the literary form taken by law, see chapter seven.
Ibid. See Kidder, Robert L, 'Courts and Conflict in an Indian City: A Study in Legal Impact', 
Journal o f  Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol 11, 1973, 121-139; Nagpaul, Hans, 'The Legal 
Profession in Indian Society: A Case Study of Lawyers at a Local Level in North India', International 
Journal o f  the Sociology o f Law, Vol 22, 1994, 59-76. Also see Kidder, Robert L, 'Formal Litigation 
and Professional Insecurity in Bangalore' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, Francis (eds) 
(1987), 697-707 at 703, where he obsserves:
Formal litigation imposes the need to develop a portfolio o f alternative legal theories' which 
can first be examined for legal strengths and weaknesses, ranked into a set o f priorities,
prepared and protected like a fail safe' system, then altered innovatively as the events of
litigation make some positions untenable.... Many o f the client's most basic assumptions about 
the relevance of events and facts will be shattered by the lawyer's decision to discard 
peripheral or legally irrelevant facts.
Gandhi, J S (1987) at 118.
In the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts there is a separate class o f legal practitioners, known 
as solicitors, who prepare the case, but do not argue in Court.
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of another advocate and argues before the Court. The advocate-on-record is permitted, 
after passing an examination, to file any application in Court on behalf of a party, and 
therefore deals with all the procedural matters. The junior assists either a senior 
advocate or an advocate-on-record. The critical role of the lawyer, in PIL, acting as 
a mediator between the court and the people, can only be understood according to the 
type of advocate in question, and therefore, the relationship that the advocate has with 
the client.
With a grand perception of their role and the concomitant sense of the 
centrality of law, lawyers were fundamental to the inception of PIL. When the state 
of internal emergency was declared in 1975, some lawyers protested. For example, N 
M Palkhiwala refused to continue to appear for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 
Allahabad High Court in protest at the declaration of emergency, and the All India Bar 
Council and groups of lawyers challenged the changes.K idder, noting the propensity 
of lawyers to react as a group against a policy if it clearly threatens their economic 
interests, suggested that the agitation among city lawyers could have stemmed from 
the reduced amount of work available after the emergency measures were enforced.'*  ^
However, members of the legal profession were not just reacting to the compromise 
of their professional autonomy. Leading constitutional lawyers, such as Ram 
Jethmalani, then President of the All India Bar Council, were threatened with 
imprisonment. For many others, the threats were realised.
Lawyers became involved in PIL in a number of different ways. Many 
were petitioners themselves, filing applications in response to newspaper articles. Their 
area of expertise was law, and legal provisions promised a resolution through the 
enforcement of legally defined rights. Kapila Hingorani, together with her husband and 
professional partner, wrote of the emotional response that led her to initiate
See N  P Nathwani v The Commissioner o f  Police 1975 (78) BLR 1, for a petition filed by 
lawyers in Bombay after they were prevented from holding a meeting to discuss “Civil Liberties and 
the Rule o f Law under the Constitution”.
Kidder, Robert L, 'Law and Political Crisis: An Assessment of the Indian Legal System's 
Potential Role', Asian Survey, Vol 16 No 9, 1976, 879-897, at 892.
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Hussainara Khatoon v State o f Bihar,^^ after reading press reports in the Indian
Express:
I started reading the article while sipping my tea. I felt choked. “How 
can such a situation exist in our country? We are lawyers of so many 
years' standing and we are not even aware of it, we must do something 
about it.”'*^
Some lawyers were office-holders in civil liberties organisations^® and 
were themselves instrumental in initiating discussion of civil rights abuses on the 
public agenda, as well as in filing the petitions. From the inception of PIL these 
lawyers appear to differ from petitioner-lawyers,^ ' both in the motivation for filing 
petitions and in the general awareness of the issues raised. Of concern was the 
integrity of the judicial and criminal justice systems. Often senior advocates, they were 
imbued with a sense of constitutionalism and respect for the existing rule of law. In 
addition to these advocates, other senior, well-established lawyers became involved 
in PIL, often arguing cases in Court. They gave the initiatives a greater legitimacy and 
credibility in front of judges who might have been more dismissive of those with a 
lesser reputation.^^
Others had themselves gained perspective, that was to inform their 
future professional activity, whilst a part of the new politics discussed below. A 
younger generation than the civil liberties lawyers, many of these advocates had been 
involved in student politics, and brought their political commitment with them to the
(1980) 1 s e e  81, as discussed in 'Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three.
Hingorani, Kapila, 'Public Interest Litigation', (unpublished article. New Delhi, [1987?]) at 3.
Examples are V M Tarkunde and Govind Mukhoty in the Supreme eourt and M A Rane in the 
Bombay High eourt. V M Tarkhunde was a member o f the PUeL and the eitizens for Democracy, M 
A Rane a member of the PUeL, and Govind Mukhoty a member o f the PUDR. Upendra Baxi has 
described the Gitizens for Democracy, People's Union for Givil Liberties and PUDR as lawyer-led social 
action groups. See Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme 
eourt o f India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 379.
Lawyers who are the petitioners in PIL petitions.
For example. Ram Jethmalani and Soli Sorabjee.
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law.”  Having often made a self-conscious decision to practice law for more
disadvantaged sections of the community, they were struggling to varying degrees with
the concept of constitutionalism and the prevailing modes of dispute settlement. As
one such lawyer, Indira Jaising, stated:
India literally inherited a legal system because it was a colony. .. Much 
of my time in the legal profession has been spent trying to dismantle 
that system.”
Excited at the prospect of the increased access provided by PIL, and by the support 
of judges, these lawyers actively participated in initiatives to file PIL cases, by activist 
groups and individuals with no formal constituency.”  Other lawyers, less overtly 
committed to activist concerns, became involved because of personal connections with 
journalists, or activists.”  The informal networks of schools and colleges provided 
connections between lawyers and activists, many of whom shared similar 
backgrounds.”
Although the careers and aspirations of many lawyers were to flow 
from their involvement with PIL, for others it presented a threat. Many lawyers 
protested against the perceived explosion in the number of PIL cases:
For example; Indira Jaising, a Supreme Court and High Court advocate and founder member of 
the Lawyers Collective in Bombay; Nandita Haksar, a Supreme Court and High Court advocate, 
member of the PUDR and later a member of the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights; Supreme 
Court advocate R Venkataramani; S S Vasudevan, an advocate in the Madras High Court; A X 
Verghese, an advocate practicing in the Kerala High Court.
Jaising, Indira, 'Public Interest Litigation: The Lessons from India', (presentation on The future 
for civil litigation' at an International Conference, Shaping the Future. New directions fo r legal services, 
Legal Action Group, London, 12/11/94). The proceedings of this conference have been published. See 
Smith, Roger (ed), Shaping the Future. New directions fo r legal services, (Legal Action Group, London, 
1995).
For example. People's Union for Democratic Rights PUDR and others v Union o f  India and 
others AIR 1982 SC 1473, as discussed in Labour' in chapter three.
See the section on the dramatis personae o f PIL in Baxi, Upendra, Taking Suffering Seriously: 
Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court o f India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 395- 
398.
For example, advocate Kapil Sibal appeared in the case filed by Sanjit Roy (Bunker Roy, Social 
Work and Research Centre, Tilonia, 16/2/92) and Swami Agnivesh o f the Bandhua Mukti Morcha was 
able to contact advocate Govind Mukhoty, then member o f the PUDR, through a college friend (Swami 
Agnivesh, New Delhi, 21/2/91).
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senior lawyers were openly heard to say that if the Supreme Court thus 
wants to do social justice, it had better meet on the weekends/^
The reaction, described by Upendra Baxi as ranging from indifference to indignation
at what is perceived as a freak form of litigation,^^ contrasted with the overt support
from others in the legal profession.
Concomitant with the differing ideological inclinations and status at the 
bar, a number of different types of legal practice in the Supreme and High Courts can 
be identified. Along with the successful urban lawyer (with a reputation and a large 
income) were those who conduct the routine work of the Court. Many focussed on the 
rule of law with the overwhelming belief that law could resolve injustice on a case-by- 
case basis,^° whilst others were responding to instances of injustice and the populist 
demand for legal assistance. Emerging in the 1980's, with PIL and legal aid as the 
mainstay, was a new category of activist lawyers. PIL was to be found in all types of 
offices, but with different levels of commitment.^' The focus of the lawyer on the 
inherently formal procedures and requirements encouraged issues to be viewed as legal 
problems. Developments, parallel to the use of PIL, were taking place in the Supreme 
and High Courts. Within non-governmental organisations, “barefoot lawyers”, as they 
came to be known, were predominantly concerned with access to justice. Support 
would be given to clients through the provision of legal education and the filing of
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of  
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 409. This echoes the Congressmen” of the nineteenth 
century, who worked for social uplift at the weekends. See Nossiter, T J, Communism in Kerala, ((C 
Hurst & Company, London, 1982) at 71.
59 Ibid.
Galanter, Marc, 'Making law work for the oppressed'. The Other Side, Vol 3 No 2, Mar 1983, 
7-15 at 12.
In a study of legal change in the US, Marc Galanter has noted:
The more close and enduring the lawyer-client relationship, the more the primary loyalty of 
lawyers is to clients rather than to courts or guild, the more telling the advantages of  
accumulated expertise and guidance in overall strategy.
See Galanter, Marc, 'Why the “Haves” come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change'. Law 
and Society, Vol 9 No 1, Fall 1974, 95-160 at 114-115. For a study of lawyers in Britain see 
Scheingold, Stuart, 'The contradictions of radical law practice' in Cain, Maureen and Harrington, 
Christine B (eds). Lawyers in a postmodern world, (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1994), 265- 
283.
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c a s e s . Initially, initiatives of this kind contrasted sharply with the development of 
PIL which could only situated in an urban, elite setting, and the proponents of which 
were not accountable to those represented by the petitions.^^ The dilemma of the urban 
lawyers committed to a different vision of society were to be sharply delineated by 
the practice of PIL.
Activism
The close link between human rights groups and law has been apparent 
from the start. Groups were formed in the early 1940's to provide legal aid to 
nationalists accused of sedition against the colonial authorities.Initially, activist 
groups were more in evidence in the southern states of India, a region culturally 
distinct from northern states. In the late 1960’s, the release of political prisoners from 
jail and the concern for the violation of the constitutional rights of some marginal 
groups and of political activists, were imperatives in the formation of regional civil 
liberties groups, by sympathizers of and participants in the Marxist-Leninist 
movement.^^ Opposition to the Congress (I) government gained momentum with social 
movements in the 1970's such as the agitation launched by Jayaprakash Narayan to 
counter Indira Gandhi. In 1975 the PUCLDR (People's Union for Civil Liberties and 
Democratic Rights) was formed. After the stifling of dissent under the emergency and 
the lull in the activity of these groups during the time of the Janata government
Galanter, Marc (1983) lists Rajpipla Free Legal Aid, the Legal Support Scheme operated by the 
An and Niketan Ashram and the programmes o f AWARE in Andhra Pradesh as organisations with 
schemes o f barefoot lawyers and paralegals. See 'Alternative and Corollary Innovations' infra.
Galanter, Marc (1983) at 12.
See Kothari, Smitu, 'The Human Rights Movement in India: Crisis and Challenges' in Forsythe, 
David P (ed), (1989), 94-109 at 95. In interview, V M Tarkunde stated that the first such movement, 
the Civil Liberties Union, was formed in 1936 - see Kothari, Smitu, An Interview with V M Tarkunde' 
in Sethi, Harsh and Kothari, Smitu (eds) (1989), 133-149 at 133. Also see Haksar, Nandita, Civil 
Liberties Movement in India', The Lawyers, Vol 6 No 6, June 1991, 4-12 at 4.
See Kothari, Smitu, The Human Rights Movement in India: Crisis and Challenges' in Forsythe, 
David P (ed), (1989), 94-109 at 95; Haksar, Nandita, Civil Liberties Movement in India', The Lawyers, 
Vol 6 No 6, June 91, 4-12 at 4
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thereafter, civil liberties groups resurfaced with greater momentum. Having been
disappointed by the expected revival of the democratic process after the emergency,
by 1980 the activities of civil liberties groups, including the now divided Delhi-based
PUDR and national PUCL, resumed. Both were to become important protagonists in
PIL. The dilemma faced by such groups, which repeatedly resorted to law, has been
encapsulated by Harsh Sethi:
Working within the bounds of our Constitution and operating with a 
single point charter that the laws of the land be respected and followed, 
most of their earlier activities, though causing momentary discomfort, 
rarely created waves. This applies to the dozen of earlier exposes of 
illegal detention, torture, encounter killings, indiscriminate firings - 
even to promulgation of draconian laws. Since the debates generated 
essentially remained confined to a small set, neither did they acquire 
significance, nor was it necessary to silence such criticism. If anything 
CRGs [civil rights groups] could always be pointed out as reflections 
of a healthy democratic polity.^^
The conflict between effectiveness and legality is recognisable in many of the groups
that began to petition the Court. While recourse to law would ultimately reinforce the
legitimacy of laws, it could not ensure the provision of basic civil and democratic
rights.
Distinct from these civil liberties groups, with a predominantly middle- 
class urban elite membership, social action groups, without any overt political 
affiliations, began to be formed in the late 1960's, predominantly in southern states.^^ 
By the late-1970s these social movements gained strength and organisations such as 
the Social Work and Research Centre in Tilonia, Bandhua Mukti Morcha in New 
Delhi, Shramjeevi Sangathana in Maharashtra and Manushi in New Delhi began to 
emerge.*^  ^ Concerned with specific groups of people, such as villagers of a particular
“  Sethi, Harsh, 'Beyond the Fragments: The Civil Rights Groups Today' in Sethi, Harsh and 
Kothari, Smitu (eds) (1989), 73-82 at 75.
Fernandes, Walter, 'Participatory Research and Action in India', Social Action, Vol 39, Jan-Mar 
1989, 1-21 at 1.
It cannot be assumed that these groups are comparable in terms of their structure and actions. For 
an overview, see Shah, Ghanshyam, Social Movements in India. A Review o f  the Literature, (Sage 
Publications, New Delhi, 1990).
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region, bonded labourers or w om en,these groups had a commonality of opposition 
t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  m o d e r n  
Indian state, and had grown out of a post-emergency consciousness.
Variously identified as an alternative movement or the “New politics”
by Raj ni Kothari,^® the emergence of activist groups has been attributed to the failure
of the top-down model in managing society .R ajeev Dhavan has observed that all
identified similar problems, and that all expressed an interest in developing greater
legal skills in order to deal with these problems.^^ The emphasis was on the rights of
people, not just in terms of civil liberties but economic, social and community rights
and on the causes and effects of poverty and marginalisation. Amongst those
participating and analysing the developments was Harsh Sethi of the Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi. His definition links civil rights and
activist groups under the broad heading of human rights groups, and locates civil
liberties (CL), democratic rights (DR) and human rights(HR) along a continuum;
CL and DR define the nature of the political terrain mediating the 
relationships between the state and the citizen. In the case of India, CL 
are rights which are guaranteed by the constitution, justiciable in courts 
via law. DR get reflected in the directive principles of state policy 
which provide indications of the directions in which the expansion of 
fundamental rights ought to take place. HR go beyond what any nation­
state is willing to or is in a position to consider, and raise questions of
Omvedt, Gail, We will smash this prison!: Indian Women in Struggle, (Zed Press, London, 1980); 
Kumar, Radha, The History o f  Doing, (Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1993); Reddy, R Narayana, 
'Women's Movement: The Indian Scene' in The Indian Journal o f  Social Work, Vol XLVI No 4, Jan 
86, 507-514; Patel, Vibuthi, 'Women's Liberation in India', New Left Review, No 153, Sept-oct 85, 75- 
86; Caiman, Leslie J, Toward Empowerment. Women and Movement Politics in India, (Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1992). Madhu Kishwar described how it was only after the emergency that the women's 
movement developed “a more comprehensive and articulated perspective on the steady discrimination 
against women through the forces of the market and state policy”. See 'Annexure II - Summaries of  
Special Lectures' in Sethi Harsh, Refocussing Praxis; Report o f  the UNU-UNDP Interaction Programme 
fo r  Senior Action Researchers in South Asia, (A SETU-Lokayan Report, 1987), 57-60 at 57.
Kothari, Raj ni. Politics and People. In Search o f  a Humane India, Volume I, (Ajanta Publications, 
Delhi, second edition, 1990) at 397.
'The Grassroots Phenomenon' in Kothari, Rajni, Politics and the People. In Search o f  a Humane 
India, Volume II, (Ajanta Publications, Delhi, second edition, 1990), 401-413 at 402.
Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Managing Legal Activism: Reflecting on India's Legal Aid Programme', 
(unpublished paper, 1984) at 25.
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an ontological nature, such as the rights of unborn generations/^
The key choices of such groups, as identified by Upendra Baxi, were between 
reformism and revolution, autonomy and accountability, violence and non-violence, 
youth and age, direct action and law/'^ These theoretical and practical organisational 
dilemmas were to suffuse the concerns about the resort to law and compromises 
necessitated by the legal system.
For many Indian marxists, who formed a significant part of the civil 
liberties groups and participated in the new politics, law could do little more than 
expose the contradiction between the rhetoric and reality of the constitutional scheme. 
Using PIL could perhaps speed this process. For them, and for others, using the 
Constitution was akin to accepting the compromises made at the time of independence. 
Nonetheless, having witnessed the abuse of constitutional powers, and the strength of 
law as a tool of this legitimacy, it was recognised that a resort to legal measures might 
be apposite, indeed the only viable option given the violent means that had been used 
by the state to quell dissent (both in terms of physical and institutional violence).^^ It 
was hoped that the courts would provide an opportunity to participate in democratic 
processes, which had previously been denied in practice, consequently closing the gap 
between the ethics and legality. PIL was thus a social rather than a legal ac tiv ity ,a s  
the social costs of other forms of dissent had proved too costly. Implicit were choices 
for reformism, non-violence and law. The question of accountability was to arise later.
Sethi, Harsh, 'Report on the Meeting: The Discussions' in Sethi Harsh (1987), 17-42 at 30.
Baxi, Upendra 'Activism at the Crossroads with Signposts' in Fernandes Walter (ed), Voluntary 
Action and Government Control, (Indian Social Institute monograph series. New Delhi, 1986), 35-49 
at 40-47.
Rajni Kothari, referring to the anticipated model in which the state played a dominant role, 
attributed the discussion of voluntary organisation to the reappraisal o f the role o f the state:
Not just the ruling party and the government, but even the radicals, including the Marxists, 
whose theory told them that the State was the executive committee of the ruling class, believed 
that in India the State had to take on a pioneering, regenerating and liberating role. And, except 
for a few albeit strong sceptics, even the Gandhians accepted this assumption.
'Voluntary Organisations in a Plural Society' in Kothari, Rajni (Volume II, 1990), 414-434 at 414.
Dhavan, Rajeev (unpublished, 1984) at 24.
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The ascription of causation when analysing the use of law by activist 
groups must not be overstated. In particular, many of the activist groups had emerged 
as a response to social conditions. To attribute a formal vision of law and its 
potentialities to these groups would be impossible. It is only through the experience 
of using law, from the difficulties that they were to encounter, that a vision of what 
law could achieve was gained. One of the most striking features of PIL is the naivety 
with which law had been used. It was perceived by petitioners and legal professionals 
that recourse to the courts could redress wrongs and correct injustices. While the gap 
between legal discourse and reality was acknowledged, the distance between the two 
did not seem unbridgeable.
Other groups that had not emerged from the political left, nor from the 
student and other social movements that had burgeoned after the emergency, were 
pivotal at this time. Law was a central concern of the new public interest groups that 
had begun to gain momentum. The impetus for the Consumer Education and Research 
Centre in Ahmedabad was not a concern for civil rights or poverty, but rather for 
those issues which had been dealt with under PIL in the USA.^  ^ These new public 
interest groups were to become increasingly visible users of PIL. However, what was 
remarkable about all the groups that emerged was the convergence of interest in the 
late 1970's. The concerns about how law should be used, and by what means, 
characterised the groups and was to be reflected in the eventual successes and failures 
of PIL.
Media
The expansion of investigative journalism after the emergency period, 
promoted the recognition given to the issues that became the subject of PILs.^  ^During
Manubhai Shah, Consumer Education and Research Centre, interview, Ahmedabad, 17/2/91.
For a critical study of the press in India see Dhavan, Rajeev, Only the Good News, (Manohar 
Publications, New Delhi, 1987).
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the emergency, press freedom had been curtailed through a number of censorship
orders and the enactment of the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Act.
1976/"^ Petitions had been filed, for example in the Bombay High Court, in an attempt
to uphold the freedom of the press.^° Many journalists had been imprisoned.^^
Although influential, the post emergency press has been criticised for its eclecticism:
In an effort to claim their own power and find social and political 
status for a core of journalists, the press entered into mindless 
exposure. It did everything and nothing.
Citing Arun Shourie as an example, Rajeev Dhavan questioned whether he was trying
to protect the institutions of democracy, or to assert his animosity for Indira Gandhi.^^
Whatever the impetus, it was the breadth of reporting and the growth
of investigative journalism, after the emergency, that led to many PIL cases. Upendra
Baxi in his early seminal study of PIL has taken a more sympathetic view, when he
described the realisation amongst joumalists that the curtailment of civil liberties under
the emergency was analogous to the every day excesses of state power on citizens:
this print media transformation enabled activist social action groups .. 
to elevate what were regarded as petty instances of injustice and 
tyranny at the local level into national issues, calling attention to the 
pathology of public and dominant power group.®'^
See Sorabjee, Soli J, The Emergency, Censorship and the Press in India, 1975-1977, (Central 
News Agency, New Delhi, 1977); Sorabjee, Soli J, Law o f  Press Censorship in India, (N M Tripathi 
Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1976).
See Binod Rao v Minocher Rustom Masani (1976) 78 BLR 125 and Shridhar Mahadeo Joshi v 
The State o f  Maharashtra (1976) 79 BLR 289. For a citation of a petition filed by joumalists, see N  
P Nathwani op cit note 46.
Dhavan, Rajeev (1987) at 57.
Ibid. at 8.
Ibid. at 60.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court o f  
India' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 394. Also see [anon], 'Special Report: Press on 
Regardless or, how the Indian media pioneered the concept of public interest litigation'. The Sunday 
Times o f  India, 6/9/92.
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Press reports were to motivate the filing of petitions by journalists/^ 
lawyers/^ judges^^ and concerned individuals. Prisoners, bonded labourers and women 
were among those to be given attention in the print media.^^ In addition, the extra 
impetus given to social movements, such as the women's movement, by the 
publication of specialist journals including Stree Sangarsh and Manushi, were to 
provide support, exposure and a forum for the discussion of PIL.^^
Funding
The viability of PIL was shaped, in part, by the money available. While 
some lawyers did consent to work free and relaxed procedures enabled petitions to be 
filed without charge, especially for activist groups working in mral areas, the burden 
of the cost of PIL was debilitating. While the increase in legal aid funding through 
CILAS did enable some groups to use PIL, attempts by Rajeev Dhavan to establish 
a PIL cell as a part of CILAS in 1982 were unsuccessful.^® Financial issues were 
important in the courtroom, in the appointment of lawyers to work amicus curiae and 
in the award and disbursement of costs. These costs, especially those rendered for the 
conduct of an investigation or to commissioners, were paid for by the government. As
Arun Shourie, a prominent journalist o f the time petitioned the Court and discussed the need for 
PIL in Shourie, Arun, ' Aide-memoir for the Hon'ble Supreme Court. On Why the Hon'ble Court Must 
Hear Us', (1981) 4 SCC (J) 1. As noted in chapters three and four, numerous other PIL petitions were 
filed by joumalists.
It was K F Rustamji's articles in the Indian Express of 8/1/79 and 9/1/79 that were to prompt 
Kapila Hingorani to file the case Hussainara Khatoon and others v Home Secretary, State o f  Bihar 
(1980) 1 SCC 81. Many others were to follow.
Suo moto actions were usually prompted by newspaper reports.
See for example, Mazumdar, Sudip, 'Undertrials: a living hell'. Seminar, Oct 1984, 14-17. This 
was published as part of an issue entitled “Lawless Laws” and described as a symposium on the misuse 
of the judicial process'.
The section on 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three documents cases which were 
discussed in these journals.
Chot Murada, Committee for the implementation of Legal Aid Services, interview. New Delhi, 
12/3/91. See 'Alternatives and Corollary Innovations' infra.
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a result of the limited finances available for PIL, the most controversial and 
widespread support for activism in general, and PIL in particular, came in the form 
of foreign funding.
Amongst the foreign foundations and organisations working in India, 
the Ford Foundation, a North American philanthropic organisation, has been the most 
visible in the funding of action groups using law. Funding of this nature had begun 
with programmes in the USA, for example when, in 1964, the Ford Foundation funded 
legal services in its Mobilisation for Youth in New York and in 1970 when it began 
to support PIL firms.^' Beginning its work in India, this foundation initially focused 
on developments in the USA as a justification for encouraging legal activism in India. 
One of the first recipients of funds by an organisation which was to enable the 
creative use of law, was given to the Consumer Education and Research Centre in 
Ahmedabad, after Manubhai Shah had convinced funding officers of the viability of 
his proposed legal strategy by citing USA legal decisions.^^ The appointment of R 
Sudarshan to the Foundation, in the mid 1980's, was to remove much of the remaining 
inhibition for the funding of social action groups within the funding mandate.
Along with the funding of groups, support was forthcoming through the 
funding of conferences, which enabled groups of social activists to meet and discuss 
the potentialities in law. Justice P N Bhagwati and Upendra Baxi were amongst those 
who sought to promote PIL in this manner. In 1981 CILAS held a meeting which 
encouraged PIL petitions.^^ Other conferences were organised by the International 
Commission for Jurists^ "* and the Ford Foundation.^^ Rajeev Dhavan, who has attended
See Handler, Joel; Hollingsworth, Ellen Jane and Erlanger, Howard S (1978).
Manubhai Shah, Consumer Education and Research Centre, interview, Ahmedabad, 17/2/91.
Prem Bhai, Banwasi Seva Ashram, New Delhi, 9/4/92. See 'Access to Justice' in chapter two for 
details.
Rural Development and Human Rights in South Asia' held in Lucknow in December 1981.
' International Workshop on Effective Uses o f Law by Social Action Groups' held in Ahmedabad, 
from December 1981 to January 1982.
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many of these meetings observed that although they recognised common issues:
many of the groups had very little in common. They differed greatly 
in the nature and style of their operations. They differed in respect of 
the comfort and discomfort they suffered and the danger they courted. 
While adopting the perspective of the disadvantaged, they differed in 
their relation to activist work. Their political alliances reflected 
gravitational pulls which gave rise to mutual suspicion and doubt.^^
Divisions emerged not just amongst those groups which were attending 
the conferences and receiving the funding, but within the broader human rights 
movement. Civil liberties groups, in particular, refused to take funds from foreign 
organisations or large corporations, for fear of being drawn into a spiral of expenditure 
that would compel them to shape their activities in a manner that would ensure further 
funds. Financial resources would equip an office and pay staff, and would mean that 
the recipient would be under pressure to ensure that funding continues. One example 
given was that once a computer is installed, money is needed at regular intervals to 
pay for air-conditioning. The administration of the funds would require an 
establishment capable of producing financial and progress reports, and of submitting 
repeat requests for funds. Underlying this was the fear that the mandate of funding 
agencies would support a particular kind of activism, ignoring certain difficult and 
politically sensitive issues. Many organisations felt insecure at not being able to dictate 
the conditionality of funding, and those that did receive funding were often dependent 
on the brokers, the main players in PIL in New Delhi, who had a personal relationship 
with the funders. The extent to which the form and substance of PIL in India has been 
led by the resources was to remain a subject of controversy. However, many of those 
groups that petitioned the Court from an organisational base, had to rely, initially, on 
the arbitrary method of sending a letter to the court (see chapter five), before later 
gaining the attention of a funding agency, and building a stronger organisational base.
Dhavan, Rajeev (unpublished, 1984) at 29.
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PIL Continues
The experience of using PIL after the mid-1980's warrants separate
analysis. The constitution of the courts changed, lawyers' initial excitement at being
involved in a new form of litigation waned, and the aspirations of petitioners were
informed by the experience gained during the early part of the decade. V M Tarkunde,
a civil liberties lawyer, described the changes:
For some time, there was a good deal of optimism because of this 
method of raising public issues. ... we are increasingly coming up 
against a sort of dead wall. If you are able to induce a court to give 
some compensation or relief, then people's interest is redeemed. More 
often now, there are investigations and nothing happens.^^
As with the former section, the involvement of 'Judges' is first 
discussed. The evaluation of Lawyers' involvement with PIL leads into the evaluation 
of Petitioners and Petitions'. The involvement of the 'Media' and aspects of 'Funding', 
after the establishment of PIL, complete this section.
Judges
The judicial response to PIL has changed and evolved over time. After 
the retirement of Chief Justice Bhagwati from the Supreme Court in 1986, few 
significant developments to further the cause of the activist, through PIL, have taken 
place in the Supreme Court.^^ Continuing support for social justice initiatives can be 
found in the High Court: Justice P D Desai was a known supporter of PIL during his
Kothari, Smitu, 'An Interview with V.M. Tarkunde' in Kothari Smitu and Sethi, Harsh (eds), 133- 
149 at 145-146. This reply was in response to the question: “How do you view, particularly in the 
1980s, the recourse to public interest litigation?”
Compensation has been given more freely and greater access to justice achieved through the 
increased use o f class action petitions.
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tenure as Chief Justice of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, from 1983 to 1988;^^
Justice Hansaria was known for his support for PIL when in A ssam /N onetheless,
judgments of the Supreme Court show how the conceptual base of PIL has been
further elucidated only in an effort to restrain its scope. Writing in 1987, Justice
Bhagwati noted the reaction of many judges to the appointment of socio-legal
commissions of enquiry:
This new strategy evolved by the Supreme Court was unorthodox and 
unconventional. It shocked the conscience of conservative lawyers and 
judges clinging to the worn-out values of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
They thought that what the Court was doing was heretical*®*
Judges faithful to the Anglo-Indian tradition were to remain in the majority on the
Court, as Judges who might further the initiatives of the early 1980s were no longer
appointed. One significant influence of PIL has been the effect upon judicial
discourse. As seen in the case studies, the parameters of PIL have been refined. In
interviews conducted in 1991,*®^  the reaction of sitting Supreme Court judges to
questions about PIL was marked by rhetorical support, showing that PIL has gained
a semblance of acceptability even amongst conservative judges.*®^
As part of this support, all the judges described PIL as necessary to 
ensure justice was made available to the poor, and were in favour of the relaxation in 
the rule of locus standi. In spite of this sentiment, with the exception of two judges, 
there was little clarity about the origins of PIL, as a variety of different cases were
See the discussion of Himachal Pradesh in chapter five.
Niloy Dutta, advocate, interview, Guwahati, 8/6/93. Upendra Baxi also observed that wherever 
Justice Hansaria and Justice P D Desai are, they are progressive. Upendra Baxi, Vice-Chancellor of 
Delhi University, Delhi, 5/8/93. See 'High Courts' in chapter five.
Bhagwati, P N, Social Action Litigation: the Indian Experience' in Tiruchelvam, Neelam and 
Coomaraswamy, Radhika (eds) (1987), 20-31 at 25.
The identity of the eighteen sitting judges of the Supreme Court (total number of sitting judges 
at that time equalled twenty-five) interviewed between January and March 1991 has been withheld, as 
this was a condition o f the conduct o f the interviews.
Eighteen o f the twenty-four judges sitting on the Supreme Court were interviewed between 
January and March 1991. References to these interviews are given in code. For an example o f the 
interviewing style of judges see Mitta, Manoj, Interview o f the Fortnight: M N Venkatachaliah “All 
mercy is no justice”', India Today, 15/11/94, 42-44.
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cited as the starting point. Similarly, there was little clarity as to the import of PIL. 
In response to an initial question about why PIL emerged, one judge asked “what did 
Justice Bhagwati say?”. Half of those interviewed were supportive of the other 
procedural innovations, such as the registration of letters as writ petitions and the 
institution of commissions. One judge was enthusiastic about PIL, to the extent that 
he stated that 95% of cases have had a good result.
Having expressed their support for PIL as a concept, other judges
displayed a reluctant antagonism to PIL during interview. A hesitation to speak openly
was apparent even in those judges who have demonstrated a hostility to PIL in their
judgments. It was felt that PIL was interfering with the functioning of the Court as
part of the constitutional scheme and as the upholder of the rule of law. The perceived
fear that an undue burden was being placed on the Court was repeatedly voiced. The
need for a formal definition of PIL was a theme that recurred as some judges no
longer seemed willing to allow PIL to evolve according to the kind of petitions which
were filed. PIL was perceived as messy, petty and lacking in legal depth. One judge
laughed whilst referring to a petition asking that fluoride be banned from toothpaste,
whilst another said;
PIL is also known as “Publicity Interest Litigation” .. Yesterday there
was a person in court trying to stop the elections. It was a publicity
stunt as that person wanted his name in the paper. Also there are a lot 
of unverified claims, for example about bonded labour. PIL is useful, 
for example to counter pollution in Delhi, but not for individual fights 
and not in adversarial cases. When the court gets a complaint about 
bonded labour, and investigation takes place, it is found that the 
workers are working voluntarily.
Some were concerned about the Court as a non-partisan institution which was
succumbing to popular pressures:
The US Supreme Court and the House of Lords [in Britain] are 
effective because they are inaccessible. First an attempt to resolve the 
issue is made through lobbying and then through negotiation and 
compromise. Only then is a suit presented to the District Court. If and 
when it does reach the Supreme Court in the US it is not a live issue.
The court has time to think in a balanced state of mind because the
Justice AH2 in interview.
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apex court is not controversial.
The fissures that had emerged in the Court in the early 1980's seemed
to have become entrenched. While some were unequivocally supportive of PIL, others
criticised the judicial response. The pride with which one judge told of his own
involvement is noteworthy:
When I was Chief Justice i n  I was entering the court and saw a
woman distraught and crying. I stopped and asked her what the 
problem was. I often used to stop on the way to court in this way. She 
said that her husband and sons had been taken by the police and killed.
I took her to the registrar where she filed a petition. As a result of this
case from , ten police officers have been suspended and committed
for trial. This judgement has had a salutary effect in all of the State of
 . One order has made the police more careful in handling people
in custody.
When juxtaposed with the criticism that “everything is now a PIL”, and the repeated 
reservations expressed about the extent of PIL, the tensions within the bench are 
illustrated:
Before a Supreme Court judge would have a conservative outlook on 
PIL but in the Supreme Court with the problems of the country the 
philosophy and outlook of the court has been transformed. Great 
judges, of whom Bhagwati contributed the most, have sometimes gone 
too far in this direction. A balanced view is needed; it is not the court's 
function to take up the job of the executive
The concern about the use of PIL that has been articulated, has appeared in the form
of concern about the parameters of judicial review, and the misuse of PIL, as seen in
the case studies in chapters three and four.
It is possible that the judges were especially cautious in their responses 
because of the corruption charges that had been directed against Justice V Ramaswami
Justice NKl in interview. 
Justice ASl in interview.
Justice HNl in interview.
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at the time at which the interviews took place. Reports about judicial corruption are 
inextricably linked to the tactics employed by lawyers. A list of corrupt practices 
compiled by a reader in psychology listed fourteen ways in which judges could 
exercise their discretion for unscrupulous ends.^°  ^ Covert judicial manoeuvres 
compound the discord, and as Upendra Baxi noted in 1988, Justice Pathak's 
reservations in the leading bonded labour case,^'° provides “a ruling idiom for 
governance of SAL” as the Court errs on the side of c a u t i o n . I n  a later article he 
went on to note:
care has been taken to ensure that the powerful dissident articulation 
of the violation of human rights in planning and development becomes 
an occasional rather than a growing permanent feature of judicial 
discourse; persons suspected of even remote tendencies towards 
activism are to be kept away from the high Bench.
Changes on the bench have occurred, as the numbers of women judges 
on the High Courts have increased.Some judges with a stated concern for social 
justice continue to be appointed, as the considerations for appointment do allow for 
those who, whilst displaying judicial statesmanship and integrity, articulate their 
concern effectively. This concern has manifested itself in efforts to limit the misuse 
of PIL through judicial discourse.
Chengappa, Raj and Rahman, M, 'Special Report: The Judiciary. Crisis of Credibility', India 
Today, 15/7/90, 18-23. Although a sitting judge, during the interview period Justice Ramaswami was 
not active, and there was much consternation about the events as they unfolded. See Judges, Courts, 
Lawyers' in chapter four.
See [anon], 'Adaalat Antics: Corruption Check-List', The Lawyers, Vol 6 No 2, Feb 1991, 32. 
The lists includes 'statutory provisions in favour of disfavoured party are overlooked'.
Bandhua Mukti Marcha v Union o f  India and others (Haryana Mines I) AIR 1984 SC 802, as 
discussed in Bonded Labour' in chapter three.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 413.
Baxi (1991) at 83-4.
See Keshwaar, Sanober, 'Women Judges. Who will make it to the Supreme Court?', The 
Lawyers, Vol 3 No 1, Jan 1988, 4-10. Nonetheless, only 2.8% of all Supreme Court and High Court 
judges were women, according to Government statistics published in 1988 and quoted in Agarwal, Bina 
(1994) at 499.
303
There appears to be little change in the social background of judges,
who have been appointed. In a judgment in 1993, Justice S Ratnavel Pandian referred
to tables showing the poor representation of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other
backward classes and women on the benches of the High Courts,""^ stating:
the right of entry into superior judicial office is not the exclusive 
prerogative or any particular coterie or privileged class or group of 
people. ... it is neither inheritable nor a matter of patronage."^
The patronage in judicial appointments has been shown to extend to the judicial
function. Part of the growing concern over judicial corruption has highlighted
prevalent nepotism. It has been alleged that in several High Courts, almost half of the
judges have children or close relatives practising in the Cour t , wh i l s t  efforts by the
bar to entertain sitting judges has become commonplace .The  cases on 'Judges,
Courts, Lawyers' (in chapter four) illustrate the concern about the judiciary, whilst also
demonstrating the willingness of judges to use PIL for their own welfare.
Judges have been able to secure privileges outside of the courtoom. The 
use of sitting judges on commissions, appointed to investigate in PIL matters, or by 
the Government, has caused concern. J S Gandhi noted that such appointments could 
amount to political investments in these judges and an exchange of f a v o u r s . T h e  
timing of some appointments is noteworthy - one judge was appointed as the
'Statement in reply to parts (a), (b), (c) & (d) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No.4742 for 
31.3.93 regarding sanctioned strength of Judges in High Courts and Supreme Court' and 'Statement in 
reply to parts (a) & (b) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question N o.1410 for Answer on 4th August, 1993', 
quoted in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and another v Union o f  India 1993 (1) 
SCALE 111 [658] at 141-2, as discussed in 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
Ibid. at 140.
Jaising, Indira, All in the Family', The Lawyers, Vol 8 No 10, Nov 1993, 22.
See issues o f The Lawyers and Mahajan, Krishan, Legal Perspectives: Whisky Judiciary',
Hindustan Times, 14/4/86.
Gandhi, J S (1987) at 24. Similar concerns have been expressed by others - see Jaising, Indira, 
Editorial. Fairfax Enquiry', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 4, Apr 1987, 2. It is interesting to note that very 
soon after he completed the one-person enquiry into the Nadiad incident. Justice Sahai was appointed 
to the Supreme Court - see Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, New Delhi v State o f  
Gujarat and others 1989 (2) SCALE [748], as discussed in Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
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chairperson of a court-appointed commission soon after he retired from the bench/ 
This allowed him to retain his official residence and the other benefits that accrue to 
sitting judges. Others who have supported PIL have gained much from their time on 
the bench. The “bio-data” of Justice Bhagwati testifies to his innovations while he was 
a sitting judge.
Lawyers
As more and more PIL petitions were filed, the involvement of lawyers 
increased. Many who became involved in PIL did so with little lasting commitment 
to social change through law, but with an eagerness to be involved in any new legal 
changes or merely as a method of gaining experience.'^* In some High Courts, Kerala 
for example, PIL was often used by petitioner-lawyers for the experience, publicity 
and status it would bring. Others, while concerned with the issue and able to mobilise 
the Court into action, have had little direct connection with activist g r o u p s . W i t h  
little or no accountability, the attention of many has been diverted to more lucrative 
matters. For a few, the realistic expectation of what law can achieve, and a lasting 
commitment to a particular group of people or issue, has determined the experience
M C Mehta v Union o f  India & Ors (air pollution o f Delhi - vehicles and industries) 1991 (1) 
SCALE 104 [427], as discussed in 'Environment and Resources' in chapter four.
In addition to the honours and awards, the numerous public service activities listed include 
member of and International Labour Organisation Committee, and chairman o f the South Asian Task 
Force on the judiciary.
To quote from Upendra Baxi:
Lawyers only rhetorically stress outside and inside court rooms their role obligations in the 
achievement o f the values of justice, equality and dignity for the most depressed and exploited 
classes in modem India. But there are plenty of seminar and symposia documents in which 
lawyers continue to dwell upon their favourite self and collective images as agents o f social 
change.
Baxi, Upendra, Towards a Sociology o f  Indian Law, (Satvahan, New Delhi, 1986) at 113.
Individual lawyers such as M C Mehta have gained credibility as public interest lawyers because 
of the kinds of judgments gained in petitions filed and, latterly, his involvement with environmental 
action groups.
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of lawyering for social c h a n g e I t  is these lawyers, committed to a different vision 
of society, for whom PIL was to prove to be a microcosm of all the problems they 
had with the system of law.
The Lawyer's Collective, a group of lawyers in Bombay, emerged as 
a unique participant in PIL. Unlike lawyers working for other organisations, such as 
the PUCL and PUDR, members of the collective share a framework, refusing, for 
example, to take the case of an employer against an e mp l oyee . The  magazine. The 
Lawyers, was first published by the collective in 1986, as a distinctive alternative to 
legal journalism and a n a l y s i s . I t  was this magazine that first exposed the corrupt 
practices of Supreme Court judge. Justice V Ramaswami, whilst providing a forum 
for the critical discussion of law and its potential for the activist. Like those in the 
collective, other lawyers, such as R Venkataramani of the Supreme Court, have 
established links with activist groups, from whom most of their practice comes. Few 
of these advocates are designated seniors, some preferring the status of advocate-on- 
record because of the direct access it gives to procedural matters.
The paradox of the lawyer working in this way is found in the form that 
legal practice takes. This has been described as a vicious circle because “the good 
lawyer is busy and the bad lawyer is not busy”.’^  ^ Although the case studies have 
shown that the rhetoric of conciliation is often just that, the lawyer has remained 
preoccupied with the rhetorical support for issues raised in PIL pe t i t ions . The  need 
to establish credibility on the bar and bench, by learning courtcraft, dressing and
For a discussion of litigating lawyers in the USA see Tigar, Michael and Levy, Madelaine, Law 
and the Rise o f  Capitalism, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977) at 328-9.
Gandhi, J S (1987) at 150.
Other journals, such as Legal Perspectives, published by Legal Resources for Social Action in 
Tamil Nadu, were a part of this effort.
Lotika Sarkar, Centre for Women and Development Studies, interview. New Delhi, 22/1/91.
A notable exception is the legal strategy employed by Indira Jaising in Bombay Hawkers' Union 
and others v Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1985 SC 1206 and Olga Tellis and others v Bombay 
Municipal Corporation and others AIR 1986 SC 180, as discussed in the section 'Urban Space' in 
chapter four.
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speaking as a lawyer does, and by maintaining contacts, limits the involvement and 
empathy of the lawyer with the activist or those represented by the petitions filed 
Courtcraft encompasses the ability to manipulate the legal system to the benefit of a 
client, through its procedures (including the procurement of stay orders or 
adjournments), and by fostering interpersonal relationships with judges, registry staff 
and other l a w y e r s F o r  example, the ability to keep a petition pending is considered 
important, as this ensures that there is some form of redress, and that the remedy may 
be monitored. However, the composition of the judiciary and the bar, the orientation 
towards litigation strategies, and the process of the petition through the Court, limits 
the perceived transformative potential in law.^ °^ Marc Galanter's observation that 
lawyers are more concerned with discrete claims than a more wide-ranging selection 
of legal services, is also relevant for PIL.*^‘
Petitioners and Petitions
The issues of concern to the petitioner who has filed a PIL petition are 
dependent upon the kind of petitioner and the nature of the issue brought to court. 
Increasing numbers of groups and individuals began to notice the possibilities and 
petition the C o u r t . F o r  example, public interest groups and environmental groups 
became important participants and individuals such as Sheela Barse and Rajendran,
Efforts are made to circumvent the demands of professionalism by taking care over the location 
of the office, and ensuring that lawyers maintain an informal demeanour and dress when out o f court. 
For example, A X Verghese is perhaps the only lawyer practising in the Kerala High Court at 
Emakulam, whose office, Niyamavedi, is located in the old city o f Cochin.
See 'Petitions and Petitioners' below.
As much o f the bar functions according to parochial patronage, advocates from less represented 
groups such as women or tribal people, have encountered unique problems in managing the system. 
Only 3.6 per cent of advocates registered in the state bar councils in 1985 were women, according to 
Government o f India statistics published in 1988, and quoted in Agarwal, Bina (1994) at 499. Some 
have concentrated on impact litigation, individual claims and conciliation.
See Galanter, Marc, 'New Patterns of Legal Services in India' in Galanter, Marc (1989), 279-294.
Alternative fora were provided, through the Consumer Protection Act. 1986, to groups, such as 
Common Cause, concerned with consumer protection.
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activists working alone rather than within organisations, have filed numerous petitions.
Although a number of petitions have been filed relating to the election process or to
politicians, many have been concerned with the public interest, as interpreted
spaciously. The perception that certain cases, such as the Bofors l i t igat ion,amount
to the abuse of PIL and its appropriation for private causes, is evident:
Enlargement of the court's jurisdiction in the form of public interest 
litigation has given rise to proxy litigation where the litigants misuse 
the judicial process for personal gain, private profit or political or other 
oblique considerations.
Petitions concerned with the use of urban land use and the impeachment of Justice V
R a m a s w a m i , a n d  the case of Sachidanand Pandey and another v State o f West
Bengal and others have reinforced this perception. Lawyers have echoed this
concern about the use of PIL by proxy for those representing private interests.
Jamie Cassels, in her study of PIL, noted that strategic considerations 
militate against litigative strategies aimed at social c h a n g e . T h e  considerations she 
noted included the composition and ideology of the judiciary, the costs of litigation, 
and the unequal distribution of legal resources. The efficiency of PIL as a remedy for 
social ills has to be examined in relation to the progess of a petition through the court. 
The relationship of petitioners with the Court as an institution, as with lawyers and 
judges, is largely a function of structural and substantive problems encountered during
See Janata Dal v H S Chowdhary & Ors 1991 (2) SCALE 71 [400], as discussed in 'Public 
Policy and Administration' in chapter four.
[anon], 'Proxy litigation', Hindustan Times, 27/1/92.
See 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four and Anthony, M J, 'Fighting private battles 
through public interest'. Business and Political Observer, 8/1/91; Mitta, Manoj, From Public to Proxy',
The Sunday Times o f  India, 6/9/92.
AIR 1987 SC 1109, as discussed in 'Urban Space' in chapter four. This case is widely 
understood to be a cover for continued corporate rivalry between two major hotel chains.
See Mitta, Manoj, From Public to Proxy', The Sunday Times o f  India, 6/9/92 in which he notes; 
Interestingly, perhaps ironically, senior advocate Kapil Sibal, who is himself criticised in legal 
circles for representing Krishna Swami, asserts that 90 per cent of the so-called PIL cases are 
not genuine.
Cassels, Jamie (1989) at 496.
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the pendency of a petition, and have informed the expectation of what can be achieved 
through PIL. The case studies in chapters three and four have indicated the different 
stages of concern to the petitioner. While it is these stages that are addressed here, the 
study of petitioners is restricted to those who have mobilised law in an attempt to 
bring about change as envisaged by Social Action Litigation.
The potential for direct access to the higher judiciary, relatively quick 
procedures and low costs, and the exposure of an issue in the media have determined 
the initial choice of using the forum of the Supreme Court or a High Court. In the 
absence of other fora on which to raise grievances, PIL provided a potential and 
seemingly viable solution. However, the very location of the courts has been 
inconvenient, if not obstructive. Those petitioners located at a distance have had to 
find legal representation in the relevant court, to expend time and money travelling 
and to negotiate with the demands of an urban metropolitan envi ronment . In  the 
early days of PIL, when judges of the Supreme Court were promoting PIL as a 
strategy of the activist, many petitions were filed there. With the establishment of PIL 
in the High Courts more petitions have been filed in the state concerned. This has 
been encouraged by an overburdened Supreme Court,^ "*' and preferred by many 
activists. The latter's preference has been influenced by the level of acceptance that 
PIL has gained in a High Court, the potential for an appeal, the generation of local 
publicity and awareness, and relative proximity to the site of the Court.
Framing an issue for legal resolution has often involved a compromise, 
as judges can only recognise legal wrongs. Legal needs have been described as:
When PIL is used as a relatively accessible substitute for other ways of gaining access to justice, 
fewer insights can be gained about law and social change.
The importance of the cost of the litigation and the hidden costs to petitioners who lose earnings 
cannot be underestimated. For example see 'Costs o f (ln)justice' in Legal System Judiciary and 
Democratic Rights; Papers for Second Annual Convention, January 23, 1983', (People's Union for 
Democratic Rights, Delhi) in which it was stated:
The minimum expenditure has to be incurred if  one is approaching the Court is certainly above 
the government defined poverty line.
For example, see In Re the Petitions ofN aw al Thakur, a convict kept in the Kulu Jail (1984) 
3 s e e  572, as discussed in Prisons and State Institutions' in chapter three.
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social constructs composed of a perception first, that something is 
wrong and, second, that what is wrong ought to be corrected through 
the legal system ... the final step is to persuade the sources of the law - 
courts, agencies, or legislatures - the need should be officially 
recognised as such.^ '*^
The gap between incidence of injustice and its construct in terms of the law is the first
essential step that has reverberated throughout the experience of using PIL. The
conversion of the collective into the i n d i v i d u a l , o f  the broad framework of an
injustice into particularised legal n o r m s , a n d  of the unrealistic into the
manageable,'"^^ is repeatedly seen. For many, expediency has determined the form
which a petition takes. One lawyer described how he would only file petitions relating
to the resettlement and rehabilitation of project affected people, rather than challenge
the project itself, because of the Court's anticipated sympathies.'"^® The decision, by
activist groups, to use PIL has presented lawyers with additional challenges. How
much can a client be involved in making decisions that are critical to the progression
of the litigation; how much room is there for discussion when, to an extent, the law
dictates the possibilities?
Different perceptions of the essence of an injustice have added to the 
limitations of legal language. The conflict that arose between the petitioners in the 
seminal case of the Bombay slum dwellers'"'^ graphically illustrates this potential for 
disagreement amongst those working for human rights. For advocate Indira Jaising, 
the plea that there is a fundamental right to live on the pavement was non-negotiable.
Handler, Joel; Hollingsworth, Ellen Jane and Erlanger, Howard S (1978) at 185.
Madhu Kish war, Manushi, New Delhi, 12/1/91. She referred to case of the women o f the Ho 
Tribe, as discussed in 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three.
Vijay Kumar, Tarun Bharat Sangh, New Delhi, 3/3/92 referred to such problems in Tarun Bharat 
Sangh, Alwar v Union o f  India and others AIR 1992 SC 514, as discussed in 'Environment and 
Resources' in chapter four.
Pradip Prabhu, Kastkari Sangathana, Maharashtra, 27/3/93 spoke of the problems associated with 
cases filed on forest and tribal lands in Maharashtra, as discussed in 'Environment and Resources' in 
chapter four.
Jose Verghese, advocate. New Delhi, 25/2/92.
Olga Tellis op cit note 127.
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despite the anticipated unresponsiveness of the Court to this plea which was later 
home out.'"^ ^
PIL petitions, usually having been filed through an advocate and
exempted from Court fees, have been readily admitted for hearing by the Courtd'^^
Even if admitted and listed for hearing, the petitioners, far from having their grievance
addressed with some compassion, have been thrown into the fray of adversarial
proceedings. The credibility of some, otherwise well-respected, petitioners has been
questioned‘^ ° and the veracity of claims has been questioned in a peremptory fashion.
In 1992, the Advocate-General himself stated that:
From the Government we do not treat PIL as different. We have no 
special guidelines, values or procedures for a PIL. .. The Law Ministry 
has no business to have a department for PIL, there is no need or scope 
for funding of PIL. As a concept, it is like any other litigation.'^'
As with most petitions filed in the higher courts, the passage of a case 
is checkered with numerous applications. Usually filed along with the main petition
This echoes the fragmented nature of activism, that had been implied by Upendra Baxi and 
discussed by Rajni Kothari:
in the case of these non-party political formations, the fragmentation is o f a dual type: by 
focussing their energy on discrete micro settings they remain at a big remove from the macro 
processes o f transformation, and even within the micro movements they remain isolated and 
alienated from each other. ... lacking in a larger comprehension and vision that could at once 
consolidate arenas of struggle and bring them together under a common banner and for a 
common goal. Without this larger perspective, it will not be possible to deal with the backlash 
from entrenched interests and classes which feel threatened but are not yet willing to negotiate 
structural changes in the distribution of power and access to resources and positions.
The State, the People and the Intellectuals' in Kothari, Rajni (Volume II, 1990), 377-389 at 386-7.
Instances where the Supreme Court has directed the petitioners to the High Court, or refused to 
admit the petition, on the grounds of mala fides or justiciability, have determined the parameters of  
“public interest” concern. See Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti and others v State o f  U P  and 
others (1990) 2 Supp SCR 606, as discussed in the section on 'Environment and Resources' in chapter 
four.
Referring to the litigation Upendra Baxi op cit note 2 co-petitioner Lotika Sarkar told how; 
during an Agra hearing state counsel claimed that myself and Upendra Baxi had been bribed 
by the landlord because he wanted the premises to be vacated. The Court issued strictures 
against the state eounsel.
Lotika Sarkar, Centre for Women and Development Studies, New Delhi, 22/1/91. Sheela Barse faced 
similar problems with the petitions she had filed.
^ 'G  Ramaswamy, Advocate General, New Delhi, 10/4/92.
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is an application for immediate relief. Other applications filed during the pendency of 
the case are often used as a strategy to ensure that a petition is listed for hearing, by 
asking for directions from the Court in an interim order, or that the petition is 
monitored effectively. In this way, miscellaneous petitions are filed, including 
applications for modification or clarification of a court’s order, amendment of a 
petition, impleadment or intervention. If it is felt that the respondent is disobeying the 
Court's orders, a contempt petition is filed.
Case documents provide unique insight into the lengthy process through 
which a petition t r a v e l s . O n e  petition filed by a women’s group in June 1988, was 
listed before the Court eighteen times before the final judgment in December 1989.'^^ 
The difficulties of arranging legal representation, the trauma of repeated delays and 
the sporadic support for a case from other organisations listed as petitioners, led an 
activist from the organisation to state “I would now think 100 times before going to 
court - its a terrible decision to make”.*^'* The case of the Agra Protective Home, filed 
by Upendra Baxi and Lotika Sarkar in 1981, tells a similar story, with forty-nine 
hearings up to April 1991, of which thirty were in 1981 and 1982.'^^ The petitioners 
have expressed their appreciation that the petition was kept pending for monitoring, 
but fear the consequences of a final judgment. It was felt that conditions in the Home 
may deteriorate in the absence of supervision, and that the possibility of extending the 
litigation to other such homes would be lost.'^^ In the case of the Bombay slum 
d we l l e r s f i l e d  1981, there were twenty-five hearings before the judgment, one of 
which lasted for several days when arguments were heard. Organisational problems
All listing information is from the Registry of the Supreme Court of India and is correct up to 
March 1992. The information may not be exhaustive as it only records the documents available on file.
SAHELI, a Women's Resources Centre through Ms. Nalini Bhanot and others v Commissioner 
o f  Police, Delhi and others AIR 1990 SC 513, as discussed in the section on 'Injustices Specific to 
Women' in chapter three.
Elizabeth Vatsyayay, Saheli, New Delhi, 13/3/91.
Upendra Baxi op cit note 2.
Lotika Sarkar, Centre for Women and Development Studies, interview. New Delhi, 22/1/91. 
Olga Tellis op cit note 127.
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were compounded as the legal protagonists were compelled to travel to Delhi for each 
hearing. It is not surprising that Bombay-based activist Sheela Barse attempted to 
withdraw her petition during the twenty-ninth hearing of the appeal in the Supreme 
Court, after there had been no improvement in the conditions in the children's home.’^ ^
This lengthy process was found in all the available case documents. The 
first petition of the organisation Bandhua Mukti Morcha was filed in 1982. There were 
forty-one hearings up to June 1986, including one which lasted for thirteen days when 
arguments were heard. Thereafter the petition changed character as another petition, 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v State o f Tamil Nadu,^^^ was tagged onto the earlier petitions. 
There were 30 more hearings up to September 1991.*^ ® In one case which the Court 
monitored over a number of years, there were eighty-three hearings between 1985 and 
January 1992,^ '^ while in another there were forty-two hearings between 1986 and July 
1 9 9 1  162 ^ petition filed regarding the resettlement and rehabilitation of people
displaced because of the construction of a dam, there were ten hearings between 1985 
and March 1986, after which it was pending. In the last order in the paperbook, of 
4/2/86, the Supreme Court had issued directions and ordered that their implementation 
be moni tored.Despi te a note attached to the petition, by the Registry, on 18/11/89 
describing it as a “final hearing PIL matter”, the lawyer for the petitioner was glad 
that the petition had not been disposed of and a judgment given, saying that it is the
See Sheela Barse v Secretary, Children's Legal Aid Society and others (children in jails) 1986 
(2) SCALE 1 [1], as documented in 'Children' in chapter three. After the order reported AIR 1988 SC 
2211 / (1988) 4 s e e  226, the cause title changed to Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. A further 
thirteen hearings were recorded up to May 1991. See chapter five for a discussion of the problems o f  
the courts.
1986 (Supp) s e c  541.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha op cit note 110.
Workers o f  M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. v M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. (1987) 2 SCC 588, as 
discussed in the section on 'Labour' in chapter three.
Rakesh Chandra Narain v State o f  Bihar 1986 (Supp) SCC 576, as discussed in 'Prisons and 
State Institutions' in chapter three.
Karjan Jalasay Yogana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samiti v State o f  Gujarat and others 
1986 (Supp) SCC 350, as discussed in 'Environment and Resources' in chapter four.
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unlucky ones that have been disposed of by the Court. The continued monitoring 
of the case was perceived as more important than a lengthy, rhetorical judgment.
There are many consequences of this kind of courtcraft for the 
petitioner. The number of hearings is compounded, adding to a strain on resources and 
a psychological strain on the subjects of the petition whose hopes may have been 
raised. While for some, monitoring the implementation of court directions is of greater 
importance, for others a final outcome is the only desirable result. For lawyers, the 
demands of legal practice have aggravated already existing communication problems 
with a p e t i t i o n e r . O f  the many petitions that have not been heard, some have been 
purposefully ignored by lawyers concerned about the orders that would be given by 
a Supreme Court in which PIL has lost f a v o u r . M u c h  depends on the commitment 
of the lawyer, in a context when all are overworked, and the level of understanding 
of the issues raised, and therefore of when Court intervention is most needed.
Evidentiary requirements are another hurdle for the petitioner, 
particularly in the absence of a constitutional right to information. As an ever 
increasing amount of relevant accurate information is often needed by the Court, the 
importance of an efficient and supportive lawyer is intensified. The appointment of 
commissions of enquiry, as a dynamic response to such problems, has often
Jose Verghese, advocate, New Delhi, 25/2/92.
An unusual situation arose, in Sheela Barse op cit note 158 when communication problems lead 
to a stalemate between the petitioner and her advocate. The latter then gained the permission of the 
Court to withdraw from the case.
After questions were raised about PIL in Sudipt Mazumdar v State o f Madhya Pradesh (1983) 
2 SCC 584, as discussed in 'Reisitance to the changes' in chapter two and in 'Environment and 
Resources' in chapter four, Upendra Baxi described the strategy used to ensure that the petition 
remained pending:
1 was in Surat at the time and got fifty-sixty organisations to intervene and ask for a free 
paperbook and that was the end o f that.
Upendra Baxi, Delhi University, Delhi, 5/8/93.
In Karnataka Kolageri N  S Sangathana and others v State o f  Karnataka and others, as discussed 
in Environment and Resources' in chapter four, the Court directed the petitioners to file a list o f those 
affected, putting pressure on both the advocate and on the petitioner organisation because o f the time- 
bound nature of the request.
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compounded the hurdles. The mandate of the commissions and the personnel 
appointed have, in certain circumstances, mitigated against resolving the grievance 
raised. Moreover, while costs have sometimes been forthcoming from the Court, these 
awards have not been consistent. During the course of its litigation, the Naga Peoples 
Movement for Human Rights filed common legal submissions in the Guwahati High 
Court, together with the Manipur Baptist Convention Women's Union, stating:
That the petitioners have incurred enormous debts in order to 
continue these cases. Several members of the petitioner organizations 
namely the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) and 
Manipur Baptist Convention Women's Union (MBCWU) have set aside 
their other work for more than four years to work on this case. Under 
the circumstances they pray that this Hon'ble Court may direct the 
respondents to pay costs.
The burden of administration, photocopying, and fact-finding has been a common
complaint. This has not always been understood by lawyers acting for petitioners in
such cases, adding to the difference in the experience of and response to PIL. Leading
constitutional lawyer. Ram Jethmalani responded to a question about these problems
by saying:
Photocopying and changed listings - these are not serious hurdles. With 
a little organizational care, these can be managed. It is not so 
backbreakingly expensive.
The participation of intervenors’^ ° has changed the character of many 
cases. Interventions have been common in PIL petitions as the importance of the 
issues raised has encouraged organisations and individuals to participate in the 
proceedings, in a representative capacity. Although an intervenor has to remain within 
the parameters of a writ petition established by the petitioning party, the advantage of 
an intervention is that an issue has already gained the attention of the Court. In several
C R No 1043 of 1987/337/91 and C R No 1355/87/338/91. Legal Submisions' as part of the
litigation on the Oinam issue, Naga People's Movement fo r Human Rights (NPMHR) v Union o f  India
and others AIR 1990 G au 1 as discussed in 'The Armed Forces' in chapter three.
Ram Jethmalani, advocate, interview. New Delhi, 12/2/92.
A person who is not a party to a matter in court can, with the permission o f the court, intervene 
in the proceedings if  it is shown that the outcome o f the case will affect such person in some way. An 
intervenor does not become a party, does not have an automatic right to be heard, but can file an 
affidavit. The intervenor is bound by the decision in the case, as if  it were a party.
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cases intervenors have added perspective and depth to the legal discussion in the 
courtroom. Interventions began in the very first PIL cases/^^ and has been continued 
to be a strategy, for example, of women's g r o u p s . O t h e r  organisations have 
intervened, including the Association of Indian Automobile Manufacturers*^^ and All 
God's Children Inc., Arizona, USA.*^ "*
Even in those petitions where substantive orders or a judgment has been 
given, implementation has been poor, as demonstrated by the case studies in chapters 
three and four. In the absence of an organisation to monitor directions, or of the 
Court's own monitoring, there has been little certainty that any actual remedy will be 
forthcoming. Moreover the grievances of petitioners have not usually been addressed 
in full. With notable exceptions where the integrity of the judicial process has been 
challenged, contempt petitions have not resulted in any significant directions. Seen 
in this context, PIL petitions have often fared very badly, with orders that are poorly 
implemented, contempt that is not issued and, for some, lengthy pendencies of over 
a decade.
The ideological framework in which law is used reflects the experience 
of using law and the practical context. Some have used law in the belief that it can 
only expose the inequities prevalent in society and in the legal system. Whilst
The Citizens for Democracy intervened in the Bihar undertrial cases. See note 397 in Baxi, 
Upendra, 'Taking Suffering Seriously' in Baxi, Upendra (ed) (1988), 387-415 at 397.
See 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three.
M  C Mehta op cit note 119.
One o f the many organisations that intervened in Laxmi Kant Pandey v Union o f  India (1984) 
2 SCC 244, as discussed in Children' in chapter three, in addition to those that were impleaded.
An unreported order D/-30/7/90 by Justice Ranganath Misra and Justice Kuldip Singh, in 
Workers o f  M/s Rohtas Industries op cit note 161, epitomises the response:
Mr Ramaswami appearing for the Chairman o f the Bihar State Electricity Board has explained 
the circumstances in which there was a delay in compliance with the Court's direction and he 
has given an assurance to the Court that special care will be taken to ensure that the supply 
o f energy to Rohtas Industries would be carried out without undue interruption. In view o f  the 
assurance which we record, the contempt proceeding is dropped.
For example, human rights activists in Assam use law in this manner.
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subscribing to the belief that law can only mirror the divisions of a class society, PIL
has been used to highlight the conviction that the constitution and laws are biased.
Having been unable to secure the required relief, the Naga People's Movement for
Human Rights declared its support for the secession of Nagaland from the Union of
India, effectively frustrating its own efforts to use constitutional methods to record its
dissent. Disenchantment with PIL after the Asiad judgment, which failed to order
better working conditions in time, led the PUDR to draft a resolution not to use PIL
in the absence of a people's organisation to ensure its implementation. Lawyers, too,
as urban professionals, have been anguished by the ineffectiveness of the only strategy
which they know. PIL lawyer, Girish Patel, after the failure in substantive terms in
petitions filed by him, in his capacity as a member of an urban-based civil liberties
organisation, asked:
Where is my place? In the courtroom, with black-robed persons all 
around talking of the constitution, law and Justice, oblivious of the 
lawlessness, injustice and oppression outside; or is my rightful place in 
the fields, slums, factories, mines or the forest, where the suffering 
masses directly experience unconstitutionality, illegalities and 
injustice?*^*
In spite of the catharsis induced by PIL, petitions continue to be filed 
by all manner of petitioners. For social activists, the choices and consequences have 
become clearer, as many have become wise to the limitations of the law, the 
dependency upon the craft of the lawyer and sympathy of the judge, and the 
obstructions of legal process. Environment groups are an example, combining local 
organisation with other forms of activity such as lobbying, with petitions filed in the 
Supreme Court and High Courts. By using PIL as part of a broader strategy, the 
expectations are lessened, and the opportunity for raising awareness and mobilising 
the people involved are increased.
Yagnik, Achyut, 'Human Rights Movement; Some Yakshaprashana' in Sethi, Harsh and Kothari, 
Smitu (eds) (1989), 127-132 at 131. Similarly PUDR lawyer Nandita Haksar has left legal practice to 
participate in the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights and to teach human rights law.
Patel, Girish, Dilemma of a PIL Lawyer', The Lawyers, Vol 3 No 7, July 1988, 18-19 at 18.
See Dias, Clarence J, Problems and Challenges faces by Legal Resource Groups in South Asian 
Region', Journal o f  the Indian Law Institute, Vol 30 No 1, 1988, 63-68
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Media
Continuing media coverage has reinforced the impact of PIL judgments. 
Although court orders or judgments may not in themselves motivate action, an account 
in the local or national press can be inspirational. Mobilising public opinion for people 
whose plight has not been told, for activists who had been viewed with suspicion, 
and against the recalcitrance of the state, has aided those whose situation provoked the 
initiation of PIL. Petitions have continued to be filed in response to press reports. The 
cases themselves have demonstrated the influence of the media as Courts have ordered 
that details of directions or orders be published in the press.
Legal journalism has gained strength, with journalists like Krishan 
Mahajan continuing to provide a critique of the legal system in his column 'Legal 
Perspectives'.'*' The poor implementation of Court orders has gained the attention of 
the m e d i a . T h e  context in which petitions have been filed - activist groups and 
movements - have inspired others. Rashid Talib produced a series of six programmes 
for Doordarshan (the state controlled television company), entitled 'Citizens and the 
Law', which were produced and broadcast between January 1988 and June 1989.'*^ Of 
the seven programmes produced, five were concerned with movements or 
organisations that had used PIL,'*'' while the other two were concerned with issues that
One activist working with and for bonded labourers described how:
We filed a petition at the right time. We had just set up the Shramjeevi Sangathana and 
because the petition was filed in the Supreme Court and commissioner came - this gave 
strength to the organisation. There were reports in the press saying that Vivek Pandit has gone 
to the Supreme Court and filed a writ and the government has to give Rs.5000 to a 
commissioner. This gave us strength in the area and standing in front of the bureaucracy. 
Vivek Pandit, Vidhayak Sansad, Thane, 28/3/93.
See Gandhi, J S (1987) at 157-9.
Mahajan, Krishnan, 'Legal Perspective: Cautionary PIL', Hindustan Times, 10/3/86.
Rashid Talib, Chittaranjan Television, interview. New Delhi, 6/4/92.
These five were entitled 'Dawn over Tilonia', 'Bonded for Life?', Mary Roy's Crusade', 'E P 
Drugs - Anatomy o f a Ban' and Creating a Wasteland'.
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had not been taken to the C o u r t / W h i l e  Doordarshan's concern was that the 
programmes reflect individual rights - they objected to the original series title Taking 
Suffering Seriously' - all the programmes reflected collective struggles. The 
endorsement of Justice Bhagwati, who appeared in the programmes, emphasised the 
legal potentialities.'^^
The focus of much of the media attention has been on high profile
issues of judicial corruption, on proxy litigation and instances where the writ
jurisdiction has been used for private i n te res t s . Whi le  useful, as a method of
discouraging litigation outside the ambit of PIL, the comparatively little exposure of
less sensational issues has led to criticism. Referring to legal reporters in the Supreme
Court, Krishan Mahajan has described how many newspapers and agencies are:
using the Supreme Court as a training ground for their correspondents 
for a year or two and then promoting their correspondents to cover 
Parliament or some other Ministry.
Even in this milieu, the sensitisation of the media to legal issues has increased, as
seen, for example, in the weekly section on 'Law' in the national daily newspaper. The
Pioneer.
The exposure given to PIL judgments and orders in law reports has 
been critical. The official law reporters, which include the Supreme Court Reports and 
the High Court law reporters, publish all and only those judgments and orders which 
have been deemed “reportable”. J u d g e s  themselves indicate whether a judgment is
Entitled 'Too Deep a Wound' about the tapping o f pine trees for resin in Almora and 'Kusnur 
Satyagraha'.
The slot allotted for the series, 10.20pm, was subsequently criticised as being to late for the 
illiterate audience that it hoped to reach. See Sabharwal, Jyoti, 'Right theme, wrong slot'. The Indian
Post, 9/6/89.
[anon], 'Frivolous litigation costs petitioner Rs 10,000', Times o f India, 28/5/93; Anthony, M J, 
Fighting private battles through public interest', Business and Political Observer, 8/1/91; Anthony, M 
J, 'Misuse o f writ jurisdiction causes anxiety to SC judges'. The Business and Political Observer, 
11/12/91.
Mahajan, Krishan, 'Legal perspectives: SC and media', Hindustan Times, 8/9/88.
Vijay Kumar, Joint Registrar Supreme Court Cases, interview. New Delhi, 31/3/92.
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to be reported, a practice which has been criticised by the Law Commission of India:
In our view the judges should have no voice in deciding whether a case 
should or should not be reported. In several States there is in vogue the 
practice of judges marking their judgements “A.F.R.” i.e., approved for 
reporting. This is a very unwholesome practice and should be stopped.
A judge is too often inclined to a generous view of his own judgements 
and rarely hesitant to decide that it should be reported. Not infrequently 
judgements tend to become lengthy and somewhat pedantic because the 
judges think of the judgement's finding a place in the law reports.
The lack of a rational criterion has been noted by Krishan Mahajan:
The result is ad-hocism in the reporting of judgements with the public 
not even knowing what it has lost apart from completely destroying the 
court's comity in terms of precedent.
According to Mahajan, this is an impasse which has been created because PIL is the
domain of middle class professionals - “the middle class bureaucracy in the courts
never realise the necessity of disseminating information about the various laws and
judgements among the poor people”. E v e n  commercial law reporters, such as the
All India Reporter (AIR) and Supreme Court Cases (SCC), both of which are more
commonly subscribed to by lawyers of the Supreme and High Courts, publish
judgments and orders at the discretion of the editor, taking note of whether judgments
have been approved for reporting. The distinctive nature of the subject of PIL
petitions, and legal content in the form of procedural relaxation, have ensured that PIL
has received systematic attention in the Supreme Court law reporters once it became
established, and more sporadic attention in the High Courts. Simultaneously, academic
writing on PIL has burgeoned, in law journals within India and internationally, and
in books.
Law Commission o f India, Fourteenth Report, Volume I, Chapter 28 (Ministry o f Law, 
Government o f India, 1958) at 642.
Mahajan, Krishan, 'Legal Perspectives: Non-reportable', Hindustan Times, 23/3/87.
Gandhi, J S (1987) at 159 referring to Mahajan, Krishan, 'Middle Class PIL', Hindustan Times, 
10/9/84.
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Funding
Funding has continued to be the subject of much contention. As many 
of the organisations that were able to get judgments from the Court had done so with 
the benefit of funds, fears have continued to be voiced that PIL is a game conducted 
by elites. There does seem to be a correlation between the grant of funds and the 
success of a petition. However, much of this has been because of the potential for 
organisation activity outside the arena of l a w . T o  an extent funding is controlled by 
the regulations that exist in the donor and the recipient country, and the mandate of 
the donor organisation. Clearance under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation") Act. 
1976 was withheld by the Home Ministry for many years for Ford Foundation funding 
of a proposed centre, the Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre 
(PILSARC) to monitor PIL.’^  ^ It was only in 1992 that clearance was given, and the 
reasons for this remain opaque. The recipient of these funds, Rajeev Dhavan, has 
himself concluded, after a discussion of foreign funding, that:
For the example of Banwasi Sewa Ashram in Uttar Pradesh, see the section on 'Environment 
and Resources' in chapter four.
The Ford Foundation has continued to support legal initiatives, sponsoring conferences on PIL. 
One was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh in October-November 1992, hosted by the Ain o Shalish Kendra 
and Madaripur Legal Aid Association, and attended by senior legal professionals from India and 
Pakistan. The conference aimed to sensitise the Bangladeshi judiciary to PIL. Another conference was 
held on Public Interest Law Around the World'. See Hutchins, Thomas and Klaaren, Jonathan, Public 
Interest Law Around the World. Report o f a Symposium Held at Columbia University in May, 1991, 
(Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Columbia, 1992). See Williams, David and Young, Tom, 
'Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory', Political Studies, Vol 42 No 1, 1994, 84-100, for 
a discussion of the World Bank and the modernising intention o f its policies which has interesting 
parallels with the Ford Foundation.
Purewal, Jasjit, ' Stalling the people's access to justice', Indian Express, 22/8/89. Marc Galanter, 
commenting upon the Ford Foundation program o f human rights and social justice, observed:
The support centre (PILSARC) which was to be the centerpiece o f the Foundation's 
program failed to obtain approval by the Government o f India - perhaps due in part 
to a new resistence to the use of foreign funding to support legal services projects.
Galanter, Marc, The Changing Legal Environment and the Prospects of the Strategic Use o f Law by 
India's Disadvantaged', (A Report to the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 20/9/89) at 3-4.
An internal Ford Foundation memo written in 1991, stated:
The government's receptivity to appeals to unblock the Foundation's grant to 
PILSARC (FY87-$275,000) has considerably brightened the prospects o f providing community 
action groups responsible professional advice on legal strategies.
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The only real and correct form of radical activism consists of people 
fighting for their own rights (oppressed activism).
Thus perception that the receipt of funds is a compromise remains, even for those to
whom funding has been made avai lable.Just ice Krishna Iyer, in an address to the
Third Karnataka State Lawyers Conference, on 28-29 December 1983, echoed the
concerns of many activists when:
He warned more than 1,000 lawyer delegates that the country's legal 
institutions were in imminent danger of takeover by the US intelligence 
agency the CIA, that legal aid was in danger of takeover by the Ford 
Foundation and that public interest litigation would probably now be 
run by multinational corporations.*^^
The legal profession has received increasing attention from the Ford 
Foundation, with support for the establishment of the National Law School University 
of India at Ba ng a lo r e , a s  have initiatives to move the focus away from the court- 
centred approach fostered by PIL. °^* Pervasive financial problems faced by many 
lawyers and activists remain, and the appeal of foreign funds grows stronger for many 
of those using law and PIL.
Dhavan, Rajeev (unpublished, 1984) at 30. Dhavan has been critiqued for other inconsistencies 
in his formulation o f reform and legal activism, see Gandhi, J S (1987) at 146-148.
’’* One legal organisation that declared itself to be against foreign funding, takes covert funds in 
the form of subscriptions, that do not have to be declared to the Indian government, or to other 
organisations. Rajni Kothari has noted that the agenda o f the state is also influenced by donor agencies. 
See 'People's Action: A Conceptual Analysis' in Kothari, Rajni (Volume II, 1990), 393-400 at 399.
Mahajan, Krishan, 'Legal Perspectives: End of the Road', Hindustan Times, 9/1/84.
The National Law School University o f India has instituted original teaching programmes, 
including 'Human Rights' and 'the Rights of the Child'. Nonetheless, it has come under criticism, for 
example, for the “American style” recruitment of Bombay solicitors:
whatever happened to the commitment given ... that its students would join the legal profession 
to devote themselves to, or at any rate, be trained to do public interest law?
[anon], Adaalat Antics: National Law School in the news'. The Lawyers, Vol 9 No 4, Apr 1994, 32. 
Contemporary legal education has received attention in: Gandhi, J S (1987); Dias, Clarence J, Dying 
of the Light: Legal Education reform in the 1990's', monograph, [(1990?)], 1-11. Indigenous initiatives 
do exist, for example the Bar Council o f India's contribution to the establishment the National Law 
School and the establishment o f an Institute for Public Interest Litigation in 1994. See [anon], Adaalat 
Antics: Public Interest Litigation', The Lawyers, Vol 9, No 2, Feb 1994, 32.
■“' In 1993-4, an Advocacy Centre was established in Pune, partially funded by the Ford 
Foundation.
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Alternatives and Corollary Innovations
Along with the evolution of PIL, came other initiatives to make law 
more responsive to social justice considerations. The rhetoric of conciliatory forms of 
justice that had inaugurated PIL, strengthened moves to establish alternative modes of 
dispute settlement.^°^ In addition to legal aid initiatives,^®  ^informal methods of dispute 
settlement, tribunals and the district courts have been increasingly used, and innovative 
legal services are continually being refined. The government has responded to the 
relaxation of standing, by introducing changes in legislation, both newly passed, and 
through amendments.
In 1976, Justice Krishna Iyer had suggested that informal methods of
settling disputes may be more appropriate and desirable:
Dispute processing is not by Court litigation alone. ... Litigation, 
whoever wins or loses, is often the funeral of both. We are a 
developing country and need techniques of maximising mediatory 
methodology as potent processes even where litigation has erupted. ...
Should we have at all hinted to the advocates to resolve by negotiation 
or stick to our traditional function of litigative adjudication? In certain 
spheres, 'judicious irreverence' to judicialised argumentation is a better 
homage to justice.^®'*
Having been established in 1980, legal aid continued to attract attention from judges, 
legislators and academics.^®  ^Interest in the legal aid movement escalated concurrently
As with PIL, the existence of alternatives in the USA may have strengthened initiatives in India. 
See Galanter, Marc, 'Justice in many rooms: courts, private ordering and indigenous law', Journal o f  
Legal Pluralism, 1981, 1-47; Cappelletti, Mauro, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the 
Framework o f the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement', Modern Law Review, Vol 56, May 1993, 
282-296.
See 'Access to Justice' in chapter one.
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others AIR 1976 SC 1455 
at 1470.
For background see 'Access to Justice' in chapter one and Grover, Anand, 'The Right to Legal 
Aid', The Lawyers, Vol 1 Nos 11-12, Nov-Dee 1986, 5-10. For discussion of Legal aid in the 1980s see 
Bhagwati, P N, 'Social Action Litigation: Need For Setting Up Free and Independent Legal Aid
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to PIL. The Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee was involved in PIL c a s e s , a n d  
many of the letters sent to the PIL Cells were redirected to the legal aid boards 
Some legal aid funds were used for Lok Adalats, people's courts run on a voluntary 
and conciliatory basis/°^ In 1987 the Legal Services Authorities Act was passed, 
institutionalising legal aid with the establishment of the National Legal Services 
Authority to conduct, amongst other activities, lok adalats and public interest litigation.
Services In Urban And Rural Areas' in Judiciary Under Seige. Report o f  Consultation on Asian Lawyers 
fo r  Justice and Human Rights. Hong Kong October 24-27, 1983 (Christian Conference o f Asia- 
International Affairs, Hong Kong, 1984); Reddy, O Chinappa, 'Socialism, Constitution and Legal Aid 
Movement in India', AIR 1986 (J) 9; Menon, N  R Madhava, 'The Dawn o f Human Rights 
Jurisprudence', (1987) 1 SCC (J) 1, at 2-5; Samaik, Seema, 'Legal Aid in Maharashtra', The Lawyers, 
Vol 1 No 2, Feb 1986, 9-12; Grover, Anand, 'The Right to Legal Aid', The Lawyers, Vol 1 No 11, 
Nov-Dee 1986, 5-8; Abraham, Susan, Tribals and Legal Aid', The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 4, Apr 1987, 
19; Williams, Mark, Increasing Access to Justice', The Lawyers, Vol 5, No 1, Jan 1990, 4-12. The 
discussion o f legal aid in the Lok Sabha, continued even after the spate of interest that followed the 
publication o f the Bhagwati Committee report (chapter two) - see Legal Aid to poor provided in 
Supreme Court and various other Courts and allocation .. [of funds]', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 7 
Session 7 Vol 37, 12/4/83, 167-69; 'Allocation o f funds for Legal aid Scheme', Lok Sabha Debates, 
Series 8 Session 6, Vol 19, 5/8/86, 185-86.
See Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v Union o f  India & Ors 1989 (2) SCALE 73 [400] in 
the section on Children' in chapter three.
See chapter five and Dixit, A K, 'Public Interest Litigation and Legal Aid', Kanpur Law Journal, 
1986, 50-55.
In 1986, the then Minister of Law defined lok adalats:
Lok Adalat is a voluntary agency for settlement of disputes through conciliatory method. When 
the State Legal Aid and Advice Board is approached by one of the parties to the dispute, the 
Board approaches the other party and through persuasive measures, tries to motivate the other 
party for a compromise/amicable settlement. The matter is taken, if  both parties are agreeable, 
before the Lok Adalat and a settlement is recorded if  parties come to a mutual settlement. The 
final decree on such a settlement is then passed by the concerned court.
'Functioning o f Lok Adalats in Gujarat', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 7 Vol 21, 11/11/86, 250- 
52 at 252: Over two thousand cases pending in the lower courts o f Gujarat were settled in Lok Adalats 
in two years, as detailed in '“Lok Adalats”', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 4 Vol 10, 19/11/85, 
193-94. For details o f the schemes see Providing legal assistance to settle issues through conciliation', 
Lok Sabha Debates, Series 7 Session 7 Vol 49, 24/7/84, 90; 'Lok Adalats in Capital', Lok Sabha 
Debates, Series 8 Session 4 Vol 11, 10/12/85, 175-6; 'Statutory Status for Lok Adalat Scheme in 
States', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 4 Vol 10, 19/11/85, 99; Lok Adalats in Uttar Pradesh', 
Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 8 Vol 28, 28/4/87), 18-29; Biggest Lok Adalat during 1987-88', 
Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 10 Vol 39, 4/5/88, 430-32. See Razdan, Vinod K and Razdan, 
Versha, People's Courts, Development and Justice',//if/m/i S'odo-Lega/Jowrna/, Vol 15 Nos 1&2, 1989, 
145-150; Sinroja, Naresh M, Lok Adalats: A Cure Worse Than the Disease?', The Lawyers, Vol 7 No 
3, Mar 1992, 11-12; Barhat, Virendra Singh, Judicial Courts v Lok Adalats', AIR 1987 (J) 5; Saxena, 
Manoher Raj, 'Legal Aid Scheme & Lok Adalat', AIR 1986 J 103.
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described as “social justice litigation” in section 4(d) of the Act/°^ Based on the draft
bill proposed in the Bhagwati Committee R e p o r t , t h e  act caused consternation
amongst judges and academics.^" Marc Galanter, referring to the Act, noted that while
the reform energies of the early 1980's were channelled into PIL by prominent judges
who were “patrons and instigators” of this form of litigation, their counterparts in the
late 1980s were promoters of a new infbrmalism/^^ He further observed that the
increasing incidence of Lok Adalats, and the Bhopal litigation, indicate a loss of faith
in the formal legal process:
Instead what is offered is a program of palliation which is almost a 
photographic negative of the animating idea of public interest law 
[PIL]. PIL sought to be “strategic”; it sought to empower organizable 
constituencies of the disadvantaged. In contrast the new informalism 
[NI] addresses isolated individual victims. Where PIL sought to 
marshall facts by extensive investigation and to develop the law by 
pioneering cases, NI seeks compromises that obviate both factual and 
legal definition. Where PIL encouraged the development of new 
specialized expertise and wide dissemination of new knowledge, NI 
demands no expertise and generates no new knowledge. Where PIL 
sought to use the wider, radiating effects of legal action to bring large- 
scale movement toward constitutional ideals, NI eliminates
Parallels had been drawn with the Legal Services Corporation in the USA. See Leelakrishnan, 
P, 'Access to Legal Service and Justice', Cochin University Law Review, [(198?)], 473-483. Other 
statutory changes were made. Order X, rule 8(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, as amended on 
16/2/86 (with effect from 2/7/83) provided that no fees were to be charged for matters filed by the 
SCLAC. A similar amendment was made on 26/7/87 with the insertion of rule lO-A(l) to order XVIII - 
see note 67 in chapter two for details.
See 'Access to Justice' in chapter one.
Justice Krishna Iyer wrote an influential treatise shortly after the Act was legislated. Iyer, V R 
Krishna, Legal Services Authorities Act - A Critique, (Society for Community Organisation Trust, 
Madurai, 1988). Upendra Baxi protested at the little interest that was generated in activist circles:
There is not a scrap of expression of outrage by or amoung the activists. Even Ela Bhatt of  
SEWA, whose activist credentials brought her to the Rajya Sabha as a nominated member, and 
who has first-hand knowledge of the legal need o f the unorganized, and Justice Bhagwati, an 
explosively activist justice now in his retirement, have failed, so far to protest at the 
governmental mockery of legal services, a conception assiduously promoted by him and others. 
Where are, one may ask, the activist voices protesting at this historic default? If one is not able 
to generate and impact on one's kindred in activism, how is one to be expected to transform 
or limit the state?
Baxi, Upendra, 'Law, Democracy And Human Rights' in Sethi, Harsh and Kothari, Smitu (eds) (1989), 
101-117 at 115. Reference to newspaper articles criticising the legislation was made in Legal Services 
Authorities Act', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 9 Vol 3.2, 18/11/87, 137.
Galanter, Marc (1989) at 4.
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consideration of these general effects and confines its concern to 
specific cases.^'^
Commenting on PIL and what he describes as other creative 
experiments in law (including legal aid, legal literacy and lok adalats), Upendra Baxi 
was prescriptive, believing that the institutions of law and order could be turned 
around to address poverty and in jus t i ce .Some activist groups have found a focus 
on legal awareness and unconventional modes of practising law to be more relevant 
than a continuing focus on the inappropriateness of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 
1987. Barefoot lawyers' and paralegals, often from within indigenous communities, 
committed to the provision of less hierarchical and alienating legal services have 
become more prevalent.^'^ The need for such lawyers dedicated to a different vision 
of society was to be sharply delineated by the practice of PIL. As Jose Verghese, an 
advocate involved in PILs for tribal peoples, noted when referring to schemes of 
barefoot lawyers:
Before attempting to launch any public interest litigation a thorough 
knowledge of traditional ways of dispute settlement which existed and 
to some extent still prevalent among the tribals is necessary. The 
modem method of dispute settlement renders the tribals desperate and 
the difficulties to approach the system have alienated them further
Ibid. at 14-15.
Baxi, Upendra 'Activism at the Crossroads with Signposts' in Fernandes, Walter (ed) (1986), 35- 
49 at 47.
Galanter, Marc (1983) has documented four organisations which “break from the prevailing 
atomistic style o f legal services delivery”; Rajpipla Free Legal Aid in Gujarat; the Legal Support 
Scheme for the Poor run by the Anand Niketan Ashram in Rangpur, Gujarat; AWARE in Andhra 
Pradesh; Consumer Education and Research Centre in Gujarat. It is interesting to note that all these 
groups have been involved in PIL. In a petition filed by Justice Krishna Iyer and heard by Justice 
Bhagwati, the right to free legal aid was discussed, and its pivotal role affirmed, as was the critical role 
of voluntary organisations:
the legal aid programme which is needed for the purpose o f reaching social justice to the 
people cannot afford to remain confined to the traditional or litigation orientated legal aid 
programme but it must, taking into account the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the 
country, adopt a more dynamic posture and take within its sweep what we may call strategic 
legal aid programme, consisting of promotion of legal literacy, organisation of legal aid camps, 
encouragement of public interest litigation and holding o f lok adalats or niti melas for bringing 
about settlements of disputes whether pending in Courts or outside.
Centre o f  Legal Research and another v State o f  Kerala AIR 1986 SC 2195 at 2196-7, as discussed in 
Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four.
326
away from the administration of justice.^*^
While acknowledging that “the movement did grow from the top”, through PIL, he 
observed, that if the use of law with tribals is developed slowly, PIL can still be 
encouraged/'^ The use of such barefoot lawyers and paralegals has been critical for 
the implementation of orders given in PIL/'^
In addition to the new informalism and the provision of innovative legal 
services, other alternatives to the efforts to the use of the writ jurisdiction through PIL, 
exist within the legal system/'^ The potential for PIL has been mobilised at the district 
court level,^^° and tribunalisation has continued to gain momentum/^^ Following from 
the procedural changes initiated by PIL, the newly legislated Child Labour (Prohibition 
and Regulation") Act. 1986,^^  ^Consumer (Protection) Act. 1986^ ^^  and the Environment
Verghese, Jose, 'Legal Aid to the Tribals' in Gandhi, P K (ed) (1985), 136-141 at 137. The case 
filed asking the Court to give women of the Ho tribe the right to succession illustrates this point. See 
Madhu Kishwar & Ors v State o f  Bihar & Ors 1991 (2) SCALE 148 [794] as discussed in 'Injustices 
Specific to Women' in chapter three.
Ibid. at 141.
See the discussion of Banwasi Sewa Ashram v State o f Uttar Pradesh (1986) 4 SCC 753 in 
Environment and Resources' in chapter four.
See the survey of The Legal Framework' in chapter two.
Cases have been initiated in Dhule, Maharashtra, under section 91 o f the Code o f  Criminal 
Procedure, when the Dhule District Court ordered the State to provide relief for victims o f drought - 
and a state appeal to the Bombay High Court was rejected. Suryawanshi, Nirmalkumar, Social Action 
Litigation under Section 91 CPC, The Lawyers, Vol 2, No 1, Jan 1987, 20.
Many o f the cases refer to tribunals, specifically see S P Sampath Kumar v Union o f  India and 
others AIR 1987 SC 386, as discussed in Judges, Courts, Lawyers' in chapter four. An comprehensive 
overview o f tribunals, commissions and other quasi judicial authorities is given in Sathe, S P, 
Administrative Law, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, fifth edition, 1991). Also see Sathe, S P, College 
Tribunals in Pune and Bombay: A Survey o f De-Professionalised Dispute Settlement', Journal o f  the 
Indian Law Institute, Vol 29 No 4, 1987, 468-493.
Section 16(1) states that “any person, police officer or Inspector may file a complaint o f an 
offence under this Act in any Court of competent jurisdiction.”
Section 2(1) defines a “complainant” as either a consumer, or any registered voluntary 
association or the Central Government or any State Government or one or more consumers, where there 
are numerous consumers having the same interest. See Singh, Guijeet (1993) and Nayak, Rajendra 
Kumar, Consumer Protection Law in India, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1991) for the use o f this 
Act and the forums constituted under it.
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rProtection') Act. 1986^ "^* which were framed with expanded standing provisions. 
Amendments were made in 1986 to a number of existing statutes, widening standing 
provisions to allow registered consumer associations to file complaints.^^^ PIL was to 
foster a concern for human rights, which, in part, informed the Human Rights 
Commission,^^^ a quasi judicial authority, established in 1993 through the Protection 
of Human Rights Ordinance to monitor and investigate abuses of human rights.
Thus, the concern for access to justice that motivated the procedural 
innovations leading to the establishment of PIL, extended beyond this single form of 
litigation. PIL, the term given to the particular use of Articles 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution, was only one of the explorations of dispute resolution in contemporary 
India. In the context of these 'alternatives and corollary innovations' the centrality of
Section 19 states that a complaint can be filed by “the Central Government or any authority or 
officer authorised in this behalf by that Government” or “any person who has given notice o f not less 
that sixty days, in the manner prescribed, o f the alleged offence and o f his intention to make a 
complaint, to the Central Government or the aughority or officer authorised as aforesaid.”
Sections 12 and 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 1954, sections 25 and 32 o f the 
Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 1940, section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955, section 10 of the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act. 1969, section 72 o f the Standards o f Weights & 
Measures Act. 1976 and section 5C o f the Agricultural Product IGrading & Marking) Act. 1937.
For extensive discussion of the commission see: Sathe, S P, 'Towards and Effective Human 
Rights Commission', EPW, 3/10/92, 2155-2156; The Human Rights Commission. A Critique', (People's 
Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi, monograph, 1993); Human Rights Commission. Statement and 
Proposals', (Consultation organised by Legal Resources for Social action, Asian Forum for Human 
Rights and Development, Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre, New Delhi, 27-28/3/93); 
'India: Human Rights Commission', International Commission o f Jurists: The Review, No 51, Dec 1993, 
7-9; Keshwaar, Sanover, 'The National Commission on Human Rights: Boon or Charade?', The 
Lawyers, Vol 8 No 5, June 1993, 4-6 & 8; Rao, Kavitha, Amnesty International on the National 
Human Rights Commission', The Lawyers, Vol 8 No 9, Oct 1993, 23 & 26. The PUCL Bulletin has 
earned numerous article following the discussions and implementation o f the commission, and making 
connections with PIL:
with such a commission coming into existence, the Courts might well take the easy option of  
passing the buck to it and refrain from directly entertaining cases of violation of civil liberties, 
thus reducing the efficacy of our already enfeebled Public Interest Litigation System 
Sheth, D L, Human Rights Commission', PUCL Bulletin, Vol 12 No 10, Oct 92, 1-2 at 2. For a 
collection o f newspaper articles, see Human Rights Commission. Dossier', (Legal Resources for Social 
Action, [1993?]). Details o f the National Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulation, notified 
in March 1994, can be found in: [anon]. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Notification', 
PUCL Bulletin, Vol 14 No 4, Apr 1994, 11-12. See The Armed Forces' in chapter three and chapter 
six for a discussion of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. 1987. In addition to 
those directly linked with procedures and issues central in PIL, other fora were being established, for 
example by the passing of the National Commission for Women Act. 1990.
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PIL as the most viable option for securing greater access to justice, and therefore of 
more just law, is uncertain. However, the study of PIL has provided unique insight 
into the aspirations and motivations of legal professionals and petitioners and informs 
the study of the explorations and changes that have accompanied the use of PIL 
throughout India.
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Chapter Seven - Conclusion
Public Interest Litigation is now an established legal mechanism in the 
Supreme Court and all of India's eighteen High Courts. Its significance has extended 
throughout the country. Petitions and court orders have addressed issues of importance 
for people from all strata of society, from every community and in each region. It has 
increased access to justice and has brought new issues onto the judicial fora. 
Constitutionally prescribed rights have been clarified and their ambit expanded. For 
the researcher, PIL has provided a means by which the operation of the legal system 
can be explored, and its effect upon access to justice evaluated, thus facilitating the 
evaluation of the viability of PIL as a mechanism to resolve injustice. It provides 
insight into a basic dilemma of the human rights activist, whether to advocate reform 
or revolution.
The initial contestation between the legislature and judiciary did not 
account for poverty issues, but reflected opposing perspectives on prominent questions 
of government, leading Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to refer to the Court as the 
“third House of Parliament”.' The structure of the colonial state determined the 
parameters of the initial debate about the judiciary, leading to numerous constitutional 
amendments and the manipulation of judicial appointments. By the 1970's, political, 
social and legal factors coalesced to nurture a concern for access to justice. 
Concurrently, the potency of international influences was to bolster the preoccupation 
with human rights. Some members of the judiciary, legal profession and media, 
together with participants in political and social activities, disaffected by the influence 
of emergency rule and the emasculation of constitutional rights, turned to the 
previously unexplored potential in law and legal institutions. Public Interest Litigation
' Quoted in Hardgrave, Robert L and Kochanek, Stanley A, India. Governemnt and Politics in a 
Developing Nation, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, fourth edition, 1986) at 93.
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was the result.
The fundamental problems of definition, discussed in detail in chapter 
two, resonate throughout the thesis. The initial concern over procedures, including the 
locus standi of petitioners and the justiciability of the issues, has persisted, in the 
context of an ever expanding range of issues and petitioners. Upendra Baxi, in 
suggesting that PIL should be termed Social Action Litigation (SAL), underlined the 
conceptual differences between the two forms of legal action. Broad in its ambit, PIL 
is best described in procedural terms. SAL, however, implies a concern that legal 
institutions become more responsive to poverty and inequality, both in the kinds of 
decisions made and through the refinement of the decision-making process.
Five broad types of cases have been set out in chapter two: PIL for the 
marginalised and excluded; PIL for the disadvantaged and deprived; PIL for 
development/resource rights; where PIL ends?; PIL and the judicial process. These 
categories provide a useful base for the formulation of a definition, and for evaluation 
of the case studies, as they indicate trends in the resolution of grievances. Judges, in 
their capacity as gatekeepers to the courts, have been complicit in the extension of 
SAL into PIL, while remaining concerned about the use and application of this form 
of litigation. From remit of the issues, it is apparent that while SAL may have been 
the aim of initiatives taken in the late 1970's and early 1980's, it is the broader based 
PIL that has become established in the Supreme Court and High Courts. Hence, the 
term PIL is used throughout the thesis as the more accurate description of the 
litigation as a whole.
Although initially postulated in terms of the public and collective, rather 
than private and individual, the vision of a new form of litigation has not been 
sustained and many of the issues within SAL have not been resolved.^ The “creeping 
jurisdiction” acquired by the Court over State institutions has advanced little since
- In a study of the USA, Scheingold, Stuart (1981) noted the propensity forjudges to remain within 
liberal-capitalist boundaries, to avoid allocative problems and only to take initiative in policy matters, 
in a halting and incremental manner.
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Justice Bhagwati retired in 1986.  ^ Many of the innovative procedures which were to 
facilitate access to justice have not become established, as the Court's overt 
enthusiasm for the use of conciliatory techniques has waned.
Judicial discourse has focused on the availability of the Fundamental 
Rights as a remedy for injustice. The scope of Article 21 of the Constitution has been 
expanded and some of the Directive Principles of State Policy have been included 
within the ambit of the justiciable Fundamental Rights. However, there has been little 
discussion of Article 12 of the Constitution, which defines the 'State' against which 
Fundamental Rights are available,"* nor has the discussion extended to incorporate 
concern for generational rights which have underpinned some of the appeals to law 
through PIL.^ By stressing economic and social rights, the significance of many civil 
and political rights has been sidelined.^
The importance of freedom of information, a matter that had gained 
significance during the emergency rule, has been emphasised but no precedent has 
been set.^ The right to know has not been categorically affirmed, which, in an 
adversarial system, where judges cannot always depart from established procedure, has 
had repercussions. As judges have only occasionally taken on an investigatory role to 
uncover the facts of a case, the onus has remained on the petitioner to present a case 
in detail. Without access to information, petitions have lacked convincing facts, thus.
 ^ Baxi, Upendra (1987) at 175.
" In the case concerning the oleum gas leak, the Supreme Court shied away from a definitive 
pronouncement on Article 12 o f the Constitution. See M  C Mehta v Union o f India and Ors (1987) 1 
SCC 395, discussed in the section on 'Environment and Resources' in chapter four and Sheela Barse 
V Secretary, Children's Legal Aid Society and others (children's home) (1987) 3 SCC 50, discussed in 
the section on Children' in chapter three. The case law on Article 12 includes Central Inland Water 
Transport Corporation Ltd. v Tarun Kanti Sen Gupta AIR 1986 SC 1571.
 ^ See Kothari, Rajni 'Human Rights - A Movement In Search o f a Theory' in Sethi, Harsh and 
Kothari, Smitu (eds) (1989), 19-29.
 ^ See Sen, Amartya, 'Freedoms and Needs. An argument for the primacy o f political rights'. New  
Republic, 10& 17/1/94, 31-38.
 ^ See Bombay Environmental Action Group v Pune Cantonment Board, discussed in the section on 
' Urban Space'.
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by not facilitating the presentation of a detailed and informed legal argumentation, 
judicial discourse has not addressed one of the most exclusionary aspects of legal 
process.^
With notable exceptions,^ there has been little change to statutory 
provisions. Laws which contribute to the persistence of many of the problems brought 
to the courts have not been critically appraised, nor has the constitutionality of statutes 
been considered. Thus, as Chhatrapati Singh has noted, judges have not taken the 
opportunity to examine statutes such as the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, the Factories 
Act. 1947, the Mines (Regulation and Development) Act. 1947, town planning acts 
and municipal laws,‘° even when their unsuitability has been illustrated by PIL 
petitions.
The veiled alliances between the agents of law and order (courts, 
advocates, police) are illustrated in the section on 'the Police' (see chapter three). 
There is no evidence of specific police officers having been condemned by the 
Supreme Court or a High Court, in PIL, with the exception of the Nadiad incident 
where the autonomy of the judiciary was under threat. The judiciary's preoccupation 
with its own establishment is reflected in the cases where some accountability of state
 ^ See Sathe, S P, The Right to Know, (N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd, Bombay, 1991).
For example in P Rathinam and another v Union o f  India and another, as discussed in 'Public 
Policy and Administration' in chapter four, the Supreme Court struck down section 309 of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860.
Singh, Chhatrapati, 'Right to Life: Legal Activism or Legal Escapism' in Bhatia, K L (ed) (1989), 
281-290 at 285. He stated:
The point is that the right-to-life-litigation are precisely those cases which have provided the 
judges the opportunity to scrutinise, repeal or amend the colonial laws which deprive the poor 
people of their livelihood.
For an example of the reluctance to assess legislation see the section on Injustices Specific to Women' 
in chapter three for petitions filed challenging the constitutional validity o f the Muslim Women 
^Protection of Rights on Divorce! Act. 1986 and the Muslim Personal Laws (Application! Act. 1937. 
For a listing of the twenty-two laws which had been invalidated, out of the 2311 laws passed, between 
1950 and 1985 see Laws struck down by Supreme Court', Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8 Session 5 Vol 
15, 25/3/86, 170-6.
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functionaries has been ensured/'
The nature of judicial decision making is further revealed as the 
particular needs of tribal and indigenous peoples have not been recognised. 
Constitutionally defined, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward 
Classes have only been extensively discussed in the context of political controversy.'^ 
From cases about slums to resource rights and prisons, reticence is apparent in most 
judgments. Similarly, there are many nuances which the Court has yet to consider. For 
example, while the Court may be concerned with the environmental effects of 
pollution, it has not considered, thus far, the effects on mental health.'^
The litigation on 'Environment and Resources' and 'Urban Space' 
expose the vulnerabilities of PIL as a strategy for social change. Even when orders 
have been given, few have been implemented. It is in the North American styled PIL, 
increasingly prevalent in the Indian Courts, that tangible successes have been 
achieved. The legislative changes providing wide standing provisions to approach the 
courts for environmental and consumer issues, have echoed the trends in the 
courtroom ,as the orders implemented reflect the urban, elite base of the participants 
in PIL.'^ The Court's reluctance to interfere in property relations, consistent since
" In particular see chapter four for S P Sampath Kumar v Union o f India and others AIR 1987 SC 
386 as discussed in 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers' and see D C Wadhwa and others v State o f  Bihar AIR 
1987 SC 579 as discussed in 'Public Policy and Administration'.
See Indra Sawhney and Ors v Union o f India and Ors JT 1992 (6) SC 273 (the Mandai 
judgement) and the other cases on reservation policy in the section on Public Policy and 
Administration'. Also see All Kerala Poor Legal Aid Association v Chief Justice 1990 (1) KLT 1, 
discussed in the section on Judges, Courts, Lawyers'.
It is possible that recourse to law is not considered appropriate, that it is not equipped to appraise 
all the facets, or that judicial priorities are determined. For example, see the discussion o f the court's 
treatment of Olga Tellis and others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and others AIR 1986 SC 180 in 
the section on Urban Space' in chapter four.
See Alternative and Corollary Innovations' in chapter five.
See Bardhan, Pranab, The Political Economy o f Development in India, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1984); Stem, Robert W, Changing India, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) in particular 
chapter three for his discussion o f class.
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independence, has continued in the resolution of PIL matters/^ Judicial decisions 
relating to land and its use, an issue central to many of the 
petitions, have been limited by the stmcture of the constitution, which protects many 
land reform laws from judicial review/^
Certain politically sensitive cases have remained pending, such as those 
relating to sati and police firings.’* Seen in tandem with the reluctance of judges to 
pass orders against individual administrators, police officers or bonded labour keepers, 
this kind of response is part of the concern not to antagonise those in power or to 
affix liability for injustice.’^  However, in policy areas within the ambit of PIL, rather 
than the more narrowly defined SAL, the tendency of the Court to provide the role of 
an “opposition” ®^ has continued. Constitutional provisions have continued to be 
mobilised by the judiciary to provide a critique of the administration.^’ Stuart 
Scheingold's analysis of judicial decision making in the USA - that judges remain 
within liberal-capitalist boundaries, steer clear of allocative problems and take halting.
Any efforts that could have been made have been stymied by the existence o f the Ninth Schedule 
to the Constitution. See chapter two.
. Bina Agarwal, analysing land legislations from a gender perspective, has noted;
the placing of most land reform laws beyond challenge on constitutional ground, through their 
inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, has taken away a major means o f changing the gender-unequal 
land-related legislation still prevailing in many states.
Agarwal, Bina, 'Gender and Legal Rights in Agricultural Land in India', EPW, Vol 30 No 12, 25/3/95, 
A39-A56 at A52. See Baxi Upendra in Shah, Ghanshayam (ed) (1992) at 189 for a discussion o f the 
ninth schedule.
See Chaitanya Kalbagh and another etc v State o f U P  and others, as discussed in 'The Police' 
in chapter three. Petitions filed challenging the constitutional validity of enactments, including those 
documented in 'Injustices Specific to Women' also in chapter three, have not been heard.
It is not just PIL, but other judgements that demonstrate the biases and proclivities of the bench. 
The quick release from Tihar Jail o f the director of the Thapar group of companies has been criticised 
in the context o f other orders of the Supreme Court, see Mahajan, Krishan, 'Legal Perspectives: 
Midnight Judiciary', Hindustan Times, 15/9/86. This analysis persists in additional documentation. See 
Human Rights in India. The updated Amnesty International Report, (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi, 
1993) at 87.
Sudarshan, R (1990) at 57.
■' Baxi, Upendra (1991) at 83. In Robert Stem's table o f major political events in the Indian Union's 
history, from 1947 to 1992, many o f the issues of the 1980's, including the Bofors affair, rising 
communalism and the Mandai commission report, have all been admitted, heard and extensively 
discussed by the Court. Stem, Robert W, (1993) at 181-183.
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incremental initiatives in policy matters - is pertinent for PIL in India/^
Broad themes can be deduced from the case studies. The Court has 
acted to ensure the implementation of statutes, has monitored cases and has repeatedly 
given orders indicating concern for social justice. However, the Court has not acted 
when asked to consider the remit of civil and political rights against the State, in terms 
of army and police action, and has deferred issuing directions that would, in effect, 
redistribute land to provide a broader base of land ownership and control. The 
separation of powers has been respected, and the Court has rarely adjudicated upon 
policy issues, politically sensitive cases or considered economic criteria.
The most persistent theme is the problem of implementation.^^ In many 
instances courts have responded to petitions and the directives given, if realised, would 
certainly have had some effect. One analyst of PIL, writing in 1985, identified three 
possibilities if orders are not implemented: the Court can either initiate proceedings 
for contempt of court, keep the case on file by issuing interim directions and 
monitoring implementation, or award compensation or exemplary costs for the 
violation of fundamental rights.Through the case studies the weaknesses of all three 
options has become apparent. The imperatives of monitoring cases have been exacting 
and difficult to fulfil in all but a few cases. Compensation can be paid, but is not 
mandatory. Awards have therefore been dependent upon the discretion of the Court 
and the propensities of individual judges. Although it is possible to order punishments 
for contempt of court, under the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971,^  ^ there have been few
See Scheingold, Stuart A (1981).
In a study-of the USA, Stuart Scheingold expressed his strongest reservation to PIL their was 
implementation. He identified the potential for delay, the Court's reluctance to assuming administrative 
burdens and the nature o f the opposition as determinants in implementation. Scheingold, Stuart A (1981) 
at 200.
Agrawala, S K (1985) at 40.
See section 12 o f the Act and the discussion of 'Petitioners and Petitions' in chapter five.
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instances where it has been used - or even threatened/^ Occasionally, 
criminal contempt has been mobilised to chastise those who cast aspersions on the 
judiciary and courts/^
Despite the efforts of some judges to ensure that procedures were 
instituted in the courts for the management of letters received as writ petitions, and 
of the rest of the PIL docket, the resultant administrative machinery has proven 
counter productive. The powers of admission and listing vested in the registries have 
often mitigated against the PIL litigant. The manner in which obstacles to gaining 
access to justiee have been removed has determined the profile of PIL to a significant 
extent. Delays continue to be endemic and while the Court has recognised the 
damaging effect of long pendencies on any effort to increase access to justice, it has 
been unable to ameliorate the situation. The PIL petition is not automatically 
prioritised by the courts.
The aspirations, movitations and experiences of the people involved 
provide explanations for many of the questions raised during the study of PIL about 
the changing profile of the litigation, the contrasting nature of many of the judgments 
given, and the varying ways in which PIL has shaped the use of law for social change.
On the rare occasions that civil contempt has been threatened, to elicit implementation, it does 
not appear to have been used. See Common Cause, A Regd Society v Union o f  India & Ors, in the 
section on 'Consumer Issues'. This practice can be noted in petitions filed in the regular manner. For 
example in ML Sachdev v Union o f India & Anr 1990 (2) SCALE 196 [926], the Supreme Court found 
A N Verma, Secretary o f Industry and Company Affairs, guilty o f Contempt of Court, but held, at 928: 
In recent times, instances o f non-compliance with Court's directions have multiplied 
and it is necessary to curb such tendency of litigating parties. We, however, do not propose 
to impose any punishment in view of the offer o f unqualified apology offered in paragraph 8 
of the affidavit but hope and trust that there would be no recurrence o f the conduct.
See the section on 'Judges, Courts, Lawyers', supra. See Sathe, S P, Freedom of Speech and 
Contempt o f Court', The Lawyers, Vol 3 No 10, Nov 1988, 17-19. Also see Kameshwar Prasad 
Sharma, 'Slave' President, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Bihar v State o f  Bihar and others, as discussed in 
'Bonded Labour' in chapter three. For a discussion of the use of contempt powers see Dhavan, Rajeev, 
Only the Good News, (Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1987), 149-157, where he observed at 150- 
151:
The incidence of contempt petitions against those who criticise the judiciary has increased. 
Such petitions linger on to benefit the prestige o f the contemnors. This reflects on the 
vulnerability of the judiciary, its own capacity for over-sensitivity as well as the manner in 
which the judiciary can be trapped by its own processes in an unequal battle with an 
unscrupulous adversary, on the latter's terms.
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Despite the difficulties that were perceptible even during the initial euphoria, there was 
an assumption that the recourse to law is worthwhile/^ Practical difficulties combined 
with disillusionment with legal doctrine have led to a revaluation of the strategy of 
using law. Although PIL was fashioned as a last resort for those unable to bring about 
change elsewhere or by other tactics, it has been considered most effective by those 
who use it strategically. Questions about levels of accountability of petitioners to those 
affected by the petitions, and the mobilisation of these groups, have thus gained 
prominence.^^
The organisational strategy of the petitioners has, both acted for and 
against the successful use of law. Emphasis on using law for political struggle has 
been ultimately disappointing, and, in some instances, may have postponed 
mobilisation at the “grassroots”.^ ® Similarly, the emphasis on legal mechanisms.
A parallel debate that took place within the law and development movement, the literature on 
which is extensive. In particular, see Trubek, David M and Galanter, Marc, 'Scholars in Self- 
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States', 
Wisconsin Law Review, Vol 4, 1974, 1062-1102; Burg, Elliot M, Law and Development: A Review 
of the Literature & a Critique of “Scholars in Self-Estrangement”', The American Journal o f  
Comparative Law, Vol 25 No 3, Summer 1977, 492-530; Snyder, Francis G, 'The Failure o f “Law and 
Development”', Wisconsin Law Review, Vol 1982 No 3, 373-396; Dias, Clarence, Law and the 
Development Process within the Asia-Pacific Reality' in My Rights, Whose Control? A Report o f  the 
Regional Consultation: Asia Pacific Women's Issues, Law and the Development Process, 26-30 August 
1989, New Delhi, (Asia Pacific Forum on Women Law and Development), 1-17. It has been observed 
that:
The evolution of “development law” is motivated, first, by a belief that the great inequalities 
of wealth between, and within. States are offensive to social justice and, secondly, by the 
conviction that law can be used to bring about a change towards greater justice.
Muchlinski, P T, “Basic Needs” Theory and “Development Law”' in Snyder, Francis and Slinn, Peter 
(eds) (1987), 237-270 at at 237. Also see Griffiths, John, 'Is Law Important?', New York University Law 
Review, Vol 54 No 2, May 1979, 339-374.
See Scheingold, Stuart A (1981) at 204-207 for a discussion of law as a political tactic in the 
USA. Marc Galanter has observed, “those who seek change through the courts tend to represent 
relatively isolated interests, unable to carry the day in more political fora”. Galanter, Marc, 'Why the 
“Haves” come out ahead: Speculations on the Limits o f Legal Change', Law and Society, Vol 9 No 1, 
Fall 1974, 95-160 at 135.
See Lukacs, George, 'Legality and Illegality' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, Francis 
(eds) ( 1987), 745-749; Hutchins, Thomas and Klaaren, Jonathon, Public Interest Law Around the World, 
(Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 1992) at 3. Marc Galanter observed:
Although broader in scope than typical legal aid schemes, in crucial ways it replicates the 
prevailing atomistic style. Public interest litigation too is initiated and controlled by elites and 
is responsive to their sense of priorities. It carries no accountability to a specific client 
constituency nor does it imply a sustained commitment to such a constituency. Typically, it
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necessarily a “top-down” approach when using the higher courts, has lessened the 
focus on other ways of holding the state accountable for its actions. At its most 
ineffective, PIL, having graphically exposed the inadequacy of the legal system in 
ensuring justice for all, has provided a justification for the sustenance of, often violent, 
emerging political movements.^^
The legal concerns of the activist have rarely left the scope of a
particularised case. The initial vision that PIL, or more properly SAL, would address
the structure of the courts and legal process has not been realised. Upendra Baxi has
therefore concluded:
while they take every salient problem to courts appellate, they fail to 
regard the problematic of the independence of the judiciary or its 
adequate infrastmcture as problems serious enough to warrant their 
attention.
In these circumstances, all that the managers of the state have 
to do is to allow the SAL, as it were, to run its initial course and to 
deploy the growing internal critique of SAL to eventually de-legitimate 
it .''
Baxi's statement has been borne out. PIL is no longer perceived as a solution, but is 
perceived as an arduous process, forcing involvement in a system that is at best 
unscmpulous, and at worst, threatens the motivation and credibility of both the 
petitioners and their perception of how injustice can be resolved.
Lawyers have been instrumental in the relationship between the PIL 
petitioner and the legal process; innovations are most apparent in the area of 
lawyering. Whilst PIL has been appropriated as another tool in the armoury of some
is an episodic response to a particular outrage. It does not mobilise the victims nor help them 
to develop capabilities for sustained effective use of law.
Galanter, Marc, 'New Patterns of Legal Services in India' in Galanter, Marc, Law and Society in 
Modern India, (OUP, Delhi, 1989), 279-294, at 291. See chapter six.
Parag Kumar Das, editor Boodhbar, interview, Guwahati, 3/6/93. He was referring to Naga 
People's Movement fo r  Human Rights (NPMHR) v Union o f  India and others, as discussed in The 
Armed Forces' in chapter three, and the censorship o f the press in Assam. See Dhavan, Rajeev, 'Means, 
Motives and Opportunities: Reflecting on Legal Research in India', Modern Law Review, Vol 50, Oct 
87, 725-749.
Baxi, Upendra, 'Judicial Discourse: Dialectics o f the Face and the Mask', Journal o f the Indian 
Law Institute, Vol 35 Nos 1&2, Jan-June 1993, 1-12 at 11.
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ambitious lawyers, it has also been used effectively by artful lawyers concerned with 
social change, who are able to manipulate the system. This has extended into local 
areas, where lawyers work alongside social activists, furthering endeavours to ensure 
the implementation of existing laws and court orders.
Thus, the continuing absence of a dependable framework in which a 
concern with poverty and injustice can be discussed and redressed is striking. PIL, 
embodying the benevolent facet of the judiciary, has remained discretionary, 
dependent upon complex bureaucratic procedures and upon the sympathy of judges. 
Usha Ramanathan's description of PIL as “compassionate jurisdiction”^^  seems 
appropriate. Whilst, through PIL the Court has gone some way to recognising the 
victim and acknowledging injustice,^"  ^ one analyst came to a general conclusion that 
“in resolving conflicting interests, the victim all too often becomes an incidental event 
in the law”.^  ^ Moreover, while procedural changes have had an impact, the extent to 
which the ethos of social justice has permeated the orders of the Supreme Court and 
High Courts outside PIL is questionable.
By concentrating on PILs originating in the writ jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court and High Courts, this study has, necessarily, excluded consideration 
of litigation in lower courts.^^ With most litigation in India is concentrated in 
Magistrates' and District and Sessions Courts, it is here that concern for social justice 
also needs to be reflected.^^ The requirements of implementation have ensured that
Ramanathan, Usha, 'Victimology: as if  people mattered', (unpublished paper presented at the First 
Biennal Conference of the Indian Society o f Victimology, Madras, 12-14/8/94), note 62 at 18.
Ibid. at 9-10.
Ibid. at 7.
A few notable exceptions include Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand and others, as 
discussed in 'Urban Space' in chapter four and State (Delhi Administration) v Laxman Kumar, as 
discussed in Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three, which came to the Supreme Court in 
appeal, via an appeal to the High Court.
See Mendelsohn, Oliver, 'The Pathology o f the Indian Legal System', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 
15 No 4, 1981, 823-863; Agarwal (1994) where she documents the obstruction faced to the 
implementation of relatively progressive legislation. Referring to Madhu Kishwar, whose experience 
with PIL is discussed in the section on 'Injustices Specific to Women' in chapter three, Agarwal notes,
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these courts are the site of struggle, for example, for the “barefoot” lawyer filing cases 
following a Supreme Court judgment.^*
The lower courts have a range of precedents set by the Supreme Court 
and High Courts, in PILs, from which to chose. While many orders can be relied upon 
in support of relaxing procedures, others can be referred to when procedures are 
sought to be strictly interpreted. The nature of the influence of PIL on the judicial 
decisions made in lower courts can only be observed in the relaxed standing 
requirements legislated in certain statutes.^^ PIL appears to have had little direct 
impact on the procedures and court rules of the lower courts, with the exception of 
existing statutory procedures mobilised for PIL in district courts. However, the extent 
of this form of legal action has not, as yet, been explored.'*®
PIL has contributed to an increasing awareness of injustice from the 
village to the international community, despite its conduct being the preserve of urban 
elites One result of the measures to increase access, which include legal aid and other 
initiatives, has been the knowledge imparted to some disenfranchised sections of 
society about the existence of rights and remedies, and of the legal process.'** A unique
at 274, “a common tactic is to initiate expensive litigation which few women can financially afford” - 
litigation that is largely conducted in the lower courts. Also see Baxi, Upendra (1987) at 176 where 
he raises the question o f the “wider and sustained diffusion throughout the entire judicial system”, and 
Joseph, George and Desrochers, John, 'Development, Human Rights and Action Groups', (Centre for 
Socil Action, Baangalore, 1985), where it is concluded, at 127:
The success o f PIL as a movement largely depends on how lawyers are able to force the lower 
rungs o f the judiciary to respond to PIL involving the common every day issues o f the poor.
See the discussion of Banwasi Sewa Ashram v State o f  Uttar Pradesh in 'Environment and 
Resources' in chapter four and in Petitioners and Petitions' in chapter five.
Existing statutory provisions have been detailed in chapter two, and changes in standing 
requirements discussed in Alternative and Corollary Innovations' in chapter five.
Gnanapragasam, Legal Resources for Social Action, interview, 12/4/93. See Suryawanshi, 
Nirmalkumar, Social Action Litigation under Section 91 C P C ,  The Lawyers, Vol 2 No 1, Jan 1987, 
20 for details o f a litigation in the Dhule District Court in Maharashtra.
The Self-Employed Women's Association in Ahmedabad, an organisation which has used law 
through PIL and other means, is one example o f an organisation that has learnt from its initially 
litigation-orientated approach:
SEWA, continuing its struggle to open up communication and understanding between the poor 
and the legal system, has tried a two-pronged approach to touch both lawyers and its members.
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insight has been gained into the legal system, and the game of law, together with an 
opportunity to understand how law can be deployed for new constituencies. The 
continuing involvement of both Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice Bhagwati in social 
justice initiatives, after their retirement, echoes the breadth of the influence of PIL. 
While Justice Krishna Iyer, a well-respected figure amongst social and rights activists, 
has concentrated his efforts within India by extending his patronage. Justice Bhagwati 
has become renowned as an international jurist.
The urge to participate on International fora, by manifesting the 
characteristics of a liberal democratic state, continues to inform the initiatives to 
increase access to justice, and to litigate on issues of global concern, in particular, the 
environment. That some issues have received attention outside India, including child 
labour and bonded labour,*^  ^ has encouraged the courts to evince sympathy."^  ^ Just as 
Indian PIL was, in part, informed by PIL in the USA, the Indian Supreme Court's 
activism has resonated throughout South Asia, strengthening the similar use of law in 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.'*'^
In collaboration with the legal aid committee of Gujarat High Court, SEWA brought the two 
groups together twice yearly in an effort to encourage social awareness in lawyers and increase 
rural women's knowledge of how the law has an impact on their lives.
Martens, Margaret Hosmer, 'Experience in organising women in the informal sector in India' in 
Martens, Margaret Hosmer and Mitter, Swasti (eds), Women in Trade Unions. Organising the 
unorganised, (International Labour Office, Geneva, 1994), 127-129 at 129, referring to a study o f  
SEWA by S Selliah.
For a brief study of the activities o f Anti-Slavery International, with whom Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha has established strong links, see Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard, (1992) at 244.
Similarly, the 'Alternative and Corollary Innovations' discussed in chapter five are strengthened 
by similar efforts elsewhere and the increasing attention paid to legal pluralism and interest in 
alternative dispute resolution. For example, see Cappelletti, Mauro, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Processed within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement', Modern Law Review, 
Vol 56, May 1993, 282-296.
See Gomez, Mario, In the Public Interest. Essays on Public Interest Litigation and Participatory 
Justice, (Legal Aid Centre University of Columbo, Columbo, 1993); Tiruchelvam, Neelan and 
Coomaraswamy, Radhika (eds) (1987); Khan, Mansoor Hassan, Public Interest Litigation: Growth o f  
the Concept and its Meaning in Pakistan, (Pakistan Law House, Karachi, 1993). See note 194 in chapter 
six for Bangladesh. Initiatives similar to those in India have taken place worldwide. See Public Interest 
Law Around the World (1992) - also interesting for the links it makes between access to justice and 
foreign funding.
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In spite of this influence, PIL in itself has not become a prominent or 
contentious issue on political fora. For example, little attention has been paid to PIL 
in the Lok Sabha (the Lower House of the Indian Parliam ent).T he extent of this 
disinterest is seen in the writings of former President of India, R Venkataraman, 
whose perceptions were largely shaped by the public focus on the misuse of PIL.'^  ^
Complacent about the potentialities in the law, the legislators have had little reason 
to be wary of the Court's power. The controversy over the Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities (Prevention! Act. 1987 illustrates this. In a judgment in 1994,^ ^^  the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act, which had been criticised by many, 
including the National Human Rights Commission."^  ^ Nonetheless, when it was 
considered politically expedient, the Act was permitted to lapse by the Congress 
Government on May 23, 1995.
The conclusions reached give credence to the argument that the 
dramatic initiatives of the Supreme Court in the early 1980's are an appeasement to 
increasing vocal sections of society. It is at this point that:
One o f the few recorded instances is 'Public interest cases pending in Supreme Court', Lok Sabha 
Debates, Series 7 Session 7 Vol 40, 16/8/83, 54. M J Anthony observed:
So far there have been no vociferous protests in Parliament over this judicial activism. 
Nor has the executive protested against affirmative stance of the judiciary as questioning the 
jurisdiction of the courts would only expose their role.
Anthony, M J, 'Legal scene: Can Supreme Court judges asume role o f law-makers?'. The business and 
Political Observer, 27/11/91.
See Venkataraman, R, My Presidential Years (Indus Harper-Collins, India, 1994) at at 95 and at
521:
The Judge [Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Phillipines] wanted to know about the 
public interest litigation and how it helped justice. I told him that within limits it is a salutary 
system and secured speedy justice to the aggrieved. At the same time this tendency to abuse 
this extraordinary remedy needed to be countered lest it might degenerate into public nuisance 
litigation. 1 said that it was under reasonable control in India and that it had helped to voice 
public grievances which affected the whole or a class of people. There was a pleasant cultural 
show after dinner.
Kartar Singh v State o f Punjab 1994 (Supp) SCALE I. See the discussion on The Armed Forces' 
in chapter three.
Human Rights in India. The updated Amnesty International Report, (Vistaar Publications, New  
Delhi, 1993); 'Nair criticises misuse of TADA', The North East Times, 12/7/94, reprinted in 
Government runs amok in Assam, (Ganatantrik Adhikar Sangram Samiti, Guwahati, Assam, 1994); 
TADA (P) Act must go', PUCL Bulletin, Vol XV No 5, May 1995, 1.
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Analysis of the state helps us to determine to what extent the state is 
an instrument or expression of class rule, to understand the limits of 
dominance and purely through coercion, and to assess the role of law 
in the mediation of economic relationships and class domination/^
The study of PIL provides a microcosm for the study of the entire legal system, and
its relationship with the other institutions of the state. Debates over the suitability of
the existing, formal legal order are most relevant when considered in tandem with the
failure of the legal system to ensure that the rights of Indian citizens are upheld. From
its formal structure and the assumption of rationality in legal reasoning,^® to its day
to day functioning, the legal system has consistently excluded many from its ambit.
Correspondingly, for the state theorist and legal historian alike, PIL may prove to be
the focal point which E P Thompson found in the “Black Act” of 1723, enacted in
Britain, when he concluded that the eighteenth century “provides a text-book
illustration of the employment of law, as an instrument and as ideology, in the
interests of the ruling class’’.^ '
The implicit opposition from the executive, which has consistently 
flouted the orders of the Court, is a major determinant in the evaluation of PIL. As 
the majority of petitions have been filed against the state or one of its functionaries, 
who are then asked to remedy injustices identified by the Court, it is on these that
Part II: State, Law and Ideology - Introduction' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and Snyder, 
Francis (eds) (1987), at 177. See 'Part II: State, Law and Ideology - Introduction' in Ghai, Yash; 
Luckman, Robin and Snyder, Francis (eds) (1987), at 177-182 for a brief but useful introduction to 
readings from Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci. Also see Cain, Maureen and Hunt, Alan, Marx and 
Engels on Law, (Academic Press, London, 1979).
Ranajit Guha's observations of the relationship between the peasant in colonial India and writing 
remains relevant when examining legal reasoning, because of its dependence on the written word:
He had leamt, at his own cost, that the rent roll could deceive; that the bond could keep him 
and his family in almost perpetual servitude; that official papers could be used by clerks, 
judges, lawyers and landlords to rob him of his land and livelihood. Writing was thus, to him, 
the sign of the enemy
Guha, Ranajit, Elementary Aspects o f Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, (Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1983) at 52. Also see Tigar, Michael and Levy, Madelaine, Law and the Rise o f  Capitalism, 
(Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977). For an introductory discussion of the Indian state, and its 
formation, see Mitra, Subrata Kumar, 'Between transaction and transcendence: The state and the 
institutionalisation o f power in India' in Mitra, Subrata Kumar (ed). The Post-Colonial State in Asia, 
(Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1990), 73-99.
See Thompson, E P, Capitalism and the Rule of Law' in Ghai, Yash; Luckman, Robin and 
Snyder, Francis (eds) (1987), 57-69.
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attention must be focused. While it cannot be generalised for the whole of India, Jan
Breman's study based in Gujarat provides pertinent insight into the administration:
legal measures such as the regulations on dismissal, right to work, 
health insurance etc. which might provide real protection for the large 
part of the rural population of India which depends upon income from 
wage labour, either does not exist or exists only on paper, for example 
the rulings on minimum wages and working hours, equal pay for men 
and women and the prohibition of child labour. ... There is a general 
complaint that the landowning class arranges the work in such a way 
as to frustrate the realization of the object[ive] of these special 
regulations and provisions. That they succeed so well in doing so is 
partly due to the indisputable fact that the members of the middle and 
higher castes fill the executive positions in the regional government 
apparatus, and, for that matter, in the whole of social life.^^
In this instance, ineffective trade union intervention amongst contract workers in
Gujarat, has contributed to the conditions in which such workers live.^  ^ Interviews
conducted during fieldwork have supported Mendelsohn's conclusion, as petitioners
and lawyers have repeatedly expressed their disaffection with restrained and inefficient
administration.^'^
However, elucidation of the judicial function in PIL has enabled some 
judges to begin to transcend the role ascribed to the judiciary, within the scheme of
Breman, Jan, O f Peasants, Migrants and Paupers. Rural Labour Circulation and Capitalist 
Production in West India, (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985) at xxii.
”  Patel, Sujata, 'Contract Labour and Public Interest Litigation', (1983) 18 EPW 2151-2153 at2151.
This has led to a malaise where they become recalcitrant in their efforts to ensure the 
implementation of favourable court orders by petitioning lower courts. For example, referring, amongst 
others, to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjit Roy v State o f  Rajasthan, as discussed in Labour' 
in chapter three, Nikhil Dey observed:
The fact that every court decision has consistently held that workers on government 
employment programmes including Famine Relief Works must be covered by the notification, 
and that paying less than the minimum wage would be a violation o f the workers fundamental 
rights seems to have been ignored by the State Government once again. The worker will have 
to approach the court to obtain a decision he/she has obtained several times before. The cost 
of this effort and delay to the worker is self-evident.
Dey, Nikhil, 'Minimum Wages in Rural Employment Programmes: The Legal Status' in Gianchandani, 
Deepak (ed). Minimum Wages in Government Sponsored Rural Employment Programmes, (Institute of 
Development Studies, Jaipur, 1991), 36-45 at 45. Also see Banwasi Sewa Ashram v State o f  Uttar 
Pradesh 1986 (4) SCC 753 as discussed in Environment and Resources' in chapter four and Petitions 
and Petitioners' in chapter five.
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governance, through “the articulation of social contradictions”.^  ^Thus, the rights upon 
which the legitimacy of the government is based, were to provide the space in which 
PIL was to emerge, and endure.^^ The experiences garnered through the 1980's have 
led some to seek more viable ways to resolve injustice, thus providing a point of 
appraisal for judges, lawyers, activists, funders, courts and issues.
While judges have been at the centre of PIL, the control of judicial 
appointments has remained a fundamental obstacle to stabilising this articulation. 
What has endured is the preoccuption with the judicial function and a continuing 
deliberation on judicial review and legal decision making, which has had import for 
all forms of litigation.^^ Whatever its shortcomings, PIL has highlighted the need for
See Baxi, Upendra, 'On the Problematic Distinction between “Legislation” and “Adjudication”: 
A Forgotten Aspect o f Dominance', Delhi Law Review, Vol 12, 1990, reprint, 1-15. Thus, the tension 
between the rhetoric o f legal equality and human rights in the Constitution, and its poor reflection in 
reality, has provided the leverage needed by judges and petitioners to extend the realm of law to those 
previously unrepresented in legal, or even political, fora:
If constitutional phrases mask the reality o f the practices o f power, they also remain 
important for struggles for justice. The extraordinary thing about Constitutions is that 
their rhetoric often provides potential to avenge the practices of powers; constitutional 
discourse, in its historic moments o f articulation, structures both modes of legitimation 
o f power and its delegitimation as well. Constitutional discourse is not simply a 
register o f dominance; it also marks sites o f resistance to domination.
Baxi, Upendra (1991) at 77. Similar conclusions have been reached by Joseph, George and Desrochers, 
John, (1985) and in Dhavan, Rajeev and Partington, Martin, 'Co-optation or Independent Strategy? The 
Role of Social Action Groups' in Cooper, Jeremy and Dhavan, Rajeev, Public Interest Law, (Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), 235-260, in which the “new” entitlements that would emerge are discussed.
S P Sathe's statement epitomises the excitement of the early days o f PIL:
Gone are the days when the court's main occupation was right to property. Today's court is 
more concerned about violations of rights 
Sathe, S P, Legal Activism, Social Action and Government Lawlessness', Cochin University Law 
Review, [(198?)]++, 362-382 at 369. In a thorough analysis of the foundations of modem law, Tigar 
and Levy observed contradictions o f relevance to the study of PIL in India:
to assert that the eventual justification o f legal ideology is in economic self-interest does not 
mean that there is a direct and immediate relationship between each element of legal ideology - 
or even each individually expressed command - and the economic self-interest o f a particular 
group. To the contrary, it is precisely the contradictions between ideology and self-interest that 
permit insurgent groups to win partial and temporary victories within the parameters of existing 
law.
Tigar, Michael and Levy, Madelaine, Law and the Rise o f  Capitalism, (Monthly Review Press, New  
York, 1977) at 288.
57 George Gadbois noted that in the area of prison reform and prisoners' rights,
the court seems to have succeeded not only in placing prison reform on the nation's agenda of  
problems that need to be addressed, but in setting standards for how prisoners must be treated. 
In other words, the court appears to be acting in advance o f the more political branches in
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structural change in the distribution of resources, such as land, and the need for 
administrative and political will to bring about the necessary changes. It has 
contributed to national and international endeavours to provide universal access to 
justice. The Indian legal system can no longer be as deliberately and comprehensively 
exclusionary as it was before.
making prison-related public policy.
Gadbois, George H, The Supreme Court o f India as a Political Motivation' in Dhavan, Rajeev; 
Sudarshan, R and Khurshid, Salman (eds) (1985), 250-267 at 256. Concern has been voiced about the 
extent of judicial action. See Anthony, M J, 'Legal scene: Can Supreme Court judges assume role o f  
law-makers?'. The Business and Political Observer, 27/11/91. While commenting on the letter petition 
regarding adoption {Laxmi Kant Pandey v Union o f India in the section on 'Children' in chapter three), 
Anthony noted:
Parliament has failed to pass a comprehensive law on adoption so far, and every attempt to do 
so had floundered on hurdles set up by vested interests in each community. Where Parliament 
had failed the Supreme Court has succeeded, though the rules it has passed cover only a 
limited area of adoption - only that of Indian children adopted by foreign parents.
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Appendices
Appendix A 
Excerpts from the Constitution of India
Part III: Fundamental Rights
Article 12 
Definition.-
In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” includes the Government 
and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States 
and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of 
the Government of India.
Article 13
Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.-
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement 
of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, 
shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any 'law which takes away or abridges the rights 
conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, 
to the extent of the contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, 
notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the 
force of law;
(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature 
or other competent authority in the territory of India before the 
commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, 
notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not 
be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.
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[(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution 
made under Article 368]
Article 14
Equality before law.-
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection 
of the laws within the territory of India.
Article 15
Prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of 
birth.-
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any 
of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to-
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public 
entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort 
maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use 
of the general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision 
for women and children.
[(4) Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from 
making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.]
Article 16
Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.-
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to 
employment or appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of 
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect 
of, any employment or office under the State.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, 
in regard to a class or classes of employment or employment to an office [under the 
Government, or any local or other authority within, a State of Union territory, any 
requirement as to residence within that State of Union territory] prior to such 
employment or appointment.
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(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the 
reservation of appointment or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, 
in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the 
State.
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the 
incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or 
denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a 
person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.
Article 17
Abolition of Untouchability.-
“Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The 
enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence 
punishable in accordance with law.
Article 18 
Abolition of titles.-
(1) No title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the 
State.
(2) No citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign state.
(3) No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall, without the 
consent of the President, accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from 
or under any foreign State.
Article 19
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.-
(1) All citizens shall have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; [and]
(f) [* * * *]
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing 
law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in 
the interests of [the sovereignty and integrity of India,] friendly relations with foreign
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State, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence].
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of [the sovereignty and integrity of India or] public order, 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of [the sovereignty and integrity of India or] public order 
or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by the said 
sub-clause.
(5) Nothing in [sub-clauses (d) and (e)] of the said clause shall affect the operation 
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, reasonable restriction on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the 
said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the 
interests of ny Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restriction on the exercise 
of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular [nothing in the 
said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, 
or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any 
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled 
by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the 
exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise].
Article 20
Protection in respect of conviction for offences,-
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force 
at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to 
a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the offence.
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.
(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against 
himself.
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Article 21
Protection of life and personal liberty.-
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.
Article 22
Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.-
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, 
as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to 
consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the 
nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the 
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate 
and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the 
authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply-
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for 
preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person 
for a longer period than three months unless-
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are 
qualified to be appointed as. Judges of a High Court has reported 
before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in 
its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Providing that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention 
of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made 
by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law 
made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law 
providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as 
may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made 
and shall afford ham the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the 
order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is 
referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against 
the public interest to disclose.
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(7) Parliament may by law prescribe-
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in
which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months 
under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the 
opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub­
clause (a) of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes
of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; 
and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under 
sub-clause (a) of clause (4).
Article 23
Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.-
(1) Traffic in human beings and hegar and other similar forms of forced labour are 
prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law.
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service 
for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any 
discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class in any of them.
Article 24
Prohibition of employment of children in factories etc.-
No child below the age of fourteen Years shall be employed to work in any factory 
or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment.
Article 25
Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.-
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provision of this Part, 
all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to 
profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the 
State from making any law-
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other 
secular activity associated with religious practice;
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(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu 
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of 
Hindus.
Explanation /.-The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be 
included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation //.-In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall 
be construed including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist 
religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed 
accordingly.
Article 26
Freedom to manage religious affairs.-
Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or section 
thereof shall have the right-
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable
purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immoveable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
Article 27
Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion. - No person 
shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically 
appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any 
particular religion or religious denomination.
Article 28
Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain 
educational institutions.-
(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly 
maintained out of State funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is 
administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust 
which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognised by the State or 
receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious 
instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship 
that may be conducted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may
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be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached there to unless such 
person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto.
Article 29
Protection of interests of minorities.-
(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof 
having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve 
the same.
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained 
by the State of recieving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, language or any of them.
Article 30
Right of minorities, to establish and administer educational institutions -
(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
(1 A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of 
an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in 
clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such 
law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the 
right guaranteed under that clause.
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against 
any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a 
minority, whether based on religion or language.
Article 31A
Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc. -
(1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in article 13, no law providing for
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the 
extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or
(b) the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a 
limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper 
management of the property, or
(c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest 
or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations, or
(d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents, 
secretaries and treasurers, managing directors or managers of corporations, or 
of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or
(e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any
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agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning any 
mineral or mineral oil or the premature termination or cancellation of any such 
agreement, lease or licence, 
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away 
or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19:
Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the 
provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved 
for thee consideration of the President, has received his assent:
Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the 
State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under 
his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of 
such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time 
being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, 
unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides 
for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value 
thereof.)
(2) In this article:
(a) the expression “estate” shall, in relation to any local area, have the same 
meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law 
relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include
(i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of (Tamil 
Nadu) and Kerala, any janmam right;
(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement;
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary 
thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings 
and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and 
village artisans;)
(b) the expression “rights” in relation to an estate, shall include any rights 
vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-bolder, (raiyat, 
under-raiyat) or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of 
land revenue).
Article 31B
Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.-
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31A none of 
the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions 
thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that 
such Act, Regulation or provision in inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any 
of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any 
judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said 
Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal 
or amend it, continue in force.
Article 31C
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Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy 
of the State towards securing (all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV) shall 
be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or 
abridges any of the rights conferred by (article 14 or article 19); and no law 
containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in 
question in any court on thee ground that it does not give effect to such policy:
Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of 
this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the 
consideration of the President, has received his assent.
Article 32
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part -
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto 
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights 
conferred by this Part.
(3) without prejudice to thee powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) 
and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local 
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court 
under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise 
provided for by this Constitution.
Article 33
Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to 
forces, etc.-
Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this 
part shall, in their application to,
(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or
(b) The members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order; or
(c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation established by the State for 
purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence; or
(d) persons employed in, or in connection with the telecommunication systems set up 
for the purposes of any force; bureau or organisation referred to in clauses (a) to
(c) be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of the duties and 
the maintenance of discipline among them.
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A rticle 34
Restriction on rights conferred by this Part while martial law is in force in any area.- 
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, Parliament may by 
law indemnify any person in the service of the Union or of a State or any other person 
in respect of any act done by him in connection with the maintenance or restoration 
of order in any area within the territory of India where martial law was in force or 
validate any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, forfeiture ordered or other act done 
under martial law in such area.
Article 35
Legislation to give effect to the provisions of this Part.- 
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution
(a) Parliament shall have, and the Legislature of a State shall not have, power to make 
laws
(i) with respect of any of the matters which under clause (3) of article 16, 
clause (3) of article 32, article 33 and article 34 may be provided for by law 
made by Parliament; and
(ii) for prescribing punishment for those acts which are declared to be offences 
under this part;
and Parliament shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this 
Constitution, make laws for prescribing punishment for the acts referred to in 
subclasses (ii).
(b) any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in the 
territory of India with respect to any of the matters referred to in sub-clause (i) of 
clause (a) or providing for punishment for any act referred to in sub-clause (ii) of that 
clause shall, subject to the terms thereof and to any adaptations and modifications that 
may be made therein under article 372, continue in force until altered or repealed or 
amended by Parliament.
Explanation - In this article, thee expression “law in force” has the same meaning as 
in article 372.
Part IV: Directive Principles of State Policy
Article 36
Definition - In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” has the 
same meaning as in Part III.
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A rticle 37
Application of the principles contained in this Part.-
The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the 
principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these prineiples in making laws.
Article 38
State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people.-
(1) The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by seeuring and 
protecting as effectively as it may a social order in whieh justice, social, economic and 
political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income and 
endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only 
amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or 
engaged in different voeations.
Article 39
Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.- The State shall in particular, 
direct its policy towards securing
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood;
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to subserve the common good;
(c) that the operation of thee economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment;
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;
(e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of 
children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter 
avocations unsuited to their age or strength;
(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner 
and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are proteeted 
against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.
Article 39A
Equal justiee and free legal aid.-
The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a 
basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular provide free legal aid, by suitable 
legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing 
justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
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A rticle 40
Organisation of village panchayats.-
The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such 
powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of 
self-government.
Note: See the 64th Amendment.
Article 41
Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases.- 
The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make 
effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance 
in case of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of 
undeserved want.
Article 42
Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.-
The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and
for maternity relief.
Article 43
Living wage, etc., for workers.-
The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation 
or in any other way, to all workers agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living 
wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of 
leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall 
endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural 
areas.
Article 43A
Participation of workers in management of industries.-
The State shall take steps, by suitable legislation or in any other way, to secure the 
participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishments or other 
organisations engaged in any industry.
Article 44
Uniform civil code for the citizens.-
The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout 
the territory of India.
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A rticle 45
Provision for free and compulsory education for children.-
The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the 
commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children 
until they complete the age of fourteen years.
Article 46
Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes and other weaker sections.-
The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of 
the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Caste and the 
Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of 
exploitation.
Article 47
Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to 
improve public health.-
The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living 
of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, 
in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, 
except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious 
to health.
Article 48
Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry.-
The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modem 
and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the 
breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught 
cattle.
Article 48A
Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life 
- The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard 
the forests and wild life of the country.
Article 49
Protection of monuments and places and objects of national importance.
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It shall be the obligation of the State to protect every monument or place or object of 
artistic or historic interest, (declared by or under law made by Parliament) to be of 
national importance, from spoliation, disfigurement, destruction, removal, disposal or 
export, as the case may be.
Article 50
Separation of judiciary from executive.-
Tbe State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public 
services of the State.
Article 51
Promotion of international peace and security.- 
Tbe State shall endeavour to
(a) promote international peace and security;
(b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of 
organised people with one another, and
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.
Part IVA: The Fundamental Duties
Article 51A 
Fundamental duties.-
It shall be the duty of every citizen of India -
(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National 
Flag and the National Anthem;
(b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national struggle for 
freedom;
(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India;
(d) to defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so;
(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people 
of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to 
renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women;
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(f) to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture;
(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers, wild 
life and to have compassion for living creatures;
(h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform;
(i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence;
(j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so 
that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement.
Part V: The Union
Chapter IV - The Union Judiciary
Article 136
Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court -
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion 
grant special leave to appeal from any judgement, decree, determination, sentence or 
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory 
of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgement, determination, sentence or 
order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating 
to the Armed Forces.
Part VI - The States
Chapter V - The High Courts In The States 
Article 226
Power of High Courts to issue certain writs-
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(1) Nonwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have the power, 
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any 
person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those 
territories direction, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the 
enforcement of rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue direction, orders or writs to any 
Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising 
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or 
in part, arises for the exercise of such power, nonwithstanding that the seat of such 
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or 
stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition 
under clause (1), without -
(a) furnishing to such parties copies of such petition and all documents in 
support of the plea for such interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard;
makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes 
a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or 
the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a 
period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which 
the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High 
Court is closed on the day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards 
on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the 
interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of 
the said next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of 
the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.
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Appendix B - PIL Guidelines
Supreme Court of India: Guidelines to be followed for entertaining 
letters/petitions received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation
No petition involving individual/personal matter to be entertained as a PIL 
matters except as indicated hereinafter.
Letter-petitions falling under the following categories alone will be ordinarily 
be entertained as Public Interest Litigation:-
(1) Bonded labour matters
(2) Neglected children
(3) Non-payment of minimum wages to workers and exploitation of casual 
workers and complaints of violation of labour laws (except in individual cases)
(4) Petitions fi*om jails complaining of harassment for pre-mature release and 
seeking release after having completed 14 years in jail, death in jail, transfer, 
release on personal bond, speedy trial as a fundamental right
(5) Petitions against police for refusing to register a case, harassment by police 
and death in police custody
(6) Petitions against atrocities on women, in particular harassment of bride, bride- 
burning, kidnapping etc.
(7) Petitions complaining of harassment or torture of villagers by co-villagers or 
by police from persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
and economically backward classes
(8) Petitions pertaining to environmental pollution, disturbance of ecological 
balance, drugs, food, adulteration, maintenance of heritage and culture, 
antiques, forest and wildlife and other matters of public importance
(9) Petitions from riot-victims
(10) Family pension
All letter petitions received in the PIL Cell will first be screened in the Cell and only 
such petitions as are covered by the above-mentioned categories will be placed before 
a Judge to be nominated by Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for directions after which 
the case will be listed before the bench concerned. To begin with only one Hon’ble 
Judge may be assigned to this work and the number increased to two or three later 
depending on the workload.
Cases falling under the following categories will not be entertained as Public 
Interest Litigation and these may be returned to the petitioners or filed in the PIL Cell 
as the case may be.
(1) Landlord-Tenant matters
(2) Service matters and those pertaining to Pension and Gratuity
(3) Complaints against Central/State Government Departments and Local Bodies
except those relating to item Nos. (I) to (10) above
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(4) Admission to medical and other educational institutions
(5) Petitions for early hearing of cases pending in the High Courts and 
Subordinate Courts
In regard to the petitions concerning maintenance of wife, children and parents, the 
petitioner may be asked to file a Petition under sec. 125 of Cr.P.C. or a Suit in the 
Court of competent jurisdiction and for that purpose to approach the nearest Legal Aid 
Committee for legal aid and advice
NEW DELHI 
December 1, 1988
Chief Justice of India 
(P N Bhagwati)
E S Venkataramiah
Sabyasachi Mukharji
Ranganath Misra
G L Oza
B C Ray
M M Dutt
K N Singh
S Natarajan
M H Kania
Guidelines for the Admission of Letter Petitions as Writ Petitions, 
Bombay High Court
1) Where a letter petition makes a grievance in respect of the life or personal 
liberty of the writer or anyone else, it should ordinarily be treated as a writ 
petition.
2) Where a letter petition makes a grievance in respect of the life or personal 
liberty of the writer or anyone else, it should ordinarily be treated as a writ 
petition.
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Provided that a letter petition containing a grievance made on behalf 
of a class of persons may not ordinarily be treated as a writ petition unless the 
class of persons is a deprived class which does not have easy access to legal 
assistance.
3) Where a letter petition makes a grievance that would not properly be the 
subject matter of a writ petition, it should not be treated as a writ petition.
4) Where a letter petition makes a grievance that would properly be the subject 
matter of a writ petition but the grievance is not made on behalf of a class of 
persons and is not such that a class of persons would be interested in its 
redressai, the letter petition should ordinarily not be treated as a Writ Petition. 
Such a letter should be referred to a legal aid cell.
5) A letter petition containing a grievance that would properly be the subject 
matter of a Writ Petition may be treated as a Writ Petition even though it 
contains a grievance of an individual, if the individual is not in a position to 
have easy access to legal assistance, as for example, if he is in jail.
6) All such letter petitions whether received by individual Puisne Judges or by the 
Office shall be forwarded to the Public Grievances Cell of the Office for 
scrutiny. The letters so received shall be entered in a ledger by the cell.
7) The Public Grievances Cell shall classify the various letter petitions and shall 
endorse on each letter petition whether it should be treated as a Writ Petition 
or whether it should be rejected. The cell shall annex to each letter a very brief 
summary of the grievance contained in the letter.
8) Whenever the Public Grievances Cell suggests that the letter petitions should 
be treated as a Writ Petition it should endorse whether it should be considered 
on the Original Side or the Appellate Side and who, in its view, should be 
made the respondents.
9) All letter petitions shall after classification by the Public Grievances Cell, be 
placed before the Chief Justice or such other Judge or Judges as the Chief 
Justice may appoint for consideration of the recommendation of the Public 
Grievances Cell.
10) If the Chief Justice or the other Judge or Judges appointed by him for this 
purpose are of the view that the letter petition should be treated as a Writ 
Petition, the letter petition shall be numbered as a Writ Petition.
11) The letter petition shall thereafter be placed on board of the learned Judge or 
Judges assigned the work of considering Writ Petitions for admission. A notice 
shall be sent by the office to the petitioner as well as the respondents of the 
date on which the letter petition would be placed on board for admission.
12) If admitted, the letter petition shall thenceforth be treated in every respect as 
a writ petition.
13) Where a letter petition which is proposed to be admitted as a Writ Petition 
claims to be on behalf of a class of persons, such letter petition should be 
advertised in newspapers by the Court in the same manner as in the case of 
any other representative action.
14) The Court shall appoint a lawyer to represent the petitioner in such cases. The 
Court may direct such a lawyer to file a detailed affidavit in support of the 
petition.
15) A Judge who desires to have a news item in a news-paper or periodical or any 
such reported grievance to be treated as a Writ Petition should forward this
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request to the Chief Justice for consideration.
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